As far as events in the incident which are reported here are concerned they had that connection.
Q This brings me to the last document contained in Volume XXV, which has been used to incriminate you, and thereby I go to the last document of the Prosecution which I should discuss. This is document NOKW-1804, which was Exhibit No. 579. It may be found on Page 119 in the English Document Book and Page 90 in the German. This is a Daily Report by Ic of the LXVIIIth Corps; on Page 121 of the English and Page 92 of the German we find in the Daily Report of 23 April 1944 that 12 Communists are reported to have been shot to death in Tripolis as a retaliation measure for a surprise attack on a lieutenant of the Police. General, who ordered that retaliation measure?
A I'm afraid I can't tell you, nor does the report make that clear. Moreover, it's completely unclear as to what unit this lieutenant of the Police belonged. General Headquarters had no police units under it. They had a police platoon it's true, under an officer, but it was not that officer because that platoon was stationed in Athens in the Headquarters of the Corps. I could not say, therefore, who ordered the retaliation for the surprise attack on the lieutenant of the Police.
Q This brings me to Page 123 of the English and Page 93 of the German. There in the Daily Report of 8 May 1944 is a reprisal measure for surprise attacks on Euboea--the shooting of a total of 48 hostages, as reported from three villages. Do you remember that incident?
A Reference is made here to the Daily Reports of the 11th and 26th of April, but as those Daily Reports are not available, no real connection can be reconstructed; so I cannot make any statements again.
Q On Page 124 of the English and Page 94 of the German there were, according to the Report of the 19th of May 1944, 10 hostages shot to death for a surprise attack in Megalopefko.
Do you know that incident?
A No, nor can I remember ever having heard of it.
Q On Page 124 of the English and Page 95 of the German there is a Daily Report of the 26th of May, and as a reprisal measure for the attempted blasting of a bridge, which was preceded by a surprise attack on the bridge south of Kymi, the shooting of 26 hostages is reported, as is the destruction of 45 houses in a village near Kymi. Do you remember that incident, General?
A No, I do not. We have attempted to obtain information about members of the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division, who might have been participating in this, because the replacement battalion of that Division was situated in Chalkis, but the people concerned could not recollect any such thing, nor am I in a position to make any statements about it.
THE PRESIDENT: At this point we win discontinue until 0930 tomorrow morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned at 1630 to resume session at 0930 5 December 1947)
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 5 December 1947, 0930, Justice Wennerstrum presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the Courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain if the defendants are all present in the Courtroom.
THE MARSHAL: May it please Your Honor, all the defendants are present in the Courtroom with the exception of the Defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: You may proceed, Dr. Mueller-Torgow.
HELMUTH FELMY - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q If the Tribunal please, yesterday I stopped discussing the last Prosecution document in Volume XXV. May I continue on Page 125 of the English Document Book and Page 95 of the German Document Book?
General, in the report of the Ic of 14th June we find that the destruction of a monastery and a nursing home near Furka, in the neighborhood of Lamia, is reported, because they had been identified beyond any doubt as band shelters, that is, the monastery and the nursing home served as quarters for bands.
Will you give us your comments about that please?
A I can only say quite generally that it happened not infrequently that monasteries which were situated on mountain tops were used as strongpoints for the bands. They were perched up on these mountains like castles. I do not remember the special case which is mentioned here.
Q Then, there is the Ic report of the 17th of June 1944. In that report we find that as a retaliation measure for a surprise attack on a major in Kalamata that 27 Communists were shot to death in the locality of the incident, and for the attack on Valtetsi 10 Communists were shot to death. Can you give us your comment about that please?
A It is difficult to recall this. The major, for instance, is not identified by his unit. It says "a major in Kalamata." I would not think that he was a member of the LXVIIIth Corps because his unit or at least his name would have been reported. Who this major was I don't know. Perhaps He was a Greek. I really don't know; nor do I know what I could say about the attack on Valtetsi. I cannot even think what Valtetsi is. Probably it was a strongpoint of the volunteer formations and an attack was made on it, which happened quite frequently, particularly when the unit as such had left the village, which the bands found out soon by means of their first-class intelligence system. We experienced such incidents quite frequently. That is all I can give by way of explanation about this report.
Q And then finally we have the report of the 30th of June which is a collective report for June, 1944. There the individual reports are obviously contained in it. Is that right?
A Yes, that is correct. Usually at the end of the month you would give a concise review of the week, concerning incidents, operations, etc., and in June and July a number of operations against the bands took place in an increasing extent in the Peloponnes because it had been declared a combat zone and also on Euboea and Boeotia. On Euboea and Boeotia the operations lasted until August. Later on the troops withdrew.
Q This brings me to the end of a discussion of all the documents which have been used by the Prosecution to incriminate General Felmy.
General, I would now like, once again, to discuss the declaration of the Peloponnes as a combat zone in May, 1944. Did that measure, namely that the Peloponnes was declared a combat zone, relieve the band situation in the Peloponnes in your opinion and in your experience?
A Yes, without any doubt. I said before, I believe on one occasion, that I regret that we did not take that measure earlier because the surprise attacks and acts of sabotage decreased very visibly. The intimate contact between the civilian population and the bands, as far as the passing of intelligence was concerned, had become so intense that only by striking measures could the situation be believed. The many attacks on vehicle columns, which any way moved about only in convoys, prove unequivocally that the bands which had their helpers and assistants in every German garrison know every occasion when these convoys would be put together and set on route.
Q You mean to say, General, that the success by the bands frequently were based on collaboration with the population?
A There cannot be any doubt about that. To convey information they preferred to use women or adolescent boys because they would appear to be least suspected. By their contact men they know in good time when we made preparations for band operations -- concentration troops, for instance. In the open country the shepherds were the most important ones because there were so many herds of sheet about. On their flutes they passed on certain signals. They understood each other more or less as the Negroes do in the jungles with their tom toms. The telling of church bells had special significance, as well as other methods of this type. Primitive though they were they were effective, quite apart from modern equipment, such as radio transmitters, which the bands also had at their disposal in some cases, and of which we captured quite a few.
Q Now, this brings me to the last chapter, General. We should now discuss conditions in Athens during the last three months of the German occupation. Let us follow up the discussion which we had a few days ago concerning conditions in the Greek capital. How was it in Athens that conditions developed in the last stages of the German occupation?
A Well, in Athens there glimmered a fire under the surface; the influence of the EAM or ELAS grew. Shootings at night increased in frequency. On a number of occasions of German troops, such as Naval, Artillery, and Anti-aircraft Artillery, which were stationed in the immediate vicinity of Athens on the fringes of the city were attacked.
On the sacred road which leads from Athens to Eleusis, very near Athens, the Commanding Officer of the Corps Reconnaissance Detachment, Lt. Col. von Monsdorf, was killed, when we wanted to help, on the spur of the moment, to disentangle a confusion which had been caused by a surprise attack on a few vehicles. Therefore, by the end of September I felt compelled to issue a special warning to the City of Athens. I dropped leaflets and stipulated in them that those elements of the population which still had their common sense should exercise influence against the disintegrating elements. I was aware of the fact that I was fighting windmills, but I did not want to leave a stone unturned; therefore, I explored every avenue. I know that the present Prime Minister, Sophoulis, wrote in the Greek underground press to the same effect, and he exhorted his follow citizens not to make these pointless attacks on German troops because the end could not be good if they continued.
Q Did Prime Minister Sophoulis, at that time, hold an official position in the Greek Government?
A No, all he was was a leader of the Liberal Democratic Party. The center in Greece consists of a great many political parties.
Q Before he wrote this article in the press which you mentioned just now, had he been in the Chaidari Concentration Camp?
A I think he must have been because I went with Legation Councillor von Graevenitz, the so-called branch office of Neubacher as we called it, which was the remanant, as it were, of the former German Legation, or it was Archbishop Damaskinos who asked me or gave me a message to the effect that I should use my influence to have him released from the concentration camp.
With him the name of the new Prime Minister Gonatas was mentioned and a man called Kaffandaris, who was entirely unknown to me. The name of Sophoulis, of course, was known to me. That is how I and the man in charge of the SD, Standartenfuehrer Blume, had a conversation, and, in my opinion, the release was due to this intervention, and perhaps Neubacher exercised a certain amount of pressure. I don't know all the details. Well, any way, they were, I think, released from Chaidari. Blume was a little obtuse but not very fanatical because otherwise I would not have achieved anything if he had not complied. I could not force him, of course. I could only persuade him.
Q General, was the city area of Athens made subordinate to you?
A Yes, in the last third of September; so this is how I remember it. I was at last solely in command. The Higher SS and Police Leader had disappeared. The SD had vanished. The Military Commander, General Scheurlen at the time was fighting somewhere along the Bulgarian Front, because we had now reached the end of September with the result that I had no other agencies with whom I had to negotiate and to whom I could not issue orders.
Q. Now, that you had become competent for Athens,
THE COURT INTERPRETER: The sound system has suddenly become very bad. I believe the system is all right now, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps you should repeat the last question.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q. After you had become competent for athens did you take action against the Communist quarters of the city, where the ELAS bands had established their rule by military means?
A. We thought a lot about that very seriously, but ultimately I did not take that extreme measure. Fighting in a city -- a big city -- is a highly delicate affair. One cannot see what the enemy is doing. Both sides will suffer heavy losses, and from the word "go" one has to use the most crude means. One must either bomb them from the air or he must shell them with artillery and trench mortars where block after block has to be smashed, so that the troops can move in. I admit quite frankly that I was afraid of losses on our side and also that I took into consideration that the population would suffer in that type of fighting inevitably, because I know what direction I am to take and what I am to shell, whereas the population, since they are quite helpless, cannot do anything, Also, I wanted, if at all possible, to avoid the shelling of Athens.
Q. General, did you, at that time, hold conversations with Archbishop Damaskinos?
A. Yes, at least two, as far as I remember. In our first conversation I told him to use his influence on the radical elements. The metropolite of Pireus in the Peloponnes had joined the band, and I used that opportunity to draw the Archbishop's attention to the fact that Communist elements were greatly strengthened by an action of that sort, and that would have its effect on conditions in Athens.
I was afraid at that time that something similar might happen, such as the Warsaw uprising. The signal for the attack by ELAS could occur any day. We knew about their ammunition and their depots of weapons, that is, the reserves which they had built up. The situation was highly uncomfortable, even more uncomfortable than in any big battle at the front, as we were hedged in in a big city and had the responsibility for the population. Therefore, I asked the archbishop to use his influence to avoid an explosion because I could not answer for the consequences, I told him. He declared that he was prepared to do that, and I think, without any doubt, that he did so. I think, on that occasion, he expressed the request that we should not, under any circumstances, blow up the dam near Marathon. It is a sort of lake which has a dam at one shore. The Marathon Lake was very important for the water supply of Athens. It had been built in the 30's by an American firm, and it was the first modern water supply for Athens. The few fountains which still worked in the city did not, of course, suffice in any sense of the word. Even the quantity of water in that lake depended on rain and it was not too rich for the population. The population in Athens had increased during the war. Preparations for the blowing up of the dam must have been known to the Archbishop.
Q. What did you do after he expressed that request?
A. I realized that had we blown up the dam chaos would have broken out in the city because even during that part of the year, the end of September and the beginning of October -
because our departure had not been timed yet -- it was still very hot down there. I knew that the Marathon dam was on the list of things to be blown up. As I could find out thereupon, it was supposed to have been effected by a special detachment of the Reich Main Security Office, under Himmler, a detachment which was competent for special sabotage activities.
Representatives of that special detachment roamed about in the neighborhood of the lake and prepared the blowing up of the dam. I therefore had the high explosives removed from the dam and dropped into the water.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If the Tribunal please. I should like at this point to come back to a document in Felmy Document Book III. It is Document No. 72, on page 20. It is an affidavit by Dr. von Freyberg, who, as I said in another connection, was a Regierungsbaurat on the staff of General Felmy between August 1942 and October 1944. I should like to read Paragraph 4, on page 21:
"Water supply is one of the foremost problems in Greece. It was particularly so in the drought years 1943/44. The troops might have looked after themselves everywhere, lasting the population go thirsty. So far from acting on this principle, Felmy's headquarters retained my office although it was not on the establishment of an army corps, in order to organize the water-supply to the best advantage on geological principles. A part of this work was exclusively for the benefit of the civilian population; for instance, a through inquiry into the water-supply of the village of Paeania-Lioposi in Attica. The relevant documents were handed over to the community. All these reports, as I know, were also submitted to the General and met with his approval. The civilian population highly appreciated this care; thus, for instance, a sheep was given to the soldiers who had curbed a spring in Kakava.
"A particularly difficult problem was presented by Athens' watersupply system. It was feld from the Marathon reservoir which holds 41 million cubic meters of water and fills in winter time. The level drops lower and lower during the summer. Owing to the abnormally low rainfalls my office was commissioned to inquire into the geological conditions of the town area of Athens and the sub-soilwater conditions. It appeared that, aside from small ancient water conduits, there had originally been about 300 well-pits in the town area which, however, had fallen into disuse after the opening of the Marathon water works; many of them being used as refuse pits or partly even as latrines.
At the most there were 2000 water carrying walls, of which, however, 809, had to be classed as hygienically unsuitable, because the subsoilwater was highly contaminated by the refuse with which the wells had been filled and by faulty drainage. Athens' water supply, without the Marathon water works, was impossible. If General Felmy, by disregarding a plain order, prevented the blasting of the Marathon reservoir, he saved Athens from a major catastrophe because the inevitable use of contaminated water during a shortage of water would almost certainly have led to the outbreak of an epidemic."
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q Now, General, before we discuss your second conversation with Archbishop Damaskinos, I would like to put a question of a more general nature to you. What effect did Rumania's leaving the war have on the situation Greece?
A The desertion of Rumania and, later on, the desertion of Bulgaria - the first about the end of August and the latter about the end of September - created clear-out conditions because at last the evacuation of Greece was ordered. This meant that big organizational problems faced the leaders. The means at our disposal were insufficient. We had no shipping space for the evacuation of the Island and there was only one railroad which leads from Athens to the North. The first area I evacuated was the Peloponnes and I evacuated it by stages. This occured about the middle of September, between the 15th and 20th, without loss of lives or material, nor did the bands make themselves noticeable at that moment, which we had originally expected. They did not attack us. By the declaration which had preceded this operation, namely that the Peloponnes was declared a combat zone, they had been used to showing more reserve. It was only around Patras, near the Gulf of Corinth, that we had a brief engagement with the advancing British, which lasted until the evening before the garrison could evacuate itself across the sea to Thea, on the northern shore of the Gulf.
Q What became of the volunteer units?
A We were very worried about them. Prime Minister Rallis would have liked to have them in Athens but Colonel Papadongonas could not make up his mind to do that. Then he attempted to get General Zervas to Athens. Prime Minister Rallis asked me whether I would agree, if we crossed our ways, as it were; he was to move southward and we were to move northward. I left it to his discretion whether he wanted to march into the Peloponnes through Agrinion or whether he would choose the Euboea Karpenision Road through Lamia and Boeotia Attica - but as long as I was there he did not turn up. As I said before, Colonel Papadongonas preferred to remain in the Peloponnes, which was his home province, and there he concentrated the majority of the volunteer units around Tripolis, which is in the center of the province; operationally speaking, this was a very good decision. At the beginning of September I personally bade him farewell and out two batteries at his disposal which were not essential to us for our evacuation; they were French coastal batteries 10.5, which were quite suitable for his purposes, modern types of guns. Through my connection with the Luftwaffe it became possible that we supplied him from the air with ammunition. He sent us a wireless message back: "Thank you very much. Supply from the air has impressed both enemy and friend." That is the last I heard of him.
Q And where did the German divisions remain?
A First the 117th Division had been marching northwards, because now we had to take measures against the advancing Bulgarians who advanced on our road of retreat, and these measures had to be improvised. After all, the army group in the Saloniki area was not too well off for troops either, so therefore it was quite clear that I had to use the 117th Division as well as the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division for this purpose. In the first weeks of September the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division marched northwards, somewere seaborne and some were rail-borne, so that they would reach the target as soon as possible.
It was only the 41st Fortification Division that remained with me and, having evacuated the Peloponnes, safeguarded the tip of the canal of Corinth.
Q Was the Island of Crete also evacuated?
A Not only Crete but also Rhodes. Troops were also evacuated from those, mostly through the air. Night after night our transport squadrons were busy and through that method it was that we got the whole of the 22nd Division away from Crete and transported them into the Athens area. Only what we called "rear services", that is to say, those who were less efficient for fighting, remained on Crete and there, around the airport of Malemes, which is in the western part of the Island roughly there (indicating on may) - there they defended this outpost. The elements which reached Athens were organized and freshly equipped, because the artillery could not take its guns along in aircraft. We gave them, instead, those guns which we had formerly used for naval purposes as much as possible and we also set them enroute northwards.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. Did the British know that the Germans were withdrawing?
A. Well, any child must have noticed; I could scarcely expect the British to fall asleep, and that was quite in accordance with the overall situation as well. So once again tension gree from day to day. Where will the British land and where will they cut off our retreat? That they were capable of doing that was quite obvious.
Q. General, how did the situation in Athens develop?
A. Although the attacks on German troops decreased admittedly, which I put down to the influence of the Archbishop, who had ways and means through which he could influence the population and also the sober attitude of large parts of the Athens population; but one could not know in advance that all would go well and so I was deeply worried all the time because Elas began to see daylight. About the middle of September the Archbishop once again called on me and touched on the problem - what will happen after the Germans have left and the British, whom we are expecting, have not yet arrived? In other words, he expressed the wish that it at all possible, to come to terms with the British and to simply change guards, as it were, in Greece.
Q. What was your attitude to that?
A. I had been thinking about that problem because I thought something like that might occur and I did not see any reason to take a negative attitude to this proposal because, after all, I wanted to support the decent Greeks and I still thought they were in the majority, as far as the whole of the population was concerned. I told the Archbishop of my opinion and I told him that he must understand that it was not I who could make that proposal, for a number of reasons. This proposal had to come from the British and it should be put on a reasonable basis for negotiations. I again reassured him on the problem of the Lake of Marathon; I told him that the high explosives had been removed and that other installations had been turned over to the Evzones i.e. the Greeks themselves, who could guard them.
Q. General, what did you intend to do in the event that no agreement could be arrived at with the British?
A. Well, I had to assume that the British also would be interested to fill this vacumn which the Archbishop had mentioned, or at least to cut it as short as possible and that they would meet me halfway perhaps. Should that not be the case, against all expectations, then I wanted to declare Athens an open city. I did not want to shell it myself, nor did I want any fighting for Ancient Athens to occur during the evacuation. I know that in this connection I told the Archbishop - "Athens is worth something to me. Athens is worth a mass." The Archbishop promised me to take steps with the British so that negotiations could be opened and I asked him once again to use his influence that we should not have a second Warsaw. That was something like the writing on the wall to me.
Q. Did you negotiate with anybody else, apart from Archbishop Damaskinos.
A. Yes, a little later, but more or less simultaneously with the efforts undertaken by the Archbishop. About the end of September the Swiss Consul, M. Escher, called on me. As was to be expected, he discussed the question of changing the guards with the British. He told me that he had a letter from a British officer who, it was alleged, had full authority for negotiations of that kind. I knew how difficult it was to keep things secret in Athens out the fact that he arrived with a letter surprised me. This showed that the British Intelligence Service was working not too badly. The letter which Consul Escher read to me began, roughly, with these words:
"The Germans are to surrender...." Well, I immediately stopped him. I told him he need not go on reading and I told him "This is a demand but not a basis for negotiations." I was not yet a subordinate of the British and I had no cause at all to surrender.
Q. What was Escher's reaction to that?
A. Escher called on me again the next day and apoligized and said he had not known the contents of the letter because he had to admit that it was a little naive and not a reasonable thing to expect from a German general. He himself had his doubts by now whether that particular British officer was really a plenipotentiary. I realized, of course, that it was one of the small chieftains who rode about with the bands, who had assumed the part of Sherlock Holmes, or Lawrence of the first World War and that he wanted to play that part. Now Escher made another suggestion to me. I was to give him a letter of safe conduct and then he would undertake to drive through the German sentries in order to take up immediate contact with a higher British agency. Around that period of time the British were, roughly, halfway between Athens and Corinth.
Q. What was your reaction to that?
A. As I was interested in arriving at a reasonable agreement with the British I agreed to his proposal and I gave him a letter of safe conduct. I drew his attention to the fact that the territory between the German vanguards and the British might possibly be infested by bands. The British had, roughly, reached the Megara line which is almost halfway between Athens and Corinth, and that he would have to undertake that part of the trip at his own risk. I wished him good luck and once again expressed that I expected an offer but not a demand such as was contained in the last letter.
Q. General, did other Greek personalities try to contact you?
A. Yes, in the first days of October the Lord Mayor Georgakos of Athens appeared with a number of town councillors and asked me to spare the city and to avoid unnecessary destruction when we marched away from Athens. I assured the Lord Mayor that I had made the application that Athens should be declared an open city; and if it should be declared an open city, that is to say, if the O.K.W. should consent, then no explosions would be carried out in the city area of Athens. He then said good-bye, visibly relieved.
Q. What were the consequences of your second conversation with Archbishop Damaskinos?
A. The action on which the archbishop had embarked had had its result. In the apartment of the Swedish Professor, Sandstroem.....
Q. May I interpolate here. As far as I know, he is now the chairman of the Palestine Commission of U.N.O.
A. At that time he was chairman of the Greek Committee of the International Red Cross. Negotiations were carried out in his apartment between the Regierungsrat (Government Councillor) von Rumor, for the German side, and a British officer. The British offer was roughly this:
The Germans had to promise neither to carry out explosions in the harbor of Pyraeus nor on the airfields. They also had to clear Uboats and mine barriors. Should we comply with these British demands, the British would then not use the harbor and airfields for military purposes for a period of about ten days. Should we desist from blowing things up, then they promised us safe conduct, but; they had to take prisoners, they said, even if it were only a few hundred Italians in German uniforms.
Q What was your reaction to that offer?
A There was a time limit to it of 24 hours. I told the British officer that this did not form a basis of negotiations, but it simply amounted to a demand. I could not see anything of equal value in it. Safe conduct the British need not guarantee, for the time being I could still fight for it. I must say quite frankly I was highly annoyed at the language the British indulged in because ultimately both of us wanted something and I was not yet part of the middle east command, perhaps Mr. Scopi mixed me up with somebody else.
Afterwards I informed the Army Group of these negotiations and the Army Group was sulking, they reproached me that I did not ask them for permission first. I made a few excuses because I was annoyed because I regarded this as a vote of no confidence, as though I had any special purpose or intention up my sleeve.
You mentioned just now that nothing of equal value was in the agreement, what would you have regarded as being of equal value?
A Well, for instance if the British had guaranteed you can go on a ship of 5,000 tons from Crete to Saloniki, we will not torpedo the ship or make an airraid on the ship while you are on it. Then I would have said, very well, then we won't blow up the harbor of Pyraeus. That I would have regarded as being of equal value, which I expressed in my negative reply.
Q Did you then once again contact Consul Escher?
A Yes, meanwhile around about the 8th, 9th or 10th of October Escher returned from his trip and told me this: "Radio messages from Cairo are mixed up". At least he had contacted the plenipotentiary officer on the British side, that is at least he had learned his name, who was to carry out the negotiations concerning the changing of the guards and this was his offer. This British officer was to be promised safe conduct and should come to Athens, he should if possible bring along his wireless installations so that he could contact Cairo through that method. He would put up this British gentleman in the Swiss consulate.
Q What was your reaction to this order?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I don't see what all this testimony has to do with the matters we are concerned with in this proceedings. As far as I can tell from the indictment we have not alleged any crimes committed by this defendant in connection with Athens. I submit the political negotiations which he conducted wither with the Greek parties or the British is completely irrelevant and immaterial.
THE PRESIDENT: To some extent we may be getting a little afield, it gives us a basis however upon which this action was taken by this defendant. With the request that this type of examination be limited somewhat. The objection will be overruled.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
A I agreed to the consul's offer. I must admit the modification that no wireless contact with Cairo could be permitted without my permission and therefore I asked for special permission to that effect. Escher agreed and after the experience I had recently made with the Army Group I did not inform them of those negotiations with Escher.
Q Did you then meet?
A On account of the delay caused by Escher's trip to the British line, time had meanwhile marched on and the date at which our retreat was timed became nearer and nearer, nor did Professor Sandstroem inform me of new developments.