This has become a fixed concept.
Q. It is contained in Document Book XII, page 112 of the English text and page 94 of the German text.
A. That was the first order. The second order, which confirms this conception, is an order of which I do not know the exhibit number, but which, I believe, can be recognized if I call it the "Loehr Order of 22nd December 1943."
Q. You mean the order of the Commander in Chief Southeast, as it is contained in Document Book XVI of the Prosecution, Exhibit No. 379, page 47 and subsequent pages of the English text, and page 98 and subsequent pages of the German text?
What are the reasons for your reference to this order, General?
A. Because this order itself quite clearly mentioned reprisal measures of the troops, and it can be taken as an established fact that it is so. If I do not take into consideration, for a moment, these two orders from higher agencies, my own opinion is being confirmed by an order of a subordinate agency -- the reprisal order of the First Mountain Division, which was touched during General Lanz' examination, and which is contained in Document Book XIX or Document Book XX of the Prosecution. The importance of it is that it is being confirmed there that the troops had orders to carry out reprisal measures independently for their own losses. Those are the three orders which I would like to mention as confirming my assertion, with regard to reprisal measures of the troops in contrast with reprisal measures under executive power.
Q. In the third order, which you mentioned, I believe you were referring to Prosecution Exhibit No. 455, which is contained in Document Book XIX of the Prosecution, page 139 of the English text and page 150 of the German text. Did you have, in this connection, a right to direct, order, or check-up on the troop?
A. No, I had no right to direct or check-up in this sphere. The troops were subordinated to me merely in a territorial respect. It was subordinated for those spheres of work which I mentioned before when I listed the 10 points -point one through 10.
Q. Were the troops to report to you in respect to tactical measures, or reprisal measures?
A. No, they did not have to do that.
Q. Did you hear about such measures? Were you informed?
A. I was informed inasmuch as communication possibilities existed, and the members of my staff and the various departments of my staff attempted to compile reports. This was possible where the territorial conditions permitted it -to receive reports, for instance, from the LXVIIIth Corps, which was stationed in Athens. However, I did not receive any information or news at all from the 22nd Mountain Corps because there were no communications there. Also, I did not receive any information about combat or reprisal measures from the Commander Saloniki-Aegean, who, for territorial reasons and reasons of communications reported directly to Army Group E.
Q. In order to interpolate here for a moment, in the document books submitted by the prosecution, there are several reports of the 22nd Corps and of the Commander Saloniki-Agena. Can you say that these reports were addressed immediately to a higher agency without going via your agency?
A. That is what I mentioned before. These reports went directly to the superior agency of the agencies just mentioned. That is to Army Group E I did not even get informational copies of the reports. I learned about the facts now and again from the situation reports of Army Group E covering the total area. That is, I learned from them through the evaluation of these reports at a time when they were usually out of date.
Q. I would like to ask you one other question before we continue. You mentioned just before the small pacified districts. Do you mean to say that the occupation of Greece in the other areas was not an occupation de facto?
A. I believe that comparison in this connection is not very well chosen. These two facts have nothing to do with each other. The occupation was an occupation de facto. The tactical leadership was in a position at all times to reach any locality they wanted to and to occupy it.
Q. That was the tactical leadership which was not part of your task as Military Commander for Greece. The tasks arising from this responsibility were executed by the troops?
A. Yes, that is correct, by Army Group E and the units subordinate to this Army Group.
Q. Did the Higher SS and Police Leader have an independent right to order reprisal measures?
A. It depends in which connection and in which capacity. One, as long as police regiment 18 was subordinated to me for tasks of security in the Boeotian area, from August to the middle of November, I was responsible for the commitment of this unit and thus also for possible reprisal measures. Two, after the Higher SS and Police Leader at the beginning of November had been appointed the tactical leader for Army Group E and had been commissioned with the safeguarding and pacification of the Boeotian area, he as tactical leader and divisional commander, had the same right and the same duty as all other divisional commanders to carry out reprisal measures independently and to order them independently; more so, since according to instructions and channels of command he was independent in this area or, as it says in the service instructions, he acted on his own responsibility.
Tactical measures and reprisal measures cannot be separated from each other. Reprisal measures of the troops are part of those tasks. Three, the third factor is that to the extent to which the Higher SS and Police Leader had to carry out his police tasks, he was subordinated to the Reichsfuehrer SS. If, within the scope of these tasks, reprisal measures became necessary, for instance for acts committed on Greek policemen, he as divisional commander, was again authorized to order reprisal measures on the basis of the reprisal measures on the basis of the reprisal orders which existed.
Q. General, I would like to quite briefly discuss with you the individual reprisal orders and the individual reprisal ratios as they have been submitted here by the prosecution. What was the situation when you, late in 1942, arrived in the area of Southern Greece?
A. I believe I testified as to that this morning when I talked about the first reprisal measure, and I said that I had found there an order which ordered reprisal measures in certain events but did not establish any ratios. That is all which I know about reprisal measures and reprisal orders until that time.
Q. Was the so-called Keitel Order, dated 16 September 1941, made known to you or submitted to you when, in October 1942, you came to Greece? I am referring to Prosecution Exhibit 53 contained in Document Book II of the prosecution on page 67 of the English text and 52 of the German text.
A. This Keitel order, so frequently mentioned in this trial, dated 16 September 1941, had been issued more than one year before I took over my post in Greece and at the time that it was ordered I was still in Rumania. From the distribution list it cannot be gathered that the Military Commander Southern Greece actually received it. I ought to have found it at the office.
It is questionable that the Commander Southern Greece received the order at the time. I cannot decide this question, because the order referred, according to its title, quite generally to the fighting of communist insurgent movements. I would therefore feel inclined to assume that it did not reach Southern Greece was, as I have stated, only a very small, very restricted area and furthermore at that time nobody thought that at some later date there would be unrest there. I believe, to recall that, General Felmy stated that he had a similar opinion during the time when he was there. I can, therefore, not state with certainty whether this order was contained amongst the many documents which I found on my arrival in Greece. I don't believe it was, though.
These high reprisal ratios of 50 to one and a hundred to one would have certainly struck me at the time and I would be certain to remember them. Since these figures up till now did not mean anything to me, I feel inclined to assume that this order was either not amongst the documents or if it was that I did not have a chance to see it. I am quite sure that I read it here for the first time.
Q. The prosecution in the presentation of their case referred to Document NOKW-458 which is Exhibit 69 contained in Document Book II of the prosecution on page 138 and 139 of the English text and page 106 of the German text. Did you know that order.
A. In any case, when that order was issued, I was in Rumania. The commander Southern Greece, according to the distribution list, certainly received this order. It is quite possible I would even say it is probable that I found that order when I arrived. I do know, however, that I did not find when I got there that this order was being carried out, namely hostages were kept ready according to the categories mentioned here. I myself saw no cause to carry out this order at the time when I got there, since I liked to wait and see where the hostage question was concerned and, above all, I did not want to have any hostages from Nationalist and democratic circles because those were the very circles which supported me and by which I was supported. That is what I can say in connection with this particular order.
Q. With Exhibit of the Prosecution 306, contained in Document Book XII of the prosecution contained on page 112 of the English text and page 94 of the German text, you are not actually being charged by the prosecution. In spite of this fact, I would like to discuss it briefly. It is an order by Commander-in-Chief Southeast dated 10 August 1943. Did you receive that order?
A. May I ask you again where it is contained?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q It is Exhibit 306, contained in document book 12 of the prosecution, page 112 of the English and 94 of the German text, did you receive that order?
A If I am correct here, that is the Loehr order, isn't it the Loehr order dated 22 December 1942?
Q No.
A Well, then I received the wrong document.
Q Since you are not charged with it by the Prosecution, I believe we can skip this particular problem and instead let us turn to prosecution exhibit 371, contained in document book 15 of the prosecution on pages 61 and 62 of the English text and page 88 of the German text. These are several communications to agencies in the Croatian area, the 2nd Panzer Army, the XVth Mountain Corps and at this particular point, I am somewhat embarrassed, since I can find no explanation why the prosecution charges you with events which took place outside of your area of command, perhaps you can clear it up for me?
A The majority of the document undoubtedly does not concern me, because it deals with events in Serbia and Croatia, but I assume that the annex of this exhibit could be referred to me. It is a decision of the military commander southeast to the commanding general and military commander in Serbia and this decision contains some comments on the issuing of collective fines. Since this decree and this decision has been sent with an informational copy to Southern Greece with the added remark, copy for information, I feel inclined to assume that is why I am charged with this exhibit. I state in this connection that this decision was passed on to me merely for informational purposes. Of course, I cannot remember it any longer. Secondly, I cannot remember either that I ordered at any time collective fines as a reprisal measure although I realize of course that such a thing exists, not only on the basis of this German communication, because collective fines as reprisal measures have been applied by the Allies in Germany after they took over command in Germany.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Did you order collective fines in your area as reprisal measures?
A No, never.
Q Apart from the orders we discussed just now, did you receive any further orders which might have formed the basis of reprisal measures?
A Yes, I received approximately toward the second half of the month of October, 1943, or possibly at the beginning of November, a reprisal order which was a decisive one for me, but which I have so far not found in the documents. At that time, since I had been subordinated to the military commander Serbia, with which I shall deal in a minute, an order was sent to me. I can explain this in the same way as it was stated here by General Felber on the witness stand that he sent me both orders, which were valid for him, because I had been subordinate to him. At least he sent me at the time an O.K.W. order, and O.K.W. reprisal order, signed by Keitel where reprisal quotas are established as follows and I remember that very clearly: 50 to 1 as reprisal for murder of a German soldier, 25 to 1 for one German wounded and then there were other ratios, which I don't remember exactly, but I remember that there was one ratio of 10 to 1, which was also mentioned. That might have applied as reprisal for German civilians or applied for high indigenous people. I can no longer remember, but I know these ratios were contained with the other things. I know for certain that it is not identical with the so-called Keitel order of 16 September 1941.
Q Can you still remember when that order was dated?
A No, I can no longer remember that, I don't know the date, but I do know that Keitel signed it and that Felber had made additional remarks and these additional remarks said this order is valid. I would like to add that was the first reprisal measure on a large scale, which I received at all.
Q Did that order have any particular effects on you?
A This order, which was new to me, concerned me very deeply.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
There was no doubt of the basic justification and legality of this order as far as I was concerned. I can only repeat what I said yesterday and again today that orders of superior agencies were decisive and binding and I could have no doubt that they were valid and legal, because I knew that the O.K.W had a legal department, which undoubtedly would have examined such orders.
Another question, which concerned me, was whether the execution of this order was expedient and in this respect I had serious misgivings. I can at this point only repeal what ideas moved me at the moment, ideas which had no connection whatsoever with this trial and which were my ideas at the time. This very sharp reprisal order apparently started from assumptions, which did not apply to my area. This very sharp order could be correct and could be authorized and proper in Serbia, about which I could at the time not judge at all, it could be justified and necessary in Greece and also in band areas, because I could not form a judgment on the combat conditions in those areas. At this time, however, it seems to me that the application of such an order in the areas described by me just before as pacified areas was not expedient, and even damaging. Particularly so when taking into consideration the mentality of the Greeks, which up to a certain point I could judge at that time. My consideration of this order was restricted to its applicability in the so-called pacified area.
Q One concluding question to this particular chapter, what did you order on the basis of this order?
A I have to admit that my first idea at that time was to suppress this order. Of course, I did not act in accordance with this idea at all because it was an idea which was in contradiction to my military feelings of responsibility and duty. In any case, the order would be made known in some other manner and eventually the troops would receive their own orders through some channels. Therefore, I personally changed this order, including the supplements by the military commander southeast-it was one Sunday morning when I worked on this--and I formulated it in Court No. V, Case No. VII.
such a clear manner that the unclear parts contained in it up to then were cleared up and the order could not be mistaken or misunderstood. I added one decisive addition to this order, which stated that nobody had any right to act on this order and right for reprisal measures excepting myself and that I myself for myself would have to consent to such measures in every individual case. Thus, I believed to prevent hasty decisions and measures and until such requests reached me, the whole situation would look much more peaceful.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal will be in recess until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(A recess was taken until 0930 hours, 12 December 1947.)
Official Transcript of Military Tribunal V, Case VII, in the Matter of the United States of America, Against Wilhelm List, et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on December 12, 1947 , 0930, Justice Carter, Presiding.
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America, and this Honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not all defendants are present in the court room?
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honors, all of the defendants are present in the court room with the exception of the defendant von Weichs, who is in the hospital, and the defendant List, who is sick today.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed with the examination.
DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued.
WILHEIM SPEIDEL - Resumed.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. We shall continue today with the discussion of the events in the latter months of 1943. The prosecution has charged you with an incident which is contained in Document Book 17 of the prosecution, which is Exhibit 418 on page 88 of the English text and page 66 of the German text.
What can you tell us about this incident, General?
A. This is a report of the 68th Corps dated the 15th of December, 1943, which has been mentioned the other day during General Felmy's examination. It is stated here that in the area of Levadia which is in Boeotia, Police Regiment 18, after contact with the enemy, burned down the village Evangelistra. This then is a locality and a combat action in the combat area of the Higher SS and Police Leader, namely in Boeotia, and I would like to recall here that as of approximately the beginning of November, 1943, the Higher SS and Police Leader had been given the authority of waging independent actions in this combat area.
He had received this assignment by Army Group E. The Military CommanderGreece, had, therefore, nothing to do with this particular action.
Q. Now, would you please turn in Document Book 18 to Exhibit 437 of the prosecution on page 53 of the English text and 56 of the German text? Is this document concerned with the same incident, General?
A. This is a report of the Military Commander-Greece dated the same day as the previous report and it reports about the same incident. It is, therefore, the same report. It was passed on to the Military CommanderSouth-East.
Q. I have found one further report in Document Book 19 of the prosecution, Exhibit 449, on page 76 of the English text and page 102 of the German text. Would you please look at this report also and tell us whether this is the same incident?
A. This is a report of the 68th Corps dated the same day and dealing with the same incident. In this connection, it is sent to the Commander-in-Chief, South-East by the high command of Army Group E. This is the third document concerning the same case.
Q. You mentioned that Levadia was located in the combat area of the Higher SS and Police Leader, namely in Boeotia, and that the Higher SS and Police Leader took actions in this area independently on the basis of orders he received from the Reichsfuehrer SS.
A. Those are the actual facts, but let me correct you. The place in question is Evangelistra.
Q. Yes, and Evangelistra is located in the combat area Boeotia.
We have a report from the Military Commander-Greece addressed to the Military Commander, South-East, dating from this same time, contained in Document Book 18 of the prosecution in Exhibit 437 on page 52 of the English text and page 55 of the German text. Will you please look at this report, General? 52, Document Book 18. What can you tell us about it?
A. It is a report by the Military Commander, Greece, dated the 16th of December, dealing with the well known incident in Kalavrita.
Q. Should one not conclude from the fact of this report that the Military Commander, Greece, carried out this military action and that he ordered the reprisal measures mentioned here? It is evident that it is a report of the Military Commander, Greece, dated 16 December, and addressed to the Military Commander, South-East.
A. No, that conclusion would be erroneous. As I testified yesterday, the Military Commander, Greece, had nothing to do with the band combatting and the reprisal measures arising from the combatting of the bands, but all reports available concerning events in the total area, events concerning the combatting of bands, were passed on by the Military Commander to his superior agency, which was the Military Commander, South-East, in Belgrade, so that he would be, at all times, in a position to gain a picture of the situation in the Greek area. These current reports about the events were simultaneously passed on to Army Group E for information.
Q. In other documents with which you are charged by the prosecution, we find a large number of reports of the Military Commander, Greece, addressed to the Military Commander, South-East, concerning combat and reprisal measures. On the basis of your statements just now, I would like to ask you what the situation was concerning responsibility for such combat and reprisal measures? Were you responsible?
A. Of course, I had no responsibility where reports were concerned which purely served informational purposes, which is the bulk of the reports, I can state that these informational reports were not reports about execution of actions.
Q. It seems to me that in the interest of clarifying the channels of reporting that you tell this Tribunal briefly the aspects of the channels through which reports went where your agency was concerned.
DR. WEISGERBER: If it please the Tribunal, to simplify the relating of this channel of command I have included in document book Speidel 2, a survey of these aspects and this is document Speidel 20 on page 20 of document book Speidel 2 which I shall offer as Speidel exhibit 22. I would like to briefly present the most important part of this document on page 20.
Q. (By Dr. Weisgerber cont'd) Before I do this, I would like to ask you, General, you compiled this document?
A. Yes.
Q. And you confirm that this document is correctly compiled; you confirm this under oath?
A. Yes, I do.
DR. WEISGERBER: In this connection I would like to stress the following: "The daily reports of the Military Commander Greece had a twofold aim: 1. To give the Military Commander South East, as the superior authority, a general view of the situation, special events and the developement throughout Greece. 2. To inform Army Group E to the same effect, and at the same time to pass on continually the reports of the Higher SS and Police Leader about his mission. 3. Both kinds of report were combined in one report and given to the Military Commander South East with a copy 'for information' to Army Group E. To furnish this report, information which appeared important for a general picture was collected on all sides and evaluated. The principal sources were: 1. Information from the Military Administration Sub-area Headquarters which they collected, for the most part, by telephone from the troop units of their area, from the Higher SS and Police Leader, from the Navy and the Air Force, from the German Embassy, from the Greek Government, from the Counter Intelligence Branch Office, and from other offices. The reports, however, only gave a section at any given time, that is, only what the Military Commander got to know about."
Q. (By Dr. Weisgerber) Now, I have one question to ask you, General, in this particular connection.
How were you supplied with reports by the Higher SS and Police Leader? Was that done regularly or wasn't it?
A. It was not done regularly but whenever he had anything special to report he passed it on to my office for evaluation in passing on.
Q. You commented on this problem yesterday and stated that your information left much to be desired and that you more or less depended on what the Higher SS and Police Leader wanted to supply you with; is that correct?
A. To say that I was at his mercy in this respect is putting it a bit too strongly, but I could only get to know what he wanted to inform me of and of what he did informe me and that I could pass on. Of course, I have no way of judging about what was not reported to me.
DR. WEISGERBER: I recommend the balance of this document to the notice of the Tribunal.
Q. (By Dr. Weisgerber) From the description of the duty of reporting and the manner in which reports were made, I take it that every individual report had to be examined from the aspect of who was responsible for the execution of a certain report or action, is that correct?
A. Yes, it is, and it is clearly expressed in an affidavit which the Commander of Athens has submitted for this purpose.
DR. WEISGERBER: If it please the Tribunal, this is document Speidel number 52. I shall refer back to this document at a later context when I shall read the whole document and we will discuss some aspects of this later.
Q. (By Dr. Weisgerber) To turn to something else, General, do you remember from the documents which have been submitted by the prosecution the individual events?
A. As a general rule, no, but a small part of them I do remember.
Q. When the word "Feldkommandant of Athens" was translated I don't believe it was made quite clear what function this agency had. It was translated as Commander of Athens. It should be Commander of Sub-area Administration Headquarters Athens. I don't believe that is quite correct.
Could the translation be revised?
Is it correct that the Commander of the Administrative Sub-area at Athens was an agency subordinate to you?
A. The Commander of the Administrative Sub-area Headquarters in Athens was, of course, subordinate to me as I mentioned during the examination yesterday.
Q. General, were the incoming reports submitted to you?
A. The incoming reports were submitted to me in their original version which is nowhere contained in the documents and then only a small part of them. As a general rule the substance of the reports was submitted to me in the scope of the general orientation about the situation by means of the situation map or of some other way however, only to the extent as it was of particular interest and of importance to me and to my task, that is, to give me a picture of the situation.
Q. General, did you see the outgoing reports?
A. I saw the outgoing reports only to a very small extent because, as we have heard repeatedly in the course of this trial, these reports were passed on through the I-a or I-c channel automatically in order to fulfill the demand of superior agencies. Most of these reports were as mentioned of a purely informational nature and were passed on automatically, and they were as a rule of no particular interest to me, where my tasks were concerned.
Q. General, you mentioned just now the I-a and I-c channel. Will you quite briefly explain to us what you mean by these terms?
A. There were two channels of reports, the I-a channel and the I-c channel. In the reports contained amongst the documents here, they are sometimes I-a and at other times I-c reports. I myself did not quite see from what point of view this particular selection of reports were made. In comparing the reports one can see that mainly reports from band combat areas, that is, reports of a tactical nature, also concerning reprisal measures which took place in the scope of a tactical operation, were passed on through the I-a channels and other reports, the balance of them, on the I-c channel. Exactly how this was handled in the staff I cannot tell you. There might have been some internal agreements between the members that, for instance, the I-a of the Military Commander or of the Army Group phone and said, "It takes too long for me to get the I-c reports.
I want direct reports." Thus it can be explained that both agencies, both departments, passed on the reports.
Q. Can you perhaps remember individual cases or cases of particular importance, cases which have been submitted here by the prosecution?
A. I could remember quite well, not including details of course, that two reprisal measures in retaliation of sabotage on ship about which I testified here yesterday. These two cases I remember very well, of course, because I was deeply concerned about them at the time. I can also remember the surprise attack mentioned yesterday directed against parts of police regiment 18 near Aratuka because I remember the heavy losses which were suffered during that attack. I remembered looking at the documents, immediate the threat of reprisal measures in the Karisen incident, a case about which I testified yesterday and where I stated particularly that this was only a threat.
Then the Kalavrita incident I remembered very clearly indeed because at that time the Greek Prime Minister approached me. He told me about combat actions in and near Kalavrita and asked me for information. In this particular case, however, he knew more than I did because I had heard nothing yet about Kalavrita. I then gathered information in order to be able to inform him. Other than that I do not remember any events that occurred at that time.
Q. Could you perhaps explain to us this gap in your memory, General
A. There are, above all, those reasons which apply to all of us who are here, for one, the consequence of what the War meant to us, the work during the War and then our activity which did not serve to improve our mental faculties. In my particular case there are perhaps some other mitigating circumstances, if I may call them that, and I could explain my partly really depressing loss of memory through the following facts. During the first World War I was wounded twice in the head. Between the two Wars I had three concussions and once I damaged my skull. During the War, as I have stated, I suffered from malaria, and I suffered from the consequences of this illness during the whole of my stay in Greece. Thus in March, 1943, I was once in a hospital in Athens because of overwork, and later on in January, 1944, I was forced also owing to exhaustion to go to Germany and stay in a hospital there for two months. All these factors together might have contributed to make my memory as uncertain as it is, but I can state that I would attach particular importance to having a memory free of gaps and being able to overlook the whole of my period of Greece.
Q. I believe during the translation it was not mentioned that you had a skull fracture which can partially explain the gaps in your memory.
A. I said that during the War I had three times concussion of the brain and one skull fracture caused by accidents in airplanes and through an accident on a horse.
Q. In the preparation of your case did you have anything to support your memory such as notes, diaries, etc.?
A. No, I don't have a single piece of paper concerning those days. All my property which I had was taken from me during my captivity.
Q. This will bring me back to the starting point, and that is the case Kalavrita. Did you have anything to do with the incident Kalavrita which was a combat and reprisal measure on the Peloponnes?
A. No. It was merely a concern of the 117th Division. At this point, however, I have to add that this fact does not only apply to the Kalavrita incident but also to a number of incidents in the Peloponnes. On the Peloponnes where reprisal measures were concerned, there was a special arrangement which had been reached quite early in November, 1943. This arrangement created a clear limitation of the tasks and rights of the troops and the tasks and the rights of the Administrative Subarea Headquarters there
Q. General, I believe you are here talking about the activity report of the 117th Light Infantry Division covering the period of time from the 1st to the 30th of November, 1943, which is contained in Document Book 20 of the Prosecution as Exhibit 474 on page 94 of the English text and page 66 of the German text.
A. Yes, that is the one.
Q. Document Book 20, page 94 of the English document book and page 66 of the German text. We are concerned here with the first page and the entry under the 5th of November, paragraph 5. Would you please give the Tribunal your comments on this particular part?
A. To the regulation provided here I have to say the following. The troops in combat take their own reprisal measures, as I stated yesterday. On the Peloponnes, as we have heard from statements made by General Felmy, the troops found themselves constantly in combat actions. Furthermore, they had the means to carry out reprisal measures. The Administrative Area Headquarters on the Peloponnes did not have these means. It would have needed the support from the troops. Furthermore, they would learn of all these combat incidents much too late. As a consequence of the further development of the fighting situation, everything was a tactical measure of the troops. In order to create a clear sphere of responsibility and to separate the authorities from each other as well as to avoid double measures in the sphere of reprisal measures this arrangement was made.
Thus rights and duties in this sphere had been clearly invested in the command of the 117th Light Infantry Division.
Q. You say then, General, that this excludes every responsibility where you are concerned?
A. Yes.
Q. We discussed just before the cases Evangelistra and Kalavrita. In these reports the destruction of localities is mentioned, and on this I base the following questions. Have you ever given an order to destroy localities or houses?
A. No.
Q. Is it known to you that in tho area of your responsibility there was ever a case of reprisal measures concerning the burning down of houses and villages where you saw the need for an investigation and examination?
A. No. I know not a single such case. Destructions of what type formed a part of the reprisal measures which were taken in connection with the combatting of bands and the reprisal measures of troops. I personally had nothing to do with these.
Q. Since we are just talking about destructions, General, I would like to deal with one further document in this connection, and that will be Prosecution Exhibit 381 contained in Document Book 16 of the Prosecution on page 55 of the English text and 104 of the German text. The Prosecution charges you with an order of the Second Panzer Army concerning the evacuation of the islands and of the coast in the Adriatic Ocean in the event of an enemy landing. Were you in any way connected with or did you participate in these events?