As the War Diary shows. I arrived only on the 22nd of October 1943 at the staff of the 15th Mountain Corps in Banja Luka. The War Diary shows that on the 1st of November 1943 I took over the leadership of the 15th Corps. Measures against Italian officers on the 27th of September 1943 can therefore not have been ordered by me.
DR. TIPP: May it please the Tribunal, I would like to point out at this point that the discussion of the War Diary of the 15th Mountain Corps is a difficult one. The Prosecution have on many occasions presented this War Diary. As I have already stated, this was done in Document Book XIV as Exhibit 340 and we have a further reference to this War Diary in Document Book XXV under Exhibit 561.
May I refer to this last document, Exhibit 561 which is NOKW-1796contained in Document Book XXV. Here on page 15 of the English text and page 12 of the German text we have the following entry under 22nd of October.
"General of the Infantry von Leyser, new Commanding General, has arrived."
Under the 1st of November 1943 we find the following:
"Turning over of the headquarters to Lieutenant General Infantry von Leyser of Banja-Luka by Lieutenant General Lueters."
These entries make it quite clear when General von Leyser arrived at the headquarters of the 15th Corps.
Q General, in Exhibit 360 we have under the 30th of September an entry concerning the shooting after the court martial procedure of three Italian generals in Split and on the 1st of October 1943 we have an entry concerning the court martial shooting of 45 officers of the Italian Army in Split. In other words, to clarify these entries I would like to ask the following, General, did you have anything to do with these shootings?
A No, the same applies here as did before. At this date I was not yet present at the 15th Corps headquarters.
Q The prosecution documents show where your participation in the Italian capitulation is concerned nothing further but in order to clarify this problem I would like to ask you the following: did you in the subsequent period order any measures against Italian officers and soldiers?
A I think that is out of the question. I think it is quite impossible that I should have given such orders, for in November the measures against the capitulated Italian Army had already been concluded. Excepted from this is the transportation of the prisoners of war. I also do not remember that at the time of my tenure any reports about the execution of orders previously issued did come in.
Q General, we had already discussed the reprisal measures and we had discussed whether the bands in the Croatian area were regular belligerents. But in this whole set-up of questions we have one other question which has not yet been answered and that is the question of the treatment of prisoners. Let me ask one preliminary question: were prisoners taken in the area of your Corps?
A Yes, they were, but in this connection I must say that the method of fighting on the part of the bands made it only rarely possible to take a larger number of prisoners. The bands, for the majority of instances made smaller surprise attacks. When fightings with a larger band took place the terrain and the difficulties of the terrain frequently allowed it that the bands could evade the attacks of the German forces, but if members of the bands were taken prisoner then they were treated in the same way as regular PWs. An order that no prisoners were to be made has, to the best of my knowledge, never been given by me or any units subordinate to me.
Q And what happened then to the prisoners, General?
A The prisoners were brought to the Division, to the Ic, and he interrogated them. The Division kept them there for the time being until they had all been interrogated and then they were transferred into rear areas. The Corps had nothing to do with these actions whatsoever. All we did is -- we received the reports about these facts.
Q There is a reference to prisoners in only two documents here, General, with which you are charged. The first one of those is contained in Document Book XIV of the Prosecution, on page 124 of the English document book and on page 95 of the German test.
This reference is contained in Document NOKW-1370 which is Exhibit 359. This is a teletype of the 15th Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army, Quartermaster General, dated the 26th of November 1943. It says here:
"Daily Report for three days," dated the 26th of November, and then we have the reports of the subordinate divisions where it says: "114th Division -- 420 military internees in the Camp Knin; 373rd Division (a) 16 band members, 9 hostages, (c) 6 band members."
Can you give us your comments on this report, General?
A That is comparatively difficult because I think these reports have been made according to certain codes as can be seen from the small letters used for the subdivisions of these reports. I do not know the code which was applied, but one thing is quite clear from these reports and that is that the divisions had only very few prisoners because the 373rd Division reports, I believe, 16 band members.
Could I possibly see the document, please? I cannot remember the figures.
Q I will give them to you again, General; they read as follows:
A Yes, the 373rd Division reports 16 band members and 7 hostages. This document also shows the divisions have made very little use of the possibility to take hostages because, as it says here, the 373rd Division reports 9 hostages and the 114th Division reports none at all.
Q Furthermore, another document has been submitted against you with reference to this particular point, and this document is contained in Document Book XXV. The report to which I have reference is on page 49 of the English Document Book XXV and on page 38 of the same document book in the German text. This is Document NOKW-1768 and Exhibit 569. It is a report of the 15th Corps dated the 20th of January 1944 and addressed to the 2nd Panzer Army. The report concerns the total numbers of prisoners of war as of the 1st of January 1944.
General, I would like to give you the document and ask you to give us your comments.
A This document is a summarizing report of the Quartermaster General Department. This department had to work on the reports about prisoners and in this report it compiles the received reports in a report of its own as of 1 January 1944. I would like to point out the numbers mentioned here; 1418 prisoners of war, total, are reported here. Of these 110 are Russians and the rest are Italians. Under "2", 187 bandits are reported. It is significant that of these 187, 131 are deserters, and under "3" the hostages are reported. In the whole area of the Corps these are 27. This again is a sign that the troops made only very little use of their possibility to take hostages.
Q There is another thing that strikes me in this report, General. As you said just now, under "1" prisoners of war are reported and the captured bandits are separately listed under "2". Is that of any practical significance?
A I am in no position to say that, but I know that there was no difference made in the treatment of these people. I would assume that the separation in the report had at one time been ordered from higher headquarters and, therefore, the report was made out in this form.
Q One more question in connection with this document, General as you said, deserters are mentioned here; do you know anything about how they were treated?
A Deserters occurred quite frequently in our area mainly because the bands had many members who had been recruited by force and these men, of course, made use of every possible opportunity to desert. Besides, it had been ordered that it should be tried in every possible manner to get members of bands to desert.
The documents talk about these things quite frequently. The deserters themselves were, first of all, gathered together in camps for their own protection. This question of deserters too was dealt with by the divisions so that I am only informed on a rather large scale outline, but it did even happen that deserters had themselves recruited by the Ustasha, I happen to know for instance that in the 392nd Division there was a whole unit which had deserted together with its leader and these men later fought against the Tito bands.
Q In the course of this trial it has been frequently mentioned, General, that in the Balkan area there was an exchange of prisoners. Were such measures, to the best of your knowledge, also carried out in the area of your Corps?
A Yes, they were. It happened quite frequently with these subordinate units. Particularly concerned was here an exchange of wounded and sick prisoners.
DR. TIPP: May it please the Tribunal, I would like to offer two documents in this connection which will throw a light on these statements of General von Leyser. The first document which I would like to offer is contained in Document Book Leyser I on page 72. This is Leyser Document No. 24 which I would like to offer as Leyser Exhibit 23. As I have mentioned, it is contained on page 72 of Document Book Leyser I. This is an affidavit by Dr. Med., Adolf Hammer and dated the 22nd of September 1947. The affidavit has been sworn to duly before the notary in Schwaebisch Hall on the same day. May I read briefly from this document?
"1. In the official position of a Lieutenant Colonel (Med.) in the army I was stationed as ward officer in the Base Hospital in Zalgreb (Croatia) from about the middle of October 1943 until 10 January 1945.
"2. During this period German Croat members of the Armed Forces were brought again and again in smaller transports to the base hospital mentioned. These had been announced as exchange wounded by the Chief Medical Officer with the German Commanding General for Croatia. These totalled about 300 to 400 and confirmed in conversations with me that they had been exchanged for wounded members of Tito's forces."
The next paragraph deals with the treatment of captured American Air Force men. May I also read this passage very briefly?
"While I was stationed in Zagreb about 15 to 20 members of the American Air Force who were wounded or injured were taken into base hospital 1637 and were given medical care and attention until they were fit to be taken further."
The next document to which I would like to refer in this connection is contained in Document Book Leyser III of the defense on page 164. This is Leyser Document No. 54 and I am offering it as Leyser Exhibit 24. It is an affidavit by Hanns Freiherr von Tucher in Simmelsdorf and dated the 15th of October 1947. The affidavit was sworn to duly on the same day.
First of all I would like to draw attention to paragraph 1. The affiant says here:
"I have known General von Leyser since he took over the 15th Mountain Corps in October 1943. At that time I was Quartermaster on the Staff of the 15th Mountain Corps. Subsequently to that I was officially subordinate to him and was in personal contact with him, at first almost daily and later from time to time during the oral reports."
Q General, one question to this passage: the affiant said here that he was Quartermaster on the Staff of your Corps. Did I understand you correctly to say before that to work on the prisoner reports was a matter of the Quartermaster?
A Yes, that is correct.
Q For the moment I would just like to read one brief paragraph from this document which deals with the question of prisoners. This is paragraph IV. It is on page 18 of the document. I quote:
"As a quartermaster I had nothing to do with prisoners except when they were sent to the rear in empty transport space. The management of matters concerning prisoners was the business of the divisions according to directives which were issued by superior headquarters. The guarding, evacuation or exchange of prisoners was done directly by the divisions, since the Corps did not have any installations, camps or guard units available. As Quartermaster of the Corps, my office was only a collecting and forwarding point for reports from the divisions to the Chief Quartermaster of the Army concerning the number of prisoners. I likewise gave directives from the Chief Quartermaster of the Army concerning this matter to the divisions."
The next passages of this document will be referred to later by me.
Q General, the hostages mentioned in the prosecution document which we have now discussed I think can be included in the large chapter of reprisal measures. But the prisoners and deserters, I believe, have to be counted in amongst the tactical tasks and operations of the troops. Right at the beginning of your activity down there we find the operation "Panther" which you have already mentioned. This operation "Panther" is particularly mentioned in the Indictment of the Prosecution. It says under Count 4 of the Indictment: "On or about the 13th of December 1943 the Commander of the 15th Mountain Corps ordered during the operation "Panther that troops under his command and under his jurisdiction were to bring the able bodies population of numerous villages to Germany for compulsory labor."
May I ask you, General, to tell the Tribunal the reason and the purpose of this operation "Panther"?
A In this connection may I refer to Sketch 3?
Q May I interrupt you, General? The sketch to which the witness is referring just now has been submitted by me as Leyser Exhibit 15. It is Document Leyser 11 in Document Book I von Leyser. General von Leyser here refers to Sketch 3.
Would you please continue now, General?
A This sketch shows the tactical situation at the time when the operation "Panther" was carried out. As we have already mentioned when we explained Sketch 1, the following situation applied: after the capitulation of the Italians in the areas Petrova-Gora and Samrica -- both can be seen in this sketch -- these were particularly strong band areas where attacks on the railroad Sisak-Karlovac-Zagreb took place frequently. Simultaneously, these band areas threatened; shown in this sketch as a red circle, the advance towards the coast. As you will remember, my task was to reach the coast with the right flank of my Corps as soon as possible. The blue arrows in this sketch which point into the red circle show the the advance of the combat groups of the operation "Panther". From a tactical point of view, it should be quite obvious that the responsible leadership could never have carried out an advance towards the coast if they had not, prior to this, eliminated the enemy in their rear and in their right flank by previous acts.
This is shown by the red circle on the sketch. Apart from this, the purpose of the operation and the carrying out can be seen from the documents submitted by the prosecution.
DR. TIPP: May it please the Tribunal, there are quite a number of documents which refer to the operation "Panther". These documents have been submitted by the Prosecution. Unfortunately, these documents are contained in a number of document books and they are in no chronological order. I believe that the operation "Panther" can be clarified on the basis of these documents especially if we look at them in a chronoligical order. Therefore, I shall show General von Leyser the individual documents in a chronological order and I shall also ask him to give us the comments on each individual document. I just wanted to say this to show how I am going to proceed.
Q General, the first document which I could find in the document book is a teletype from the headquarters of the 21st Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army dated the 27th of November 1943. Therefore, this document is dated three to four weeks later than your arrival with the Corps. We find this document in Book XIV of the Prosecution on page 137 of the English text and on page 109 of the German text. The document number is NOKW-1258.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q. May I briefly repeat what I said? The document was submitted in Document Book 14 of the Prosecution, contained on Page 137 of the English text and Page 109 of the German text. It is NOKW 1258, Exhibit 367. As I have said before, it is a teletype of the 15th Mountain Corps to the 2nd Panzer Army, dated the 27th of November, 1943. The number is 955/43, Top Secret. May I point particularly to this reference number, because there will be reference to it in a later document. What is the significance of this teletype, General?
A. Under the Corps reports, "15th Corps intends to conduct an operation to destroy bandit forces and supply an operation to destroy bandit forces and supply bases in the Petrova-Gora and Samarica district." According to Paragraph 2 of this document, the operation was to be carried out with parts of the 371st Division, the Cossack Division, the 373rd Division, and parts of the 2nd Croatian Rifle Brigade. Under Paragraph 4, the Corps headquarters proposes to evacuate the entire able-bodied male population of the area to be mopped up, as this area has always been a bandit stronghold. This shows the two purposes of this operation very clearly. To me, as the tactical commander, the destruction of the bauds and the destruction of their supply bases was of primary importance in order to eliminate the constant interruption of our own supply lines as I have said already before. Besides, it had been intended that the area be evacuated of the entire male population in order to rob the bands of the men to carry out further attacks. The male population was under compulsion for military service in the Croatian State. The majority also were willing and prepared to join the Army, if they wouldn't have been in fear of the terror of the bands.
Up to that time the Croatian Government had, because of the bands, not been able to send their recruiting commanders into the district of the Operation "Panther". Therefore, apart from eliminating a source of unrest in the rear of the front, the Corps was naturally interested in having also Croatian soldiers support the struggle of their fatherland. It hoped, with this Operation "Panther", to kill two birds with one stone.
Q. One other question in that connection, General. You were just talking about recruiting measures. Were you in a position to carry out such measures on your own initiative?
A. No, by no means. That was completely outside of my sphere of activity. That was a task which was entirely up to the Croatian authorities, and the Croatian authorities and the Plenipotentiary Commanding General in Zagreb to some extent were the competent authorities for this question. May I mention in connection with the teletype that here there was no discussion about a proposal on my part how to further make use of the evacuees, because this had nothing to do with my own tasks.
Q. Chronologically seen, the next document in the same document book, on Page 138 of the English text and Page 109 of the German text, we have a teletype dated the 27th of November, 1943, from the 15th Corps. This teletype has the same date as the one we have just now mentioned. Can you clear up for us the significance of this teletype?
A. Will you give me the page again?
Q. Page 109 of the German text and 138 of the English document book.
A. This teletype is a supplement to the one which we have discussed just now, dated the 27th of November, 1943. Here again, the purpose of the operation becomes quite clear; destruction of the bandit forces around Glina and destruction of the enemy bases near Petrova-Gora and Samarica.
Through mopping up the Samarica, the bands are being deprived of the possibility of supplying larger forces, and thus the main line Zagreb-Sisak-Mostar will be securer. Paragraphs 2 and 3 are of a tactical nature, and therefore of no particular interest here. Paragraph 4 contains the same proposal of evacuation which has been discussed just now.
Q. It we follow the chronological course of events, General, we will have to turn to the next exhibit, which is Exhibit 362 on Page 139 of Document Book 14 in the English text, and on Page 111 of the same document book in the German text. This Exhibit 362 is prosecution Document NOKW 022. Here on the pages which I have just mentioned, we find a teletype by the 2nd Panzer Army dated the 2nd of December, 1943, and addressed to the German Plenipotentiary General in Zagreb. What can we see from this document?
A. Under Paragraph 2, we find "it is requested to prepare the evacuation and to submit suggestions for its accomplishment as soon as possible to the 2nd Panzer Army, keeping it strictly secret as far as Croatian authorities are concerned. It is considered practical to deport the evacuated male population to the Reich for labor employment. This shows quite clearly that the Corps as such had nothing to do with the evacuation itself, but that instead the evacuation came into the sphere of the German Plenipotentiary General in Croatia.
Q. I would then like to refer back to Exhibit 361, General, which is on page 105 of the German document book and 133 of the English text. This is a teletype to the 15th Mountain Corps with the same text as was contained in the teletype of the 2nd Panzer Army to the plenipotentiary Commanding General in Zagreb. What would you say as to the significance of this document?
A. It is exactly the same text as went to the German Plenipotentiary General in Zagreb. The 15th Mountain Corps received this teletype for informational purposes; that is to say, merely for information.
Q. One more question arises from these documents. The radio message was sent off by the Army, but maybe it is possible for you, on the basis of your general knowledge, to tell us why the German Plenipotentiary General was particularly asked to keep these measures secret as far as Croatian authorities were concerned?
A. That was done purely for military reasons. Every tactical measure has to be kept secret from any authorities that have nothing to do with it. In addition to this, we frequently faced the danger that the Croatian authorities would give these facts away to the bands, later on the Croatian authorities were to be informed, which can be seen from the document.
Q. General, let's have a look on Page 112 in this same document book of the German text. The document I would now like to discuss is on Page 141 of the English text. This is Prosecution Exhibit 363, Document NOKW 074. The document which I would like to show to you, General, is a teletype by the German Plenipotentiary General, dated 4 December 1943, and addressed to the 2nd Panzer Army.
A. I would like to say that I saw this document for the first time here when I saw all the documents. The Corps did not at this time receive this teletype. The teletype shows that the German Plenipotentiary General counted on about 6,000 people who were evacuated to camps in Sisak and Karlovac which were to be constructed for these people. This was to be done by the 1036th Administrative Sub-area Headquarters, which means not by the own troops. Furthermore, the German Plenipotentiary General suggests here not to evacuate all the male population fit for military service, but only suspects, strangers in the locality and those who were seized loitering around outside of the localities.
Further, he points out that the evacuation of the population fit for military service to Germany, which was not suggested by me, might come up against strong resistance from the Croatian Government. Negotiations may take place only after the end of the action through the Embassy. This again shows, in my opinion quite clearly that the troops had nothing to do with what use was later on to be made of the evacuees, but that that was a matter of the Croatian Government and the German Embassy.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our noon recess at this time.
THE MARSHAL: Court is in recess until 1330.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed.
BY DR. TIPP:
Q General, we had finished before the recess when we talked about the operation Panther. The last document which we discussed was the teletype of the German Plenipotentiary General dated 4th of December 1943. In the chronological course of events we now have a teletype of the 2nd Panzer Army dated 6th of December 1943 addressed to the XV Mountain Corps. This document we can find in Document Book XIV on page 129 of the English text and on page 102 of the German text. This is Exhibit 361 of the Prosecution which has repeatedly been quoted here. Would you please have a look at this teletype of the 6th of December 1943 and tell the Tribunal the significance of this teletype.
A This teletype is the approval of the Operation Panther by the Army. Under paragraph 1 the Army agrees to the proposal to carry out the Operation Panther and in regard to the evacuation the Army under 2 ordered the following: One could count on about 6,000 evacuees. The camps for these people will be located in Sisak and Karlovac and will be set up and looked after by the 1036 sub-area headquarters. This is a local headquarters which is not subordinate to the corps. The guards for the camp were to be furnished by the corps. Under 2b it is ordered that in accordance with the suggestion of the Plenipotentiary General in Croatia only suspects, strangers, and those arrested outside of the villages are to be evacuated. The screening was to be carried out by the SD. SD groups were to be put at the disposal of the troops for this purpose.
Q May I interrupt you here for a minute, General. I would like to draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that the temporary subordination of the SD for the carrying out of this screening is mentioned in another Prosecution Document. We have a reference to this fact in Document Book XV on page 8 of the English text and 7 of the German text. This is Prosecution Exhibit 365 and the document is NOKW 1399.
It says here in the daily report of the 11 December 1943 of the 373rd Division and I quote: "SD Commando arrived with the 373rd Division." Will you please now continue with the discussion of this document which we are referring to, General.
A Under "3" it is ordered that the Headquarters of the XV Mountain Corps will examine whether the area concerned in Panther Operation can be occupied after successful operation. The Croatian government could then be requested to provide administrative personnel. Under paragraph "4" it says the evacuation is to carry the code name "Silberstreifen", Silver Stripe. This again shows that the evacuation was to be strictly distinguished from the carrying out of the Operation Panther; that this was a purely tactical operation and therefore my task was that of a tactical leader.
Q Now, the most important question in connection with this operation Panther: Which of the orders were issued by you personally for the carrying out of the Operation Panther?
A This also can be seen from the documents submitted.
Q Would you please turn to the following pages in Document Book XIV which you have in front of you, page 94 of the German text which is page 123 of the English text, this document to which I am referring here has been submitted as von Leyser Exhibit 359 and is NOKW 1370. The Operation ordered for Operation Panther is contained on those pages which I have just mentioned, that is, 123 of the English text and page 94 of the German text. Will you give us your comments to this order, General.
A This order is a preliminary order and was issued on the 17th of September 1943. It was sent to the 371st and 373rd Divisions. In this order the purpose of the operation is once again clearly defined. Under "5" it says that the Operation aims at the destruction of the bands and mopping up of the terrain according to plan in order to seize the very last depot, supplies of all types and leisure of the male population fit for military service. The last paragraph of this order is changed because of the order which had already been mentioned by the Army.
Q May I add something here. This amendment of the original order which General Leyser mentions here which is the order of the 2nd of December 1943 has also been submitted by the Prosecution and again in Document Book XIV, on page 131 of the English text and page 104 of the German text. This is a supplementary order to the order for Operation Panther. Will you please, continue, General.
A It is made clear here that the administrative area headquarters, the 1,*36th, is responsible for the evacuees which might turn up. for these people camps at Sisak and Karlovac are to be installed for the security forces; guards have to be furnished by the troops for these camps. Furthermore the order of the 1st of December is amended to the effect that not all the male population fit for military service are to be evacuated but only those people who are suspects, strangers in villages or persons seized outside the villages.
Q May I ask you now, General, to tell us briefly how this operation Panther took its course and what its result was?
A This too can be seen from the document in the final report for Operation Panther.
Q. May I interrupt you. May it please the Tribunal, the final report for the Operation Panther has not been submitted by the Prosecution. We found it amongst those documents which we received additionally from Washington and I have incorporated two documents in my document book which clear up the Operation Panther and I would like to offer them here. The first document of this type is contained in. Leyser Document Book II, on page 96. This is document Leyser 32 which I shall submit as Exhibit Leyser 25. In order to keep it as brief as possible I would just like to give you very brief quotations from this document. The headline reads:
"Combat report concerning Action (Panther' from 7 December to 20 December 1943."
Under "1" it is described what the enemy situation is like and it reads:
"Communist bands between Una and Korana (Kordun division, Kordun and Banija units, totaling 5 - 5000 armed men) with their basis in Petrova Gora - Samarica continually disturb the railway-lines of Agram - Sunja Bihac and theaten the Glina.
"2. Strategical Plan: XVth Mountain Corps intends to shatter the enemy forces around Glina and to destroy or secure their supply bases in Petrova Gora and Samarica."
May I, at this point, draw the Tribunal's attention to the fact that in this Strategical Plan the intention to evacuate is not contained. May I ask the Tribunal if the English Document Book is in their hands? I shall then continue.
Under "3" we find tactical details about troops and forces assigned which I don't think are of any particular interest here. Under "4" we find notes about the tactical carrying out of the action and I believe that too does not have to be read here. It seems more important to me to deal with paragraph "5" which bears the head line "Enemy Losses:" "882 counted dead, numerous wounded taken along, 191 prisoners, 21 deserters,". Then we have a figure which may possibly be of a decisive importance for the evaluation of the operation Panther. It says 96 evacuated persons.
May I remind the Tribunal that the General in Zagreb reported 6,000 people as possible evacuees whereas as an actual fact only 96 people were evacuated. Why this evacuation was kept so low is to be found the following sentence: "Villages had been evacuated forcibly by the Communists." The next passage gives own losses of the German troops. They were rather high. I may mention that 4 officers were killed; 16 officers were wounded, 66 NCO's and men were killed and 24 NCO's and men were missing. The next sentence gives an explanation for the high number of "Own Losses" and I read and quote:
"The high number of our own losses finds its explanation in the number of fights which were conducted partly with great exasperation by the enemy who had been disturbed in his winter quarters."
I shall then turn to "6" where the booty is described.
BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q. General, may I make an inquiry. What was the size of this force that was opposing the Germans there at that time?
A. According to the reports which we had there were about 6 - 7000 men.
Q. It took on more than the nature of a band then, did it not?
A. Yes, this area was one of those areas where the bands concentrated, where they trained and where they had their depots. As a consequence of this that area was one which was mopped up. Above all this was an area where they trained the recruits which they had forcibly recruited. Therefore, this was the main reason why we took steps against this large band area and why we wanted to eliminate it.
Q. Where a force of 6,000 men is it naturally would be divided into military units, would it not?
A. That might quite easily be the case in the instance of those bands and they did give their units names.
Q. And naturally with a group of that size they would have a recognized leader, would they not?
A. These people must of course within their units have had leaders but one still cannot talk about a regular troop. They did remain bands.
Q. Well, was there anyone in command of this entire 6,000 individuals or soldiers or whatever you may call them?
A. I am afraid I can't state that; I don't know.
Q. Well, they had supply depots which would indicate that it was organized and had a definite plan of operation. Is that not correct.
A. I don't know anything about a plan of operation of the bands. All I know is that in that district above all the railway was attacked and where I was concerned it was most important that I had the commission to reach with the right flank of my corps the coast and therefore the bands would be in my rear when I reached the coast. For that reason I had to eliminate the bands which found themselves in that area because possibly in the event of an enemy landing they could become very dangerous to me. Where I was concerned it was absolutely necessary and tactically necessary that I got rid of these people.
Q. When you eliminated them what kind of a battle did you have, if any. What did you do to eliminate them. Did you engage them in battle?
A. I have tried to explain that when I talked about Sketch No. 3. With regard to that sketch I explained that the blue arrows which are contained in that sketch show the German troops which advanced into this band territory in order to destroy the bands which were there and also in order to destroy the depots and the supplies which we knew were there because we had reports about them. It was, therefore, merely and purely a, tactical operation which took place there. That was nothing like a reprisal measure. It was purely a military operation.
Q. Well, was it on a large scale basis or did you have to hunt then out, one nest at a time?
A. This operation Panther can be called a large scale operation. From our side alone we used 3 divisions for this operation. At least the greatest part of these divisions.