Representatives of that special detachment roamed about in the neighborhood of the lake and prepared the blowing up of the dam. I therefore had the high explosives removed from the dam and dropped into the water.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If the Tribunal please. I should like at this point to come back to a document in Felmy Document Book III. It is Document No. 72, on page 20. It is an affidavit by Dr. von Freyberg, who, as I said in another connection, was a Regierungsbaurat on the staff of General Felmy between August 1942 and October 1944. I should like to read Paragraph 4, on page 21:
"Water supply is one of the foremost problems in Greece. It was particularly so in the drought years 1943/44. The troops might have looked after themselves everywhere, lasting the population go thirsty. So far from acting on this principle, Felmy's headquarters retained my office although it was not on the establishment of an army corps, in order to organize the water-supply to the best advantage on geological principles. A part of this work was exclusively for the benefit of the civilian population; for instance, a through inquiry into the water-supply of the village of Paeania-Lioposi in Attica. The relevant documents were handed over to the community. All these reports, as I know, were also submitted to the General and met with his approval. The civilian population highly appreciated this care; thus, for instance, a sheep was given to the soldiers who had curbed a spring in Kakava.
"A particularly difficult problem was presented by Athens' watersupply system. It was feld from the Marathon reservoir which holds 41 million cubic meters of water and fills in winter time. The level drops lower and lower during the summer. Owing to the abnormally low rainfalls my office was commissioned to inquire into the geological conditions of the town area of Athens and the sub-soilwater conditions. It appeared that, aside from small ancient water conduits, there had originally been about 300 well-pits in the town area which, however, had fallen into disuse after the opening of the Marathon water works; many of them being used as refuse pits or partly even as latrines.
At the most there were 2000 water carrying walls, of which, however, 809, had to be classed as hygienically unsuitable, because the subsoilwater was highly contaminated by the refuse with which the wells had been filled and by faulty drainage. Athens' water supply, without the Marathon water works, was impossible. If General Felmy, by disregarding a plain order, prevented the blasting of the Marathon reservoir, he saved Athens from a major catastrophe because the inevitable use of contaminated water during a shortage of water would almost certainly have led to the outbreak of an epidemic."
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q Now, General, before we discuss your second conversation with Archbishop Damaskinos, I would like to put a question of a more general nature to you. What effect did Rumania's leaving the war have on the situation Greece?
A The desertion of Rumania and, later on, the desertion of Bulgaria - the first about the end of August and the latter about the end of September - created clear-out conditions because at last the evacuation of Greece was ordered. This meant that big organizational problems faced the leaders. The means at our disposal were insufficient. We had no shipping space for the evacuation of the Island and there was only one railroad which leads from Athens to the North. The first area I evacuated was the Peloponnes and I evacuated it by stages. This occured about the middle of September, between the 15th and 20th, without loss of lives or material, nor did the bands make themselves noticeable at that moment, which we had originally expected. They did not attack us. By the declaration which had preceded this operation, namely that the Peloponnes was declared a combat zone, they had been used to showing more reserve. It was only around Patras, near the Gulf of Corinth, that we had a brief engagement with the advancing British, which lasted until the evening before the garrison could evacuate itself across the sea to Thea, on the northern shore of the Gulf.
Q What became of the volunteer units?
A We were very worried about them. Prime Minister Rallis would have liked to have them in Athens but Colonel Papadongonas could not make up his mind to do that. Then he attempted to get General Zervas to Athens. Prime Minister Rallis asked me whether I would agree, if we crossed our ways, as it were; he was to move southward and we were to move northward. I left it to his discretion whether he wanted to march into the Peloponnes through Agrinion or whether he would choose the Euboea Karpenision Road through Lamia and Boeotia Attica - but as long as I was there he did not turn up. As I said before, Colonel Papadongonas preferred to remain in the Peloponnes, which was his home province, and there he concentrated the majority of the volunteer units around Tripolis, which is in the center of the province; operationally speaking, this was a very good decision. At the beginning of September I personally bade him farewell and out two batteries at his disposal which were not essential to us for our evacuation; they were French coastal batteries 10.5, which were quite suitable for his purposes, modern types of guns. Through my connection with the Luftwaffe it became possible that we supplied him from the air with ammunition. He sent us a wireless message back: "Thank you very much. Supply from the air has impressed both enemy and friend." That is the last I heard of him.
Q And where did the German divisions remain?
A First the 117th Division had been marching northwards, because now we had to take measures against the advancing Bulgarians who advanced on our road of retreat, and these measures had to be improvised. After all, the army group in the Saloniki area was not too well off for troops either, so therefore it was quite clear that I had to use the 117th Division as well as the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division for this purpose. In the first weeks of September the 11th Luftwaffe Field Division marched northwards, somewere seaborne and some were rail-borne, so that they would reach the target as soon as possible.
It was only the 41st Fortification Division that remained with me and, having evacuated the Peloponnes, safeguarded the tip of the canal of Corinth.
Q Was the Island of Crete also evacuated?
A Not only Crete but also Rhodes. Troops were also evacuated from those, mostly through the air. Night after night our transport squadrons were busy and through that method it was that we got the whole of the 22nd Division away from Crete and transported them into the Athens area. Only what we called "rear services", that is to say, those who were less efficient for fighting, remained on Crete and there, around the airport of Malemes, which is in the western part of the Island roughly there (indicating on may) - there they defended this outpost. The elements which reached Athens were organized and freshly equipped, because the artillery could not take its guns along in aircraft. We gave them, instead, those guns which we had formerly used for naval purposes as much as possible and we also set them enroute northwards.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q. Did the British know that the Germans were withdrawing?
A. Well, any child must have noticed; I could scarcely expect the British to fall asleep, and that was quite in accordance with the overall situation as well. So once again tension gree from day to day. Where will the British land and where will they cut off our retreat? That they were capable of doing that was quite obvious.
Q. General, how did the situation in Athens develop?
A. Although the attacks on German troops decreased admittedly, which I put down to the influence of the Archbishop, who had ways and means through which he could influence the population and also the sober attitude of large parts of the Athens population; but one could not know in advance that all would go well and so I was deeply worried all the time because Elas began to see daylight. About the middle of September the Archbishop once again called on me and touched on the problem - what will happen after the Germans have left and the British, whom we are expecting, have not yet arrived? In other words, he expressed the wish that it at all possible, to come to terms with the British and to simply change guards, as it were, in Greece.
Q. What was your attitude to that?
A. I had been thinking about that problem because I thought something like that might occur and I did not see any reason to take a negative attitude to this proposal because, after all, I wanted to support the decent Greeks and I still thought they were in the majority, as far as the whole of the population was concerned. I told the Archbishop of my opinion and I told him that he must understand that it was not I who could make that proposal, for a number of reasons. This proposal had to come from the British and it should be put on a reasonable basis for negotiations. I again reassured him on the problem of the Lake of Marathon; I told him that the high explosives had been removed and that other installations had been turned over to the Evzones i.e. the Greeks themselves, who could guard them.
Q. General, what did you intend to do in the event that no agreement could be arrived at with the British?
A. Well, I had to assume that the British also would be interested to fill this vacumn which the Archbishop had mentioned, or at least to cut it as short as possible and that they would meet me halfway perhaps. Should that not be the case, against all expectations, then I wanted to declare Athens an open city. I did not want to shell it myself, nor did I want any fighting for Ancient Athens to occur during the evacuation. I know that in this connection I told the Archbishop - "Athens is worth something to me. Athens is worth a mass." The Archbishop promised me to take steps with the British so that negotiations could be opened and I asked him once again to use his influence that we should not have a second Warsaw. That was something like the writing on the wall to me.
Q. Did you negotiate with anybody else, apart from Archbishop Damaskinos.
A. Yes, a little later, but more or less simultaneously with the efforts undertaken by the Archbishop. About the end of September the Swiss Consul, M. Escher, called on me. As was to be expected, he discussed the question of changing the guards with the British. He told me that he had a letter from a British officer who, it was alleged, had full authority for negotiations of that kind. I knew how difficult it was to keep things secret in Athens out the fact that he arrived with a letter surprised me. This showed that the British Intelligence Service was working not too badly. The letter which Consul Escher read to me began, roughly, with these words:
"The Germans are to surrender...." Well, I immediately stopped him. I told him he need not go on reading and I told him "This is a demand but not a basis for negotiations." I was not yet a subordinate of the British and I had no cause at all to surrender.
Q. What was Escher's reaction to that?
A. Escher called on me again the next day and apoligized and said he had not known the contents of the letter because he had to admit that it was a little naive and not a reasonable thing to expect from a German general. He himself had his doubts by now whether that particular British officer was really a plenipotentiary. I realized, of course, that it was one of the small chieftains who rode about with the bands, who had assumed the part of Sherlock Holmes, or Lawrence of the first World War and that he wanted to play that part. Now Escher made another suggestion to me. I was to give him a letter of safe conduct and then he would undertake to drive through the German sentries in order to take up immediate contact with a higher British agency. Around that period of time the British were, roughly, halfway between Athens and Corinth.
Q. What was your reaction to that?
A. As I was interested in arriving at a reasonable agreement with the British I agreed to his proposal and I gave him a letter of safe conduct. I drew his attention to the fact that the territory between the German vanguards and the British might possibly be infested by bands. The British had, roughly, reached the Megara line which is almost halfway between Athens and Corinth, and that he would have to undertake that part of the trip at his own risk. I wished him good luck and once again expressed that I expected an offer but not a demand such as was contained in the last letter.
Q. General, did other Greek personalities try to contact you?
A. Yes, in the first days of October the Lord Mayor Georgakos of Athens appeared with a number of town councillors and asked me to spare the city and to avoid unnecessary destruction when we marched away from Athens. I assured the Lord Mayor that I had made the application that Athens should be declared an open city; and if it should be declared an open city, that is to say, if the O.K.W. should consent, then no explosions would be carried out in the city area of Athens. He then said good-bye, visibly relieved.
Q. What were the consequences of your second conversation with Archbishop Damaskinos?
A. The action on which the archbishop had embarked had had its result. In the apartment of the Swedish Professor, Sandstroem.....
Q. May I interpolate here. As far as I know, he is now the chairman of the Palestine Commission of U.N.O.
A. At that time he was chairman of the Greek Committee of the International Red Cross. Negotiations were carried out in his apartment between the Regierungsrat (Government Councillor) von Rumor, for the German side, and a British officer. The British offer was roughly this:
The Germans had to promise neither to carry out explosions in the harbor of Pyraeus nor on the airfields. They also had to clear Uboats and mine barriors. Should we comply with these British demands, the British would then not use the harbor and airfields for military purposes for a period of about ten days. Should we desist from blowing things up, then they promised us safe conduct, but; they had to take prisoners, they said, even if it were only a few hundred Italians in German uniforms.
Q What was your reaction to that offer?
A There was a time limit to it of 24 hours. I told the British officer that this did not form a basis of negotiations, but it simply amounted to a demand. I could not see anything of equal value in it. Safe conduct the British need not guarantee, for the time being I could still fight for it. I must say quite frankly I was highly annoyed at the language the British indulged in because ultimately both of us wanted something and I was not yet part of the middle east command, perhaps Mr. Scopi mixed me up with somebody else.
Afterwards I informed the Army Group of these negotiations and the Army Group was sulking, they reproached me that I did not ask them for permission first. I made a few excuses because I was annoyed because I regarded this as a vote of no confidence, as though I had any special purpose or intention up my sleeve.
You mentioned just now that nothing of equal value was in the agreement, what would you have regarded as being of equal value?
A Well, for instance if the British had guaranteed you can go on a ship of 5,000 tons from Crete to Saloniki, we will not torpedo the ship or make an airraid on the ship while you are on it. Then I would have said, very well, then we won't blow up the harbor of Pyraeus. That I would have regarded as being of equal value, which I expressed in my negative reply.
Q Did you then once again contact Consul Escher?
A Yes, meanwhile around about the 8th, 9th or 10th of October Escher returned from his trip and told me this: "Radio messages from Cairo are mixed up". At least he had contacted the plenipotentiary officer on the British side, that is at least he had learned his name, who was to carry out the negotiations concerning the changing of the guards and this was his offer. This British officer was to be promised safe conduct and should come to Athens, he should if possible bring along his wireless installations so that he could contact Cairo through that method. He would put up this British gentleman in the Swiss consulate.
Q What was your reaction to this order?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I don't see what all this testimony has to do with the matters we are concerned with in this proceedings. As far as I can tell from the indictment we have not alleged any crimes committed by this defendant in connection with Athens. I submit the political negotiations which he conducted wither with the Greek parties or the British is completely irrelevant and immaterial.
THE PRESIDENT: To some extent we may be getting a little afield, it gives us a basis however upon which this action was taken by this defendant. With the request that this type of examination be limited somewhat. The objection will be overruled.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
A I agreed to the consul's offer. I must admit the modification that no wireless contact with Cairo could be permitted without my permission and therefore I asked for special permission to that effect. Escher agreed and after the experience I had recently made with the Army Group I did not inform them of those negotiations with Escher.
Q Did you then meet?
A On account of the delay caused by Escher's trip to the British line, time had meanwhile marched on and the date at which our retreat was timed became nearer and nearer, nor did Professor Sandstroem inform me of new developments.
Meanwhile we received word from the OKW that they had consented to declare Athens an open city.
Q If the Tribunal please, at this point I would like to submit a document, contained in Felmy document book No. 3, it is Document No. 85 on page 54, it is offered as Exhibit 60. This is an affidavit by the former consul Alfred Escher. At the present time Escher is Legation Councillor at the Swiss Legation in London. On page 54, it says:
Prior to the time of the negotiations which are described further below, General Felmy was unknown to me. Since his departure from Athens I did not see him again now had I any contact with him.
General Felmy, who - if I remember correctly -- was in command of the LXIIV Army Corps, was the responsible commanding officer in Athens only for the last weeks after the Commander in Chief Greece, General Scheurlen, and SS General Schimana, had left Athens.
On 30 September 1944 I received a letter, written by a British officer, in which I was asked to inform the German Commander in Chief of the presence of a British officer in the vicinity of Athens, who was authorized to negotiate with the German commanding officer for the surrender of the German forces in Greece to the Allied High Command. I got in immediate touch with General Felmy who had hitherto been unknown to me. He declared that a capitulation of the German forces was out of the question, but as far as the surrender of the city of Athens to the British in the sense of "changing the guard" was concerned, he would listen to reason. To be sure, he himself could not make any proposals, but he would be ready to examine any reasonable suggestions made by time opposite side. He pointed out that similar proposals had already come into his hands through other channels.
I forwarded this information by messengers to the British and requested precise details on the credentials of the British officer and the submittal of concrete suggestions.
The messenger, who set out to the British post on 2 October and was expected to join me again after two days, because of technical difficulties did not return until. Monday, 9 October. The reply did not offer a satisfactory basis for negotiations, and as time was pressing, I suggested to General Felmy that I should go personally to the British station. General Felmy gave me a pass for two days, which permitted me to cross all German lines, promised me not to put my car and the goal of my ride under observation; furthermore, not to carry out any destructions and blastings during 48 hours, unless explicit orders were given him by higher echelons or enemy action forced him to do it.
I found the British post at Megara, situated on the road to Corinth, and the post established radio communication with Cairo; but once more no sufficient basis for negotiations could be found before I had to leave Megara, in order to keep within the 48 hours-limit. I came to an understanding with the British that they should send me a messenger if further useful news should arrive from Cairo.
General Felmy, whom I informed of the state of affairs, acquiesced in my putting up the British officer plenipotentiary,if necessary, in my house and permitted even the setting up of a radio station in my house for his use, if the Englishman would pledge his word of honor to use the station only in connection with the subject under negotiation.
The British messenger did not show up for want of further favorable news from Cairo. General Felmy had to leave Athens, left, however, a higher officer behind to make it possible for me until the very last moment to contact him, General Felmy, once more, in case fresh news should arrive. This was not the case, however, and the respective officer, who still called on me in the early afternoon of 12 October, had to leave the city without an agreement having been reached.
Permit me to add here that similar negotiations were conducted through other channels, above all through Mr. Sandstroem, the Swidish chairman of the administrative committee for aiding Greece, as well as through the Swedish Consul General, Mr. Thyberg. These negotiations, also led to no result.
Summing up, it can doubtlessly be said that General Felmy did all in his power to initiate an orderly surrender of the city of Athens, to prevent the disturbances which were to be feared and which would certainly have to be expected if there would have elapsed any length of time between the withdrawal of the German forces and the arrival of the Allied troops, and to prevent destructions unwarranted by military necessities. General Felmy told me during our first discussion that he realized what harm the occupation of Greece, which after all had been undesired by the German side had brought to the Greek population, and that he would do all in his power to prevent unnecessary suffering and damages.
Although, as I know from other sources too, the German local commanders were strictly forbidden to get in touch with representatives of the enemy, he did enter into negotiations, in the course of which, true, he did not make any suggestions on his part, but could merely accept possible suggestions made by the opponent. The fact that no agreement was reached, cannot be regarded as his fault.
The negotiations entered into through my intervention were most warmly supported by the Archbishop and later Regen Damaskinos, who authorized me before my journey to Megara to declare also in his behalf that General Felmy was a reliable, loyal person, who was well-disposed toward the Greek people. Such a declaration I passed on to the English plenipotentiaries in the name of Archbishop Damaskinos as well as in my own name.
Although it came to no formal agreement, General Felmy did his best to prevent unnecessary destructions. According to sources which seem to me reliable, it can be ascribed to General Felmy's personal credit that the originally ordered blasting of the Marathon Dam did not take place. Furthermore, General Felmy, shortly before the evacuation of the last troops, declared Athens an open city. According to the statements made by a member of General Felmy's staff, who seems to me reliable, he sent on a directive received from higher echelons relative to the blowing up of the power station to his subordinate officers with the remark that he himself did not approve of that order, which, according to a statement by a technical expert, had the result that the blasting charges, which would have put the plant out of operation for at least six months, were reduced in such a way that the plant could again be put into operation already a few days after the blowing up. Finally it is said to be likewise due to General Felmy's initiative that on 5 October 1944 an agreement was reached between Army Corps Headquarters LXIII, LXVIII it should read not LXIII. (represented by Korps-intendent, Oberfeldintendent BergHofer), the Special Plenipotentiary for the German Reich, Dr. Overcott, and Dr. Sandstroem, to the effect that the foodstuffs which were no longer required by the German Wehrmacht were handed over to the International Red Cross.
During my term in Athens, no complaints whatsoever with regard to General Felmy's personal attitude or to that of his staff towards the Greek population came to my knowledge from Greek sources either.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I object to the reading of the last paragraph. It can have no meaning whatever unless we know precisely during what period the affiant was in Athens and that period is not indicated in the affidavit itself.
THE PRESIDENT: That objection will be sustained.
BY DR. MUELLER-TORGOW:
Q General, during what period of time did consul Escher serve in Athens?
AAt least in September and October of 1944, possibly for longer but I did not know him before.
Q If the Tribunal please, an affidavit by Archbishop Damaskinos I unfortunately am in no position to submit. Your Honors will recall that at the time I made an application to go to Athens to collect a number of affidavits. This trip was turned down by Berlin and we then attempted to put questions to the Archbishop, which were sent to Athens in the official way, but even through official and diplomatic channels, through Washington, but no answer has been received from Archbishop Damaskinos and the other gentlemen, this is apart from the former welfare minister, Louvaris, whose affidavit I hope to be able to submit to in due course.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Your Honors, I know of no application on the part of counsel to make a trip to Greece and I know further of no attempt on his part to get in touch with the prosecution to have it use its good offices or the Greek delegation who for a long time was part of the prosecution staff. If that had been done, I am sure that the prosecution would lend its efforts and make an effort to secure the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: I know of an application of some sort of that character having been submitted. Unfortunately the proceedings for this Tribunal and perhaps other Tribunals seems necessary to have the cooperation of the prosecution.
I am not directing that toward the representative of the prosecution in this Court. That is about all I have to say, perhaps that is enough.
BY DR. MUELLER TORGOW:
Q General, did you then carry into effect this decision to declare Athens an open city and did you announce it to the Greeks?
A On the 11th of October I asked the Lord Mayor to call on me and I told him this important decision, highly delighted, he asked me whether he could broadcast this over the Greek broadcasting system. I agreed, but the Greek General Spiriotopoulos, whom the British had appointed as the city commandant of Athens did, as he had on the next days, prevent that this news should be broadcast. What purpose he had there I do not know, because this news spread like wild-fire through the city.
Q Was then an official surrender to the Greeks of the city of Athens effected?
A On 12 October at noon, in accordance with my agreement with the Lord Mayor, the surrender of the town of Athens to the Greek authorities was carried out in front of the castle. A company of honor had marched up, the German flag was solemnly hauled down from the Akropolis and a wreath was laid on the grave of the Greek Unknown soldier. The combat commandant of Athens was in charge of the ceremony, his name was Lt. Col. Meier.
Q Was this surrender published in the papers?
A On the same morning, I announced this in the papers and the same wording was communicated to the Lord Mayor on the 11th. When I heard it first, It said roughly this:
"I have the honor of informing you that the Wehrmacht has declared the city of Athens to be an open city. The withdrawal of German troops has commenced. The measure is being taken with the expectation that the enemy will approve it."
Q General, what became of these large depots and supply goods which had been stored up in Athens?
A Large quantities of supplies had been stored up in these depots, which could not be taken to Crete, because we did not have enough shipping space, we had at least a few thousand tons of food, supplies and clothing stored in the depots with various equipment, beds, tables and other furniture. Some of these things were handed over to the International Red Cross and some to the Greek Minister of the Interior Louvavis. Actually we had the order to destroy those goods less the enemy would capture them. I did not carry out that order in view of the suffering of the Greek population, because I could not detect any military necessity in this. Later on finally during our retreat in Thebes, Lamia and Larissa the food supply depots there were turned over the local Greek Red Cross in those cities.
Q May it please the Tribunal, it is my intention......
THE PRESIDENT: May I interrupt please? We will take our morning recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal, before the recess we discussed the delivering up of the large stocks in Athens. I had intended at this point to submit an affidavit contained in Document Book Felmy III, Document 86. It is an affidavit executed by Berghofer. This man Berghofer resides in Nurnberg and, therefore, I will call him here as a witness on the stand and examine him concerning the points dealt with in his affidavit.
Q General, how long did the Corps Staff remain in Athens?
A My Combat Staff withdrew on the 12th of October toward noon, Athens was left completely undestroyed to the Greeks.
Q And what happened with the port sector Pyraeus?
AAfter dark in the evening of the 12th of October in the war harbor Pyraeus the blowing ups took place according to plan. The orange harbor which served exclusively trade purposes and the coal harbor where the Swedish Red Cross ships were anchored, these harbors remained undestroyed. In the town area of Pyraeus the electric plant was merely rendered unusable but was not destroyed; as I learned shortly afterwards, it could be used again.
Q Had this destruction been ordered?
A The electric plant was contained on the list of objectives to be destroyed. The last troops withdrew from Kyphissia, a suburb of Athens, in the morning of the 13th of October.
Q What was the attitude shown by the British?
A The British did not pursue at any point. Also the air landings which we had expected did not take place. The withdrawal and further retreat movements took place without enemy contact at any time. We succeeded, therefore, despite the misgivings which we had previously had, in leaving behind the towns of Pyraeus and Athens which harbored almost one quarter of the Greek population entirely without any bloodshet whatsoever.
Q General, I have one last general question to put in conclusion.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
What is your attitude to the reproach made by the prosecution that you have terrorized and exterminated the Greek population?
A We waged a fight against the destructive elements within the Greek state. That was fully in the interests of the country itself. The same opponent is being fought now by Greece after four years. Large circles supported us in this from the Democrats right down to the Conservatives. If I had wanted to terrorize and to exterminate the Greek nation I would have had abundant opportunity, at least during the last months, to do that. Then I could have blown up the Marathon Dam as had been ordered; then I could have taken the many surprise attacks in the suburbs of Athens as cause to counter these with armed force.
As previously mentioned, discussions -- and I only mentioned the most important ones, the leaving behind of the stock of food and other supply goods, and distributing it to the suffering population, the declaration of Athens to an open city -- all these prove unequivically what feelings I personally had at the time. They were not foolish and senseless measures, to use a term used by the prosecution, which I ordered.
The Motives which guided me personally had a good amount of sense and meaning. "What motives these were will have to be decided by the Tribunal.
DR. MUELLER-TORGOW: If it please the Tribunal, this brings me to the conclusion of my direct examination.
THE PRESIDENT: Are there any of the defense counsel who desire to examine the defendant now on the stand?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
EXAMINATION BY DR. WEISGERBER (For the Defendant Speidel)
Q General, did the Military Commander of Greece have towards the troops in his area any official jurisdiction or supervisory functions or even the duty to check up on these troops concerning reprisal measures ordered by a troop commander?
A No, he did not have this authority. For instance, the troops of the 68th Corps were not subordinated to him.
Q Then the Military Commander Greece could, therefore, not have given a divisional commander subordinate to you, an order not to carry out a reprisal measure ordered by such a divisional commander?
A You mean a divisional commander subordinated to me? No, he did not have the right to do that.
Q General, I am now having reference to the so-called Loehr Order, which is the order concerning reprisal measures, dated 22 December 1943. It is Prosecution Document NOKW-172 contained in Document Book 16 of the Prosecution. It was Exhibit 379 of the Prosecution. The pages are 48 and 49 in the English, and page 99 in the German text. In this order it is mentioned that reprisal measures of the troops have to be carried out in agreement with the sub-area administrative headquarters. If the two agencies do not reach an agreement, the Military Commander has to make the decision. I will show this passage to you. It is on the page which is turned up, under capital "C".
Is it known to you whether, for instance, the 117th Light Infantry Division carried out its reprisal measures on the Peloponnes in conjunction with the sub-area administrative headquarters Corinth?
A It doesn't look like it, because yesterday, from the Activity Report of the 117th Division, the passage was read here - where the 117th Division reports that after lengthy negotiations with the subarea administrative headquarters it had invested the rights and duties for reprisal measures in the Division. I believe that report is dated the beginning of November, and the Activity Report as such was not sub Court No. V, Case No. VII.