in-Chief of the 14th Army. That was in the campaign against Poland.
Q And what was your next position?
A With the 14th Army I participated in the campaign in Poland, and soon after the campaign was finished, - that was in October, 1939, I was sent to the west with the high command of the army, and this command was then given the designation, "High Command XII".
To begin with, I came to the army group von Bock, which was divided up later, and on the occasion of the division, I came to von Rundstedt's Army group, that is, the southern wing in the Eiffel territory.
Q In what capacity did you participate in the campaign against France?
AAs Commander-in-chief of the 12th Army.
Q And after that campaign was concluded?
AAt the conclusion of the campaign in France, I was again transferred to the east, to the district of Cracow, together with the army command XII.
In the meantime I had been promoted Field Marshal. That was in the middle of July.
Q And what were your further positions during the war ? Very briefly.
A I remained in the east for a short time, Before Christmas, on the occasion of the visit of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army he informed me that my army command would be transferred to the southeast, -- in order to form there army forces in the Roumanian area, and at that time, when I was informed of this, this had already started.
Q And how long did you remain in the Southeast area? Quite briefly to begin with, we will come to it more in detail later.
A I remained in the southeast until my illness, that was on the 15th of October, 1941, and I was then in the hospital in Athens up to December, 1941.
Q Did you later on have another position?
A Yes, I did have another position for the duration of about two months.
Q And what was that?
A From July and August to September, 1942, I had the command of Army Group A. Army Group A was then located on the southern wing of the Eastern front.
Q How long did you maintain this command?
A From the 7th of July to the 10th of September.
Q And why did you discontinue?
AAt that time there were serious differences of opinion between me and Hitler.
Q What decorations did you receive during the war?
A During the war I received the clasp to the iron cross, first and second class, and the Knight's Cross to the Iron Cross, and furthermore a number of foreign decorations, Slovakian, Hungaian, Italian, -Bulgarian and Roumanian, decorations.
Is it necessary that I mention them all in detail?
Q No, it is not necessary.
What was your attitude to the party of the National Socialists?
A My attitude was, from the very beginning, critical and rejecting, and this, my attitude, was based on my activities, that is, when I had to take part in suppressing the Hitler rise in Munich, I had then noticed the whole manner in which the party proceeded. Furthermore, my attitude was based on the experiences I had made during the struggle before the elections between Hitler and Hindenburg, and especially it was based on the manner of how the party showed itself toward the Wehrmacht, - how the party endeavored to destroy the above-party character of the Wehrmacht and how they tried to gain influence over the Wehrmacht; as I had described before, there were certain cartels amongst the young officers corps; in the years 1929/30 that it was possible that such a thing existed was due to the influence of the party, and on all of these facts my rejecting and critical attitude toward the party was based.
Q Why did you remain in the service then, in 1933?
A In spite of this, my attitude, I saw no cause, and none of the officers could see any cause, for resigning the service because after all Hitler had gained power legally. We served under the Weimar Republic, as long as this Republic held the confidence of the German people, and there was no cause now, just because the political party had changed, and a different political party had taken over, -- there was no reason for us to resign the service. Besides, we did not serve the armed forces of the party. I saw my service as that of the Fatherland.
Q Did your rejecting attitude toward the party of the National Socialists diminish later on?
A No, maybe at the beginning one was somewhat influenced by the successes which Hitler doubtlessly gained in the inner political sphere, as well as on other spheres, and which had gained him respect abroad in broad circles, but it was shown repeatedly that within party circles, and mainly in the inner life of Germany, excesses occurred on the part of the party, which were directed especially against the officers' corps, so that it became necessary to watch out, and my rejection did not diminish, but after a short time, sort of an "in-between" period, I felt rather more strongly in this rejecting attitude. For this reason, in order to not have to accept these excesses towards the Wehrmacht, and even those of a general nature which became felt, I, during the time from 1933 to 1938, when I was commanding general in Dresden.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is not only time for our afternoon recess, but they have run out of sound recording tape, so we will have to recess.
DR. LATERNSER: The question has not been fully answered yet, maybe the defendant can answer it after the recess.
JUDGE CARTER: You probably will have to repeat part of the answer, because it has not been taken down.
DR. LATERNSER: Vary well.
(In recess until three-fifteen o'clock)
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Tribunal is again in session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed. I don't know how much of the last question or the last answer was on the tape, so you'd better ask it again.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Yes, Your Honor.
Q Field Marshal, you were just enumerating the reasons why you remained in office in spite of the excesses which had become known.
A I said that Hitler came to power legally so that was no reason for us to leave the service, all the more so, since we did not serve the party but the fatherland, so as we had done in the Weimar Republic, as long as this Republic enjoyed the confidence of the people. Furthermore, I was of the opinion that the purely objective activity of the Reichswehr, especially of the officers corps which knew only the cause and their duty, and the fact that I would carry out this idea in general, and I was of the opinion that just in such times of political unrest it was necessary for the elements of peace that they should remain at their posts.
Q You mentioned before transgression by the party into the territory of the Wehrmacht. Did you object against such attempts at transgressions against the Wehrmacht?
A Yes. In 1933 until 1938, as long as I was a commanding general, I frequently made representations to the Gauleiter.
Q It was only in 1938?
A No, from 1933 to 1938.
Amongst other things, it was at the time of 30 June 1934 the Roehm putsch, when excesses commenced by the SS. In the same night, I sent a staff officer to the office of the Minister Reichenau and at that time asked him if he would take care that these excesses ceased.
Q And were you supported in this?
A Emphatically, in these attempts, my chief of staff, who was later general of the artillery Olbricht.
Q What was the result of your step on the 30th of June 1934?
A Unfortunately, it was not successful.
Q Did you also on other important occasions object against methods taken by the party?
A Later on, yes.
Q When?
A 1938, on the occasion of the Jewish pogrom in Vienna.
Q What did you do then?
AAt that time I learned it first of all from the newspaper and then I went to my office and when I was certain about events which had happened and I sent the staff officer to the Gauleiter at that time and told him that he should take care that these events did not recur.
Q. Did you also apply to some other office?
A. At the same time, I went to the police president and I told my commanders that if soldiers took part in those kinds of things then they must intervene and punish them.
Q. What sort of happenings were they at that time?
A. In these Jewish programs, I didn't experience them myself. There were plunders and destructions of shops and synagogues.
Q. In order to make this quite clear, when was it?
A. It was in November, 1938.
Q. Did you know Hitler before 1933?
A. No.
Q. When did you meet him for the first time?
A. I met him for the first time in late autumn, 1933, or perhaps winter, 1933-1934.
Q. When was that? On which occasion?
A. Well, I can't say in detail. It was some kind of official occasion.
Q. Then did you see him later on frequently?
A. During the course of the following years, of course I saw him. It may have been three times or four times a year.
Q. And what sort of meetings were they at that time?
A. They were either visits to the troops by Hitler or they were public meetings or it was a discussion which Hitler had in a large circle.
Q. Did you also have private discussions with Hitler?
A. Before the war, no.
Q. Did you go to conferences of a military kind with Hitler?
A. No, never.
Q. From when onwards did you count on the serious possibility of a war?
A. I did not count at all on a serious possibility of a war before the actual outbreak of war.
Q. What about summer, 1939?
A. In summer 1939, the situation was very tense, but I regarded Germany's armament at that time as such that a war could not come. In addition, the diplomatic solution of the Sudetendland and the protectorate had preceded and so I counted on the Polish question also being solved in this manner.
Q. What were you doing at that time of the crisis?
A. I was commander-in-chief of Army Group 5. And I received the order to carry out fortifications along the new Polish frontier and to visit troops which were not under my command.
Q. And what did you think would be the outcome at this time of crisis?
A. Well, I hoped and counted on the fact that as in other cases there would be a diplomatic solution.
Q. And what strengthened you in this view?
A. In this view, I was especially strengthened by the conclusion of the pact with Russia.
Q. But nevertheless war came. And as you have already said, in the Polish campaign you were commander-in-chief of the 14th army, and what was your commission at that time?
A. The 12th army was on the southern flank of Army Group Runstedt --that is, on the southern flank of the army group advancing towards the east and I had the task of going via Cracow in the direction of Lemberg.
Q. And did you get to Lemberg?
A. We got to Lemberg. We also took Lemberg but then in face of the advancing Russians we had to leave Lemberg to them with the oil fields between Lemberg and Prezmysl, including Prezmysl.
Q. Field Marshal, this evacuation before the Russians took place during the fighting then?
A. Yes, this took place during the fighting. At that time, the fixed demarcation line, as a result of the pressure of the Russians, had to be very quickly changed and repeatedly pushed back towards the west.
Q. How long did you remain in the eastern theater of war?
A. Until approximately the middle of October, 1939.
Q. Where did you go then?
A. From there I went with the staff of the 11th Army which was then called Army Group 12 to the west to army group von Bock.
Q. Of what intentions did Field Marshal von Berk inform you?
A. When I arrived in Godesberg, Field Marshal von Bock, who was then general told me at that time rather agitatedly that Hitler was having ideas of operations against England and France.
Q. If you say ideas about operations, what do you mean by this ?
A. I mean an aggressive intention.
Q. What was Field Marshal von Bock's attitude towards this?
A. General von Bock rejected this idea and he told me of this idea of Hitler's -- they were obviously the first thoughts-and he was all excited about it.
Q. And what was your attitude towards this?
A. My attitude was the same as that of General von Bock.
Q. What did you do in order to make your attitude clear to your superiors? I mean your attitude towards these aggressive actions?
A. I talked with some of my commanding generals, with my chief, I worked out a short memo and this memo I presented it to General von Brauchitsch when he came to visit me. This memo contained the idea that I was of the opinion that one should try to avoid a new war and to find a peaceful and diplomatic solution.
Q. And what was Brauchitsch's opinion at that time?
A. Brauchitsch shared my opinion entirely and he instructed me that when I had the opportunity I should submit it to Hitler the same as I submitted it to him.
I was under the impression that Brauchitsch wanted this as a support for his own opinion.
Q. And did you later receive any answer to this representation?
A. Well, an indirect answer, in so far as Hitler called the generals including all the commanding general, I think it was in November, 1934, to come to Berlin.
MR. DENNEY: Your Honor, that is a wrong translation. It would be November, 1939. You said 1934.
A. I received an indirect answer through Hitler who in November, 1939, called the generals together in Berlin. At this discussion, he told us all his ideas and reproached us older generals with timidity.
Q Along came the Western offensive, and what was your task in this?
A I stood with my Army in the Eiffel, and my job was to break through the Maginot line near Mezieres and Sedan and further on to advance towards the West.
Q And was this carried out?
A In the West of Sedan my Army was stopped and turned towards the South against the Aisne to set up a new front which the Panzer forces which were behind me advanced towards the West.
Q How long did you remain in France after the conclusion of the Western campaign?
A Until the middle of October or the end of October 1940.
Q Then where did you go?
AAt this time the Army High Command was again transferred towards the East, towards Cracow.
Q And how did you learn about this new task.
A By orders, an order that the Army High Command had to go toward the East and take over a new task. This task consisted of the development of the fortification line along the German-Russian demarkation line.
Q And at that time did you speak to the Commander in Chief of the Army?
A The Commander in Chief of the Army came during December, shortly before Christmas, and visited me. He was on a visit to the troops.
Q And what did he tell you?
A On this occasion I received a new commission, namely, that the Army High Command from 12 should build out a new group in Roumania whose advance at this time was already in force.
Q And for which reason did one think that kind of assembly of forces from Roumania was necessary?
A There were indications that the British were retrenching themselves in Roumanian there were reports of landing intentions, and of the erection of air bases and that could force us to turn against this in order to prevent it.
Q What operation did you have to count on then?
AAt that time there were thoughts that it could be necessary to occupy Greece up as far as the Aegian coast and in this way to prevent a threat to the Italian Front by the British forces and at the same time to prevent the British from setting up air bases in Greece which would be a great danger to the oil fields, especially those near Ploesti and to the supply along the Danube.
Q And what hopes did you entertain at that time?
AAt that time too I thought that an armed dispute would not arise. And Hitler too didn't want a war with Greece and I counted on the fact that the establishment if necessary by our troops in Bulgaria would along have been sufficient to s top the Italian-Greek conflict and that an armed dispute would not be necessary.
Q Did you express this opinion?
A Yes, I discussed this opinion with my officers and other things were also discussed immediately prior to my departure to Rumania, that is, in the last days of February 1941, with the Dowager Queen of Roumania, the sister of the King of Greece, who at that time of course expressed the hope to me that we would not be forced to wage war against her brother. Her brother was the King of Greece and I could only tell her that I shared this hope.
Q Then was your opinion strengthened by any kind of events that war should not come in that stage.
A This opinion in the next few weeks was of course strengthened by the Anschluss of Yugoslavia joining in the German-Italian pact.
Q Then how did the situation become changed?
A The situation was completely changed from the 27th of March 1941 by the Revolution in Jugoslavia.
Q Then what else happened in Jugoslavia?
A Some news came from Jugoslavia that Jugoslavia since January or February had been mobilizing and on the Bulgarian and Jugoslavian front there were also signs at this time of troops of various formations and, according to British sources later on, Jugoslavia at this time had nine times a hundred thousand men under arms.
Q What orders did you receive then?
A By reason of this coup d'etat I received the order not only as was intended before planned to advance against Greece but simultaneously from the East against Jugoslavia.
Q And what was necessary in order to carry out this order?
A Formerly my eyes were exclusively in the direction of Greece. About my long right flank, already in the weeks before, I had been calmed down by the Commander in Chief of the Army, and I also received the order to reassure King Boris of Bulgaria who told me repeatedly, said to me repeatedly, "don't be so sure; I know my cousins; in the shortest time possible they will advance in your right flank." The forces at this time were not present and were not envisaged and therefore the new task demanded a sudden swing around the whole plan of operation and a new advance against Jugoslavia and so an alteration of the former advance against Greece.
Q The Prosecution contends, Field Marshall, that the campaign against Greece was well prepared.
A The campaign against Greece was prepared; the campaign against Jugoslavia was in no way prepared, but before the 27th there was a friendship pact which was concluded with Jugoslavia, to prepare for an attack against Jugoslavia, we only had the period from the 28th of March until the 6th of April.
Q. When did you receive an order to start a campaign?
A. In the last days of March 1941.
Q. And when did the campaign start?
A. The campaign started against South Macedonia and against Greece on the 6th of April 1941 with the Tank Group Kleist which was further to the North on the 8th of April 1941 it was two days later, because Kleist Panzer group was not ready for the advance.
DR. LATERNSER: Your Honor, before I question the witness about the forces which were under his command at that time I would like to show the Tribunal Exhibit List No. 1. This is four sketches and the photostats are four exhibits together. Actually, when I need them during the examination I will hand them over to the Tribunal and the General Secretary.
MR. DENNEY: Could we have the understanding that they are offered in evidence before determining whether or not an objection should be made. Perhaps Dr. Laternser would like to lay a foundation for it, as there is nothing to show what they are. At this time I object to them.
DR. LATERNSER: Of course I would be very pleased to show them to the Prosecution.
MR. DENNEY: We have them but don't know what they are.
JUDGE GARTER: I assume Dr. Laternser proposes to show when questioning his witness, what they are.
DR. LATERNSER: That was my intention, I think they were distributed a little too early.
Q. Now, Field Marshall, you will see from these sketches, looking at the first one --
MR. DENNEY: I don't want to be unreasonable about it but throughout the presentation of our evidence we constantly were abiding by the 24 hour rule. We won't insist upon it because this document is nothing more than some sort of a chart which has been prepared by somebody who has something to do with the defense. However, I don't think it is unreasonable to respectfully request the Tribunal to direct in an exhibit as simple as this that we be served with copies before so we will have some idea what was being offered and to save time both for the Tribunal and counsel.
DR. LATERNSER: Of course, Your Honor, I realize that, and everything I submit to the Tribunal I will submit to the prosecution 24 hours beforehand.
JUDGE CARTER: There appears that the Prosecution has not made an objection on the 24 hour rule so you may proceed.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Field Marshall, please look at the first chart. Does this chart give a clear picture of the forces which were under your commandeat that time?
A. Yes.
Q. Please explain this chart to the Tribunal?
A. At the top is Hitler and at the same time OKW and then OKH, Commander in Chief of the Army, General Field Marshall yon Brauchitsch; I was subordinate to him at that time.
MR. DENNEY: The interpreters don't even have a copy of this thing and what they are saying, for instance she just said about the center, talking about OKW; OKW is not at the center and I ask that the defense counsel give them a copy. It is not the interpretor's fault but they arc just repeating what the witness says without having the document.
DR. LATERNSER: I an sorry I didn't know that the interpreters didn't have a copy. Your Honor, in this connection may I say the following: I don't want to make any difficulties; it isn't so simple for the defense to get so many copies of German photostats because if we ask for a certain number then we are told, "you can do with less," and it makes a difference whether the defense asks for a certain number of copies or the Prosecution asks for them. In this case I would ask the Prosecution to take this into account.
It is exactly the same with translations. I this connection I would like to state this:
If the Prosecution gives anything to be translated and say they needed it in two days. I assume this, this is a pure assumption -- I assume they get it, but it I, as defense counsel, ask for it, I may not get it according to the experiences I have had up to now something of this kind might well happen in the course of the trial so that technical difficulties arise in this direction and I would ask that what I have just said be taken into account.
JUDGE GARTER: We evidently have enough copies of this so let's proceed.
BY DR. LATERNSER:
Q. Field Marshall -
A. Then AOK 12 and my Chief was von Grafenberg, and subordinate to me the Panzer group 1 von Kleist, and General Command Stumme, and General Command 18 Mountain Corps Boehme, General Command of the 30th Corps, under off, and under Panzer Group 1 there were two general Commands the 14th Panzer Corps, von Wiestersheim and the General Command 11th Army Corps von Kortzfleisch.
Q. Now field Marshall, what about Panzer Group von Kleist.
A. Panzer Group von Kleist advanced on the Northern flank, via Nisch towards Belgrade and they had to smash the Serbian forces between there and then to occupy Belgrade. With the entry into Belgrade Panzer Group 1 with its troops was transferred to AOK II and General Field Marshall von Weichs.
Q. That is sufficient from this chart. I now would like to ask you how the campaign went on. Please describe it to the Tribunal quite briefly.
A. I have already said on the right flank from the East to West there was Panzer Group Kleist which went via Nish towards Belgrade.
Q. Just a minute Field Marshall, the other charts, which are joined to this one, which I will submit to you later on, I will come to these.
Q. And then towards the South General Command Stumme with the divisions under him had to advance, break through, the Bulgarian-Jugoslavian frontier mountains, smash the Jugoslavian forces there, and take up communication with tho italians. The 18th Mountain Corps had the last sector, had to limit attacks to this line towards the South, also the corps Ott in the direction of Thrace, where were the Creek Bulgarian frontier mountains.
Q. When was Salonika occupied?
A. A Panzer division of Corps Boehme to go around and attacked this line towards South Macedonia in the direction of Salonika. Salonika was occupied on the 9th of April 1941 without fighting.
Q. What was the result of this occupation in Salonika?
A. By the occupation of Salonika the Greek-Thracian Army and the occupations of the Metaxas line fortifications were cut off from their communication with the rear. The Greek-Thracian Army, therefore, capitulated on the 9th of April 1941.
Q. What happened after the capture of Salonika?
A. After the capture of Salonika the forces of the 18th Mountain Corps turned against the Olympic positions which were occupied by Creeks and British.
Q: And when were these positions removed?
A: I can't say the exact date, during the next few days.
Q: And then what happened after this removal?
A: These troops then went towards Larissa, and at the same time from the North a Panzer Division came down. This was sent by Panzer Group Kleist, and went from Florina, towards Larissa. From there the troops went on towards the south in the general direction of Athens which another group of forces went against the rear of the Greek Epirus Army, who faced the Italians.
Q: And what was the result?
A: One of these detachments went over the Mecovo pass in the direction of Joannina; the headquarters was in Joannina, the headquarters of the Greek Epirus Army. This Greek Epirus Army then capitulated.
Q : Why, Field Marshall?
A: By reason of the fact that through this advance their communication, too, was completely cut off.
Q: Who concluded the capitulation of this Epirus Army?
A: The capitulation of the Epirus Army was concluded by me with the Deputy Commander in Chief of the Epirus Army, a General Zolacoughlu.
Q: Where was the real commander in Chief?
A: The real commander in chief bad left his Army shortly before.
Q: When was the capitulation concluded?
A: The capitulation was concluded and signed on the 21st of April 1941.
Q: And did things remain like this?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: The capitulation had to be renewed, that is had to be effected again with the same contents. The reason was that the commander in chief of the Epirus Army had only offered this capitulation to the Germans. Of course, I asked during the negotiations for capitulation that with the signing of the capitulation the fighting had to be stopped also against the Italians. Now Mussolini objected to this conclusion, because it was against his prestige that the capitulation also wasn't offered to him and it was not signed by the Italians, so this had to be done.
Q: And when was the capitulation signed for a second time?
A: It was signed again. I think, on the 23 of April 1941 in my headquarters.
Q : And who concluded it? Between whom was it concluded?
A: This capitulation was signed between -- for the Germans Generaloberst Jodl, for the Italians I don't know who signed it, and for the Greeks General Zolacoughlu. I refused to sign the capitulation which had already been concluded.
Q: Did you meet this Greek General again?
A: In the capitulation negotiations on the 23 April, which took place in my headquarters, even if I didn't take part, I met General Zolacoughlu again. I invited him to breakfast without the Italian mission, in order not to offend his honor as a soldier, because he hadn't been conquered by the Italians.
Q: With the signing of the capitulation did the fighting stop?
A: Yes, completely, at least against the Greek troops?
Q: How many Armies did the Greeks have?
A: The Greeks had two armies.
Q: And what were these armies?
A: The Thracian Army and the Epirus Army.
Q: Could you make it quite clear when the Epirus Army and when the Thracian Army capitulated?
A: The Thracian Army capitulated on the 9th of April and the Epirus Army capitulated on the 21st, and again on the 23rd of April 1941.
Q: To whom did those forces capitulate, who were in action in Albania against the Italians?
A: That was the Epirus Army.
Q: And which provisions did the capitulation negotiations contain about the treatment of the Greek soldiers?
A: The Greek soldiers immediately after the cessation of fighting and after the arms had been turned in the soldiers were released.
Q: At that time did you issue an order with regard to the treatment of the Greek soldiers?
A: I issued an order to the effect that to correspond with the bravery of Greece and the Greek soldiers should also be treated in such a manner.
Q: And did any Greek forces come into the captivity of the Italians?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: After the Greek Army had first of all only offered the capitulation to the Germans, I wanted to save the Greeks from this. On former Greek-Italian fighting line set up German Security troops in order to prevent the Italians from going over this demarcation line until the disarming had been carried out, and the Greek troops were started on their way home.