Q. Who did in fact carry out the executions?
A. The 117th Light Infantry Division, on whom these ambushes had been made.
Q. Do you know General Felmy in this same entry in your war diary on 11 March 1944, there is a notation of the number of the Germans losses and this statement: "That the commander 117th Light Infantry Division, General Felmy requests approval of following reprisal measures." Did Colonel Papagondonas ask your permission before the 200 hostages mentioned in paragraph 4 were actually executed?
A. Yes, that becomes clear from this: "He asks for permission for the following reprisal measures," and then it is mentioned that all transports and traffic on certain roads must remain at a standstill, that a certain station so and so had to be established; the curfew had to be observed, and finally the execution of hostages; that it says: the decision concerning the burning down of villages known as "band nests" had not as yet been taken , and, I said, on direct examination yesterday, that I remember the details of this incident very well, because the high ranking party, Colonel Papagondonas told me of the situation at the "band nests", and that he confirmed everything and that it was only then that I released these villages for destruction. In the same connection it was mentioned that not the 200 hostages that were shot but that in case of 59, it was found out that they were not connected with the reprisal attack, and decided that only 141 hostages were shot, in view of the fact that the Germans listed 21 dead and 42 wounded.
Q. It was with your permission to execute these 200 hostages?
A. No, the 141 , which I explained just now.
Q. Is it a fact that Le Suire requested approval, the approval of the following reprisal measure, that he requested the approval of it from you as the commander?
A. He requested it from me.
Q. And you gave him that permission?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. And after you gave him that permission, in fact, 141 hostages according to your testimony were executed?
A. Instead of the 200, it is 141.
Q. That is a particularly high ratio for the German dead and wounded isn't it?
A. No. The German list counted to 63. The German list amounted to 63.
Q. How many of those were dead and how many were wounded?
A. Twenty-one were dead, and forty-two were wounded, as the report said.
Q. Now this same Major General Le Suire carried out the Calavrita operation. Do you consider the Calavrita operation an excess on the part of the German troops?
A. Yes, I said so, yesterday on direct examination.
Q. Why do you think that, General Felmy? You testified that Calavrita. was a band-nest, and in fact they were around there with fighting and attacks upon your troops in the neighborhood. Wasn't that what the various reprisal orders instructed the divisional commanders to do in that case?
A. It was one of the many reasons, but I regarded it as an excess, because when the hostages were shot, it had not been clearly established which one of them was really connected with the bands, and that the destruction of villages which however were highly set in the area of the bands also seemed to have been selected not diligently enough, not as it had been done before. This was the direction which the German soldiers followed.
Q. How did you go about to find out who was really connected with the bandits; what procedure did you use?
A. The best method later on became the volunteers, they called them , they and Papagondas staff.
Q. He was another Greek, or a German?
A. Well, to inform you, Mr. Fenstermacher, if you could see how these poor farmers fought at the time. They knew the inhabitants of the various villages far better, they spoke their language.
Q. But it is a fact, is it not, General Felmy, that only a Greek who had spite, or vengeance, or haired, perhaps, would inform on another Greek falsely, and then you or your German troops would execute the man as a hostage, when really, in fact, he had nothing to do with the band?
A. That might have happened, often, yes. I could not deny that, but, of course, I don't know it. It is hardly quite possible to realise, you can see it now, how people denounced each other, how the people would work against one another, as they do now here in the denazification trials, and so forth.
Q. What method did you take to insure against that happening?
THE PRESIDENT: How would this man know that, Mr. Fenstermacher?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: He testified, Your Honor, of course, that he was dealing with this Colonel, the Greek volunteer commander.
THE PRESIDENT: How could you tell us whether one Greek farmer was testifying or reporting falsely on another? I am afraid we arc getting a little far afield in a matter which pertains to some details that can not be very helpful. I don't want to restrict you, but how this man here can tell about something that was in the mind of a Greek farmer's who is trying to, as you suggest, testify or reporting falsely, it seems rather impossible for this man to give that information.
MR. FENSTERMACHER: Very well, Your Honor.
BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q. General Felmy, did you hear how many persons were in fact executed during the course of the Calavrita operation?
A. I said before that from the activity reports, or final report of the 117th Division, it may be seen that 696 Greeks were executed -- were shot.
Q Do you consider that a particularly high ratio in view of the fact that 78 Germans had, as you claimed, been executed by the bands?
A Well, the ratio is not even one to ten, as General LeSuire pointed out. On the other hand, it is quite a few human beings, I admit.
Q Were you concerned -- Withdrawn. Do you call the Calvrita, operation an excess because the ratio was as high as it was, or rather because not enough deligence was used in ascertaining which villages to burn down and which persons to execute? What is the main reason, the ratio itself, you believe, was not particularly high.
A That would only take second place.
Q Now, prior to the murder of the 78 German soldiers, you had demanded of the bands that they release them to you , isn't that correct?
A The regiment had reported that they were negotiating with the bands to have the prisoners released or exchanged, and these mutual negotiations did not lead to anything.
Q Was there a demand on the German part, General Felmy, to return the German soldiers?
AAs far as I know they were to be exchanged for other prisoners.
Q You didn't believe that by negotiating with the bandits you would be rendering them a certain amount of recognition as a belligerent entity?
A No, that has nothing to do with it.
Q You said that if you had asked to have General LeSuire disciplined as a result of the excess at Calavrita, the OKW and Hitler would probably not have upheld your request.
A Yes, that is what I said.
Q Calavrita occurred in December, 1943, General Felmy, and as you know -
A December, yes.
Q And as you know, in that month, I believe it was on the 22nd of December, 1943, an order came out, agreed upon by Field Marshal von Weichs and Minister Neubacher that political considerations were thereafter very important and that reprisal measures should only be taken after first clearing with him, and that no strict reprisal ratio was to be enforced after that date.
A It is not entirely correct. The political aspect is correct; the period of time is correct; and the fixed ratios are no longer mentioned, which up until then were valid and were based probably on the Keitel Order of September, '41. But reprisal measures remained in force should the population give such provocation for this, and are to be carried out by officers with at least the disciplinary authority of a divisional commander, or by the military commanders who also have disciplinary authority of at least a divisional commander. Usually they had the rank of a commanding general.
Q Minister Heubacher was very much interested in not having excesses occur within the southeast area, since he had a great deal of power along about that month of December, would he not have upheld you had you asked for LeSuire's dismissal because of the excesses in Calavrita?
A Well, whether he would have interfered in purely military matters, I couldn't say.
Q Do you think Field Marshal von Weichs who had agreed with Neubacher on the order of 22nd December, 1943, would have upheld you if you had asked for LeSuire's dismissal?
A That is entirely possible, but Field Marshal von Weichs was not the decisive agency.
Q Why didn't you ask Firle Marshal von Weichs to support you with the OKW and with Neubacher regarding LeSuire's dismissal?
AA dismissal of General LeSuire did not seem to be indicated at all in my opinion.
Q You don't think that LeSuire should have been dismissed because of his troops having committed this excess upon his orders?
A He should have been disciplined, yes, but that would not have been carried out. He should have been put before what was known as a Generals' Court and the decision would have been the Fuehrer's, namely the sentence to be reached by the court.
Q You never took any steps to initiate that type of procedure, did you?
A No, because I realized from the beginning that it would be hopeless.
Q Did you ever recommend LeSuire thereafter for a promotion?
A No.
Q Will you look at this document General Felmy, NOKW-1446. This is offered as Prosecution's Exhibit 628, Your Honors. You will note, General Felmy, under date of 1 March 1944 you state as follows regarding General Karl von LeSuire: "Holds tight reins on his Division which was reorganized in spring and summer 1943. Has perfected training in particular in the cooperation of all arms. Up to now, only employed in combating bands. His well defined temperament does not permit him to be daunted by any difficulty. Mentally and physically above average, National-Socialist. Pronounced leading personality. Above average. It is suggested that he remain at his post." I understood you to say on direct examination that LeSuire should, have been disciplined. Did you really want LeSuire to remain at his post under your command, or would you have preferred, in view of the Calavrita excesses, that he be removed from your area and your jurisdiction?
THE PRESIDENT: Your question, Mr. Fenstermacher, was as to whether or not he had recommended his promotion, was it not?
MR. FENSTERMACHER: I am coming to that in just a minute, your Honor. There is another entry by General Felmy in this same particular personnel file.
Q. (By Mr. Fenstermachcer) Perhaps, General Felmy, we should have the bulk of your comments at the same time. You note on Page 3 of the document which you have an entry under the date of 16 July 1944 where you say this of LeSuire: "Energetic soldier, leading personality. Holds tight reins on his division and has perfected training. Up to now, only combating bands. His well defined temperament does not permit him to be daunted by any difficulty. Mentally and physically above average. National-Socialist. Pronounced leader personality. Lately an exaggerated touchiness and feeling he is in the right. Above average. - Commander of a Mountain Corps." You were there recommending LeSuire to command a corps, are you not?
A. Yes, I do, but that doesn't mean that he would become one. These are simply the sort of judgments reached at regular intervals on the men concerned, namely, whether they can be left in their positions or whether they were to be promoted to next higher position, and that in accordance with all his soldierly past and abilities he was quite suitable.
Q. Did you hope that he would not become a corps commander?
A. Would I hope that, do you mean? Well he was next in turn.
Q. Did you want General LeSuire to become a corps commander and get a promotion, is that why you wrote this recommendation for him?
A. I certified here that he had the ability of leading a corps.
Q. Why did you call him a National-Socialist, General Felmy?
A. Well, that has been mentioned often before, that there was a stipulation that we had to add this, and as officer -
Q. You will note under General Loehr's recommendation and General Weich's recommendation, on page 4 of the document which you have, that they don't mention he is a National Socialist. Neither does General Jodel or General Stettner or General Schoerner. As a matter of fact, you are the only commander who mentions that he is a National-Socialist, are you not?
A. I don't know what judgment the others arrived at concerning him. There was a regulation that a remark of that sort had to be included in the personal file, and this has been discussed so often before.
Q. Did the regulation on that point come only to you, or was it generally distributed throughout the German Army?
A. I know that in the case of the Luftwaffe this had been initiated before the war. In the case of the Army it became acute only later on. I cannot give you the date when the Army received the regulation.
Q. Why did you recommend in March 1944, that LeSuire remain in his post?
A. He had been in command of his division for just a year. I think it had been established in the early part of summer, 1943, I mean the 117 Light Infantry Division, and it was customary for him to stay in command for about a year. Had he not had that, he still would not have been promoted commanding general before, because our theater was not a largescale theater of war where people could distinguish themselves personally. Things on the whole were a quiet routine.
Q. He had commanded a division for quite sometime, had he not, General Felmy? You will note on the first page of has personal file he was deputy commander of the Forty Sixth Infantry Division as early as February, 1943.
A. Well, that probably was with his personal file at the time when I wrote down his qualification? You are sure it was in with his personal file? At the time I didn't read it, what he had done before, because I was to judge him from my own experience of him. In the case of every written judgment we had to write a new judgment, and I do not remember that the compilation was worded in the way it is reproduced here, that as it were his whole military career could be deduced therefrom. All personal papers usually rested with the next higher agency. In this case, in the case of the corps command, if a new file had to be started new forms were asked for.
When I wrote out these judgments, not only in the case of General von LeSuire, but in all others, I did not look at the whole of the career so that my own judgment would be objective amid without prejudice.
THE PRESIDENT The Tribunal will recess at this time until Monday morning, December 8, 1947, at nine-thirty in the morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 8 December 1947, at 0930 hours.)
Court No.V, Case No. VII.
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al, defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 4 December 1947, 0930, Justice Carter, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military Tribunal V is now in session. God save the United States of America and this Honorable Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Marshal, you will ascertain if the defendants are all present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor, all the defendants are present in the courtroom, with the exception of the defendant von Weichs who is in the hospital.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Carter will preside at this day's session.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
HELMUTH FELMY - Resumed CROSS-EXAMINATION - (Continued) BY MR. FENSTERMACHER:
Q Thank you, Your Honor. General Felmy, last Friday we spoke somewhat generally about the subject of hostages and at that time you said you were unable to ascertain an approximation regarding the number of hostages executed in your Corps area during your second sojourn in Greece. Would you look now at document book No. 20, page 38 in the German, page 53 in the English. This is an excerpt from your own -from the war diary of the 1st Panzer Division, who was subordinate to you, and it reports that on 22 August 1943 a Corporal was disarmed and beaten up and that ten hostages were to be shot to death unless the culprits are named, you will note the statement "with the approval of the Corps headquarters"; did you give approval for the execution of those hostages?
A Without doubt, if it says so here. I suppose an inquiry reached the Corps Headquarters and the answer which is contained here can be Court No. V, Case No. VII.
expressed by that fact.
Q You said on Friday and again on your direct examination that you did not recall any particular quota for the execution of hostages within the Corps area. You will note here the quota ten to one; was that simply arbitrarily established or was there an order providing for a ten to one ratio?
A The reprisal measures depended on the individual cases, it depended on the extent and the importance, because you had to adjust than to military necessity.
Q Would you look now at document book 19, page 83 in the German and page 64 in the English. This is an excerpt from the daily reports of Army Group E for the 12th September 1943 and it states under Army Group Southern Greece, of which you were the commander at that time, "As reprisal measure for one murdered German soldier, ten Greeks were hanged." Again there is reference to the ten to one ratio, is that simply again individually established for this particular case?
A I remember from my study of the documents in the case which you have discussed, about the 1st Panzer Division, not ten but three people were shot, having partially confessed, otherwise I never saw the war diary of the Panzer Division. I found this particular case when I studied the documents and diary for some passages in the diary of the Panzer Division where it says so.
As for the case in document book 19, I would ask you to bear in mind that on 9 September in the morning, anyway before noon, I had taken over the Army Group Southern Greece and I was, therefore, scarcely in a position within two or three days to issue an order to this effect, because my task was to see to it that the Italian army be transported away, nor do I know what unit carried this out. The lines of debarkation were not very tightly drawn at the time this had been Italian territory and what German units were committed there now I do not know. I think you are asking too much.
Q Let us look now, General Felmy, to a particular three week period, Court No. V, Case No. VII.
the period covering the three weeks from 25 November 1943 to 16 December 1943 in document book 17 at page 71 in the German and page 98 in the English. You will note there under "LXVIII Infantry Corps: In reprisal for band attack on Aighion 20 Communists shot to death." Then if you will turn to pages 93 and 94 in the English, page 69 in the German, you will note four days later on the 29th of November, 1943? "100 hostages shot in reprisal for the band attack on the road Tripoli Sparta." And if you will turn next to page 92 in the English and page 68 in your German document book, the daily report of the 5th of December, just a few days after the few preceding reports, "50 hostages shot in Aighion." Do you recall any of those three incidents, the total number of persons shot is 170 by these reports?
A On direct examination I said that I do not recall these individual incidents. I don't know whether the case of the 100 hostages was discussed or not. For the attack on the trucks on the Tripolis-Sparta road, I cannot recall at this point the sum total of German losses incurred there. For that I would have to refer to the war diary where more details are possibly given and where perhaps you might get more information.
Q Those three incidents were on the 25th of November, 29th of November and 5th of December; then on the 6th of December, 1943, 50 more hostages were hanged for an attack on the railroad base Southeast of Tripoli. You will find that on page 68 of your book and 92 of the English and finally on 8 December.....
AAs for the 6th of December, I remember the figures. I found them afterwards in the war diary, because they are not contained in the report itself. In the case of the surprise attack on the railway base, 10 German soldiers were killed and 4 wounded. That is, 14 casualties altogether.
Q Will you look at the war diary notation for that, General Felmy, in document 20 page 64 in the German, page 90 in the English; do you find any notation there regarding your last statement?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A Do you mean reprisal measures for a surprise attack on 1 December, 50 hostages hanged at the station of Andritsa, or which one do you mean on page 64?
Q Where do you find the reference that 10 Germans were killed and 4 wounded prior to the attack for which 50 hostages were executed?
A If I remember right, from the photostatic copy, which is not contained here. Here we have only extracts from the war diary. Unless I am very much mistaken, that figure must be correct. I think I am almost certain to be right here, because I looked for the reason why and I found the confirmation of the figure, which I gave, namely 10 killed and 4 wounded.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q On the 8th of December, 1943, General Felmy, 25 hostages were shot as reprisal for band attack Southeast of Gythion, that is on page 67 of your book and 91 of the English, do you happen to know that reason for which those persons were executed?
A I could not tell you, I am afraid I have found nothing in the documents so far, but not all the documents are available here. One reason or another must have been at the bottom of this reprisal measure.
Q The total number of persons shot, General Felmy, is: 20 on 25 November, 100 on 29 November, 50 on 5 December, 50 on 6 December and 25 on 8 December, or a total of 245 hostages shot between the 25th of November and 8th of December; is that a particularly high figure do you know; is that a representative figure for the time span involved.
A In that case I would have to have the precise information so that I could give you the total German losses at the same time, because only then I would be in a position to draw a conclusion. As it is, I am not in a position to give you an answer here.
Q General Felmy, if there were German losses as a result of these various attacks on railroads and other attacks, would they not have been noted in your reports?
AAs far as I remember, losses were reported every ten days to the Army Group. On some occasions one also finds some indication in which the reprisal measure itself is reported.
Q The last attack we mentioned was on 8th of December, 1943; you will remember between the 12th and 16th the operation Kalavrita was going on; would you tell us again what the losses were during that operation?
A I know the losses very precisely in the case of Kalavrita, because General von LeSuire reported them to me, there were 696.
Q And how many villages were burned?
A More than 20, I believe 24 were reported.
Q Do you recall the testimony of the Greek witness Spiliopoulis to the effect that 1,300 persons were killed at the village of Kalavrita Court No. V, Case No. VII.
alone plus 140 persons who were foreign to the area, who happened to be in the area of Kalavrita that day?
A I recall that his statements mentioned a higher figure; how many there were in detail I don't know.
Q Do you believe his figure is too high?
A Yes.
Q You have indicated, General, that the prosecution's excerpts have been taken out of the context of the reports; would you look therefore at your own war diary which is in your own defense document book 4, turn to page 7a, the entry for 17 January, 1944 states that in retaliation for an attack on one officer, 20 Communists were executed; did you know about that?
A No, I know nothing about that.
Q Do you know whether or not the officer was killed or was it simply an attack upon him?
A If 20 people are reported as having been executed in reprisal, I am inclined to assume that not only the officer was killed but probably also his driver and his escort and several other persons would probably have been injured.
Q If that had happened, General Felmy, would not that have been reported the same as attacks on other convoys are reported with some detail as to the number of persons killed or injured?
A They were not always reported, these entries in the war diaries are never 100% correct. In this case the loss of the officer was particularly stressed and this I only assume, of course.
Q Will you look now at page 15 of your own Corps war diary, the entry for the 7th of February, 1944, it talks about the destruction of three villages and the execution of 100 Communists in retaliation for an attack near Skela. There the losses are specifically mentioned, the guerilla had 100 dead and Germans had 10 dead and one wounded, Did General LeSuire consult with you before he took that reprisal measure?
A I believe this is the reprisal measure carried out by the naval Court No. V, Case No. VII.
commander, that becomes clear quite definitely from other reports. On direct examination, I explained that it had been the third surprise attack on a column of naval trucks, and if I remember correctly there occurred two attacks on naval trucks and this was the third such attack on a naval truck column, whereupon this reprisal measure was ordered by the naval commander.
Q Who was the combat commander of the Peloponnesus; was that General LeSuire?
A The man in charge of the defense of the Peloponnesus was General von LeSuire, his position or his functions went into effect as soon as the Allies landed and in that event he did not have the possibility of issuing orders to the Navy, but collaboration became rather more intimate should the Allies land. The task of the Navy insofar as the mainland was concerned was mainly that the naval artillery and batteries were to adjust their commitment to the fighting be it on sea or after the landing, also on land. This was a highly complicated affair and we never found a particularly happy or complete solution for this as to how to adjust the naval batteries and the army coastal batteries to each other.
Q Would you look at document book 18, General Felmy, just momentarily, at page 20 in the German and page 17 in the English. This is a report dated 11 February 1944 from the military commander Southeast, General Felmber, the report itself is signed by Geitner and it states: "By order of the Combat Commander of Peloponnesus, 3 neighboring localities burned down and 149 inhabitants shot as reprisal measure.." Doesn't this state "the combat commandant" at that time?
A Yes, of course, but I explained that this statement is incorrect. There was a mistake made here, namely by the Military Commander Southeast who was stationed in Belgrade and as he was stationed on the mainland, all he knew about water was the Danube and Save. He had no idea that two naval commandants would be stationed on the Peloponnes, one in Kalamata and one in Patras. Other reports as far as this case is Court No. V, Case No. VII.
concerned always mention the naval commander. Only the Military Commander Southeast reports combat commandant. This is quite obviously a mistake on his part.
Q Would you look next on page 21 of your document book 4, the 68th Corps War diary, the entry for the 23rd of February 1944. This is a report of an attack on a truck convoy and again the losses are listed. German losses 15 dead and 7 wounded. Then will you note the following reprisals which were to be taken, the shooting of 200 hostages from the Tripoli hostage camp are to be shot at the place of the attack. LeSuire consult with you before ha took this reprisal measure?
A I pointed out in direct examination and I can offer evidence from the documents that some days previously, namely on the 20th of February, as I remember it, in the area of Megalopolis there was an attack made on trucks of the 117th Division where fairly considerable losses were suffered -- according to my recollection 10 or 15 killed and a number of people wounded and a large number of people kidnapped, so that the second attack unfortunately does not say here... Oh, yes, it says under paragraph 2, in Tripolis and Megalopolis, in other words, on the same road, or to be very, very cautious in my statements, in the same area, there was the second attack.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Well, let's look, GeneraL Felmy, at the losses from the attack of the two days previous to which you refer. That is found on page 20 of the Document Book under the entry of the 20th of February 1944 losses are 9 dead and 3 missing so the totals for the two attacks would be 24 dead and 9 wounded and 3 missing; and in retaliation for those losses 200 hostages were ordered executed.
You don't think that is a particularly high retaliation quota?
A Thirty eight German losses were to be retaliated for the two attacks.
Q Did you consider the execution of hostages in retaliation for the wounded with the same degree of severity as for those who were killed?
A These sums which were laid down in the OKW regulations of 50 to 100 for one German killed, and I think 25 for one German wounded, and another ratio for one wounded Greek or wounded Serb who was serving with us, I never made these calculations. The Germans had lost a total of 38 men and for that 200 hostages were shot. In other words, the proportion figures about 6 or 7, if you work it out.
Q Another attack was in February 1944 and there was another one in March of 1944. Will you turn to page 27 and page 28 in your corps war diary? The losses for the attack upon the convoy on the 11th of March 1944 were 18 dead and 44 wounded. Ten villages were also destroyed, I believe. You testified that actually only 141 persons were shot although 200 hostages had been ordered from all hostage camps. Were you consulted beforehand, before that retaliation measure was taken? As a matter of fact, I believe you said you had been consulted and had approved that measure.
A General von LeSuire asked me for my approval for the carrying out of this reprisal measure. I have testified to this. I referred back to Colonel Papadongeas about the villages which had been reported to be band nests and, he having confirmed them as being band nests, I gave my approval that they might be destroyed. As later reports show, Court No. V, Case No. VII.
not 200 hostages were shot but 141, so that, if you bear in mind the German losses, the figure of people killed increased from 18 to 21 some of the wounded died, so the figure of the wounded originally figured at 45 had now been decreased by 3 with the result that we arrived at the figure of 63 German soldiers lost, and that should be compared with the 141 hostages which were actually shot.
And then I further emphasized that after these band nests had been burned down throughout the whole period of time when we were still in the Peloponnes -- that is to say, almost 6 months -- not one single attack occurred on a truck column along this Sparta-Tripolis road. In other words, we had taken the correct measure -- namely, burning down the villages and eliminating the band nests.
Q The month of April 1944 was apparently an active one, judging from your corps war diary. Would you look on page 35, the entry for the 1st of April 1944? There under the Attica-Boeotia area it is stated that there were 10 Communists in reprisal. That would appear to be a ratio of 5 to 1 for each German wounded. Did you know about that ratio before the Communists were actually executed?
Here I should point out that the SS Police Mountain Regiment 18 was under the orders of the Higher SS and Police Leader, General Schimana, who as far as band warfare was concerned, received orders from his own SS agencies. That he happened to be serving in my area is another paid of shoes.
Q You mean to say, General Felmy, that you could be combat commander over a whole corps area and that particular units could be engaging in military operations with one partisan within your corps area and you could not give them tactical instructions not to take reprisal measures?
A That is entirely correct because I was, as I said, the commandant in my area. As soon as the Allies landed, then, similarly to what I said about the Peloponnesus and General von LeSuire, I had a certain amount of latitude in taking measures and my authority would have been Court No. V, Case No. VII.
extended, but not for, let us say, normal times.
Q You mean Schimana who was commander of the 18th Police Mountain Light Infantry Regiment had to phone Berlin and talk to Himmler before he could execute these 10 Communists in retaliation for these 2 wounded?
A I don't think so. The Commander of the Police Regiment 18 was not Schimana. Schimana was the Higher SS and Police Leader and among others the Police Regiment 18 was subordinate to him. As far as I know, the Commanders of the Police and the Greek Gendarmerie also under him. The Evzones Battalions were under him.
Q You could order Schimana to attack a given point or you could order him to secure the Lavadia area, but you couldn't tell him not to take reprisal measures?
A I did not commit Schimana in that area. That was the army group. Schimana was not subordinate to me in any sense of the word, unless The allies landed.
Q That regiment was transferred later in 1944 to the Peloponnes. Was he subordinate to you then?
A By an order of Himmler's which I mentioned in direct examination, he was transferred to the Peloponnesus in order to pacify the Peloponnesus. That shows again hos independently Himmler could give orders to Schimana, that he transferred him to an area where the 117th Division was in command. It had not been our idea, but the order came down from above. We, or the corps headquarters, which becomes clear from the corps war diary, drew attention to the fact that this was not a proper thing to do because the area in Boeotia which he was also to pacify at Himmler's orders, had not been pacified yet. If you withdrew him from there, a gap, a vacuum, would arise there. When at Himmler's wish he was transferred to the Peloponnes, the notorious Police Regiment 7 about which we have heard before from testimonies, was transferred to that area.