Can yon remember this incident and can you explain it?
A I cannot remember it, nor I can I clear up the incident, because I had no insight into the matter and into the measures of the Higher SS and Police Leaders. Also I had no insight into the conditions in Chaidari; but for two reasons I can make a certain guess from all the documents which I have before me today.
First of all, the number 200 and secondly the date, the first of May 1944. Both factors can without doubt be combined with the case of Krech which I have talked about here. But it is only a conclusion made by me today which is not based on any actual knowledge or remembrance.
A That brings me to the end of the subject which I have discussed here in connection with the testimony and examination of the witness Sontes.
And I will now come to another question; this is the Jewish question. General, the prosecution have charged you with having taken measures against the Jewish part of the population in Greece or in Athens and these measures claimed by the prosecution to be crimes against humanity. The prosecution has for its evidence referred amongst other things to Exhibit 422, in Document Book 17, page 118, 119 in the English and page 86 in the German.
This is a report of the chief of the Military administration of Greece for November 1943. On page 118 at the bottom in the English and page 86 in the German, there is figure E, the Jewish problem and tho following is stated in the report:
"The Higher SS and Police Leader has issued a directive dated the 3rd of October, 1943, by virtue of which all Jews in Athens had to report to the Jewish community and in other cities and rural communities to the town halls or to the community offices. Since a large part of the Jews did not report in Athens, for instance, only 1200 Jews were seized of the 8,000 living there.
The Military Commander in agreement with the special Plenipotentiary of the Foreign Office for the Southeast has confiscated their fortune by an order and has transferred it to the Greek State to be administered."
At the beginning, I would like to state that this report starts with words "the Higher SS and Police Leader". It appears that he has concerned himself independently with an operation against the Jews. General, who was competent or responsible for the actions against the Jews in Greece?
A The Higher SS and Police Leader on orders of the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Q What do you know about the incident set down here in this section of the report of the Military Administration dated November 1943?
A With regard to this, first of all, I must relate the incidents which led up to this report. In September 1943, the then Higher SS and Police Leader Strob came to me one day and told me that the Reichsfuehrer SS had given him the order for the Jews to be deported from Athens to Germany. The matter had already been in progress for some time and the next day the transport to Germany would start and he wanted to tell me about this.
I was honestly shocked by this fact; until then I had heard nothing at all about such measures and I know nothing about them. At the same time, it was also clear to me that it would be extremely difficult to prevent this measure of the Reichsfuehrer SS or to limit it in any way, apart from the fact that in my purely official capacity I had no right and no possibility to do this. Nevertheless, I thought about the matter very quickly and thought how I could intervene in some way. To turn to my superior officers in Belgrade seemed to me to be useless because they also couldn't take any decision about it, apart from the fact that at that time, the telephone call didn't only take hours but days until it came through.
And then I wondered whether I should apply directly to the OKW but I turned this thought down too. There were two possibilities; either the OKW knew about this intention and measure of the Reichsfuehrer SS and then the answer would be "Don't you meddle in things which don't concern you," or the OKW would first of all have to talk to the Reichsfuehrer SS and then it would be a long time before they came to any decision, and the transport was all ready to start the next day.
Therefore, I came to what I thought was a very good third solution; I explained to SS Fuehrer Strob that in Athens - it only concerned Athens - the Jews did not play any great part either numerically or financially, or economically, or socially. I didn't know that but I said it.
And secondly, I said that such an action of this kind would arouse considerable unrest in the population because they would not understand such a measure. Therefore, I made him the proposal if he was convinced of my reasons, on his own initiative, he should request the Reichsfuehrer SS to stop this action as regards Athens.
I said to myself, in view of the situation at that time, only a request which came from the SS could have any hopes of being heard. He agreed to the request and I asked him that until then he should stop the measure. Thereupon, on the next day, he told me that his request had been turned down by the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Q Therefore, you tried to stop the carrying out of measures which had been ordered by the Reichsfuehrer SS. Were you basically and fundamentally against this action?
A Yes, of course, I was against this action and that is why I made the attempt to intervene as far as it was possible for me under the conditions at that time. I could never prevent it with force. No one could possibly expect that perhaps I should take some action with the Police Regiment 18 which was subordinate to me at that time, and commit it against its own divisional commander.
Q Well then, I don't understand why you, yourself, as can be seen from this report, ordered the confiscation of the Jewish property. Well then, did you take part in this action, although you were in principle against it?
A In this case, it had a very special reason and here I intervened not to support the action against the Jews but in order to help them. This had the following reason: On one day I was told by the Greeks that the Jewish property, that is the property of the Jews who had in the meantime been deported, was decreasing, that the shops were being plundered etc. I could have said that this was an internal Greek affair and didn't concern me at all; but the Greek who told me added that the SS had participated in this. Now, of course, something had to be done. The statements were not concrete evidence for me but nevertheless in the same hour, I still remember, I went to the special Plenipotentiary of the Reich, Minister Neubacher, because the whole question wasn't a military question for which I was responsible but it was a political economic and financial question and for me, in the final analysis, it was a human question.
We discussed the possibilities of helping here and we came to the decision that all Jewish property should at once be confiscated and at the same time should be handed over to the Greek government to be administered, so that this property would be preserved. Thus, we created a legal basis in order to prevent plundering. At that time we wondered who should issue this order, whether he or I, and I declared myself ready to sign it because I said to myself in this way I am doing a good deed even if I am not legally competent to do this.
So I signed the order. The property was confiscated and the Greek government set up a special office to administer the Jewish property.
Q In this way, you wanted to keep the Jewish property safe or at any rate you thought that in this way, the purpose you were aiming at would be achieved?
A Yes, I thought that was the most correct thing to do and the most humane thing to do.
Q This incident took place in November 1943 or in the period preceding that, but couldn't you have said at that time that these Jews would probably never return to Athens?
A No, I didn't know that at that time. I took it as a matter of course, that one day they would be able to come back again. We knew nothing at all about Ghettos then, let alone about Auschwitz. I only heard about that for the first time in 1945.
Q When I look at the formulation of this report here, the report of the Military Administration in Greece, then I must admit that I really don't understand this formulation if it was your intention to help the Jews. What was the purpose of this method of reporting?
A Yes, I must admit that it isn't so easy to understand but the measure taken by me had to have some reason to be presented to the superior offices and this report was the result.
Q. General, you only talk about Athens. What do you know about the actions against the Jews in the rest of Greece?
A The matter about which I have just ben speaking only concerned Athens and, as Strob told me at that time, the transport of about 1,000 or 1,500 Jews from Athens. With regard to the other anti-Jewish action which took place outside Athens, I didn't know anything at all and only heard later on that already at an earlier period, the Jews had been deported from Salonicka. This took place at a time when I was still Commander for Southern Greece and had no connection, no contact at all with the Commander of Salonicka. Therefore, I only heard about this later on when my attention was drawn to anti-Jewish actions as such.
Q Do you know whether other officers in Athens played some part in this action against the Jews?
A The military offices in no way at all. I only know -- and I discovered this later on too -- that the German ambassador with regard to the first action which took place before my time -- the action in Salonicka, had done everything he could in order to achieve some change in this situation but he had no success at all.
Q Your Honor, at a later time, I will read an excerpt from the record of the trial against Goering in the IMT.
In this trial, it was stated very clearly that with regard to the Jewish deportations from Greece, a special staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS was exclusively active and responsible.
General, did you intervene with regard to later actions against the Jews in Greece?
A I would say no, on the contrary, I had nothing to do with then at all.
Q And now I would like to ask you to look at Document Book No. 20 of the prosecution, Exhibit No. 459 on page 6 of the English and page 8 in the German, Page 6 in the English, Document Book 20 of the prosecution and page 8 in the German. What comments can you make on this document?
A For me it is very clear from this document first that this continuation of the action against the Jews was ordered by the Reichsfuehrer SS, that the SS did not apply at all to the Military Commander in Greece but to other offices and third, the directives of Army Group E were sent to various offices and the Military Commander was not even told about the whole affair even for purposes of information.
Q And now to conclude this chapter, General, what was your basic attitude with regard to the actions of the Third Reich against the Jews?
A First of all, I would like to say the following with regard to this, I am convinced that it was just my attitude with regard to the case of the Jews in Athens that I have proved that I criticized the measures as such very seriously that far and above my own powers I tried to help, sometimes successfully and sometimes unsuccessfully. Secondly, with regard to my fundamental attitude about this policy, I need hardly anything to say. Every man of culture has to reject these methods. I did this strongly at the time without being able to do very much.
Finally there is a third factor, which is of a rather personal nature and which I do not mention very willingly, but since with regard to my very personal attitude about the policy of the Third Reich in this sphere it is rather important, I shall mention it here, although not very willingly. My wife is of Jewish descent and for years the Third Reich turned down my application for marriage. I received it finally as an act of mercy at the end of the western campaign.
That proves any kind of prejudice for me in this case can be excluded.
Q To conclude this subject, I would like to discuss two affidavits. The first is Speidel document No. 31, Speidel Document Book 2, pages 58 and 59. This is an affidavit by Kurt-Fritz von Gravenitz. I intend to give this document Exhibit No. 33. The affiant KurtFritz von Gravenitz was from 1938 to 1944 Councillor of the Legation with the Foreign Office Legation in Athens. In this connection I only intend to read the first paragraph on page 59, which concerns the incident which I have just discussed with my client. I quote:
"The regulation according to which the Jewish property of Greeks was entrusted to the administration of the Greek State was for the purpose of stopping threatening excesses of private individuals."
The second exhibit, which I wish to offer in this connection, is the affidavit by Rosie G. Waldeck, contained in Speidel Document Book No. I, Document No. 1 and this receives Exhibit No. 34.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honor, I object to the admission of this affidavit into evidence. It relates entirely to the acquaintance of the affiant with General Speidel in Rumania. It has nothing whatever to do with any charges brought against the defendant in this indictment.
DR. WEISGERBER: Your Honor, I have offered this exhibit intentionally. The Tribunal when judging the question as to how my client regarded the Jewish question would have to rely on affidavits of this kind because this concerns the fundamental attitude of my client. In addition, this affidavit contains mention of an incident, which I admit took place in Rumania, but is clear proof of the attitude of the SS with regard to my client and as such is of great importance. If the SS attempted to liquidate somebody then this is an incident which without doubt must be taken into consideration here.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honor please, we have not made the thoughts or attitude of this defendant any part of the charges of this indictment, his actions are what count and I submit that this affidavit concerns simply his attitude and his attitude at the time he was in Rumania is without any probative value here.
THE PRESIDENT: The objection will be over-ruled.
BY DR. WE:
Q This is an affidavit by. Rosie G. Waldeck, writer and journalist, living in New York. I do not want to read the whole document, but nevertheless in view of its importance, I would like to read a few passages. From the first first paragraph, I will read a few sentences at the bottom of page one where the affiant states: "I am an American writer and journalist of German-Jewish descent. I saw a great deal of the German "conquerors" during a stay in Europe in 1940-41. There were among them a few who behaved like civilized human beings. General Speidel was one of these few. I feel that it is a moral obligation to bear witness, from my personal observations, to his honorable conduct during a phase of the war with which I am familiar - the German "conquest" of Rumania. From what I saw and heard of General Speidel, then chief of the German air mission in Bucharest, I should consider him the least likely person ever to commit a war crime or, for that matter, any action inconsistent with the highest principles of decency and humaneness."
Then I skip page 2 and continue on page 2a, the fourth line? "However, during the preceding months of increasing terror", this is the end of January, 1941, or page 2 at the bottom, "the various hierarchies which formed the German 'colonial' administration in Rumania were divided in their sympathies and aspirations. The Nazissime Nazis - Gestapo, SS, etc. - were decidedly for the Iron Guard and against anyone who tried to check their reign of terror. These Nazissime Nazis loathed General Speidel and were out for his scalp.
My personal acquaintance with General Speidel was slight. Being of Jewish descent I was strictly 'verboten' to the German military, especially as I was suspected of being an agent of the Elders of Zion. However, from the few hundred words we exchanged now and then, this much was clear to me: the General took a very dim view of Nazism. At first he still thought that being a soldier he could keep aloof from politics. Up to a point I had the impress on that he knew very little of what was being played under his nose."
Then I continue with the next part and continue on page 3a, the last sentence:
"Whether or to what extent General Speidel tried to counteract these atrocities, I never had any opportunity to discuss with him. There were, however, indications that he really tried to do something about them. One indication was the great confidence which he inspired in Jewish circles in Bucharest. My Jewish friends there used to tell me that if there was a German they trusted it was General Speidel, and that he helped where he could. Another indication was the extraordinary dislike with which Iron Guardists, Gestapo and SS began to view him.
It so happened that I had excellent information on what SS and Gestapo and Iron Guard were up to from day to dry".
I will skip the next part and continue on page 3a, the last sentence:
"Here the Nazis and Guardists unbent under the influence of a constant flow of champaigne and discussed freely yesterday's blackmail and tomorrow's murder. General Speidel was a recurrent topic.
From what I heard it was quite evident that the SS, the Gestapo and the Iron Guard hated the man. They considered him a great nuisance. They complained that he sabotaged the nazification of Rumania and that he had no taste for the 'dynamics' of the Guardist revolution. All of which led them to the conclusion that he had to be got rid of at the earliest opportunity.
Even then I had a hunch that the Iron Guardists together with the SS and the Gestapo planned to frame General Speidel. I thought of warning him but somehow the opportunity to do so never presented itself. Almost five years later I learned from a Gestapo agent, who was at the time in Bucharest and later in the war changed sides and came over here, that my hunch was quite correct. The SS-GestapoIron Guard crowd had actually a frame all planned out and ready by which they intended to get rid of the General."
I skip the next part and I just read the last paragraph on page 4a:
"This is where my observations end. The conclusion I personally draw from them is this. At a time when the Germans were flushed with victory, General Speidel was neither fooled nor corrupted by the momentary success of German military power; *as a soldier and a gentleman he consistently rejected the ruthless tenets of Nazism; under great pressure he held on to the traditional concepts of law, order and humaneness."
That brings me to the end of this document. Now, General, I turn to another subject, you are charged by the prosecution under count 4 of deporting with force workers for labor in Germany. Did the Military Commander Greece have anything to do with the recruiting of Greek workers and their deportation for work in Germany?
A No.
A Now please turn again to the report, which we have just discussed, exhibit 422 of the prosecution, document book 17, page 111 in the English, page 81 of the German. Please turn to paragraph d, "Labor Employment." Here it states that at the beginning of the year - and it can only concern the year 1943 - 4 labor transports were sent to the Reich. Please explain to us why this report was contained in your monthly report if the Military Commander Greece had nothing to do with the question of workers.
A First of all, I would like to state that this report was drawn up during a period when I was not in Greece, therefore, I cannot say what was the reason in this case for this being included in the report. Fundamentally however, I would like to say - or rather repeat what I have already stated - that everything which happened anywhere was reported to the superior officers to form a complete picture of the situation, whether it had to do with politics, economy or propaganda or labor employment.
Everything was reported to higher agencies and the fact of the report has nothing to do with the responsibility for the contents, as in so many other cases too.
Q Well then please explain at least who was responsible for the labor recruitment in Greece?
A In Athens there was a purely civilian office of the so-called general plenipotentiary for labor, as far as I know that was Sauckel.
Q Well then what did you yourself know about the labor recruitment in Athens?
A I knew the fact as such and what I read in the newspapers about it, but of the organization as such or about the methods, I discovered nothing at all. I have to say that I was not terribly interested in it.
Q Did the Greeks, for instance the Prime Minister, over tell you anything about the transport of workers to Germany, about bad conditions or anything like that?
A No, I cannot remember anything about this.
Q Did you hear complaints from any other side at that time?
A No, if complaints about this matter had been made at all I would not have been the one who received them because this was a purely civilian question. These complaints would have to be sent to the special plenipotentiary for the Reich or somebody like that.
Q Did you ever think perhaps that the method of recruitment, the treatment of workers and their transport to Germany was inadmissable or even contrary to law?
A From what I knew at that time I could never assume that this was an illegal action.
In this report here I find a striking proof of the fact that it was not a compulsory measure because one reads here in the report that the first transport 183 people were returning from leave and the second 61 were returning from leave, therefore, in the first case that is about 15% and in the second case 10% which could be described as people on leave. From this fact it can be seen quite clearly that this was labor employment on a voluntary basis, because if the workers were forced to work in Germany, then the people who came on leave certainly would not have gone back to Germany voluntarily, but would have seized the opportunity to disappear in the large town of Athens or somewhere in the country. Furthermore, in my opinion, one can also draw certain conclusions from the fact that the men on leave went back to Germany, regarding their treatment in Germany, otherwise they would not have returned there.
Q Now please turn to prosecution exhibit 486 in document book No. 21 of the prosecution, page 67 of the English and 54 in the German.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, before the witness discusses this particular exhibit, we will take our morning recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
Q. (By Dr. Weissgerber): General, in this connection there are two passages from Exhibit 486 which I would like to discuss with you. They are contained in Document Book 21 of the prosecution. The first passage is to be found on page 67 of the English text, 54 of the German. It is a situation report by the military commander Greece. It says there roughly in the middle of the page:
"Apart from voluntary employment, there will be deportations by force from the Balkans."
The second passage may be found on page 66 of the English in the same document, page 66 which is page 51 of the German. It says about the middle of the page:
"Apart from that, a first attempt to send labor forces by compulsion from the Pelloponese for employment in the Reich."
I should like to hand you this document. Will you give us your comments briefly?
A. I should like to say first that this situation report comes from a period of time when I was no longer in Greece. Therefore, the passages which you just read are not connected with me at all, but these two reports prove, as far as I am concerned, that in the latter period of time, June or July 1944, there was for the first time an intention to use force. This proves in turn, that previously -- that is to say, when I was down there -- no compulsion was applied. It is quite clear that there was voluntary recruitment before and in those two reports one should stress two words: One is "first attempt" and the second one "in the near future." I should like to state again, therefore, that this report has nothing to do with me.
DR. WEISSGERBER: In this connection I should like to offer three passages from Speidel document books. The first document, Speidel No. 58 is contained in Document Book Speidel No. III, on page 82. This document is offered as Exhibit 35. It is an affidavit by Sklode von Perbrandt who at the present moment is ministerial councillor in the German secretariat of the Zonal Advisory Council.
This affiant served on the staff of Military Administration Greece and says this:
"I know or remember the following regarding the recruitment of Greek workers for Germany, from the time when I was a military administration official under General Speidel on the staff of the Military Commander for Greece (beginning approximately November 1943):
The procurement agent for workers for Germany was the Athens Office of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor (GBA), for brief. This was a special department, and alone competent for the recruitment of Greek workers for Germany. In all questions concerning this recruitment, it received instructions only from higher GBA departments. The authority of the military commander did not extend to this department, which had its own personnel. A special automobile was at the disposal of the chief, and the department always cherished its independence. To my knowledge, incoming mail for the department was not directed to the military commander, but went directly to the department. Decisions were signed by the chiefs of the department in person."
"According to my observations, the department recruited workers for Germany on a voluntary basis only. To my knowledge, the workers procured for Germany were entitled to take leave at intervals, after which, as far as I know, they returned to Germany without coercion."
"In answer to the questions to what I have to say on the following excerpt from the situation report issued by the military administration in November 1943, in my view such incidents could only have happened at a time when General Speidel was no longer in Greece."
Then, secondly, I should like to have reference to Speidel Document No. 37 which is an affidavit by Erich Eisenbach contained in Speidel Document Book No. II on page 72, a document which I have offered previously as Exhibit Speidel No. 13.
On page 74 I should like to read paragraph 7 in this connection. It is roughly the middle of the page and it says as follows:
"With the hiring of workers I had nothing to do."
That is to say, the then General Misenbach who was the Field Commandant in Athens.
"Nor did I know anything about it. If force had been used I surely would have heard of it because the Greek population in such case always applied either directly or by way of the arbitrators' office to the garrison's headquarters or the military administration headquarters. Then I would also have had to report to the Military Commander but this never happened."
And finally, I should like to have reference to Speidel Document No. 31, in the same document book, No. II, on page 58 and following. This affidavit which is an affidavit, by Kurt Fritz von Graevenitz I offered this morning as Speidel Exhibit No. 33. From this document I should like to quote from the second paragraph on page 59. I quote:
"Greek workers for Germany were enlisted on a voluntary basis while General Speidel was in command. The enlistment agency set up for this purpose by Dr. Hempelmann, was, as far as I know, not subject to orders by the Military Commander. This agency's activity was besides not objected to by Greeks at the time. From the ranks of the recruited some came back on leave also, who returned back to their work in Germany without any further ado after their time of furlough was up."
Q. Now, General, at this point I should like to discuss one passage which is contained in Prosecution Exhibit 422. It may be found in Document Book XVII of the prosecution on page 119 of the English and 86 of the German. It says there in the report by the Military Administration Greece for November 1943 -- and I quote:
"The required forces can frequently only be put at the disposal of the Wehrmacht only by threat and by execution of compulsory measures. At various times Mayors who were charged with the procurement of labor forces had to promise the laborers considerable amounts, in addition to German wages and they sometimes had to pay them also."
Could you give us your comments briefly on this passage because there again reference is made to compulsory measures.
A. Here we are concerned with an incomplete extract from a report by the military administration. The report is signed "Chief of the Military Administration." Whether that report was shown to me at the time, I am in no position to judge today. The report is an extract without context and even the photostatic copy does not show the cause and actual incidents behind this passage which has lost all context. I, therefore, can only express the assumption that perhaps here we were concerned with procuring of labor for the Wehrmacht in Greece; not labor for Germany, in other words, but labor to serve in Greece itself.
Secondly, it seems to me that the compulsory measures mentioned did not amount to physical force but they seemed to amount to financial measures. What branch of the Wehrmacht is referred to here cannot be identified from the document. What purposes were to be served by these workers, I cannot find out; therefore, without its context I cannot give a complete statement about that passage.
It may well be, as the mayor is mentioned here, that we are concerned with a measure by the Greek government, a directive addressed to the mayors who were to assist financially in these things, but that, as I say, is an assumption and that is all I can say about it.
Q. Now, there is another document with which the prosecution have charged you in this connection. This is Exhibit 420 contained in Document Book 17 of the prosecution on page 108 of the English and 78 of the German. This is an order by the Military Commander Southeast addressed to the Military Commander Greece and the date is 22 October 1943. There you are ordered to recruit speedily 2,200 workers. That doesn't look as though you had nothing to do with recruiting of labor, does it?
A. With the problems we discussed before, we were clearly concerned with recruiting of workers for purposes in Germany. This document here speaks of something entirely different; this is a military order which provides that for the purposes of providing the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe, labor is to be recruited not for Germany but for Greece and all the Balkans, presumably.
Q. Are we concerned here with voluntary recruitment?
A. The term "recruiting" and the conditions and terms mentioned make this quite clear, I think, but I would like to interpolate something here. When this document was read by the prosecution at the time, a translation was made which might well destroy the meaning of the document. The term "anwerben" -- recruit was translated by recruit which expressed compulsion. I should therefore like to suggest a new translation for the term "anwerben" in a manner which shows that the measure taken was a voluntary one.
THE INTERPRETER: Your Honors, I find in the official Germany military dictionary the two terms used for "anwerben" either to recruit or to enlist.