Signed Freiherr v. Weichs.
Before turning to the next page I should merely like to direct Your Honors' attention to the fact that von Weichs there speaks of the employment of Bulgarian troops.
JUDGE CARTER: Can you advise us, Mr. Denney, as to the meaning of this word "Freiherr?"
MR. DENNEY: "Freiherr", yes, Your Honor, I believe it is a title of nobility. Is that not right, Dr. Laternser? A title that would be similar to Count, or Duke. I am not familiar with the various titles of nobility. Is that right, Dr. Laternser?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
MR. DENNEY: Still on page 1 of the German, but on page 2 of the English, or rather on page 2 of the German too, we have a communication of 20 June 1944, which is from the Commander in Chief Southeast, High Command Army Group F, both being the same person, namely, the defendant von Weichs, and this is addressed to the Oberkommando Wehrmacht, Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab, Wehrmacht Operations Staff, and has reference to a communication which von Weichs has sent to them under early date No. 4450. The subject of this operation again is "Operation Klissura", and it states:
Enclosed please find copies
1.) Statements of the Greek citizens, Kitsis, Tripis, Papakristos and Manos, all residents of the village of Klissura, as certified by the German Consulate General in Saloniki. Both records are the basis for the teletype from Envoy Neubacher to the Foreign Office which has been submitted to you.
2.) Report of the Commander of SS-Panzer Regiment 7, dated. 3.6.44. And that is the report referred to in the earlier communication which we have read, but it bears the later date of 6 July.
3.) Comment of Corps Group Saloniki dated 12.6.
4.) Comment of High Command Army Group E dated 14.6.44.
And the Court's attention is directed here to the channel of command through which these various papers relating to this incident came up to von Weichs from Army Group E, and from the 7th Corps to Army Group E and from the 7th Panzer Regiment SS to the Corps Group Saloniki.
The report of the Commander of SS Panzer Regiment 7 differs markedly from the statements of the inhabitants of the village:
The Regiment Commander reports that the village was taken by assault with the employment of heavy weapons. In contrast to that the village residents state that the combat actions against the Red Adnartes did not touch village itself. They further state that after the Red Andartes her been driven out of the area around the village, the village was searched without further incidents by sections of a German detachment, and that only after a certain time had elapsed and without combat action did further sections of the German troops appear and proceed against the population of the village in the manner known.
On the basis of the comment of Army Group E the Commander in Chief Southeast believes that the accusations made by the Greeks are to be rejected. as groundless by reason of the statements of the Commander of the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7.
It is recalled to attention again that there must be strict observance of the orders on the execution of reprisal measures that were issued in agreement with Envoy Neubacher.
Copies of the report and of the comments have been submitted directly to Envoy Neubacher.
Signature For the Commander in Chief Southeast (High Command Army Group F) Chief of the General Staff Winter (signature) And down at the lower left there is a note, After dispatch Ia/F Order on reprisal measures Department Ia/F No. secret.
22.12.43, to be brought to attention in a suitable way in accordance with the paragraph preceding the last.
And on page 3 of the German and page 4 of the English, the communication of 12 June 1944, which is referred to in the earlier letter. This is the report from the Group Saloniki to the High Command of Army Group E, and the reference Number 6299 of May 18, is called to the Count's attention, and the subject is "Operation Klissura", to "High Command Army Group E."
Enclosed we are submitting another report of the Regimental Commander of the SS-Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7.
The statements of the residents of the villages of Klissura show that the male population were evacuated from the village on the day in question and only women and children remained. On the other hand it is a fact that the soldiers were shot at from the village, that is, from its near vicinity. The regimental commander of course could not know of the withdrawal of the male population. The tactical measure carried out by him to break resistance by using all available weapons in order to avoid unnecessary losses was correct and no accusation can be made against him for that. It can therefore be assumed with certainty that the majority of the women and children lost their lives while the village was under fire and not later when the village was being combed through. It may be correct that in individual cases during the combing through women were fired upon also as some statements of the residents indicate. But in evaluating this incident one must take into consideration the emotion of the soldiers during combat on the one hand and on the other hand that of the population during interrogation.
It may he absolutely correct that in some cases mistakes were made by the soldiers; but it is hardly probable that the detachment more or less murdered the women or children who lost their lives.
I personally know SS-Standartenfuehrer Schumers as a particularly severe superior. Often measures taken by him are draconically hard. But he is always considerate of the welfare of his men and his actions are motivated by this attitude.
The report of the regimental commander makes it clear that the events in Klissura do not represent a reprisal measure but that they were combat actions during a pursuit fight.
And there is a certification to the left as to the correctness of the copy by a Major, and the rank of Pflugradt was Generalleutnant. The Major's signature is illegible.
And the next document in this connection is a report from the SS Panzer Grenedier Regiment 7, with reference to the operation Klissura, and it is made by the Regimental Commander of this Regiment, dated 3 June 1944.
"Two convoys of the I/7 were attacked on the ridge of the Klissura pass on 5.5.1944. This attack cost the lives of 8 men of the I/7. Seven were more or less heavily wounded."
Some of the corpses were entirely disrobed and cruelly mutilated, and ly in a row in the street. This is how I and the sections of my regiment employed in the liberating of the pass found the place of attack.
After receiving information of the attack I myself went to the place of attack with a combat group in order to combat and perhaps pursue the bandits. Considerable detachments of the Bulgarian military stationed near Klisura also participated in the engagement to free the pass. After relatively minor resistance, the bandits preferred withdrawal in a Southwest direction to the village of Klisura taking along their wounded, their weapons and 1 motorcycle. I ordered the immediate and ruthless pursuit of the fleeing bandits.
The bandits stopped at the outskirts of the village of Klisura and resisted anew. They shot with rifles, machine guns and mortars at my units pressing after them. In order to avoid further losses I ordered the advance to halt and ordered that all heavy weapons be brought into position. Brought into action were: 1 trench mortar platoon (6 barrels), 1 light infantry gun platoon (4 light infantry guns), 1 half platoon, 2 centimeter anti-aircraft, 2 groups heavy machine guns (4 heavy machine guns). Then I gave the order to open fire ruthlessly on Klisura. Since I was unable to locate exactly the firing positions of the enemy trench mortars, the firing was directed over the entire village of Klisura. After about 30 minutes observation showed that the bandits had ceased firing and many persons, among them women and children also, were leaving Klisura for a forest situated in a southwesterly direction. I now ordered the advance on the village of Klisura. Even at that time individual shots still were fired from Klisura. Klisura itself was taken by assault. I could not prevent the killing of women and children also during the firing and assault on Klisura, because Klisura had to be taken by assault.
That in the shooting and storming of Klisura women and children lost their lives is regrettable and was in the overall situation not to be avoided.
The enclosed interrogations show beyond doubt that the bandits had occupied Klisura before as well as after the attack. I further believe the interrogation of the Greek tailor Christos Kitsis shows that this man must have been right at the place of attack at the time even if he did not participate in it, for Kitsis gives exact details regarding the attack in his interrogation. I personally know the entire terrain, and it is inexplicable to me how Kitsis was able to observe the details of the attack at a distance of 2.5 kilometers - the population of Klisura was kept in the village by guards. I notice in particular the fact that Kitsis was able to recognize at a distance of 2½ kms. that the two motorcyclists were attacked with a hand grenade which was thrown by an Italian.
As stated at the beginning of this report Bulgarian military also participated in the assault on Klisura. These people voluntarily had attached themselves to my units during the advance and after the capture of Klisura they were the first to break into the houses in which Communists known to them resided. I am not in a position to say whether the events actually took place as the interrogations state. After the capture of Klisura I ordered the burning down of houses from which fire had come and which the Bulgarian militia designated as residences of Communists.
This was done.
In the evaluation of this incident I ask that it be taken into consideration the humanly understandable feelings of my men and of the Bulgarian militia aroused by the sight if their cruelly murdered commrades at the Klisura pass.
Signed Schumers SS-Standartenfuhrer and Redigmental Commander And it is certified to be a true copy.
And next is a communication of 25 May 1944 from the foreign office. It bears the receipt stamp of High Command Army Group F, and Commander in chief Southeast, for 26 May 1944, and it also bears an arrival stamp over on the right for the same date.
And then at the left in the heading is, "For submission to the Chief WFST (Wehrmachtfuehrungestab) Via VO Ag Ausland (Foreign Office Liaison.)
"Copy.
"The Foreign Office forwards the following telegraph report from the Special Plenipotentiary Southeast, Envoy Neubacher, under Pol I M 1138 Top Secret dated 20.5.44. The report is dated 15.5."
"Rapid investigation and information as to its outcome is requested." And then over to the left is typed on this, "Commander in Chief Southeast with the request for speedy investigation and report of the results.
By order of (signature illegible)" "Subject:
The Blood Bath of Clissure."
Your Honors attention is directed to the fact that this comes from Envoy Neubacher who is the German representative down there and the Special Plenipotentiary Foreign Office Southeast, to whom Weichs first communication in this series, the one of 6 July was directed.
According to the reports previously submitted to me on 5 April 215 inhabitants of the village Clissura in the area of Saloniki, mostly women, children and old men, were killed and 27 people wounded. The allegedly was done by order of the Commander of an SS regiment from Saloniki. This action constitutes a most serious infraction of an order on reprisal measures issued by the Commander in Chief Southeast issued with my agreement on the basis of the Fuehrer directive dated 29 October 1943.
Reports available up to now show that among the dead were 9 babies less than 1 year old:
29 children from 1 to 5; 39 old people between 60 and 90.
The competent military authorities are investigating this on the basis of the present report - senseless and irresponsible excess.
The preliminary report of our Consulate General indicates to me that German trucks were shot at by partisans at a distance of about 2½ km from the village on April 4th. No losses occurred. 2 German motorcyclists were allegedly killed later by hand grenades thrown by an Italian of the same group of partisans at the same spot. The motorcycles are said to have been brought to Clissura. As happens daily in numerous villages partisans had been quartered overnight in the village itself.
Partisans surrounded the village and forbade the inhabitants to leave the village and to use the pasture. After the last partisans withdrew on 5 April at about 1400 hours the adult men left the village, because repeatedly in North Greece and elsewhere too it happened that our side proceeded with mass shootings of the male population after the partisans had left. The men went to a neighboring village to a monastery. Women, children and old men were......
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, could I ask that the Prosecution read this a bit more slowly in order to enable us to follow what is being said?
MR. DENNEY: Do you have a German copy there?
DR. LATERNSER: Yes.
(note - continue reading)
almost the only ones to remain. The slaughter of those who were left began approximately at 1600 hours, and allegedly was stopped later by intervention of a Wehrmacht officer. I do not know the number of houses burned down.
The village priest was shot with his wife on the street. The house of a Greek captain fighting on our side with a group fighting the partisans was burned. All the relatives of a tailor who had worked for many years for the Consulate General in Saloniki were killed.
In view of the necessity of advancing final operations in the population, the political effects or such incidents are catastrophic. It is utter insanity to murder babies, children, women and old men because heavily armed Red bandits billeted themselves overnight by force in their houses and because they killed 2 German soldiers near the village. The political effect of this senseless blood bath doubtless far exceeds the effect of all propaganda efforts in our fight against Communism.
No matter what the end result of the investigation may be the operation against Clissura represents a severe transgression of existing orders. The shining result of this heroic deed is, it is true, that babies are dead. But the partisans continue to live and they will find quarters again with machine pistols in completely defenseless villages. It is a further fact that it is much more comfortable to shoot to death extirely harmless women, children and old men than to pursue an armed band with a manly desire for vengeance and to kill them to the last man. The use of such methods must necessarily lead to the demoralization of a genuine combat morale.
I shall follow up this affair on the basis of the Fuehrer directive dated 29 October 1943. The Reich Foreign Minister is requested by me today to inform the highest competent military authorities of my attitude and in the interest of our foreign policy in this area to ask for a most thorough investigation."
And down at the bottom is handwritten:
"you bet we'll do it!"
And handwritten over to the right:
"M has been informed that F has asked a very thorough investigation."
And on page 12 English and page 8 of the German, a communication dated 16 May 1944. This is a teletype and it appears on a teletype blank, and it bears the receipt stamp at the bottom of Army Group F, for the 19 May 1944, and this teletype is signed by Neubacher, the Special Plenipotentiary Southeast of the Foreign Office for the Southeast, and it is directed to the Commander in Chief Southeast, General Field Marshal von Weichs, Belgrade.
And it also has to do with the "Blood Bath of Klissure," and I should like to call Your Honors attention to the fact this term "Blood Bath of Klissure" is theirs, not our.
"What ever the result of the investigation may he regarding the reprisal action against babies, children, women and old men, executed in the area of Saloniki, as far as I am concerned it was certainly a flagrant violation of the directions issued by the Commander in Chief Southeast. The principles of these directions were agreed upon with me. I state further that this senseless irresponsible operation has done great political harm which will become greater the more the news of this incident, which frequently is not even believed today, becomes public.
On the basis of the Fuehrer directive dated 29. October 1943, I request the Commander in Chief Southeast to instigate a strict investigation.
Considering the political importance of this affair I have submitted a preliminary report to the Reich Foreign Minister of which I shall inform the Commander in Chief Southeast in Belgrade.
Special Plenipotentiary Southeast (Signed) Neubacher And down written at the bottom is the words:
"What is this?" "Probably puffed up," Then on page 10 of the German and page 13 of the English is a communication of 20 April 1941, which has to do with the statement of the Greek tailor Kitsis, which was referred to in an earlier report.
As I recall there is reference to this in the report from the Commanding officer of the 7th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, page 7 of the English and page 5 of the German "Saloniki 2--April 1944," and this also has Enclosure 1 to the Commander in Chief Army Group E, from the lower units.
"The Greek tailor Christos Kitsis known here for many years appeared today at the office of the Consulate General to make the following statement regarding the incidents in the village of Klissura on the 4th or the 5th of April 1944. These statements are supported by the statement of the principal of the primary school in Klissura Aristotelus Jovas.:
Communist bands who had been in the village of Klissura several times before appeared again on Tuesday, 4 April, towards evening and took billets there. Some days previously the Germans had left. The farmer Andreas Panajotopulos, who at present is a captain with the Pulos Group, had the last guard duty in the village. The night was quiet. The next morning 2 German trucks drove from Kastoria to Amynteon. The road Klissura - Amynteon is about 2½ km distant from the village of Klissura. Both German trucks were shot at by the insurgents from that spot of the road closest to the village. But they continued on their way. Later a German motorcycle with 2 German soldiers passed the same spot. An Italian who now belongs to the Communist bands, threw hand grenades at the German soldiers; four of them were killed. The Andarts brought the motorcycle to Klissura. At that time the village was perfectly quiet. In the village itself the Andartes had left guards behind. The population was not permitted to leave the village. After the Andartes had left (about 1400) all male inhabitants left the village due to fear of German reprisal measures.
The men found refuge partly in the monastery of Panajia and partly in the village of Varikos (a Bulgarian village).
"That means that only women, children and old men remained. German troops arrived in the village about 1600 hours and searched the houses. There were no incidents, no weapons were found. Immediately afterwards an SS detachment appeared and shot women and children to death partly in the houses, cartly on the farms. Furthermore, houses were set on fire.
According to my knowledge the number of dead is 215, primarily women children and old men: and there are 27 wounded. Among the dead were 3 old men who met the arriving detachment and were asked to show the German Wehrmacht the houses in which the Andantes had been billeted the night before. After the 3 old men had pointed out these houses they were shot to death. The village priest and his wife were shot on their ways to the monastery. The house of Captain Andreas Banajotopulos also was burned down.
"According to my knowledge the Nomarch of Florina has made an extensive report of this incident to the Governor Genera 1 of Saloniki.
"The village inhabitants believe that this incident of the insurgents occupying the village occurred with the purpose of causing the male inhabitants of the village to go to the mountains together with the insurgents"--and there is a pencilled note there: (very characteristic; this method is used frequently by farmers.)
"I note that there never were any Communist elements in Klissura. All my relatives, including a 75 year old uncle, lost their lives in this.
"This statement was confirmed by the Greek teacher Georgies Tripies, who also comes from Klissura. He was present during the making of the report."
And then there is a further statement which is also enclosed which starts on page 11 of the German, page 15 of the English.
"In regard to the incident in Klissura on the 5th of April of this year the Greek citizens Spyres Papchristos and Nikoaos Manos make the following statements: these statements were referred to in the earlier communications.
"When the village inhabitants, ourselves included, woke up on Wednesday April 5th they found that there were insurgents outside the village. They surrounded the village and forbade anyone to leave the village. Even the herds might not be driven to the pasture. One detachment of the insurgents marched off in the direction of the road Kosani - Amynteon. The first rifle fire was heard in the village between 9:30 and 10:00. The combat seemingly took place on the main road which was 2½ km distant from the village. Two German a trucks could be seen on this road. These however, seemed to have escaped the attack. They continued friving in the direction of Amynteon. A combat between Bulgarian volunteers and the bands developed about 2½ kilometers on the other side of the main road."
"According to my knowledge one insurgent was shot there and 3 to 4 wounded. Shortly after the 2 trucks had disappeared a German motorcycle appeared moving in the same direction. It is alleged that an Italian with the insurgents attacked the motorcycle with had grenades and that the drivers were killed. The fighting was broken off about 1300 o'clock. The insurgents moved off in the direction of Profiti Elias touching the edge of the village of Klissurea. After they had gone the guards around the village were also removed whereupon the male inhabitants of the village went away in order to find refuge in the monastery and in a neighboring Bulgarian village. Immediately afterwards the Bulgarians together with a German detachment moved into Klissura. They had pushed forward from the village of Verga. Meanwhile it had become about 1400 o'clock. They started the searching of houses which took place without incident. Some time later machine gun fire could be heard coming from the direction of the forest.
A detachment of about 25 German motor vehicles from Amynteon arrived about 1530 o'clock. Although the village was perfectly quiet the shooting started immediately. 5 men, among them 3 old men, who led the Germans through the village were let go then and shot to death from behind. Women and children were shot in houses and yards whereupon the houses were set on fire. We do not know the exact number of losses since there are still some dead under the ruins.
"I, Spyres Papachristos, was told by my son that a German officer belonging to the unit arriving from Verga attempted to order these shootings stopped."
"Although he does not understand German, the behavior of the officer made him think so. Shortly afterwards the firing of a flare gave geh signal to stop the shootings. The detachment left again about 1930 hours. The village priest with his wife was shot to death on the street near his apartment.
"The Secretary of the Society of the Residents of Klissura, Elias Jovas, submitted a list of the casualties ascertained on the first day (5 April). In regard to the appearance of the insurgents he remarked that these probably surrounded the village during the night. The fact was that the people learned of the surrounding of the village only when dawn name. There never had been Communist elements among the residents of Klissure, he said."
And over on page 14 of the original, page 13 of the German, page 18 of of the English, is a list of the victims of Klissura as of 5 April 1944, the total number 215, and the various age groups are listed there. Again Your Honors will note it ranges from under 1 year of age to people who are between 85 and 90; and I would again like to direct the Court's attention to the first page of the exhibit, the comments of the defendant Weichs in his letter of 6 July 1944 to envoy Neubacher, the last sentence of the first para graph:
"I conscientiously believe that a further following up of this matter would meet with no success."
Turning now to page 15 in the English -- or in the German, page 21 in the English, Document NOKW 081 -- page 14 in the German and page 19 in the English -- excuse me, Your Honors --Document NOKW --081, which is offered as prosecution exhibit 483, this is a one page report from the Commander-in-Chief Southeast (High Command Army Group F, dated 16 July 1944, referring to the action at Distomon.
Now, this reference number here of 4506 is the same reference number that was used in communication from the Commander in Chief Southeast of 6 July 1944 with reference to the Klissura action and it is the same number which was used in the communication of 20 June 1944 to the Wehrmacht, Oberkommando Wehrmacht, the Wehrmacht Operation Staff, that communication again being from the Commander in Chief Southeast by his Chief of Staff.
The same file number is on the report of the Commanding Officer of the 7th Panzer Grenadier SS Regiment on page 5 of the English, page 4 of the German. That report is dated 3 June 1944.
This is from Oberkommando Suedost in Army Group F, that is, the Commander-in-Chief Army Group F to OKW/WFSt.
"Reference: Commander in Chief Southeast High Command Army Group F Ic/A O No.4506 Secret of 20 June 44. Subject: Occurrences during combat at Distomon."
" According to combat reports of the 7th SS Tank Infantry Regiment" -- and, if Your Honors please, I would like to submit this to the interpreter. This is the same unit. Still they translate it as a "Panzer Graradier Regiment."
It is the first line of the letter, Mr. Jacobsohn.
INTERPRETER JACOBSOHN: It is the same unit.
MR. DENNEY: "According to combat reports of the 7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the village Distomen was attacked during a skirmich with insurgents on the road Lewadia-Amfissa on 10 June and after the mopping up of the village 250 to 300 dead persons, suspected of geing bandits and relatives of bandits were counted.
According to another report received from an NCO of the Secret Field Police"-and that, if Your Honors please, is the Geheime Feldpolize, of which we have heard before -- "belonging to the Secret Field Police Group 510 which participated in the operation, Distomon was reached without combat whilst combats with the insurgents only began at Stiri (5 kilometers southeast of Distomon) and the inhabitants of Distomon were shot to death after termination of the operation Stiri when the troops came back. According to this latter report, in contrast to the report of tho unit, it was a question of a reprisal measure. When interrogated by Corps Judge of the LXVIII Corps, the NCO of the Secret Field Police upheld his first statement in every detail. The Corps Headquarters of the LXVIII Corps has ordered that the Commander of the 4th SS Panzer Grenadier Division be examined with regard to tho false official report which was made knowingly.
"According to information available up until now, there is a striking parallel to occurrences in Klisura which also concerns the SS 7th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. After the submission of the results of the examination, a supplementary report by Corps Headquarters of the LXVIII Corps remains withheld.
"The Special Plenipotentiary of tho Foreign Office who requested explanations of the occurrences is informed of tho contents of the reports available up to now.
"According to a report of Radio Cairo, in the Greek language, on 15 July, Hull commented at a press conference on the occurrences in Distomon."
The initial "R" and at tho bottom is typed, "Commander in Chief Southeast (High Command Army Group F" Ic/Army High Command No.5298 of 16 July 44" and it is certified to by an illegible signature "Colonel in the General Staff."
And, if Your Honors please, the reference to Hull which is here made, it is submitted, refers to the then Secretary of State of the United States Cordell Hull, who will appear in a later document.
The 68th Corps which is referred to here is the Corps of the defendant Felmy and the Special Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office who is referred to here is the Neubacher with whom we have been familiar before.
Turning then to page 15 of the German, page 21 in the English Document NOKW-467, which is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 494 in evidence this is a series of detailed reports covering the period June to December 1944 and one of January 1945 with reference to the prior exhibit, the action in the Greek town of Distomon.
The first communication is from the Commanding Officer of the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7, the same Standartenfuehrer and Regimental Commander who wrote the earlier report, von Schuemers, dated 21 July 1944. It's addressed to the Commanding General of the 68th Corps and bears a stamp up at the right with reference to an enclosure, one, to the Army, that is, the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, the small stamp; and then there is a receipt stamp from the 68th Corps dated 23 July.
"Subject: Events in Distomon on 10 June 1944. Reference: Order by the Commanding General 9.7.1944" -- that is the 9th of July -- and it is addressed to the Commanding General of the 68th Infantry Army Corps, who was at that time the defendant Felmy.
"The investigation ordered regarding the events at Distomon on 10 June 1944 has been accomplished. The Regiment herewith submits for your information:
"Interrogations of the SS leaders of that company participating in the events at Distomon.
"Comment of the battalion commander "A statement by Corporal Koch of the Secret Field Police."
And that again, if Your Honors please, refers to the "Geheime Feldpolizei."
"Investigations were made to clarify the following points in particular:
"1) Does the shooting to death of the 12 prisoners who were exceedingly suspected of being bandits represent a breach of the Fuehrer order regarding the treatment of PWs?
"2) Were reprisal measures against the village of Distomon justified and was the company commander empowered to order such measures to be taken?
"3) What factual errors and inexactitudes are contained in the combat report of the committed company and how can such deviations from the actual occurrences be explained?"
And then the report continues:
"On the basis of the results of the investigation, the regiment submits the following comment on the individual points of the investigation:
"To 1" -- and that has to do with whether or not the shooting to death of 12 prisoners who were exceedingly suspected of being bandits represented a breach of the Fuehrer order regarding the treatment of prisoners of war -- "The sequence of events regarding the shooting to death of the 12 prisoners is clarified by the interrogation of the SS Obersturmfuehrer Weichenrieder. They were men who were either suspected or convicted of belonging to bands. Since they attempted to escape while being arrested, they had in their possession parts of uniforms and detonation equipment, they were brought to Distomon as prisoners and were guarded by an entire group. As this group had to be employed except for one man and in addition attention seemed to have been diverted by the arrival of the company after the skirmish, these 12 prisoners attempted to escape. Some of them even succeeded in reaching a vegetable plot nearby.
"The use of arms in preventing the escape was a military necessity. The prisoners were shot while trying to escape.
"A procedure for negligent guarding of prisoners would have been the consequence if arms had not been used.
"The statements of Caporal Koch of the Secret Field Police do not contradict this description. Koch states explicitly that he was looking after the wounded interpreter Theo of the Secret Field Police during that period.
According to his own statement, some of his statements regarding some details of the events in Distomon are not based on observations of his own.
"Summarizing the above, one may say that there was no transgression against the Fuehrer order regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. Rather convicted, or at least exceedingly suspicious bandits were shot to death during an attempted escape. The shootings did not fall within the framework of reprisal measures."
Then with reference to "2", this has to do with whether or not reprisal measures against the village of Distomon were justified and whether the Company Commander was empowered to order such measures to be taken, and I would just like to direct your Honor's attention again to these questions and the second question: "Were reprisal measures against the village of Distomen justified?"
"The interrogation of the Company Commander SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach offers an impressive picture regarding the cooperation of the civilian population with the bandits. The guilt of the inhabitants of Distomon is proven by their assurances when questionned, that there are no bandits in the vicinity, while actually bands are in readiness at a distance of 500 meters. The inhabitants must have noticed this under any circumstances. During this interrogation SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach at length explains the reasons why, as a soldier, he not only believed himself to be justified but even considered it his duty to take immediate measures.
"Tho regiment - in complete accordance with SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach - is convinced that the competent authorities would have ordered reprisal measures against Distomon. This would have meant renewed enemy resistance and attacks and it would have meant a high fuel consumption because of the required large amount of troops. One should also consider the argument that immediate measures are considerably more effective than those taken at a later period."