Q If you want to-
A Well, have you got a pointer? Perhaps I might point it out.
Q Yes, we have.
AAs I said, when we got to the eastern part of Eastern Finnmark, the Russian forward patrols wore on the Tana River and the last contact which had been between Russian and German troops was on the 6th of November and there is the River Tana (indicating).
We heard the Russians did not try to follow up and there might be severed reasons for that. We asked that tho Norwegian troops might be put in the frontline as soon as possible. But when we got there, there was no enemy there.
Q that date are you speaking of, witness?
A I am speaking of the--now about the 27th or 26th of November when the Norwegian troops got to the Tana line.
Q Was there fighting or any contact between you and the Russian forces and the Grmans around Kirkenes prior to that date?
A No, there was not.
Q Now witness, did you advance in a westerly direction with your brigade?
A Yes. I had not a brigade to start with, but by and by we got troops from Sweden and from Great Britain so that in the spring of 1945 we had a brigade. The advance was very difficult because of the difficulties of time of year, of the roads, and the climate and I might be allowed then to say a few words about the country about which we are speaking.
The area of Finnmark is more that 48,000 square kilometers. That means it is larger than for instance Switzerland or Denmark. In this area were living about 60,000 people, mostly rather poor people and most of them fishermen. The main part of the population was living along the coast. The climate at that time of year is very, severe, and you might understand that when I show you that the Polar Circle is very for south of this area.
I will point to it now. Here it is (indicating) The mean temperature in December is about the 70th degree, 14 degrees Fahrenheit in December.
In January it is about 11 to 12 degrees. In the inner part of the country it is far colder and the temperature may drop to 40 below, even more. The country is very high so that the northern winds coming right in from the arctic Ocean have a tremendous bite. There is not a very great amount of snow.
I might say, generally speaking, about one meter. But because of the heavy storms, especially from the North, this snow is drifting up in largo drifts and that again means that it is very difficult to keep the roads open. Not so much because of the amount of snow but because of the drifting snow and I would like to point out that even with the assistance of great number of Russian prisoners of war, the Germans were not able to keep Main Road 50 open all the year around.
There are certain stretches which would be very difficult to keep open and as I said one special part of it just west of the Tana Fjord was not kept open any year as far as I know during the war.
I might also say that there is only really one road leading from cast to west. That is Main Road 50 and that is just a road which is so difficult to keep open. There is another road coming from Ivalo in Finland going through a Norwegian place called Karasho and joining Main Road 50 at the Possoni Fjord. (indicating) There is one more road from Finland to Norway and that is south of this area coming into Troms country or territory.
Q General, how far were the German rear guards ahead of you on the average?
A Well, I really don't know but I should think that they were very far ahead because the last contact between Russian troops and German troops and that was only patrols was on the 6th of November and we didn't get there until about the 26th--that means about three weeks. They had a three weeks' advance. I should think personally, sir, that by the end of November, all German main forces would be out of Finnmark and that only very small rear guards and destruction troops were loft behind; the Germans had then been in this territory for four and a half years and of course knew it very well.
They had a great number of fortifications along the Coast, partly belonging to tho Navy and partly belonging to the Army and commanded by tho Army, but all these bases were destroyed by and by.
Q Now witness, did you generally follow the main route to retreat of tho German army, generally speaking?
A Yes, one mountain force of the Norwegian troops followed that main road.
Q. And they were under your command?
A They were under my command but not until the beginning of February. Before that date, they were under the command of the Russian troops. According to an agreement which the Norwegian Government had, a similar agreement between the American, British and Russian Governments, according to which the Norwegian forces fighting in Norway should be put under the command of that particular allied commander but in the beginning of February I got command of all the troops up there.
Q What was your estimate at that time how large the German forces were who were retreating in numbers?
A Well, I had a very good order battle of the German troops. I cannot now remember exactly how many it would be.
Q Roughly.
A But I should think something between 100 and 150 thousand men.
Q Now General, you said that these Norwegian troops which followed up this German retreat or withdrawal were under the over-all command of the Russians until February, 1945. Is that right?
A No, until the 5th of 6th of February.
Q All right. Now were there substantial Russian forces accompanying these Norwegian forces?
Q. All right, Now were there substantial Russian forces accompanying these Norwegian forces?
A. There were no Russian forces accompanying the Norwegian forces, and it was quite clear as I have previously stated from the beginning that the Russian forces would not enter Finnmark. It was too difficult proposition at that time of the year to follow up with large forces in a country like that. And besides, the position was not in Norway, and it didn't very much matter to the allied forces if Finnmark was occupied or not.
Q. General, as you were going west with your brigade, between November and February, up there - just what did you see?
A. I saw the scorched earth policy as I have never seen it before. All the communications were destroyed. The roads were blown up and mined, the bridges, the quays, the telephone and telegraph centrals; the telephone poles were either out down or blown up, and in the craters along the few roads were a great number of both teller mines and personnel manes. Also the housing was destroyed - not everything in the eastern most part of Eastern Finnmark because the Russian attack had prevented that destruction. Otherwise, speaking of the line West practically specking - west of the Tana River, everything was completely destroyed. That includes all housing and what I mentioned before; also historical buildings and churches. Not all of them but more than half of the churches were destroyed. And this destruction took place - as far as I know from October until rather late in the spring of 1945. The destruction took place not always at one particular time. There were places which were raided two or three time.
Q. What do you mean by that, General?
A. That means the place was destroyed once. Not all of the population was evacuated. Some were left for some reason or other, and this was, of course, known to the German troops so that they came back for a second and a third time and got away the rest of the population and destroyed the shacks and huts or what they might have built in the meantime to be able to survive.
Q. General, what was the approximate date - I mean in months that the subsequent destructions of these towns happened?
A. I think -- well, I am sure - that places like Kjullefyord (witness spells the name) were raided by the end of November and by the middle of December; and there are several other places which are difficult to spell - I think I will drop it - which were raided a couple of times, too.
Q. General, do you have any knowledge as to the date - or the approximate date - that some of the main communication centers were destroyed, going from east to west, from Kirkanes.
A. Well, of course, there were destroyed as the German troops withdrew. And I should think that most of them were destroyed by the end of November. But I cannot tell anything exactly about that.
Q. Now, as the German troops withdrew and the destruction had taken place by the end of November, do you know whether or not other destructions occurred as the German army withdrew which would fall into the months of December and January?
A. Yes, I have just told you that at least two or three places on the coast were raided at a later date; and I also know for certain that some places in western Finnmark were destroyed, for instance, in the month of December. I think I am not wrong, but that can be verified by the official papers, when I was in the town of Hammerfest and Kjullefjord and Upper Alta were destroyed about the middle of December.
Q. General, did you get, at that time that you were up there, these reports that these various towns and hamlets were destroyed?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. What did you think at that time, was the reason for these destructions?
A. Well, I thought that it was wanton, and I could not see that it was a necessity for the German forces so completely to destroy the country as was done.
Q. Now, you say "so completely" -- do you mean that - do you want to say that not everything represented military targets? What do you mean by that? Will you explain it to us?
A. Well, I can understand that communications were destroyed, but I cannot understand and I cannot see that according to any international law that the housing, for instance, and especially along the coast where there could, not be any advantage, were so destroyed as theywere; and monuments and churches, and so on; and hospitals, for instances, were also destroyed.
Q. Now, you stated that the highway 50 was, so to speak, the crux, the most important part of this entire evacuation.
A. Will you please repeat that question, please?
Q. The Highway 50 was the most important element that has to be taken into consideration both by the forces in retrograde movement as those who were following up, is that right?
A. That is right.
Q. Now, as it possible for either the Germans, or for you, to not follow this highway 50 and still advance?
A. Yes. It could be done.
Q. To what extent?
A. Well, it could be done, but only with smaller forces and with troops on skiis, and it would, in any case, take a very, very long time; and these troops had to live under Arctic conditions, complete darkness; it rained up there for two months, from November to January so that troops which advanced outside of the main Road 50 would be exposed to very great hardships. But I don't doubt that small groups might be able to advance from east to west.
Q. But not in large bodies?
A. No, i think that is the great difference between these two things. Large bodies could not be supplied. This is the main thing.
They could probable also advance, but as they could not get supplies they could not keep themselves up.
Q. General, have you ever seen, or as it been officially reported to you, that there was substantial destruction away from Highway 50?
A. Yes, as I said, sir, I had on my mission representatives of the Norwegian government, different branches, and they sent in representatives of our government, through me, as I was their head. I read them all and saw the reports. Besides, I get reports from my unit commanders, more of a military nature. So I knew at any time what had been -
Q. You saw them?
A. And reported it.
Q. Now General, in that time that you were up there did you ever converse with the indigenous population of Norway, or Finnmark?
A. I did.
Q Did these conversations evolve around the subject of the evacuation?
A. Yes, very much so, as these people were in a very poor condition As a matter of fact in order to be able to save them we had to concentrate on saving lives instead of trying to kill Germans. We sent out three expeditions; one along the coast, which got rather far along and under the command of a lieutenant colonel, and he actually succeeded in getting back into safety more than 1,000 people. I sent another expedition along the Tana Riber down to the Sogne Fjord, which I just pointed out on the map, in the center of Finnmark. All these expeditions were equipped with clothing, food medicines, and so on; blankets -- to try to help these people who, we heard, were living in great distress. And if we had not been so well prepared with that relief work I think that the destruction would have been much greater than now happened.
Q. Now, General, you said your forces did not amount to more than three thousand men in February, is that right?
A. It did not amount to so much as three thousand men in February, but I think in March.
Q. Then did you commence this action, where you helped your country men up there.
A. We started right away. I could see that there was very little chance of capturing any German rear guards. I found it much more the much more important thing to try to save our countrymen's lives, so I started in November by sending these expeditions along the coast north, and a little later the expeditions inland.
Q. How many men did you have at that time when you commenced?
A. I had about three hundred men.
Q. Was their help effective?
A. Yes, indeed.
Q. Well, how many people did you have to help?
A. Well, they were left there in eastern Finnmark. We hoped to start with fifty thousand people but by and by we found manymore, hidden in most strange place. They were hidden in the most strange places; and then we got these reports from scouts so I think that if we had not prepared this eventuality we might not have found some people that winter.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our afternoon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
MR. RAPP: If Your Honors, please, I had a talk with the defense Counsel for he defendant Rendulic, Dr. Fritsch, and ho tells mo that ho is agreable that we withdraw Identification 515-A. That was the document which was a certificate by the Norwegian representative here in Nurnberg giving evidence as to these documents we are trying to put in, but when he made out this original certificate ho listed all the documents, including those which have meanwhile been received. I suggested to Dr. Fritsch that we pare this particular document down to include only those which have not been received, and hat I will furnish him tonight a copy of such certificate in lieu of 515-A, and that he should consider the 24-hour rule still being covered by that arrangement, and Dr. Fritsch told me that was agreeable to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
MR. RAPP: If Your Honors, please, I would bow like to continue the examination of the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
Q. Witness, prior to the recess we were concerning ourselves with reports or conversations you had in connection with the Norwegian population which you met up here, and I asked you to tell us he nature of this conversation as far as it had any bearing on the evacuation which took place at that time?
A. I think I mentioned that we saved at least 1,000 Norwegians living on the coast, and many more, but I don't know the exact number of people living inland. Now, these people, as I said were living in the greatest distress. First of all, this was at a part of the year where the temperature is very low, and they had no houses. They had no food. It was taken away when the German forces withdrew. They had no means of getting food, because their boats, motor boats, and even small going boats, were either destroyed or sunk.
So that it was an obvious task for us to try and get hold of these people, and get them back to safety. We got a report from one island west of Hammerfest, - that was in January, that about 1,000 people were living in the greatest distres, and they had to be relieved. We could not do that because we hadn't got boats enough, therefore we had to send a message to London and ask for a relief expedition from there, and that was accepted on the 15 of February, when about 500 people were brought away to Murmansk, and later on to Scotland.
Q. Did any of these persons that you saved or you administered medical care, over mention to you ho fact why they did not evacuate?
A. Yes, I cannot remember any special remark, but these people had their homes up there. Norwegians have been living in these areas for several hundreds of years, and the way they were evacuated was in such a crude manner, that they thought it would be bettor to stay there, to stay behind even when taking the risks of the cold and the scarcity of food and so on.
Q. You speak of the way - or I believe you said the cruel way of the evacuation how do you know that?
A. I have read all the reports. They nave made a general impression on me and I do not remember details, but I do remember one instance which was stated in a report to me on the 15th of December 1944 by an Army officer, who had made his escape himself. That was from a place called Berlevaag. When the withdrawal from the Eastern part of Finnmark started in October, the main population of Berlevaag got the orders to meet at a curtain day at a certain hour, and the order went on to say those who did meet would be shot. This man, this Army officer met also, and they were ordered to carry ammunition shells from dumps down to the boats. The shells weighed about 35 kilos, and they were also ordered to carry dynamite and gun powder down to the boats, and they did that for about two days.
Then the burning started. These people in Berlevaag, as many people in many places, thought they would be in a danger zone by being in their homes, and therefore they built old shacks and houses of peat outside the place, like these people had done. The burning started by burning down these small houses outside the town, and then the crowd was push forward down the quay, all of them, the old, the sick, and so forth. The cattle was either shot in the open or shot in the stables, or burned in the stables. I have soon that myself. I have seen groups of cattle being burned in the stables. That, I mean, accounts for their dislike for being evacuated. Also he very rough part of the year, and the voyage in small boats along the coast, which wore full of mines and which could be raided at any time.
Q. Have you, General, ever seen personally any villages or settlements being burned down?
A. No, I haven't seen that, but when we got to Kirkenes part of it was still burning. There was another reason for the population to try to get away. There were epidemic diseases spreading, some cases of typhus, but rather large epidemics of diarrhea and dysentery. The important part of it was that there were no doctors. I have been evacuated, and as far as I know there was only one doctor left in the whole district who had made his escape. Now, there were epidemic diseases, cold, hunger and so on, and no doctors, no hospitals.
Q. General, did you ever see personally any villages which were actually destroyed or settlements, as a result of this evacuation?
A. Yes, I have seen most of the places in Finnmark. I got to the western part of Finnmark about the beginning of April myself.
Q. What was the degree of destruction?
A. Well, I think that the destruction was as complete as it could be. As I think I mentioned in my first remarks, practically all of the territory west of the Tana line was completely destroyed. There was nothing left.
Q. And, General, these houses and settlements and villages, did they at any time offer your troops any shelter or were they all destroyed before you got there?
A. They were all destroyed before we got there, except in the Easternmost part of Finnmark. As it was, when we got to these places, they could not offer us any shelter. First of all they were burned, and secondly the concrete fundaments of the buildings were blown up by dynamite, so that building could not even be repaired, and even to this very day there are 7,000 people who have not been able to go back to Finnmark.
Q. On account of the destruction?
A. Yes.
Q. General, did these destructions, as you saw it at that time in command of a military command, offer a deterrent to the Russians to advance, in other words were the destructions a reason that the Russians did not advance?
A. Of course I can't tell you.
Q. Did the Russians ever talk to you about that?
A. No, but I can make my own opinion about it, and that is that it was not possible to advance under those conditions with large forces.
Q. In other words, you say that the destructions that were carried out actually had the effect that they kept the Russian army back from advancing?
A. No, I wouldn't say that. That was, of course, one of the reasons, but in any case, I think, that the Russian Army could not have advanced, because the cold and the climate and the temperature and so on, in Finnmark is not suitable for operations on a large scale in the wintertime. It is completely dark, as I said too, and the decision was not fought in Norway. It was merely a small sideshow which was joint on up there.
Q. But, General, the Germans, as you told us, carried on this destruction for many months to come, and the Russians did not advance, so how did you estimate the situation at that time?
A. I estimated the situation in such a way that the Russians would use their forces at other points, and didn't care about Norway.
Q. But that was information which you had in your position of constant contact with the Russian forces, is that right?
A. That is right.
Q. But you don't know whether or not the Germans were in a position to know that too?
A. Well, I think they knew. There are several reasons why I think so. First of all, the German Intelligence Service was certainly very good. Besides, they had their planes that could easily find out whether their troops were following up or not, and the third point is that after the German Army left there were radio costs which kept them in knowledge of where the advancing troops might have been at any time. We got some oi those costs, and they must have given very good information that no troops did follow.
MR. RAPP: I have no further questions, Your Honor.
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY DR. FRITSCH:Dr. Fritsch for defendant Rendulic.
Q. First of all, I would like to clarify a few personal doubts; did you say, General, that you were 38 years old?
A. No, I said 53.
Q. I beg your pardon. You are an active officer since the year 1915, an active soldier?
A. Yes.
Q. General, do we agree that on the question, of military necessity we can disagree, that we can be of various opinions on the question of military necessity?
A. Of course we can disagree.
Q. You were with the Russians, General?
A. Yes.
Q. Since when?
A. I was head of a military mission to Russia from about the 1st of October 1944.
Q. Since that time did you have any special contact with the Tana Front of the Russian Army, on the Tana River?
A. I had no personal contact with the Tana Front, but our troops had.
Q. You listed some reasons which, according to your conviction, speak in favor of the fact that the Russians would not press into Norway; would you tell me whether at the Tana Front and until what time there was fighting contact between the Germans and Russian troops?
A. Yes--
THE RESIDENT: Pardon me, General, just a moment. Let's put tipis microphone right out in front. Now, if you will just sit back, General, and take it easy, just as though you were visiting. You don't have to use it as though you were calking on a telephone.
THE WITNESS: It is very difficult to hear.
THE PRESIDENT: You say you are not able to hear?
THE WITNESS: I am hearing now.
A. But I can answer that last question. The question was, when the last contact between the Russian and German troops was on the Tana River, and according to the reports which we got it was on the 5th or 6th of November.
Q. Down to that day there were fights with the Russians?
A. Yes, there had been very little fighting since October 24, and the German troops had very rapidly gone back behind west of the Tana River, and it was just very small rear guards being left on that river at that particular time.
Q. For what reason should the German leadership be sure that the Russians would not follow?
A. As I said to the Prosecurot, the Russians would not follow because they knew very well difficult conditions up in the month if Norway at that part of the year, and also they had sent most of their troops down south to fight in the Baltic.
Q. Do you have any basis for this, that the German command was also informed of this.
A. No, I do not now whether the German command was informed of this.
Q. Ther German army command had to be, or could assume that the Russians would follow.
A. I do not think they could assume that, because their intelligence service might have told them, or would certainll have told them that the greater part of the Karelian Army was being sent South, and what was left would not have been sufficient to cope with the German forces which were then in Finnmark.
Q. But these are just assumptions on your part, General. Is that right? You said that Norwegian troops from England, in the winter of 1944-45 were sent to Finnmark?
A. Yes.
Q. Were these troops supposed to land in Finnmark?
A. They were not put ashore in Finnmark; They were put ashore in Murmansk and from there transported in Finnmark.
Q. And the reason why they were not supposed to land in Finnmark; can you give me that?
A. The reason why they were not put ashore in Finnmark, well that would probably be as I said to the prosecutor,-that we must first cooperate with our Allies, and therefore go to a Russian port and see what their plans were.
Q. Witness, didn't I understand you to have said that they did not land in Finnmark because they knew about the destruction?
A. Well, that was a small reason, I agree to that, but of course a small force of 300 men can be landed almost anywhere from beats.
Q. Witness, you spoke of the Reich Highway No. 50 and you described this high was as the only import and road from east to west in Finnmark; is that correct?
A. That is correct, - the most important road, yes.
Q. Was this highway in the year 1939, before the landing of the German troops, - was this highway fully fit to be traveled on?
A. No, it was not completely finished until after the German forces came in Finnmark. There were q few stretches which were not finished before the war.
Q. And this highway was finished by the Germans; is that right?
A,. No, that is not right, but small stretches of the highway were finished by Norweigians working under German orders.
Q. Then you spoke of the mining of this highway. Do you consider this mining as militarily necessary?
A. Yes I do.
Q. If the Russians had had the intention to follow the Germans, we cannot affirm or deny this intention post facte; wasn't it then a military necessity to destroy the housing facilities for the Russians as they would press on?
A. No, that is a great mistake. These houses were very few, and I cannot imagine how any force which could cape with the strength of the German forces could have any use of those few houses along that highway. As I have told before, the greatest part of the population in Finnmark were living on the coast, and the advance did not take place and could not take place along the coast.
Q. General, we shall came back to this question later. My question is this. I want to determine by your experiences, whether it was not especially difficult for a military opponent, if he would come in a country like Finnmark, and find no shilter.
A. Would you repeat that question; in succession please? Will you say it in English once again?
Q. Don't you think that it would be very difficult for a military opponent invading Finnmark to find no shilter there?
A. Yes, that would be difficult.
Q. General, you spoke of the fact that the inhabitants of Finnmark lived mostly an the coast. Aren't there some villages on the highway too?
A. Yes, there are some small villages on Highway 52.
Q. General, during the direct examination you spoke of destruction of towns.
PRESIDENT WENNERSTRUM: Just a minute, General. The young man wants to give you a substitute receiving set.
New General, may I suggest that you just sit back as though you were visiting in someone's home, and answer your question just as though we were carrying on a conversation.
You may proceed.
Q. General, would like to come back to the question of military necessity. If the German Command had recognized the necessity for evacuating this place, wouldn't it have done some good to the Norweigian inhabitants that it would take them out of a territory which was destroyed, for military reasons?
A. I can see no necessity of destroying the country. As I have said, I do not think that any large forces could advance in this territory and keep themselves up.
Q. Wasn't the impossibility for the opponent to enter this region only created by the fact that the housing facilities were destroyed?
A. No. The opponent would have the greatest difficulty of getting into this country even when the houses were there, and even when the roads were there. This highway 50, as I said, would not be open in the winter.
Q. Highway 50 was unsed in the winter, wasn't it General,?
A. Yes, in part of the winter, but in not winter, so far as I knew the road was kept open even with a great number of prisoners of war working on it.
Q. Do you know, General, that the road was filled with tunnels which would keep it from being snowdrifted; partly by woo*en tunnels?
A. Yes, I knew that some part of it was equipped with those tunnels, but even do they were not possible to keep open.
Q. At what time of the winter, 1944-45, did you move on this highway with your troops?
A. The troops moved on this highwas from about the end of November, and until say, March. But they did not exactly moves on the highway because they were on *kis and they went outside of the highwas.
Q. Couldn't larger units of troops have moved on this road, if the road had been open?
A. They could have moved to a certain extent, but had been stopped at very far eastern place just went of the Tana Fjord.
Q. General, you spole about the destruction of towns and villages. Was Kirkenes, for example, destroyed, as a result of the evacuation?
A. Not all Kirkenes, but a great part of Kirkenes was destroyed as the German troops evacuated.
Q. Do you know that Kirkenes wes repeatedly bombed by Russian airplanes?
A. I knew that Kirkenes was bombed on several occasions by the Russian airplanes.
Q. Do you know that these bombing and the direct fight around the city destroyed the city about 90 per cent?
A. I think that is completely wrong, because as far as I heard, there was no fighting in Kirkenes whatever.