My personal acquaintance with General Speidel was slight. Being of Jewish descent I was strictly 'verboten' to the German military, especially as I was suspected of being an agent of the Elders of Zion. However, from the few hundred words we exchanged now and then, this much was clear to me: the General took a very dim view of Nazism. At first he still thought that being a soldier he could keep aloof from politics. Up to a point I had the impress on that he knew very little of what was being played under his nose."
Then I continue with the next part and continue on page 3a, the last sentence:
"Whether or to what extent General Speidel tried to counteract these atrocities, I never had any opportunity to discuss with him. There were, however, indications that he really tried to do something about them. One indication was the great confidence which he inspired in Jewish circles in Bucharest. My Jewish friends there used to tell me that if there was a German they trusted it was General Speidel, and that he helped where he could. Another indication was the extraordinary dislike with which Iron Guardists, Gestapo and SS began to view him.
It so happened that I had excellent information on what SS and Gestapo and Iron Guard were up to from day to dry".
I will skip the next part and continue on page 3a, the last sentence:
"Here the Nazis and Guardists unbent under the influence of a constant flow of champaigne and discussed freely yesterday's blackmail and tomorrow's murder. General Speidel was a recurrent topic.
From what I heard it was quite evident that the SS, the Gestapo and the Iron Guard hated the man. They considered him a great nuisance. They complained that he sabotaged the nazification of Rumania and that he had no taste for the 'dynamics' of the Guardist revolution. All of which led them to the conclusion that he had to be got rid of at the earliest opportunity.
Even then I had a hunch that the Iron Guardists together with the SS and the Gestapo planned to frame General Speidel. I thought of warning him but somehow the opportunity to do so never presented itself. Almost five years later I learned from a Gestapo agent, who was at the time in Bucharest and later in the war changed sides and came over here, that my hunch was quite correct. The SS-GestapoIron Guard crowd had actually a frame all planned out and ready by which they intended to get rid of the General."
I skip the next part and I just read the last paragraph on page 4a:
"This is where my observations end. The conclusion I personally draw from them is this. At a time when the Germans were flushed with victory, General Speidel was neither fooled nor corrupted by the momentary success of German military power; *as a soldier and a gentleman he consistently rejected the ruthless tenets of Nazism; under great pressure he held on to the traditional concepts of law, order and humaneness."
That brings me to the end of this document. Now, General, I turn to another subject, you are charged by the prosecution under count 4 of deporting with force workers for labor in Germany. Did the Military Commander Greece have anything to do with the recruiting of Greek workers and their deportation for work in Germany?
A No.
A Now please turn again to the report, which we have just discussed, exhibit 422 of the prosecution, document book 17, page 111 in the English, page 81 of the German. Please turn to paragraph d, "Labor Employment." Here it states that at the beginning of the year - and it can only concern the year 1943 - 4 labor transports were sent to the Reich. Please explain to us why this report was contained in your monthly report if the Military Commander Greece had nothing to do with the question of workers.
A First of all, I would like to state that this report was drawn up during a period when I was not in Greece, therefore, I cannot say what was the reason in this case for this being included in the report. Fundamentally however, I would like to say - or rather repeat what I have already stated - that everything which happened anywhere was reported to the superior officers to form a complete picture of the situation, whether it had to do with politics, economy or propaganda or labor employment.
Everything was reported to higher agencies and the fact of the report has nothing to do with the responsibility for the contents, as in so many other cases too.
Q Well then please explain at least who was responsible for the labor recruitment in Greece?
A In Athens there was a purely civilian office of the so-called general plenipotentiary for labor, as far as I know that was Sauckel.
Q Well then what did you yourself know about the labor recruitment in Athens?
A I knew the fact as such and what I read in the newspapers about it, but of the organization as such or about the methods, I discovered nothing at all. I have to say that I was not terribly interested in it.
Q Did the Greeks, for instance the Prime Minister, over tell you anything about the transport of workers to Germany, about bad conditions or anything like that?
A No, I cannot remember anything about this.
Q Did you hear complaints from any other side at that time?
A No, if complaints about this matter had been made at all I would not have been the one who received them because this was a purely civilian question. These complaints would have to be sent to the special plenipotentiary for the Reich or somebody like that.
Q Did you ever think perhaps that the method of recruitment, the treatment of workers and their transport to Germany was inadmissable or even contrary to law?
A From what I knew at that time I could never assume that this was an illegal action.
In this report here I find a striking proof of the fact that it was not a compulsory measure because one reads here in the report that the first transport 183 people were returning from leave and the second 61 were returning from leave, therefore, in the first case that is about 15% and in the second case 10% which could be described as people on leave. From this fact it can be seen quite clearly that this was labor employment on a voluntary basis, because if the workers were forced to work in Germany, then the people who came on leave certainly would not have gone back to Germany voluntarily, but would have seized the opportunity to disappear in the large town of Athens or somewhere in the country. Furthermore, in my opinion, one can also draw certain conclusions from the fact that the men on leave went back to Germany, regarding their treatment in Germany, otherwise they would not have returned there.
Q Now please turn to prosecution exhibit 486 in document book No. 21 of the prosecution, page 67 of the English and 54 in the German.
THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, before the witness discusses this particular exhibit, we will take our morning recess.
(A recess was taken.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
Q. (By Dr. Weissgerber): General, in this connection there are two passages from Exhibit 486 which I would like to discuss with you. They are contained in Document Book 21 of the prosecution. The first passage is to be found on page 67 of the English text, 54 of the German. It is a situation report by the military commander Greece. It says there roughly in the middle of the page:
"Apart from voluntary employment, there will be deportations by force from the Balkans."
The second passage may be found on page 66 of the English in the same document, page 66 which is page 51 of the German. It says about the middle of the page:
"Apart from that, a first attempt to send labor forces by compulsion from the Pelloponese for employment in the Reich."
I should like to hand you this document. Will you give us your comments briefly?
A. I should like to say first that this situation report comes from a period of time when I was no longer in Greece. Therefore, the passages which you just read are not connected with me at all, but these two reports prove, as far as I am concerned, that in the latter period of time, June or July 1944, there was for the first time an intention to use force. This proves in turn, that previously -- that is to say, when I was down there -- no compulsion was applied. It is quite clear that there was voluntary recruitment before and in those two reports one should stress two words: One is "first attempt" and the second one "in the near future." I should like to state again, therefore, that this report has nothing to do with me.
DR. WEISSGERBER: In this connection I should like to offer three passages from Speidel document books. The first document, Speidel No. 58 is contained in Document Book Speidel No. III, on page 82. This document is offered as Exhibit 35. It is an affidavit by Sklode von Perbrandt who at the present moment is ministerial councillor in the German secretariat of the Zonal Advisory Council.
This affiant served on the staff of Military Administration Greece and says this:
"I know or remember the following regarding the recruitment of Greek workers for Germany, from the time when I was a military administration official under General Speidel on the staff of the Military Commander for Greece (beginning approximately November 1943):
The procurement agent for workers for Germany was the Athens Office of the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor (GBA), for brief. This was a special department, and alone competent for the recruitment of Greek workers for Germany. In all questions concerning this recruitment, it received instructions only from higher GBA departments. The authority of the military commander did not extend to this department, which had its own personnel. A special automobile was at the disposal of the chief, and the department always cherished its independence. To my knowledge, incoming mail for the department was not directed to the military commander, but went directly to the department. Decisions were signed by the chiefs of the department in person."
"According to my observations, the department recruited workers for Germany on a voluntary basis only. To my knowledge, the workers procured for Germany were entitled to take leave at intervals, after which, as far as I know, they returned to Germany without coercion."
"In answer to the questions to what I have to say on the following excerpt from the situation report issued by the military administration in November 1943, in my view such incidents could only have happened at a time when General Speidel was no longer in Greece."
Then, secondly, I should like to have reference to Speidel Document No. 37 which is an affidavit by Erich Eisenbach contained in Speidel Document Book No. II on page 72, a document which I have offered previously as Exhibit Speidel No. 13.
On page 74 I should like to read paragraph 7 in this connection. It is roughly the middle of the page and it says as follows:
"With the hiring of workers I had nothing to do."
That is to say, the then General Misenbach who was the Field Commandant in Athens.
"Nor did I know anything about it. If force had been used I surely would have heard of it because the Greek population in such case always applied either directly or by way of the arbitrators' office to the garrison's headquarters or the military administration headquarters. Then I would also have had to report to the Military Commander but this never happened."
And finally, I should like to have reference to Speidel Document No. 31, in the same document book, No. II, on page 58 and following. This affidavit which is an affidavit, by Kurt Fritz von Graevenitz I offered this morning as Speidel Exhibit No. 33. From this document I should like to quote from the second paragraph on page 59. I quote:
"Greek workers for Germany were enlisted on a voluntary basis while General Speidel was in command. The enlistment agency set up for this purpose by Dr. Hempelmann, was, as far as I know, not subject to orders by the Military Commander. This agency's activity was besides not objected to by Greeks at the time. From the ranks of the recruited some came back on leave also, who returned back to their work in Germany without any further ado after their time of furlough was up."
Q. Now, General, at this point I should like to discuss one passage which is contained in Prosecution Exhibit 422. It may be found in Document Book XVII of the prosecution on page 119 of the English and 86 of the German. It says there in the report by the Military Administration Greece for November 1943 -- and I quote:
"The required forces can frequently only be put at the disposal of the Wehrmacht only by threat and by execution of compulsory measures. At various times Mayors who were charged with the procurement of labor forces had to promise the laborers considerable amounts, in addition to German wages and they sometimes had to pay them also."
Could you give us your comments briefly on this passage because there again reference is made to compulsory measures.
A. Here we are concerned with an incomplete extract from a report by the military administration. The report is signed "Chief of the Military Administration." Whether that report was shown to me at the time, I am in no position to judge today. The report is an extract without context and even the photostatic copy does not show the cause and actual incidents behind this passage which has lost all context. I, therefore, can only express the assumption that perhaps here we were concerned with procuring of labor for the Wehrmacht in Greece; not labor for Germany, in other words, but labor to serve in Greece itself.
Secondly, it seems to me that the compulsory measures mentioned did not amount to physical force but they seemed to amount to financial measures. What branch of the Wehrmacht is referred to here cannot be identified from the document. What purposes were to be served by these workers, I cannot find out; therefore, without its context I cannot give a complete statement about that passage.
It may well be, as the mayor is mentioned here, that we are concerned with a measure by the Greek government, a directive addressed to the mayors who were to assist financially in these things, but that, as I say, is an assumption and that is all I can say about it.
Q. Now, there is another document with which the prosecution have charged you in this connection. This is Exhibit 420 contained in Document Book 17 of the prosecution on page 108 of the English and 78 of the German. This is an order by the Military Commander Southeast addressed to the Military Commander Greece and the date is 22 October 1943. There you are ordered to recruit speedily 2,200 workers. That doesn't look as though you had nothing to do with recruiting of labor, does it?
A. With the problems we discussed before, we were clearly concerned with recruiting of workers for purposes in Germany. This document here speaks of something entirely different; this is a military order which provides that for the purposes of providing the Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe, labor is to be recruited not for Germany but for Greece and all the Balkans, presumably.
Q. Are we concerned here with voluntary recruitment?
A. The term "recruiting" and the conditions and terms mentioned make this quite clear, I think, but I would like to interpolate something here. When this document was read by the prosecution at the time, a translation was made which might well destroy the meaning of the document. The term "anwerben" -- recruit was translated by recruit which expressed compulsion. I should therefore like to suggest a new translation for the term "anwerben" in a manner which shows that the measure taken was a voluntary one.
THE INTERPRETER: Your Honors, I find in the official Germany military dictionary the two terms used for "anwerben" either to recruit or to enlist.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. General, what in accordance with your own knowledge of the English, would you say was a good translation for that term?
A. Well, I wouldn't know the technical term myself. I would have said for "anwerben" - "to engage."
Q. Now about the order itself -- was it ever carried out, the order which we have just mentioned?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Excuse me, may I ask the court interpreter whether "engage" is a satisfactory translation of the German word here involved?
THE INTERPRETER: Well, according to my knowledge of the German language, I think that "anwerben" is not the term which one would use, for instance, if a private firm engages workers. Nobody would say that a firm of businessmen would engage workers in that sense. I think "anwerben" is stronger than "engage" personally. "Engage" is "anstellen" but not "anwerben," I don't think.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. General, this order of 22 October 1943, was it ever carried out?
A. No, the order was not carried out.
Q. Why not? Because, after all, it is an order.
A. I remember this incident very well. I must confess that at the time this order was unpopular with me. It was my view that the Military Commander was not a labor exchange, and I had no possibility organizationally speaking, to carry out a measure of that sort. Now in a number of telephone conversations, I put up counter-demands. I thought if I am to recruit workers for a certain purpose, first of all I must have accommodation; secondly, I must feed them; thirdly, I must provide for them and I must guard them. I must guard them not lest they run away, but I must protect them against possible raids by the bands. In other words, I put up demands as it were, which had to be fulfilled first so that I could use them as a lure for those whom I wanted to engage.
This went on for weeks and weeks and it was not really satisfactoril cleared up. Finally, the demand contained in this order was rescinded from higher up, and as I have heard from Geitner's examination here, he confirmed this at the time, namely that the measure was not carried out, that in its place, a fact which I did not know, Italian workers were employed.
Q. General, do you recall that the witness Stadtmueller who testified here last week for General Felmy, spoke of a deportation of workers by compulsion. Did you know that event at the time?
A. If I remember correctly, Professor Stadtmueller said a few days ago that the SS gathered together workers in Athens by force and he also said that this happened about two or three months prior to the evacuation of Athens. All I can say about that is that I was no longer in Athens at that time and that during my own period of time I never heard anything about a measure of that sort.
Q. General, I am sure you will recall that the prosecution charged you that you and other generals had worked out plans and carried out schemes aimed at the extermination and destruction of the Balkan people, that is to say in your case of the Greek people. In order to give you the possibility to give us your comments on that particular charge, I should like first to discuss with you briefly how your personal collaboration with other agencies in the Balkans was handled. I would like you to tell the Tribunal first how often you contacted your immediate superior General Felber.
A. I visited him three times, apart from which I had a few telephone conversations with him. He himself never called on me.
Q. Did you discuss matters with Fieldmarshal von Weichs?
A. I saw Field marshal von Weichs only once which was as late as June or July 1943, when he was on a sort of information trip through Southern Greece without my knowing at the time that he was to become Commander-in-Chief Southeast.
Q. How often did you discuss problems with the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group E, General Loehr?
A. Well, there you should make a difference between two phases. One, you must differentiate between my period of time as Military Commander Southern Greece and then Military Commander Greece. As the Military Commander Southern Greece, I went to see him two or three times, and he, I should imagine, called on me twice or three times in Athens. In the latter period of time, I went and saw him once in Salonika.
Q. What were the points of contact between you two? Because you were not really subordinate to him. Your immediate superior was General Felber, wasn't it?
A. Quite so. The reason for this visit was an argument which was concerned with the constant interference by the Army Group in my competence. It became necessary to clear things up.
Q. You had a conversation with General Loehr yourself about various points and you wanted to clear up a number of measures and you thought that conversation was necessary, did you?
A. Yes. I have given you the reason why we saw each other because it shows the duplication of work, the lack of clarity in competence and other problems. The Commanderin-Chief of Army Group E, had written me an extremely strong-worded letter. He reproached me strongly with the fact, one, that my economic and financial policies in Greece were completely wrong; two, that I only seemed to represent Greek interests at the expense of German troops; that, I thought, went a little far and I therefore answered back in the same manner. I made it clear above all, first, that I would not stand for interference within my own field of tasks and, two, that as far as financial and economic problems were concerned, I was completely dependent on the Plenipotentiary of the Reich for those things, and thereupon he invited me to speak with him personally, which we did, and up to a certain point we cleared masters up.
Q. Did you closely cooperate anything with the Chiefs of General Staff of the two headquarters--that is to say, Military Commander Southeast and Army Group E? Was your collaboration a close one?
A. No, I always negotiated with the Commanders-in-Chiefs themselves because, after all, they were my superiors, not the Chiefs of Staff. Of course, I always called on the Chiefs afterwards and informed them.
Q. Did you cooperate intimately with the Commanding General of the 68th Army Corps?
A. Despite the fact that we were stationed the same place, our collaboration was almost zero, I am inclined to say, because our fields of task were so entirely different. Throughout that period of time, I cannot recall one single official conversation we had. I am inclined to believe that General Felmy would bear me out here.
Q. Now, there also was the 22nd Corps in the Greek area. Did you have intimate official relations with that Corps?
A. After General Lanz' departure from Athens after the capitulation, I had no immediate contact with him any longer, I saw him privately at a later period of time when he was in Athens but any official contact was negligible.
Q. Did you receive basic orders or instructions by any of your superior agencies in writing or orally which were of decisive influence on the way you treated the Greek nation and state?
A. No, I relied ultimately on the orders which we have here in this trial. My actual tasks and duties I had to find myself.
Q. While you were serving in Greece, did you at any time conceive the idea that the ultimate aim of German policy, which would include the military leadership, in the Balkans was to terrorize or decimate or exterminate the population?
A. No, never.
Q. General Felber, when he was a witness here, testified that you had applied to him to be relieved of your duties.
Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is correct. I did not ask to be relieved only once; but several times, once in writing and twice orally; and the suggestion was once made to General Felber and on another occasion the suggestion was made to Army Group E.
Q. What were the reasons why you took this somewhat extraordinary step?
A. A number of factors were of importance here, and I only want to mention the more essential ones.
For one, it was the lack of organization in the channels of command which I have mentioned before, the constant overlapping of all competencies, the lack of clarity in the lines of demarcation between the various fields of duties, the endeavors on the part of other people to interfere in my own field, in one word the chaos in the channels of command, which was prevailing down there. There was no clear-out course anybody followed; all these matters contributed to make it very difficult for me to work successfully and things became therefore highly unpleasant.
Q. Was this application for relief of yours complied with?
A. Not immediately; indirectly inasmuch as I was called away in May 1944.
Q. What was the reason which they gave you at the time?
A. No reason was given me. It might be explained perhaps through the fact that my agency was somewhat diminished organizationally.
Q. At this point, if the Tribunal please, I beg to offer Speidel Document No. 27 contained in Document Book Speidel No. II on page 50. This is offered as Speidel Exhibit No. 36. This is an affidavit by Dr. Hans Speidel, and I should like to quote the following passages:
"I served as an officer from 1914 to 1944. My last rank was that of Major General in the German Army. My last appointment was as Chief of General Staff of Army Group B. (Field Marshal ROMMEL). Following the happenings of 20 July 1944, I was arrested on orders from HIMMLER on 7 September 1944, and, after being confined for 8 months in Gestapo cellars in Albrecht-strasse, Berlin, in camps, prisons and fortress, was freed by the first French Army on 29 April 45. Even in the early stages, I was associated with the resistance forces in the Army and homeland and finally, together with Field Marshal ROMMEL, prepared the separate conclusion of the war in the west, and, with it, the removal of national socialist despotism.
On account of this activity of mine then I was arrested on 7. September 1944.
In May 1944 on hearing of the recall of the Air Force General Wilhelm SPEIDEL from Greece by the High Command of the Armed Forces-as far as I can remember by General JODL - I inquired as to the reasons. Thereupon the reply was made to me that Air Force General SPEIDEL displayed a too mild and indulgent attitude towards the Greek population and had judged the situation in the Balkans, particularly in Greece, too negatively.
Air Force General Wilhelm SPEIDEL suffered considerable service disadvantages as the result of his recall at that time." End of quotation.
When was it that you left Greece, General?
A. I do not recall the exact day. I can reconstruct it only. From the War Diary kept by my agency, I have seen that my successor arrived down there on 10 May. I believe that I helped him to become acquainted with his duties for about eight or ten days and then I handed it over. It must have been therefore around the 18th or 20th of May. Having handed over my affairs, I paid a few farewell visits and I was prevented from leaving soon, as planned, because of transport difficulties. I had to postpone my departure from day to day so that I believe it was only towards the end of May that I left Athens.
Q. Now, two brief questions concerning your further assignments until the end of the war. What was the next appointment you were given?
A. First of all, I wasn't given anything. For four months, I didn't do anything at all.
Q. When was it that you were given your new assignment?
A. In October, 1944, I became commander in chief of the liaison staff of the high command of the air force in the Southeast. This was a lovely title, but nothing was at the back of it, because all I had at my disposal was slightly less than 200 men, with whom I was to have passport controls carried out along the roads which come into Germany from the Southeastern area, so that nobody, no soldiers, would cross the frontier illegally.
Q. When and where were you taken prisoner?
A. When the capitulation occurred on 8 May 1945, I was down in the Tyrol mountains after which I became an American prisoner of war.
Q. In how many American camps did you stay?
A. In eight different ones.
Q. How were you treated there as a prisoner of war general?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: If Your Honor please, I object to that question. I don't see its relevancy or materiality in this proceeding.
PRESIDENT: Overruled.
BY DR WEISSGERBER:
Q. General, you remember my question: how were you treated as a general and prisoner of war in American prisoner of war camps?
A. Well, unfortunately I have to state that in many cases it was contrary to the provisions of the Hague Convention and Geneva Convention.
Q. Will you please give us concrete examples for this view you hold?
A. I and a group of about 25 generals had been put together by chance. We were first accommodated in mass quarters, slept on the bare floor, sometimes, in huts without any beds, which was not par ticularly tragic.
On 19 July 1945, this group of 25 generals was loaded on a truck and sent to an unknown destination. Around noon, this truck drove into a prison yard and the gates were locked behind us. This was the prison at Osterhofen in Lower Bavaria. There we had to line up in the courtyard, put our baggage on the floor and unpack. Eight soldiers of the Military Police supervised this and gave orders. Having unpacked everything, the individual generals were taken to the prison. Each one of us was carefully searched. On that occasion, gold and silver cigarette cases, watches, money and anything else of any use disappeared. Then all 25 of us were locked up in a biggish cell where we waited for about two hours. Two hours later, we were fetched out again by the military police and we were to pack again, which we did, but the luggage had become much lighter all of a sudden. Practically anything new or anything of any use was now missing, linen, leather goods, etc. Then we were once again loaded on a truck and driven away. An hour later we were delivered to the American camp at Natternberg. Let me describe to you how our reception was. We generals had to line up outside the barrack of the commandant, and there we had to stand without moving for two hours in the scorching July sun, and American soldiers always threatened to beat us. Then we and our luggage were taken individually to a room for investigation. In that investigation room, I had to undress, that is to say, to speak more precisely, everything was torn off my body so that -- and I apologize for saying this -- I stood there in my shirt. Throughout these proceedings, I had to look at the wall. When I attempted to turn around, somebody hit me on the head so that I looked at the wall again. I don't know what happened behind me. Then I was allowed to put on my trousers again, and wearing trousers and a shirt, barefoot, I was kicked in the pants and thrown out of this hut. My boots and my greatcoat and a few toilet articles were thrown after me. That was all I kept in the way of personal belongings. I never saw my suitcases again, nor did I see my personal property again. My three rings, a gold wedding ring and two very valuable signet rings, had disappeared.
The largest part of my money had vanished, and all I had was a receipt for a fountain pen, a watch and some money, and of that only half returned later on. Having been thus received, we were then accommodated in mass huts together with civilian internees, among whom were criminal elements. It was there that I learned that a number of the generals -- I think it was six, I still know some of the names -were beaten by the American soldiers during the examination.
Q. Did you not make any complaints?
A. I attempted almost daily to go and see the American commandant. I attempted to do this in writing, but it was entirely impossible. He refused to see us or have anything to do with us. He did not receive us in person, nor did he accept anything in writing. We were completely cut off from the world, but I can still tell you what unit it was which committed these excesses.
Q. General, I don't think that particular detail is of interest at the moment. Should it become necessary at a later period of time, you can always tell us. Was it not possible for you to contact anybody outside?
A. No, that was out of the question. Of course, at the risk of our lives, we attempted to smuggle letters out. I remember that I wrote a letter to Cardinal Faulhaber in Munich and one to the commander in chief of the American Army. Whether these letters arrived or not, I don't know. For the rest, we were completely isolated and it was only nine months after the capitulation that we were allowed for the first time to write a postcard and thus contact our families.
Q. Did you not insist on your rights as a prisoner of war, that you should be treated, in other words, in accordance with internatienal conventions?
A. I said before, it was quite impossible to see the commandant and talk to him. About five months or six months after we had reached that camp, a commission of American generals appeared in the camp. There were two two-star generals. It was strictly forbidden to approach those generals, but I nevertheless talked to them in the main street of our camp and told them everything which I have told this Tribunal just now.