"The Greek tailor Christos Kitsis known here for many years appeared today at the office of the Consulate General to make the following statement regarding the incidents in the village of Klissura on the 4th or the 5th of April 1944. These statements are supported by the statement of the principal of the primary school in Klissura Aristotelus Jovas.:
Communist bands who had been in the village of Klissura several times before appeared again on Tuesday, 4 April, towards evening and took billets there. Some days previously the Germans had left. The farmer Andreas Panajotopulos, who at present is a captain with the Pulos Group, had the last guard duty in the village. The night was quiet. The next morning 2 German trucks drove from Kastoria to Amynteon. The road Klissura - Amynteon is about 2½ km distant from the village of Klissura. Both German trucks were shot at by the insurgents from that spot of the road closest to the village. But they continued on their way. Later a German motorcycle with 2 German soldiers passed the same spot. An Italian who now belongs to the Communist bands, threw hand grenades at the German soldiers; four of them were killed. The Andarts brought the motorcycle to Klissura. At that time the village was perfectly quiet. In the village itself the Andartes had left guards behind. The population was not permitted to leave the village. After the Andartes had left (about 1400) all male inhabitants left the village due to fear of German reprisal measures.
The men found refuge partly in the monastery of Panajia and partly in the village of Varikos (a Bulgarian village).
"That means that only women, children and old men remained. German troops arrived in the village about 1600 hours and searched the houses. There were no incidents, no weapons were found. Immediately afterwards an SS detachment appeared and shot women and children to death partly in the houses, cartly on the farms. Furthermore, houses were set on fire.
According to my knowledge the number of dead is 215, primarily women children and old men: and there are 27 wounded. Among the dead were 3 old men who met the arriving detachment and were asked to show the German Wehrmacht the houses in which the Andantes had been billeted the night before. After the 3 old men had pointed out these houses they were shot to death. The village priest and his wife were shot on their ways to the monastery. The house of Captain Andreas Banajotopulos also was burned down.
"According to my knowledge the Nomarch of Florina has made an extensive report of this incident to the Governor Genera 1 of Saloniki.
"The village inhabitants believe that this incident of the insurgents occupying the village occurred with the purpose of causing the male inhabitants of the village to go to the mountains together with the insurgents"--and there is a pencilled note there: (very characteristic; this method is used frequently by farmers.)
"I note that there never were any Communist elements in Klissura. All my relatives, including a 75 year old uncle, lost their lives in this.
"This statement was confirmed by the Greek teacher Georgies Tripies, who also comes from Klissura. He was present during the making of the report."
And then there is a further statement which is also enclosed which starts on page 11 of the German, page 15 of the English.
"In regard to the incident in Klissura on the 5th of April of this year the Greek citizens Spyres Papchristos and Nikoaos Manos make the following statements: these statements were referred to in the earlier communications.
"When the village inhabitants, ourselves included, woke up on Wednesday April 5th they found that there were insurgents outside the village. They surrounded the village and forbade anyone to leave the village. Even the herds might not be driven to the pasture. One detachment of the insurgents marched off in the direction of the road Kosani - Amynteon. The first rifle fire was heard in the village between 9:30 and 10:00. The combat seemingly took place on the main road which was 2½ km distant from the village. Two German a trucks could be seen on this road. These however, seemed to have escaped the attack. They continued friving in the direction of Amynteon. A combat between Bulgarian volunteers and the bands developed about 2½ kilometers on the other side of the main road."
"According to my knowledge one insurgent was shot there and 3 to 4 wounded. Shortly after the 2 trucks had disappeared a German motorcycle appeared moving in the same direction. It is alleged that an Italian with the insurgents attacked the motorcycle with had grenades and that the drivers were killed. The fighting was broken off about 1300 o'clock. The insurgents moved off in the direction of Profiti Elias touching the edge of the village of Klissurea. After they had gone the guards around the village were also removed whereupon the male inhabitants of the village went away in order to find refuge in the monastery and in a neighboring Bulgarian village. Immediately afterwards the Bulgarians together with a German detachment moved into Klissura. They had pushed forward from the village of Verga. Meanwhile it had become about 1400 o'clock. They started the searching of houses which took place without incident. Some time later machine gun fire could be heard coming from the direction of the forest.
A detachment of about 25 German motor vehicles from Amynteon arrived about 1530 o'clock. Although the village was perfectly quiet the shooting started immediately. 5 men, among them 3 old men, who led the Germans through the village were let go then and shot to death from behind. Women and children were shot in houses and yards whereupon the houses were set on fire. We do not know the exact number of losses since there are still some dead under the ruins.
"I, Spyres Papachristos, was told by my son that a German officer belonging to the unit arriving from Verga attempted to order these shootings stopped."
"Although he does not understand German, the behavior of the officer made him think so. Shortly afterwards the firing of a flare gave geh signal to stop the shootings. The detachment left again about 1930 hours. The village priest with his wife was shot to death on the street near his apartment.
"The Secretary of the Society of the Residents of Klissura, Elias Jovas, submitted a list of the casualties ascertained on the first day (5 April). In regard to the appearance of the insurgents he remarked that these probably surrounded the village during the night. The fact was that the people learned of the surrounding of the village only when dawn name. There never had been Communist elements among the residents of Klissure, he said."
And over on page 14 of the original, page 13 of the German, page 18 of of the English, is a list of the victims of Klissura as of 5 April 1944, the total number 215, and the various age groups are listed there. Again Your Honors will note it ranges from under 1 year of age to people who are between 85 and 90; and I would again like to direct the Court's attention to the first page of the exhibit, the comments of the defendant Weichs in his letter of 6 July 1944 to envoy Neubacher, the last sentence of the first para graph:
"I conscientiously believe that a further following up of this matter would meet with no success."
Turning now to page 15 in the English -- or in the German, page 21 in the English, Document NOKW 081 -- page 14 in the German and page 19 in the English -- excuse me, Your Honors --Document NOKW --081, which is offered as prosecution exhibit 483, this is a one page report from the Commander-in-Chief Southeast (High Command Army Group F, dated 16 July 1944, referring to the action at Distomon.
Now, this reference number here of 4506 is the same reference number that was used in communication from the Commander in Chief Southeast of 6 July 1944 with reference to the Klissura action and it is the same number which was used in the communication of 20 June 1944 to the Wehrmacht, Oberkommando Wehrmacht, the Wehrmacht Operation Staff, that communication again being from the Commander in Chief Southeast by his Chief of Staff.
The same file number is on the report of the Commanding Officer of the 7th Panzer Grenadier SS Regiment on page 5 of the English, page 4 of the German. That report is dated 3 June 1944.
This is from Oberkommando Suedost in Army Group F, that is, the Commander-in-Chief Army Group F to OKW/WFSt.
"Reference: Commander in Chief Southeast High Command Army Group F Ic/A O No.4506 Secret of 20 June 44. Subject: Occurrences during combat at Distomon."
" According to combat reports of the 7th SS Tank Infantry Regiment" -- and, if Your Honors please, I would like to submit this to the interpreter. This is the same unit. Still they translate it as a "Panzer Graradier Regiment."
It is the first line of the letter, Mr. Jacobsohn.
INTERPRETER JACOBSOHN: It is the same unit.
MR. DENNEY: "According to combat reports of the 7th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the village Distomen was attacked during a skirmich with insurgents on the road Lewadia-Amfissa on 10 June and after the mopping up of the village 250 to 300 dead persons, suspected of geing bandits and relatives of bandits were counted.
According to another report received from an NCO of the Secret Field Police"-and that, if Your Honors please, is the Geheime Feldpolize, of which we have heard before -- "belonging to the Secret Field Police Group 510 which participated in the operation, Distomon was reached without combat whilst combats with the insurgents only began at Stiri (5 kilometers southeast of Distomon) and the inhabitants of Distomon were shot to death after termination of the operation Stiri when the troops came back. According to this latter report, in contrast to the report of tho unit, it was a question of a reprisal measure. When interrogated by Corps Judge of the LXVIII Corps, the NCO of the Secret Field Police upheld his first statement in every detail. The Corps Headquarters of the LXVIII Corps has ordered that the Commander of the 4th SS Panzer Grenadier Division be examined with regard to tho false official report which was made knowingly.
"According to information available up until now, there is a striking parallel to occurrences in Klisura which also concerns the SS 7th Panzer Grenadier Regiment. After the submission of the results of the examination, a supplementary report by Corps Headquarters of the LXVIII Corps remains withheld.
"The Special Plenipotentiary of tho Foreign Office who requested explanations of the occurrences is informed of tho contents of the reports available up to now.
"According to a report of Radio Cairo, in the Greek language, on 15 July, Hull commented at a press conference on the occurrences in Distomon."
The initial "R" and at tho bottom is typed, "Commander in Chief Southeast (High Command Army Group F" Ic/Army High Command No.5298 of 16 July 44" and it is certified to by an illegible signature "Colonel in the General Staff."
And, if Your Honors please, the reference to Hull which is here made, it is submitted, refers to the then Secretary of State of the United States Cordell Hull, who will appear in a later document.
The 68th Corps which is referred to here is the Corps of the defendant Felmy and the Special Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office who is referred to here is the Neubacher with whom we have been familiar before.
Turning then to page 15 of the German, page 21 in the English Document NOKW-467, which is offered as Prosecution Exhibit 494 in evidence this is a series of detailed reports covering the period June to December 1944 and one of January 1945 with reference to the prior exhibit, the action in the Greek town of Distomon.
The first communication is from the Commanding Officer of the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7, the same Standartenfuehrer and Regimental Commander who wrote the earlier report, von Schuemers, dated 21 July 1944. It's addressed to the Commanding General of the 68th Corps and bears a stamp up at the right with reference to an enclosure, one, to the Army, that is, the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, the small stamp; and then there is a receipt stamp from the 68th Corps dated 23 July.
"Subject: Events in Distomon on 10 June 1944. Reference: Order by the Commanding General 9.7.1944" -- that is the 9th of July -- and it is addressed to the Commanding General of the 68th Infantry Army Corps, who was at that time the defendant Felmy.
"The investigation ordered regarding the events at Distomon on 10 June 1944 has been accomplished. The Regiment herewith submits for your information:
"Interrogations of the SS leaders of that company participating in the events at Distomon.
"Comment of the battalion commander "A statement by Corporal Koch of the Secret Field Police."
And that again, if Your Honors please, refers to the "Geheime Feldpolizei."
"Investigations were made to clarify the following points in particular:
"1) Does the shooting to death of the 12 prisoners who were exceedingly suspected of being bandits represent a breach of the Fuehrer order regarding the treatment of PWs?
"2) Were reprisal measures against the village of Distomon justified and was the company commander empowered to order such measures to be taken?
"3) What factual errors and inexactitudes are contained in the combat report of the committed company and how can such deviations from the actual occurrences be explained?"
And then the report continues:
"On the basis of the results of the investigation, the regiment submits the following comment on the individual points of the investigation:
"To 1" -- and that has to do with whether or not the shooting to death of 12 prisoners who were exceedingly suspected of being bandits represented a breach of the Fuehrer order regarding the treatment of prisoners of war -- "The sequence of events regarding the shooting to death of the 12 prisoners is clarified by the interrogation of the SS Obersturmfuehrer Weichenrieder. They were men who were either suspected or convicted of belonging to bands. Since they attempted to escape while being arrested, they had in their possession parts of uniforms and detonation equipment, they were brought to Distomon as prisoners and were guarded by an entire group. As this group had to be employed except for one man and in addition attention seemed to have been diverted by the arrival of the company after the skirmish, these 12 prisoners attempted to escape. Some of them even succeeded in reaching a vegetable plot nearby.
"The use of arms in preventing the escape was a military necessity. The prisoners were shot while trying to escape.
"A procedure for negligent guarding of prisoners would have been the consequence if arms had not been used.
"The statements of Caporal Koch of the Secret Field Police do not contradict this description. Koch states explicitly that he was looking after the wounded interpreter Theo of the Secret Field Police during that period.
According to his own statement, some of his statements regarding some details of the events in Distomon are not based on observations of his own.
"Summarizing the above, one may say that there was no transgression against the Fuehrer order regarding the treatment of prisoners of war. Rather convicted, or at least exceedingly suspicious bandits were shot to death during an attempted escape. The shootings did not fall within the framework of reprisal measures."
Then with reference to "2", this has to do with whether or not reprisal measures against the village of Distomon were justified and whether the Company Commander was empowered to order such measures to be taken, and I would just like to direct your Honor's attention again to these questions and the second question: "Were reprisal measures against the village of Distomen justified?"
"The interrogation of the Company Commander SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach offers an impressive picture regarding the cooperation of the civilian population with the bandits. The guilt of the inhabitants of Distomon is proven by their assurances when questionned, that there are no bandits in the vicinity, while actually bands are in readiness at a distance of 500 meters. The inhabitants must have noticed this under any circumstances. During this interrogation SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach at length explains the reasons why, as a soldier, he not only believed himself to be justified but even considered it his duty to take immediate measures.
"Tho regiment - in complete accordance with SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach - is convinced that the competent authorities would have ordered reprisal measures against Distomon. This would have meant renewed enemy resistance and attacks and it would have meant a high fuel consumption because of the required large amount of troops. One should also consider the argument that immediate measures are considerably more effective than those taken at a later period."
"No doubt that SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach has gone beyond the limits of the orders for reprisal measures. However, he did not do so because of negligence or ignorance of the orders, or in a form which might be considered insubordination. Rather he believed that, in accordance with his duty and responsibility, he had fulfilled by the measures he ordered the sense of the reprisal order, even if he had transgressed the text.
"The communist bands in general are proceeding now not only to form rifle women formations but are also using women and children for espionage purposes, as communication agencies, because they have confidence in German humanitarianism which sometimes turns to softness. They train them for acts of sabotage and for throwing bombs (see i.e. Regimental reports on the enemy situation dated 10.6.44 and .7.7.44). The Company commander thought he would have to make an example in such a clear case of civilians belonging to a band, as happened in Distomon.
"Whereby the occupying power would prove with all clearness that it also know how to counteract the meanest and most vicious "warfare". If one side continously disregards the laws of warfare and international law, it necessarily forces the other side to employ measures going beyond the usual framework of soldierly, combat between two chivalrous adversaries.
"Though I appreciate SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach's idea from a soldierly end human point of view, I request to be permitted to punish him by disciplinary action, since "I cannot approve of his acting independently because on his own he overstepped the bounds which were laid down by order of superior authority."
Then with reference to the third point which is contained in the initial paragraph of the communication from the Regimental Commander of the 7th Panzer Grenadier Regiment.
"What factual errors and inexactitudes are contained in the combat report of the committed company, and how can such deviations from the actual occurrence be explained.
"From the combat report submitted by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach the regiment immediately appreciated that SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach had exceeded his orders. On the other hand it was clear that he had done so, gladly taking upon himself the responsibility. The regiment believed it had to cover SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach. His procedure seemed to be merely a transgression against formality and corresponded to a natural soldierly feeling, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach who is one of the best company commanders of the regiment was to be guarded against incriminating himself with insubordination in his combat report. That is why the regiment suggested changing the form of some individual paragraphs of the combat report. Statements pertaining to losses of the enemy and our own remain unchanged. However SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach unhappily changed the location of the fire attack in order to explain, to justify and to give the reasons for his reprisal measures, which were inwardly justified but which did not correspond to the text of the orders.
"In this manner, the combat report does not correspond in all points to the actual course of events. In regard to this also, I request permission to call SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach to account. The suggestion of the regiment not to incriminate himself was misunderstood and misinterpreted by him after he realized he was not authorized to give the reprisal order.
"In consideration of the sacrifices which the regiment had to accept in a relatively large measure in its present area, I request that the matter rest with the disciplinary punishment of the case and not to direct further measures.
In an understandable emotion, caused by the sad fate of their comrades, and 2nd Company, a unit particularly young and eager for combat, has made mistakes. The Company Commander was also in error. The regiment believed it ought to cover and excuse this action for reasons explicitly given above.
"Since the mistakes in the combat report are not due to any base motives, I again request permission to handle it by disciplinary proceedings."
Then there is a signature, which is illegible, of SS-Standartenfuehrer and Regimental Commander. Handwritten at the bottom, dated 22 July, 1944. The year does not appear, there appears:
"I agree to the procedure suggested by the SS-Standartenfuehrer and Regimental Commander."
And it is signed, "Felmy", and this is written in his own hand.
Then on page 19 of the German, page 26 of the English, is a report from the Third Battalion of the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment No. 7, which is dated 20 July 1944, and over on the right is the statement.
"2 enclosures to Commander-in-Chief Southeast/ 1c No. 5924/44" These are minutes of an investigating officer, made by one SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Heske, SS Regimental Provost Marshal, recorded by SS Unterscharfuehrer Hillebrand:
"The person named below appeared by order of regimental commander. He was informed of the subject of the investigation and the legal consequences of untrue statements, and was interrogated as follows:
"1. Personal:
"I am Georg Weichenrieder, 24. I am on active SS leader and SSObersturmfuehrer. I am a platoon leader in the 2nd SS Pz. Grenadier Regiment 7. I am married and childless. I am a believer in God. I have no criminal record."
Now this man Weichenrieder is the one who is referred to in the letter from the regimental commander of the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment to General Felmy, Commander of the 68th Corps, and that communication is dated 21 July 1944.
The reference to Weichenrieder is on page 22 of the English, and page 15 of the German.
Subject matter:
"I gave the order to fire on the 18 Greeks attempting to escape, who were thoroughly suspect of belonging to bandits. The contents of the combat report of the 2nd SS Pz. Grenadier Regiment 7, dated 11.6. 1944 are correct. They are incomplete, or rather inexact, only inasmuch as the attempted escape took place in two different localities. The combat report does not express that clearly.
"First, 6 men shot to death in the area of the Palioklisi Ridge. The remaining 12 were captured. These 12 men attempted their escape in Distomen as parts of the company returned to Distomen on their way back from a reconnaissance mission to Stiri. It is probable that the arrestees considered this moment propitious for their attempt to escape. Only I guard was available to guard the 12 prisoners since he was the only one remaining from the original Guard Group after the rest of the men of this group had to be employed for combat tasks. Two of the 12 prisoners had already escaped to behind the house in front of which they were guarded. 3 others were even able to reach a nearby vegetable plot. The in part almost successful attempt to escape could only be interpreted as proof and admission of membership of a band. Since I had been charged with the responsibility to guard these bandits I was obliged to stop their escape by opening fire on the fugitives.
"Thus, it was not a matter of shooting to death within the framework of any reprisal measures, but it was rather a military necessity to prevent the escape of prisoners who had been recognized as bandits."
It is certified to by, "Heske, and a signature SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer and SS Regimental Provost Marshal". On the left:
"This has been read to me, approved, signed, Weichenrieder, SS- Obersturmfuehrer."
On the next page, which is page 20 of the German, page 28 of the English, is a further report by the investigating officer:
"SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Heske, SS Regimental Provost Marshal.
"Recorded by: SS-Unterscharfuehrer Hillebrand.
"The person named below appeared by order of regimental commander. He was informed of the subject of the investigation and the legal consequences of untrue statements, and was interrogated as follows:
"1. Personal:
I am Fritz Lautenbach, 27. I am an active SS leader and SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer. I am a Company Commander of the 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7. I am unmarried. I am a believer in God. I have no criminal record.
"2. Subject Matter:
I am acquainted with the orders pertaining to the treatment of prisoners and reprisal measures. I concede to not having followed them exactly in all points.
"The following considerations constitute the reasons for my procedure. Accompanying circumstances showed beyond all doubt that the assistance extended to the bands by the civilian population of Distomon was the only cause of our own losses. The competent authorities would also have subsequently ordered reprisal measures in accordance with orders. The execution of these reprisal measures would have necessitated sending a strong mission with corresponding high fuel consumption to Distomon at a later time. These troops in their turn would have had to count with enemy resistance and consequently with casualties of their own. In fact, on other occasions, there was particularly stubborn enemy resistance in this same area. As the orders themselves state again and again, reprisal measures have an impressive effect only if they follow the action to be avenged immediately, and not only after a longer period of time. In the face of the dead and wounded of my company, these considerations caused my decision to follow the sense and not the letter of the reprisal order.
I understood clearly that my directives could be taken as formal transgressions. However, I figured that they would be approved post-factum on a soldierly and human basis.
"The regiment on its part pointed out to me that my combat report in its original version would incriminate me in regard to a transgression of orders issued, and that a new version was necessary. Thereupon, I rewrote the report. Whereby several unintended inexactitudes crept in, which however were not intended originally.
"Possibly one or the other formulations was influenced or limited by the dramatic and varied events of the 10 of June which in part were painful for the company because of the casualties.
"The 18 men shot to death in the areas of Palioklisi and in Distomon were all shot while trying to escape (6 of them were captured, the remaining 12 during an attempt to escape in Distomon). None of them was shot as a reprisal measure. The urgent suspicion that these civilians belonged to a band was founded on their behavior and the finding of blasting equipment and of parts of uniforms at the locality where they were.
"The shooting attack on parts of my company took place about 2 km. southeast of Distomon. Civilians from Distomon working in the fields energetically denied the presence of bandits. These civilians were about 500 to 600 meters distant from the enemy positions which were situated in an approximate semi-circle around the column. On this assumption it is impossible for them to have overlooked the bandits' preparation to attack. The efforts of the civilians to lure the soldiers into ambush proved their previously arranged and conceded cooperation with the bands. For this reason, I believe myself justified in the immediate execution of reprisal measures. The previous behavior of the population led one to the logical and immediate conclusion that further attacks from the ambush, even from the village itself, would have to be counted on at any time. My measures also intended to stop losses which might possibly occur in the future. My first combat report, which I later rewrote, expressed this also."
Certified, "Heske, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer and SS-Regimental Provost Marshal". It is also signed, "Fritz Lautenbach SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer".
Then turning to page 22 of the German, and 31 of the English, this is a communication dated 20 July 1944:
"Reference: Letter LXVIII Infantry Corps to 4th SS-Pol. Pz. Gren. Div.
"Subject: Verbal order of the Regimental Commander.
"To the "SS-Ranzer-Grenadier-Regiment 7 "STATEMENT "The statement made against myself in the letter cited above requires the following clarification:
"The combat group SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach accomplished independently the mission I ordered for the reconnaissance in the area Arachowa-Distomen. I received a report of the development of the action via radio at battalion headquarters in Lewadia. Shortly before the combat group Lautenbach reached the village of Distomon, radio connection with it was interrupted. It was reconstituted only after the fighting was over.
"Immediately after the mission, the 2nd company was transferred to Lamia for the execution of an operation in the Sperchios Valley and subordinated directly to the regiment. Since the preceding events required a regimental report to the Army Command, the disputed combat report was produced in Lamia by Hauptsturmfuehrer Lautenbach and immediately sent to the regiment. This combat report was received by the battalion only later for information. For the above reasons, I still feel justified in having made the statements appearing in the last paragraph in my report dated 26 June 44 - Br. Diary No. 339/44 Secret."
Then on the next page, is a report from one George Koch, who has been referred to before, to the First Battalion of the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7, dated 20 July 1944, and again enclosed 5 to the Commander-in-Chief Southeast, 1c, No. 5924/44.
Koch is an under-officer in the Secret Field Police Group No. 510:
I wish to add the following to the events described by me in my report dated 12.6.1944.
"I was unable to make personally all ovservations of the events described in my report dated 12.6.1944. It was absolutely impossible for one individual to observe everything in an operation executed by two companies, since I myself did not participate in everything nor could I be everywhere at once. That is why by mutual agreement with the members of the company I have used statements and also the combat report of the company as a basis for my report. Neither have I made any observations which would contradict the statement of SS Obersturmfuehrer Weichenrieder which has been read to me since. As explained in my statement dated 2.7.1944, I spent some time looking after our interpreter who was lying in the market place.
(Signed) Koch Unteroffizier" Then there is a personal pencil notation:
"1A IF. In answer to special inquiry R 19/7" I think that is all we have to say about it.
In looking at this document and the previous one, your Honors will please see the large figure 22 D, on this and other documents. On this one I do not know what it means, unless it is some sort of an identification or number that they put on to connect some of these papers.
The next is on page 25 of the German, page 33 of the English, which is from the Commander in Chief Southeast, Commander in Chief Army Group F 1c/AO No. 4506, secret, dated 20th June 1944.
Then if your Honors please, this is the file number that we have referred to before, the first time that was used was on page 2 of this book, and it was later used in July on page 1 of this book, and now they are using it again:
"Events during fighting in Distomon.
"According to the combat report of the SS-Panzer Grenadier Regiment 7, the village Distomon was attacked during fighting with bands on the road Lewadia-Amfissa on the 10.6 and after a mopping up operation of the village, 250 to 300 dead band suspects and band members were counted. In other reports submitted by a Secret Field Police Unteroffizier of the Secret Field Police Group 510 who participated in the action Distomon was reached without fighting. The fighting with a band took place near Stiri (5 km. Southeast of Distomon) and the inhabits of Distomon were shot dead only after the finish of the operation Stiri and the return of the troops. Accordingly, in contrast, to the report of the troops, it would have been a reprisal measure. Interrogated by the Corps Judge of LXVIII Infantry Corps, the Unteroffizier of the German Secret Field Police fully reaffirmed this report. Corps Hqs. of LXVIII Infantry Corps ordered the commanding officer of the 4th SS-Pz. Gren. Div. to make an investigation of the entire incident because of deliberately false official report.
"The records available up to this point show a striking parallel to the events at Klissura which also concerned Pz. Gren. Regiment No. 7. Supplementary report after submission of the results of the investigation by Corps Hqs. of the LXVIII Infantry Corps is reserved.
"The special plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office who has asked for an explanation of the events has been informed as to the contents of the reports available up to now.
"According to radio Cairo in Greek of 15.7, Hull has commented on the events in Distomon during a press conference."
This is certified to by one, "Harling".
Now on page 26 of the German, and 35 of the English, this is a teletype to Army Group E.
"Subject: Fighting in Distomon".
And this again comes from the Commander in Chief Southeast, High Command Army Group F:"You are requested to request Corps Headquarters of the LXVIII Infantry Corps to submit speedily the results of the investigation re Distomon asked for by the 4th SS Panzer Grenadier Division".The signature here is typed, but at the left is sighed, "Certified, v. Harlingm Lt. Colonel".And then the next report-
