A Yes, that is so.
Q. Let me ask another question in this connection. I believe I have understood his Honor to ask for further orders. They need not necessarily be orders issued after the order of the 22nd December you referred to. Do you not recall an order which was issued before this one, the order as to the cooperation between Croatian agencies and the divisional commands?
A Yes, there was one and I don't remember the date, but it had been laid down before. I believe it was an Army order, or an Army group order, but I am afraid I cannot give the date offhand.
Q General, the order which sums up all previous orders you have previously discussed, do you not recall which order was issued before this?
A By this I think you mean the comprehensive Army order of 15 September, and this also regulated, that on principle contact with the Croatian agencies is to be established.
DR. TIPP: Let me say for the record that the order which you have just mentioned by the Army Group, of 15 September 1943, is contained in Document Book 14, where it is Exhibit 340. It is one page 15 of the English version and on page 11 of the German version. I believe this brings me to the end of this inquiry.
May I continue, Your Honor?
Q General, after this we shall now discuss a few reports which are concerned with Cetnik formations and Ustasha units, to put it briefly two indigenous units. The first report of that type is contained in Document Book 15, which is Exhibit 367. It is Prosecution Document NOKW 1331, and the report to which I have reference is on page 20 of the German and page 20 of the English document book.
It is a report by the 373rd Division. I take that back, it is a report by the 15th Mountain Corps of 11 December 1943, addressed to the 2nd Panzer Army, and under the 373rd Division there are some reports contained which are of no interest in this connection, but the last paragraph of the report is the point I want to discuss with you now. I quote: "On the night of 9 to 10 December the Cetniks raided Communist I local committee in Seliste, 2 bandits shot, 2 escaped." May call the Tribunals attention to the fact that the same report was submitted on one occasion by the prosecution. It is contained in the same document book, exhibit 365. It is document NOKW 1399, and the passage which I have reference to is on page 7 of both the German and the English book. In other words, the same incident has been used for two different exhibits.
General, will you give us your comment about the incident itself?
A This quite obviously is an incident which occurred in the area of the corps, and that is why it was passed on to the command. Otherwise, because it was not a subordinate unit I had nothing to do with it.
Another report of this type is contained in Document Book 25 of the Prosecution. It is on page 45 of the English and page 35 of the German. The incident is contained in Document NOKW 1769, which is Exhibit 567. May I make a brief remark about this, Your Honor? When I give a page in the document book it is always the page of the document book on which the individual report concerned is contained. It is not the page whore the exhibit begins. The report to which I have reference here, General, is a daily report by the 15th Mountain Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army, dated 10 January 1944.
I quote: "Butolica has been burned down by the Ustasha. 100 inhabitants murdered." What can you tell us about that?
A This incident is an incident which had to be reported on the area, but the description here shows what opinion the troops formed of this incident. The term "murdered" surely is an unequivocal one. No troops would use a term like that if they felt a regular operation had taken place. This report was undoubtedly done in order to get the Croatian authorities to do something.
Q Let me ask further, that probably was the reason why you included this incident in your daily report to the corps?
A Yes, certainly.
Q The next report of that character is also contained in document 25, page 52 of tho English and page 41 of the German. This is Exhibit 570, NOKW 1772. It is a daily report by the 15th Army Corps, again addressed to the 2nd Panzer Army of 9 February 1944. Under the 167th Division it says, and I quote: Cetnik reconnaissance detachment met small band, 15 prisoners, 12 of whom shot, 3 released." What is the meaning of that report, General?
A This report describes an excess committed by a Cetnik unit, and the troops were in no position to do anything about it. The event was reported so that people higher up would be informed. It was those incidents which led to complaints by Croatian authorities, and it was therefore of importance for the agencies to be informed about it whenever such complaints by the Croatians reached the Wehrmacht.
Q Let us go on and discuss another incident. It has been submitted by the prosecution in two different documents, one is contained in Document Book 16, page 93, of the English and page 139 of the German. It is Prosecution Exhibit 393, and it is Document NOKW 1428. The same incident is also contained in Document Book 25, Exhibit 567, NOKW 1577on page 109 of the English and page 83 of the German books. In both instances the event is part of a daily report by the 15th Army Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army of 5 June 1944. 373rd Infantry Division reported here that "Croatian combat troops have destroyed bandit hospital Southeast of Udbina. 20 enemy dead, including 2 physicians. In addition 95 wounded and 6 killed." May I point out to you a mistake in the translation of the document book? The German original the term is used for "niedergemacht", which I don't think the word "killed" is quite sufficient there. Perhaps it should be "slaim," "massacred" or "slaughtered." May I ask the interpreter if that proposed translation is correct?
THE INTERPRETER: I think it is, your Honor, if I may say.
DR. TIPP: Then perhaps this correction could be made in the English document book as well, if that is agreeable with the prosecution.
MR. FULKERSEN: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: I think a statement should be made for the record.
MR. FULKERSEN: It is agreeable with the prosecution, Your Honor.
Q General, let me ask you first, you have already indicated what is to be understood by a Croatian combat unit--
THE PRESIDENT: Before we get too far away, just where is the correction to be made in this document? Will the interpreter please give the line, and the sentence?-
THE INTERPRETER: It is the third sentence, Your Honor, page 4, which begins with the word "Thereby" and the sentence should read, "20 enemy dead, including two physicians, in addition 95 sick and massacred."
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
Q General, would you please tell us again what a Croatian combat group is supposed to be?
A Croatian combat groups, as I said before were local defense units, who as a rule were used for the protection of their own villages and surrounding neighborhood against the communist bands. They were neither a part of the Ustasha nor of the regular Croatian army. There was no subordination of them under the Wehrmacht.
Q Now, having cleared this up what can you tell us about the conditions of this report, what we are concerned with here is definitely an incident which the troops learned about after the event. They disassociated themselves from this incident, which becomes clear from the way they put it. The term "massacred" is used by the troops only for an act for which the troops feel contempt, but of course it was necessary to make this report for a reason which I have frequently said before. The troops, as I have said before, were in no position to do anything themselves, which is regrettable.
Q General, I can sum up what you said about these reports to the effect that here we are concerned with the incidents concerned with the local inhabitants, that is to say units were involved which were not under your order's, and the incidents themselves were quite beyond your initiative and that of the troops is that correct?
A Yes, that is quite true. The troops had no possibility to intervene.
Q Let us leave these incidents now, General. They are the only ones which are submitted against you in this trial, and let us turn to a different problem. We discussed before this long order concerning the way of reporting, which was Exhibit 369, contained in Document Book 15, page 51 English and page 75 of the German Book. One more question based upon that document. This order mentions that the troops are not allowed to give any enemy reports with the indication of the source where it came from. Why was that ordered, General?
A To give the source for enemy reports was highly important in Croatia. Quite generally the tendency existed to have reports exaggerated concerning the strength of the enemy.
For instance in the event of a report by the confidential agency, you could always reduce it by 67 to 80 per cent. Even the enemy wireless to which we listened reported none. Therefore, we soon learned they were exaggerated for reason of propaganda. For reason of camouflage alone the bands were inclined to exaggerate their strength. This becomes clear from the terms which they used to describe their units. For instance, I would like to point out here that band brigade is as a rule about as strong as a battalion, and a band division for the most part was as strong as a regiment.
Q May I interrupt you, General, and I point out here that the strength of band brigade or division is contained in a document submitted by the prosecution. It is contained in Document Book 15, page 26 of the English, and page 25 of the German. It is exhibit 368 and Document NOKW 1375. On the pages which I have mentioned there are these reports concerning the strength and personnel of a band brigade and of a band division.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our morning recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, before the recess we stopped when we discussed the question what the reasons were that in reports about the enemy situation, the source of information was to be mentioned. First of all, you pointed out what the actual strength of a band brigade and band division and I drew to the Tribunal's attention the fact that this can be ascertained on the basis of a prosecution document. May I now ask you to continue with your answer to my question?
A The source was particularly important because thus it could be ascertained how the troops received their knowledge about the enemy. Only if the knowledge of the source exists one can actually say whether the enemy strength mentioned was in accordance with the actual facts and how the strength should be evaluated.
I was mainly interested in having this point clarified because I myself experienced the confusion which arose from such designations. A battalion of the 264th Division, which advanced towards Zara had encountered the enemy, who all of a sudden with infantry and machine gun fire attacked the marching column of the battalion and thus losses were suffered. The battalion Commander, who was not familiar with the particular district because he with his battalion had come from France, received a report that he was facing an enemy division, therefore he was under the impression that he could not take the responsibility to encounter a whole division with just one battalion and for that reason he stopped.
It so happened that I met this battalion in this particular situation, I explained to the battalion commander that such band divisions could not be compared with proper divisions and with ordinary troops. I then ordered him to get his men into position, to fire artillery shells and to attack with energy, then this so-called division would itself dissolve into nothing. That is what happened. I was able to get to Zara and this very same battalion arrived in Zara on the same evening. That is my own experience and in my opinion it proves that the bands were no regular belligerents even if individual members of them wore uniforms now and again and even if they called themselves divisions.
Q There are another few questions which I would like to ask you in connection with the reports. That was the exchange of reports between the neighboring units of equal rank and your own Corps?
A The great distances in that area resulted in the communications with neighboring corps being frequently disturbed. Even radio communications did not always function properly in this mountainous area. Therefore, we cannot talk about a regular and well organized exchange of daily reports, etc.
Q One additional question in this connection, General. Did you receive reports from neighboring corps such as can be seen from some documents, did you personally receive reports of the neighboring corps, were these reports submitted to you, did you read them or if not, how were you informed about occurances with neighboring corps?
AAs I have said, there were great difficulties in the exchange of communications and thus it happened only very rarely that we were informed about events with the neighborly corps. What I have seen from the documents here was that when I arrived in the area, it still happened occasionally that I received daily reports from neighboring corps, but later on that petered out because of difficulties of communications and therefore I am in no position to say that I was regularly informed about occurances in neighboring corps.
Q In this connection, General, may I refer to a prosecution document, which is contained in Document Book 16 of the Prosecution on page 5 of the English and page 11 of the German document book. This is exhibit 375 and it is Document NOKW 658. This rather extensive document contains reports from the 69th Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army. According to the distribution in the document, these reports also reached the 15th Corps or at least for a certain period of time; what are your comments to this document?
AAs I have already stated my predecessor was General Lueter. He was in this position up until August of 1943, i.e. he was Commander of the German Troops in Croatia.
All German units stationed in this area had to report to him in his before mentioned capacity. This duty did no longer exist when the staff was changed into the 15th Mountain Corps. The 15th Mountain Corps did no longer receive these reports as can be seen from the distribution. If they only received them for information purposes and no particular task was connected with the receiving of the reports as far as I was concerned.
Q You said just now you only received the reports for information purposes, General. The Prosecution when they presented their documents asserted in some particular connection to which we will come later on that the 69th Corps was subordinate to you. May I, in order to clarify this problem, ask you General whether this opinion of the Prosecution is correct?
A The 69th Corps was never subordinated to me at any time. General Rendulic, as Commander in Chief of the respective Army confirmed this a few days ago.
Q After having cleared up these fundamental questions, General, I would now like to turn to the specific points of the Indictment, and I would like to discuss the Indictment with you in the framework of your assignments as Commander of the 15th and later of the 21st Corps. It will be necessary for us at this time to discuss a number of documents which the Prosecution have submitted. Under Count 3 of the Indictment, it is stated that the Commander of the 15th Corps had issued and carried out an order or passed on to the troops under his command, an order for the shooting of 1 staff officer and 50 men of the capitulated Italian Army, which had sold, given away or destroyed their arms before capitulating, and that he had also ordered the shooting of 1 officer and 10 men of every division which had rendered motor vehicles unusable before turning them over to the German Wehrmacht. General Rendulic a few days ago dealt in great detail with the Italian question. Now, General, I would like to ask you to limit yourself to those particular questions which concern you personally.
First of all, would you tell us whether you had in connection with the Italian question received, issued or passed on any orders whatsoever?
A No, I did not do that.
Q Now, I will have to show you a document in this connection, General, in which this assertion of the Prosecution is possibly based. This document is contained in Document Book 14 of the Prosecution, on page 127 of the English text and page 97 of the German version. I am referring to Exhibit 360, which is Prosecution Document 830. The total document is an excerpt from the War Diary of the 15th Mountain Corps, from the period of 26 August to 31 December 1943. Under the date 27 December, 1943, we have an entry here. This entry, as I have already stated, is on page 127 of the English text, Document Book 14. There is one report here about the capture of 202 Italian officers and 9,000 men in Split. We have also a note here saying that the Italian officers, according to the Fuehrer order, were to be shot, however, the Commanding General had first of all ordered an investigation to ascertain the guilt of the people concerned, i.e. the Commanding General of the 15th Corps - and I assume that the Prosecution mean you when presenting this document. Can you make any comments about this, General?
As the War Diary shows. I arrived only on the 22nd of October 1943 at the staff of the 15th Mountain Corps in Banja Luka. The War Diary shows that on the 1st of November 1943 I took over the leadership of the 15th Corps. Measures against Italian officers on the 27th of September 1943 can therefore not have been ordered by me.
DR. TIPP: May it please the Tribunal, I would like to point out at this point that the discussion of the War Diary of the 15th Mountain Corps is a difficult one. The Prosecution have on many occasions presented this War Diary. As I have already stated, this was done in Document Book XIV as Exhibit 340 and we have a further reference to this War Diary in Document Book XXV under Exhibit 561.
May I refer to this last document, Exhibit 561 which is NOKW-1796contained in Document Book XXV. Here on page 15 of the English text and page 12 of the German text we have the following entry under 22nd of October.
"General of the Infantry von Leyser, new Commanding General, has arrived."
Under the 1st of November 1943 we find the following:
"Turning over of the headquarters to Lieutenant General Infantry von Leyser of Banja-Luka by Lieutenant General Lueters."
These entries make it quite clear when General von Leyser arrived at the headquarters of the 15th Corps.
Q General, in Exhibit 360 we have under the 30th of September an entry concerning the shooting after the court martial procedure of three Italian generals in Split and on the 1st of October 1943 we have an entry concerning the court martial shooting of 45 officers of the Italian Army in Split. In other words, to clarify these entries I would like to ask the following, General, did you have anything to do with these shootings?
A No, the same applies here as did before. At this date I was not yet present at the 15th Corps headquarters.
Q The prosecution documents show where your participation in the Italian capitulation is concerned nothing further but in order to clarify this problem I would like to ask you the following: did you in the subsequent period order any measures against Italian officers and soldiers?
A I think that is out of the question. I think it is quite impossible that I should have given such orders, for in November the measures against the capitulated Italian Army had already been concluded. Excepted from this is the transportation of the prisoners of war. I also do not remember that at the time of my tenure any reports about the execution of orders previously issued did come in.
Q General, we had already discussed the reprisal measures and we had discussed whether the bands in the Croatian area were regular belligerents. But in this whole set-up of questions we have one other question which has not yet been answered and that is the question of the treatment of prisoners. Let me ask one preliminary question: were prisoners taken in the area of your Corps?
A Yes, they were, but in this connection I must say that the method of fighting on the part of the bands made it only rarely possible to take a larger number of prisoners. The bands, for the majority of instances made smaller surprise attacks. When fightings with a larger band took place the terrain and the difficulties of the terrain frequently allowed it that the bands could evade the attacks of the German forces, but if members of the bands were taken prisoner then they were treated in the same way as regular PWs. An order that no prisoners were to be made has, to the best of my knowledge, never been given by me or any units subordinate to me.
Q And what happened then to the prisoners, General?
A The prisoners were brought to the Division, to the Ic, and he interrogated them. The Division kept them there for the time being until they had all been interrogated and then they were transferred into rear areas. The Corps had nothing to do with these actions whatsoever. All we did is -- we received the reports about these facts.
Q There is a reference to prisoners in only two documents here, General, with which you are charged. The first one of those is contained in Document Book XIV of the Prosecution, on page 124 of the English document book and on page 95 of the German test.
This reference is contained in Document NOKW-1370 which is Exhibit 359. This is a teletype of the 15th Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army, Quartermaster General, dated the 26th of November 1943. It says here:
"Daily Report for three days," dated the 26th of November, and then we have the reports of the subordinate divisions where it says: "114th Division -- 420 military internees in the Camp Knin; 373rd Division (a) 16 band members, 9 hostages, (c) 6 band members."
Can you give us your comments on this report, General?
A That is comparatively difficult because I think these reports have been made according to certain codes as can be seen from the small letters used for the subdivisions of these reports. I do not know the code which was applied, but one thing is quite clear from these reports and that is that the divisions had only very few prisoners because the 373rd Division reports, I believe, 16 band members.
Could I possibly see the document, please? I cannot remember the figures.
Q I will give them to you again, General; they read as follows:
A Yes, the 373rd Division reports 16 band members and 7 hostages. This document also shows the divisions have made very little use of the possibility to take hostages because, as it says here, the 373rd Division reports 9 hostages and the 114th Division reports none at all.
Q Furthermore, another document has been submitted against you with reference to this particular point, and this document is contained in Document Book XXV. The report to which I have reference is on page 49 of the English Document Book XXV and on page 38 of the same document book in the German text. This is Document NOKW-1768 and Exhibit 569. It is a report of the 15th Corps dated the 20th of January 1944 and addressed to the 2nd Panzer Army. The report concerns the total numbers of prisoners of war as of the 1st of January 1944.
General, I would like to give you the document and ask you to give us your comments.
A This document is a summarizing report of the Quartermaster General Department. This department had to work on the reports about prisoners and in this report it compiles the received reports in a report of its own as of 1 January 1944. I would like to point out the numbers mentioned here; 1418 prisoners of war, total, are reported here. Of these 110 are Russians and the rest are Italians. Under "2", 187 bandits are reported. It is significant that of these 187, 131 are deserters, and under "3" the hostages are reported. In the whole area of the Corps these are 27. This again is a sign that the troops made only very little use of their possibility to take hostages.
Q There is another thing that strikes me in this report, General. As you said just now, under "1" prisoners of war are reported and the captured bandits are separately listed under "2". Is that of any practical significance?
A I am in no position to say that, but I know that there was no difference made in the treatment of these people. I would assume that the separation in the report had at one time been ordered from higher headquarters and, therefore, the report was made out in this form.
Q One more question in connection with this document, General as you said, deserters are mentioned here; do you know anything about how they were treated?
A Deserters occurred quite frequently in our area mainly because the bands had many members who had been recruited by force and these men, of course, made use of every possible opportunity to desert. Besides, it had been ordered that it should be tried in every possible manner to get members of bands to desert.
The documents talk about these things quite frequently. The deserters themselves were, first of all, gathered together in camps for their own protection. This question of deserters too was dealt with by the divisions so that I am only informed on a rather large scale outline, but it did even happen that deserters had themselves recruited by the Ustasha, I happen to know for instance that in the 392nd Division there was a whole unit which had deserted together with its leader and these men later fought against the Tito bands.
Q In the course of this trial it has been frequently mentioned, General, that in the Balkan area there was an exchange of prisoners. Were such measures, to the best of your knowledge, also carried out in the area of your Corps?
A Yes, they were. It happened quite frequently with these subordinate units. Particularly concerned was here an exchange of wounded and sick prisoners.
DR. TIPP: May it please the Tribunal, I would like to offer two documents in this connection which will throw a light on these statements of General von Leyser. The first document which I would like to offer is contained in Document Book Leyser I on page 72. This is Leyser Document No. 24 which I would like to offer as Leyser Exhibit 23. As I have mentioned, it is contained on page 72 of Document Book Leyser I. This is an affidavit by Dr. Med., Adolf Hammer and dated the 22nd of September 1947. The affidavit has been sworn to duly before the notary in Schwaebisch Hall on the same day. May I read briefly from this document?
"1. In the official position of a Lieutenant Colonel (Med.) in the army I was stationed as ward officer in the Base Hospital in Zalgreb (Croatia) from about the middle of October 1943 until 10 January 1945.
"2. During this period German Croat members of the Armed Forces were brought again and again in smaller transports to the base hospital mentioned. These had been announced as exchange wounded by the Chief Medical Officer with the German Commanding General for Croatia. These totalled about 300 to 400 and confirmed in conversations with me that they had been exchanged for wounded members of Tito's forces."
The next paragraph deals with the treatment of captured American Air Force men. May I also read this passage very briefly?
"While I was stationed in Zagreb about 15 to 20 members of the American Air Force who were wounded or injured were taken into base hospital 1637 and were given medical care and attention until they were fit to be taken further."
The next document to which I would like to refer in this connection is contained in Document Book Leyser III of the defense on page 164. This is Leyser Document No. 54 and I am offering it as Leyser Exhibit 24. It is an affidavit by Hanns Freiherr von Tucher in Simmelsdorf and dated the 15th of October 1947. The affidavit was sworn to duly on the same day.
First of all I would like to draw attention to paragraph 1. The affiant says here:
"I have known General von Leyser since he took over the 15th Mountain Corps in October 1943. At that time I was Quartermaster on the Staff of the 15th Mountain Corps. Subsequently to that I was officially subordinate to him and was in personal contact with him, at first almost daily and later from time to time during the oral reports."
Q General, one question to this passage: the affiant said here that he was Quartermaster on the Staff of your Corps. Did I understand you correctly to say before that to work on the prisoner reports was a matter of the Quartermaster?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q For the moment I would just like to read one brief paragraph from this document which deals with the question of prisoners. This is paragraph IV. It is on page 18 of the document. I quote:
"As a quartermaster I had nothing to do with prisoners except when they were sent to the rear in empty transport space. The management of matters concerning prisoners was the business of the divisions according to directives which were issued by superior headquarters. The guarding, evacuation or exchange of prisoners was done directly by the divisions, since the Corps did not have any installations, camps or guard units available. As Quartermaster of the Corps, my office was only a collecting and forwarding point for reports from the divisions to the Chief Quartermaster of the Army concerning the number of prisoners. I likewise gave directives from the Chief Quartermaster of the Army concerning this matter to the divisions."
The next passages of this document will be referred to later by me.
Q General, the hostages mentioned in the prosecution document which we have now discussed I think can be included in the large chapter of reprisal measures. But the prisoners and deserters, I believe, have to be counted in amongst the tactical tasks and operations of the troops. Right at the beginning of your activity down there we find the operation "Panther" which you have already mentioned. This operation "Panther" is particularly mentioned in the Indictment of the Prosecution. It says under Count 4 of the Indictment: "On or about the 13th of December 1943 the Commander of the 15th Mountain Corps ordered during the operation "Panther that troops under his command and under his jurisdiction were to bring the able bodies population of numerous villages to Germany for compulsory labor."
May I ask you, General, to tell the Tribunal the reason and the purpose of this operation "Panther"?
A In this connection may I refer to Sketch 3?
Q May I interrupt you, General? The sketch to which the witness is referring just now has been submitted by me as Leyser Exhibit 15. It is Document Leyser 11 in Document Book I von Leyser. General von Leyser here refers to Sketch 3.
Would you please continue now, General?
A This sketch shows the tactical situation at the time when the operation "Panther" was carried out. As we have already mentioned when we explained Sketch 1, the following situation applied: after the capitulation of the Italians in the areas Petrova-Gora and Samrica -- both can be seen in this sketch -- these were particularly strong band areas where attacks on the railroad Sisak-Karlovac-Zagreb took place frequently. Simultaneously, these band areas threatened; shown in this sketch as a red circle, the advance towards the coast. As you will remember, my task was to reach the coast with the right flank of my Corps as soon as possible. The blue arrows in this sketch which point into the red circle show the the advance of the combat groups of the operation "Panther". From a tactical point of view, it should be quite obvious that the responsible leadership could never have carried out an advance towards the coast if they had not, prior to this, eliminated the enemy in their rear and in their right flank by previous acts.
This is shown by the red circle on the sketch. Apart from this, the purpose of the operation and the carrying out can be seen from the documents submitted by the prosecution.
DR. TIPP: May it please the Tribunal, there are quite a number of documents which refer to the operation "Panther". These documents have been submitted by the Prosecution. Unfortunately, these documents are contained in a number of document books and they are in no chronological order. I believe that the operation "Panther" can be clarified on the basis of these documents especially if we look at them in a chronoligical order. Therefore, I shall show General von Leyser the individual documents in a chronological order and I shall also ask him to give us the comments on each individual document. I just wanted to say this to show how I am going to proceed.
Q General, the first document which I could find in the document book is a teletype from the headquarters of the 21st Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army dated the 27th of November 1943. Therefore, this document is dated three to four weeks later than your arrival with the Corps. We find this document in Book XIV of the Prosecution on page 137 of the English text and on page 109 of the German text. The document number is NOKW-1258.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. May I briefly repeat what I said? The document was submitted in Document Book 14 of the Prosecution, contained on Page 137 of the English text and Page 109 of the German text. It is NOKW 1258, Exhibit 367. As I have said before, it is a teletype of the 15th Mountain Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army, dated the 27th of November, 1943. The number is 955/43, Top Secret. May I point particularly to this reference number, because there will be reference to it in a later document. What is the significance of this teletype, General?
A. Under the Corps reports, "15th Corps intends to conduct an operation to destroy bandit forces and supply an operation to destroy bandit forces and supply bases in the Petrova-Gora and Samarica district." According to Paragraph 2 of this document, the operation was to be carried out with parts of the 371st Division, the Cossack Division, the 373rd Division, and parts of the 2nd Croatian Rifle Brigade. Under Paragraph 4, the Corps headquarters proposes to evacuate the entire able-bodied male population of the area to be mopped up, as this area has always been a bandit stronghold. This shows the two purposes of this operation very clearly. To me, as the tactical commander, the destruction of the bauds and the destruction of their supply bases was of primary importance in order to eliminate the constant interruption of our own supply lines as I have said already before. Besides, it had been intended that the area be evacuated of the entire male population in order to rob the bands of the men to carry out further attacks. The male population was under compulsion for military service in the Croatian State. The majority also were willing and prepared to join the Army, if they wouldn't have been in fear of the terror of the bands.