A Well, this was entirely a matter of expediency.
A You seem to be so familiar with the Hague Convention regarding the use of uniforms and all. What was the difference, in so far as the International Law is concerned, between the one instance and the other?
A We used the Chetnik bands, if we used them at all, not as a regular army, but, as I said, as a protective or reconnaissance troop against the Tito bands. In other words, they helped us against our joint enemy; but that does not moan that I could make claim that the Tito bands are a regular army.
Q Well, when you used those people they were armed, were they not? You have already told us that they were.
A Yes.
Q And they presumably wore armed for the purpose of shooting people and according to these reports they did shoot people when they were out on these missions in connection with the German tactical operations?
A Yes.
Q So that for all practical purposes, so far as that operation was concerned, they were acting as an ally of the Germans just as you say the Domobrans and the Ustasha did. Is that not true?
A Yes.
A Well now, what is the justification -
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: Mr. Fulkerson, at this time we will adjourn for lunch.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is in recess until 1330 hours (A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 14 November, 1947)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
ERNST von LEYSER -- Resumed
DR. WEISGERBER: Dr. Weisgerber for General Speidel. Your Honors, I ask permission that my client may be absent from the court on next Monday in order to prepare his case.
PRESIDING JUDGE BURKE: That may be done. You may continue, Mr. Fulkerson.
CROSS EXAMINATION (CONTINUED) BY MR. FULKERSEN:
Q General, you have had an hour and forty-five minutes to think about the last question. What is your answer to it, please, sir? Do you remember what the question was?
A Yes. It concerned tactical subordination of these Chetnik units under the German divisions and troops. One cannot speak about this at all. The Chetniks were local protective units which, when an operation was carried out by the Germans, joined these; but one really cannot say that we committed them into action.
Q Well, I may have misunderstood you but I thought on direct examination that you said something along this line, that you ordered Ustasha detachments not to be put in Serbian villages and for Chetnik detachments not to be put in Croatian villages. Is that right?
A Yes. I said something like that. In the area there between the Knin and Zara there were various Serbian villages. In addition, after the whole area was cleared of large bands, there were Croatian authorities there who then called managed affairs in these villages. Then came the Chetniks and Ustasha, that is, Serbs and Croats -- into friction with each other because these were purely Chetnik regions and in order to avoid this we ordered that no Ustasha -- and here it wasn't a question of armed Ustasha but general Ustasha -- were to be stationed in these Serbian villages and these Serbian villages had their own Chetnik protective units.
Q Well, when you used a reconnaissance detachment of Chetniks did you form the band -- did you organize the band yourself or did you take one that was already organized and in being, so to speak?
A I think one must imagine it in this way: If the German troops undertook an operation in one "area and there was a Serbian village there and in this village there was a Chetnik unit, then this Chetnik unit joined, during this operation, with the German troops probably, because at the same time it guard edits own locality. It isn't so that the Germans collected the Chetnik units together or organized them, but these Chetnik units were a certain kind of self-protective units in organization with the consent of Croat government and then these people themselves sent out reconnaissance troops which were at the same time a security for them and also because we wanted to cut out an operation in this area they were also at the same time reconnaissance units for us* Since they were not in opposition to us, they, of course, let us know the results of their reconnaissance.
Q Well, did you make a practice of using other un-uniformed groups other than the Chetniks as allies of yours?
A What kind of allies could they be?
Q That is what I an asking you. We have covered the Domobrans.
A No.
Q These were the only troops that you used or the only troops, let's put it this way, who acted in liaison with the German troops who were not uniformed, not regular troops?
A Yes, just as I have described about the Chetniks who joined us by themselves.
Q Now, about this Croatian independent state, we have discussed the organization of their armed forces and the relationship of their armed forces to the German Armed Forces. Are you under the impression that the Pavelic Government was given the popular support of the population down there?
Let me put it to you this way: Do you think that the Pavelic Government could have stayed in power had it not been for the presence of the German Army?
A Well, I can't say that at all, because I don't know the conditions at all.
Q Well, if you don't know, who would? We have had affidavit after affidavit which describes how assiduously you went all over the country inspecting conditions to find out what was going on yourself and you were down there for some time. You didn't have an opportunity to form an opinion about that subject?
A Yes. As to this I must say that, of course, I knew only a small sector. I only knew that part which lay in my sphere. How the whole matter would have turned out if we hadn't been there, well, I can't say.
Q How many sectors were there as regards the German Army? I mean by that, how many corps sectors was Croatia divided into?
A It had three corps sectors.
Q The 15th Mountain Army Corps and the 69th Mountain Army Corps and what was the other one?
A The Fifth SS Corps.
Q And your sector, that is to say, the Sector of the 15th Army Corps comprised an area of about what percentage of the total area of Croatia?
A That would probably be about a third.
Q Well, how long, actually, did the Pavelic Government last after the German left?
AAs long as I was there the Pavelic Government was in power, i.e. until the end of the war; that is, until the end of April, 1945, when I went away.
Q Well, have you any idea how long this independent Croatian State survived the withdrawal of the German troops?
A The Croatian troops also withdrew with the German troops. Ten days or 14 days after I left, that is, when peace was concluded, everything had come to an end. When the last fighting took place I don't know whether Zagreb was also given up, that I don't know.
Q I am not asking you now about military operations. I am just asking you how long the independent Croatian state lasted after the German troops left.
A I don't know.
Q Nov, you said the other day that in all matters affecting the Croatian populace -- and that included the Ustasha -- the Domobrans as well as the civilians -- that the Croatian authorities had to be consulted. For example, you said that when the matter of shooting hostages arose the German divisional commander was supposed to consult with the Croatian Liaison Officer; is that right?
A Yes, and this was based on an order of the Armed Group dated the 22 of December, 1943. That was exactly laid down in this order.
Q But isn't it a fact, General, that the Croatian Liaison Officer was only consulted as to the selection of the particular victims after the decision by the Germans to shoot somebody had already been made?
AAs to this, I can only say that in my sector such an occurrence took only place once and it was surely dealt with according to the provisions which I have just mentioned.
Q Well what part did the Croatian Liaison Officer take in these decisions? Was he consulted by the German Divisional Commander as to whether in his opinion reprisal measures were justified or was he only consulted after the decision to take reprisal measures had already been made. That's what I want to know.
A I wasn't present at those conversations but according to the order it says quite clearly that the Divisional Commander has to get in touch with the Croatian authorities and the decision rests with the representative of the Croatian Government. Therefore, I must assume and I was not reported to the contrary that that is what took place.
Q You mean that in every case of an execution of hostages it is your impression that the Divisional Commander first consulted with the Liaison officer who then in turn consulted with the local authorities who then in turn consulted with Zagreb or something to that effect?
A No, the Liaison had full authority. He didn't have to ask questions back but he had the decision in his own hands. Therefore, he could say yes, one must imagine that this was a mutual conversation between the Divisional Commander and the Liaison man and if the two say that this is absolutely necessary that this thing is carried out.
Q Well, some of the reprisal measures, some of the hangings and shootings took place a very short time after the occurrence or the act which inspired them, for example: in the case that you refer to where this railroad was dynamited on 25 January and the hostages were hanged on the 26th. The Croatian Liaison Officer must have been a pretty quick witted fellow to make his decision and selection in that short a time, wasn't he?
I don't think that is how the conditions were. From all documents which were submitted with regard to this incident it follows that one day or a few days previously the hostages had already bean seized and as I have also seen from the documents I think there were 23 cases of dynamiting and according to regulations first of all the hostages were seized as a warning to the population; the population had been warned and then they were told if further sabotage acts should occur then we really mean business about the whole thing and the hostages will be shot. This moans that this last railway sabotage act was the eventual cause why now by reason of all the many preceding incidents of that kind of reprisal measures were taken. It doesn't mean that for this individual case the 20 were hanged.
Q Well, on the other hand I believe that you testified on direct examination that so far as these 22 hostages who were hanged are concerned you didn't have any independent recollection on the matter at all. You didn't personally recall it. It is only from the documents that you know anything about it?
A Yes.
Q Therefore, your conclusion that the 22 people hanged on the 26th of January were part of the 36 people who had been arrested earlier is purely a surmise on your part, isn't it?
A Yes, it is a logical conclusion on the basis of the documents.
Q It doesn't exclude the conclusion that these might have been 22 different people?
A But according to these documents I must assume that this was the case.
Q But if your surmise is correct, General, then it is an absolute certainty that these people who were hanged could have had nothing to do with the railroad dynamiting on the 25th of January, isn't it?
A Of course they were in connection with this matter; the seizing of hostages was a reprisal measure which was threatened and if the affair takes place then use will be made of them; that is, it was previously threatened.
Q If these 22 people who were hanged were part of the 36 people who had been arrested 3 or 4 weeks earlier they could hardly have had anything to do with the railroad dynamiting which took place while they were in custody, could they?
A I don't know if it was four or five weeks before. I don't know. It could be and if you say that then it probably it is so.
Q Assuming that that is correct, I believe actually that there was a period of 3 or 4 weeks between the arrest of the 36 hostages and the hanging of the 22; assuming that that is correct, then what is your answer to the question?
4 Then, it is quite possible that these hostages were seized and the civilian population were threatened and were warned that if the sabotage acts continued then hostages would be shot for these acts.
Q Have, you noticed an instance anywhere in all these documents where the Croatian authorities protested against specific arrests or against specific executions and that as a result of that protest the Germans changed their decision?
A No, I can't remember that I read that in the documents.
Q Well, so much for the independent Croatian state. We will pass now from fiction to what you call humor. I want to talk now about Document NOKW 1331 which is in Book XV; it is Exhibit 367, page 13 of both the English and the German. The specific passage that I want to talk about is on page 25 of the English and on page 24 of the German. This is the little resume of the subjects of conversation between you and General Rendulic on November 5, 1943. The report says that General Rendulic -- I'm sorry, it is on page 24 of the German Document Book and page 18 of the photostat. Now, your explanation for this on direct examination was that whoever wrote this entry was simply being facetitious when he said that General Rendulic proposed that a 1,000 band suspects be shot and 1,000 additional hostages be arrested. Is that correct?
A I said this-- this is how I said it: If General Rendulic had mentioned any figures at all then of course he never meant this figure seriously. That's what I said. I didn't say that tho man who had taken down the minutes had put down wrong numbers. I didn't say that.
Q No, but I believe your explanation was that he was simply being humorous; that he was simply being facetitious.
A No, I just said I can't remember the figures and if the General had mentioned them he certainly didn't mean it seriously. That's what I meant.
Q Do you recall this particular conversation?
A Yes, I can remember that this was one of the first discussions and I can remember that I was there, but I really can't remember how this was literally expressed.
Q This was tho first time that you talked to your immediate commanding officer after you went to tho Southeast and you don't recollect what was said about a proposal to shoot hostages.
A It wasn't the first time but from the war diaries it can be seen that already in October I was there for the first time and there it was agreed that I should come once again to the Army after having previously found out about things with my Corps. And then on the 5th of November as it shows here I flew there and those were the points of discussion which we talked about there.
Q. What is your explanation for this figure, 1,000 band suspects, and that is, it seems to me, not simply a typographical error, since, it is pre-fixed by a rather large number, what is your explanation for how that crept into there, if that isn't what was said.
A. I have already said that I was there and General Rendulic wanted to make the importance of Banja-Luka clear to me. First of all Banja-Luka was the old capital of Croatia and consequently the Croatian Government didn't want it to come under Tito's occupation and such sort of things were talked about in the discussion. It was probably said this and that is very important and in case of certain events such and such steps have to be taken and I think when the minutes were taken then the most important points were put down. The whole discussion was not put down literally.
Q. What was your response to this proposal?
A. I don't know any more. Perhaps I didn't say anything at all. Perhaps I just realized that this was a very important locality.
Q. You went down to the Southeast and passed through General Rendulic's headquarters on the way to the Corps and then you stayed with the Corps and looked the situation over and then you came back and had your first serious conference with General Rendulic and at this conference he proposed to shoot 1,000 people and you don't have any recollection of that, nor of what you said to him in response?
A. I really don't know what I answered.
Q. Now, then, let's look at the part here in parenthesis at the end. General Rendulic has already told us what fine relations existed between him and the Fuehrer. Now then here is a reference to a conversation between the Fuehrer and General Rendulic on the 16th of September. What was that conversation about?
A. This conference General Rendulic probably had with the Fuehrer and in it they probably talked about Banja-Luka and they probably said that it was a very important place and it had to be held under all circumstances.
It can also be seen from this that after the Corps Staff had left and since the headquarters of the Corps Staff was certainly known to the OKW they certainly talked about this point; a new situation had arisen because of the Italians falling out and it was quite clear that the Corps Staff had to be transferred.
Q. Let met ask you this, General. You went into this conference and General Rendulic, according to this, made what is at least a rather startling proposal to shoot 1,000 people and to arrest 1,000 more. You don't recall anything about that. Then immediately following that is a reference to a conversation which General Rendulic had with Hitler about, - well a short time before-- on the 16th of September, presumably in regard, as you say, to Banja-Luka but we could also speculate that it was about shooting hostages could we not, if we didn't know any more than what we see here?
A. I must assume that as General Rendulic had only recently arrived in the area; when he reported to the Fuehrer he of course talked about this area.
Q. But you don't recall what the conversation was; you don't recall what General Rendulic told you that he and Hitler had talked about?
A. No.
Q. All right, now let's turn to the meeting which you had with the German Ambassador Kasche, a little while before this meeting. This is reported in Document NOKW 1796. It is Exhibit 561, Document Book XXV, page 15 of the English and 13 of the German. Now, you tallied about this in connection with the so-called executive authority which you had. General, I wish you would tell me exactly what you mean by executive authority. You say you didn't have it. What was it?
A. Executive power means, as far as I know, that Legislative and executive powers are combined in one hand. For instance, in an emergency case then the commander was Lord over life and death, it I might express it like that.
I am no lawyer and I don't know how you would express it.
Q. It is not important what some lawyers' legal concept is in this connection. What is important is your own. In other words your idea of what is meant by the expression executive authority is a telescoping of all authority, judicial, legislative, executive, military, everything into one person's hands.
A. Yes.
Q. General Lueters I think you said had that authority, but you didn't.
A. No, I didn't. He was Territorial Commander and as that he had it. I was a tactical officer and as such I did not have it.
Q. Let's look at this entry for the 23rd of October 1943 which is on page 13 of the English and it says here in case of increase in tension of the situation Lieutenant-General von Leyser demands unilateral, concise, executive authority which was confirmed to him on the part of the ministers. General, who was to determine whether there was an increase in tension of the situation.
A. I could only decide that on the spot.
Q. In other words---excuse me
A. Might I say how this discussion arose? I was quite new there and I hadn't yet taken over the Corps. The Ambassador Kasche came there with these ministers in order to discuss with General Lueters, my predecessor there, about who was to have the executive power and other tilings. General Lueters wasn't there, as I have already said, but as I was already there in order to find out what was going on, I, of course, took part in the conversation. The Chief of Staff told me on this occasion that it was always rumored that Banja-Luka was to be attacked and according to the duties of a soldier one had to make preparations and to decide what was going to happen. One had to take all necessary military measures for the defense of the respective place and as a soldier I, of course, had to have everything at my disposal for this purpose.
As the situation was here in this Croatian state I had to be able to give directives to the Croatian authorities and for this reason, as this point was spoken about at any rate, I said "what will I do? Will I get permission from you, if fighting goes on here," and then these people answered me, "yes, if you on the spot determine that it is absolutely necessary then you will have this possibility in agreement with the competent local Croatian authorities there, because in such a position one certainly doesn't have any possibility of getting into contact with Zagreb, with the Croatian Government." First of all I have quite different things to do and secondly, it isn't guaranteed whether I get a connection or not. Therefore, this is a precautionary measure, a precautionary request which the men agreed to.
Q. What I was getting at was that someone obviously had to make the decision as to whether there was an increase in the tension of the situation and that person was you?
A. Yes, I was that person.
Q. Now, this is not confined to any particular area in your Corps, is it, you could make that decision anywhere in the Corps area.
A. Yes, if it had been necessary I could certainly have referred back to this affair.
Q. Was this ever rescinded the whole time you were there?
A. This wasn't a fixed agreement which was to be held to. This was all agreed upon by way of conversation, and if was appropriately said "If this is absolutely necessary then you can do this because then you will not be able to take up contact. That was the sort of thing that was said, and this conversation after all was specifically concerned with Banja-Luka, which case actually became acute later on.
Q. What this seems to boil down to, General, is after this con ference with the ministers you had this executive power whenever you wanted it, that is to say, all you had to do to have executive authority was to announce that an increase in the tension in the situation existed.
A. That was the pre-condition. I couldn't do it just like that, but only in really urgent cases. In addition if I could not make contact with the Croatian Government or its representative.
Q. Well, now that last condition isn't in here?
A. No, but it is a matter of course. If there is unrest, such as occurred after the first World War in our own country, then a state of emergency was proclaimed for a certain district, and then, of course, one had to get into contact with the competent authorities.
Q. But any time you judged there was an increase in tension of the situation you could delegate unto yourself all the governmental powers that existed in any particular area that you chose, is that correct?
A. If I could not get into contact with the Croatian Government.
Q. Now, the next subject you mentioned was band warfare, and you repeatedly emphasized that the bands weren't entitled to be recognized as belligerents under International law, because they didn't have any kind of standard organization, no means of identifying them in the way of uniforms, etc. I want to ask you a few questions about some documents which you passed over lightly during your direct examination. The first one is found in book XIV, Document NOKW 808, Exhibit 354, page 105 of the English and page 77 of the German. This is a situation report to the 14th Corps, from, I believe, the 373rd Croatian Division?
A. The 22nd November is the date.
Q. I take it you read this document and are familiar with it?
A. Well, on the document itself there really isn't a sign I have read it.
Q. If you haven't read it look it over now. I want you to know what you are talking about?
A. I have already read this before, but whether I saw it at the time I really can't say.
Q. Well, do you notice the exactness and precision all through that document with which the names, the numbers and locations of the various partisan groups are given?
A. Since it is a Ic report this Ic probably received this information by radio. Therefore the sometimes detailed information about the various enemy units.
Q. And how are those units described, isn't it given with particularity what the numbers of the various brigades were and to what divisions they belonged, where they were located, etc.?
A. It was of very great importance for us, first of all to know where the bands were and I think I already stated this in my direct examination that we found this out through the enemy radio to which we listened, and which we maintained the designations used by these bands in our reports, so that there was equality, because if every corps and every division would have had its own designations for the various band units. The Corps and later the Army wouldn't have known which was which. As a result the designations which these bands gave themselves were simply taken over by us into our reports, and then we know which bands we were talking about.
Q. Well, now you will notice down there where it refers to the 8th Division, I believe it is on page 8 of the original?
A. It has only got six pages.
Q. Do you see it now?
A. Yes, I have got it now.
Q. Well, now here it describes how the first and second brigades of that division moved off to the East, while the First Brigade moved to the South, and at the same time the Proski Battalion withdrew to Rudnik. What was the Pro ski Battalion attached to, the 8th Division?
A. I don't know.
Q. And then it goes on down and describes the 7th Division and the 13th Division, and describes where the various brigades of these divisions were. Well, now when this report came in you must have been in the process of planning the operation Panther, were you not?
A. Yes, at this time, the 22nd of November, and I think according to the documents or the first order, our first report about operation Panther arrived on 28 November. That must have been shortly before this time.
Q. So naturally this intelligence report here would have been of interest to you in planning the operation, would it not, since these were some of the troops you wore going to have to contend with?
A. Yes, the ones he probably told me about at that time for that reason.
Q. And then later, this time in Document NOKW 1375, which is in Book XV, at page 27 of the English and page 25 of the German, there was prepared an even more extensive intelligence report, which is called an Enemy News Sheet. Are you familiar with this document?
A. This is a report, which according to the signature is from the Ic of 2 December 1943.
Q. That is Ic of the 15th Corps?
A. Yes, at that time the Ic certainly gave me this report.
Q. And this was also drawn up, I take it, as one of the preparations that was made for the operation Panther?
A. Not for the operation Panther itself, but this kind of report was continuously made by the Ic on the basis of the reports which we received. He summarized them and then this was used for any operations we might undertake.
Q. In other words, the Ic of the Corps would make the intelligence reports or situation reports of the various divisions, such as the document I just locked at, and would periodically collect all this material and make a compilation of all the information you had about the enemy in this area?
A. Yes, according to this.
Q. And this was, I take it, for the information of the Corps Staff and for your information?
A. These reports were actually more for submission to superior quarters, because I was told currently about the condition every day during the situation conferences, about what was going on in my area.
Q. And what is contained in such a report as this, since it is going to be passed on, say to Army Headquarters, is certainly as ac curate as you can get it, is it not?
A. On the basis of the reports he received he compiled this, yes.
Q. Now, here again we notice the three divisions which were mentioned in the Divisional report, that is the 7th, 8th and 13th. I will call them Partisan divisions to distinguish them from the Legion divisions. At the bottom of the first page the 7th, 8th and 13th Partisan Divisions are mentioned?
A. Yes.
Q. And it says there that these three divisions formed the 4th Partisan Corps, and then there is something illegible here. I suppose that that refers to the Partisan Army Group to which the 4th Partisan Corps was attached? Isn't that a reasonable assumption to make?
A. I don't understand. You said to the Army Group?
Q. No, I said there is something illegible here.
A. Not on my copy. Everything is quite clear on mine.
Q. Now, you say you are familiar with the situation yourself from these day-to-day reports you received from your Ic at the afternoon conferences; I suppose you know of your own knowledge whether the 4th Corps was subordinate to the Croatian main staff. It is mentioned here, but it is not too clear that the 4th Corps was subordinate?
A. Of course, I can't say this any more at the moment. All these bands, all had given themselves highly bragging designations, and to whom the 4th Corps belonged and to whom it was connected I really can't say.
Q. But the 4th Corps, generally speaking, comprised most of the partisan troops that were in the area of the 15th Corps?
A. That was changed. For instance, if we chased the bands then they went into another corps sector, and then they suddenly cropped up somewhere else. They weren't troops which were regularly moving here or there, but just went away from where ever we chased them.
Q. And at the time this intelligence report was made the 4th Partisan Corps comprised the main strength of the enemy you had to. contend with?
A. As far as the Ic writes this probably was monitored from enemy radion, and whether this was up to facts one must decide by the individual case; but I think what you are driving at is to find out whether this is absolutely 100 per cent correct or not. But in war one never can be sure whether a report is 100 per cent correct.
Q. Not whether it is 100 per cent correct. I realize there were bound to be inaccuracies, and that the Partisans were not accommodating enough to furnish you with information, but it is true the 4th Corps, according to this report at least, seems to include most of the socalled bandits groups in the area of the 15th Mountain Army Corps, is that true?
A. That is what it looks like, but as I said, they kept on moving around all over the place.
Q. But this was the latest information on it at that time?
A. Whether it was correct two days later I don't know.
Q. Well, now then let's look at this description they give of the composition of one of these divisions. Let's take the -- 7th, the 8th or the 13th; let's take the 7th. It comes first numerically. Do you find the 7th Division?
A. Yes.
Q. Well, now first let me ask you this, what was the usual strength of a German Infantry Division?
A. A German Infantry Division had 12 to 15 thousand men.
Q. That varied, of course, according to conditions, I take it?
A. We nearly always had 12,000 men in one division.
Q. Now, according to this report what was the total strength of the 7th Division, the 7th Partisan Division?
A. Usually a division was about equal to one of our regiments, but that also varied often.
Q. I believe that at the end of the report here it gives the strength as around 5,000 , so that would be, if that is correct --
A. Then the division must have been very strong. Usually they weren't any stronger than about 2,000 to 3,000. That was a very high strength already.
Q. Where was this, do you happen to recall where this division was located at the time the Panther operation took place?
A. No, I don't remember that any more.
Q. Well, now, let's lock at this report of the 7th Division in some detail. You have already glanced over it, I assume?.
A. Yes, I have got it.
Q. Now, this division, according to your intelligence officer, was divided into four brigades, I believe, wasn't it?
A. Yes, as it states here.
Q. And then the brigades were in turn divided into separate battalions?