expressed by that fact.
Q You said on Friday and again on your direct examination that you did not recall any particular quota for the execution of hostages within the Corps area. You will note here the quota ten to one; was that simply arbitrarily established or was there an order providing for a ten to one ratio?
A The reprisal measures depended on the individual cases, it depended on the extent and the importance, because you had to adjust than to military necessity.
Q Would you look now at document book 19, page 83 in the German and page 64 in the English. This is an excerpt from the daily reports of Army Group E for the 12th September 1943 and it states under Army Group Southern Greece, of which you were the commander at that time, "As reprisal measure for one murdered German soldier, ten Greeks were hanged." Again there is reference to the ten to one ratio, is that simply again individually established for this particular case?
A I remember from my study of the documents in the case which you have discussed, about the 1st Panzer Division, not ten but three people were shot, having partially confessed, otherwise I never saw the war diary of the Panzer Division. I found this particular case when I studied the documents and diary for some passages in the diary of the Panzer Division where it says so.
As for the case in document book 19, I would ask you to bear in mind that on 9 September in the morning, anyway before noon, I had taken over the Army Group Southern Greece and I was, therefore, scarcely in a position within two or three days to issue an order to this effect, because my task was to see to it that the Italian army be transported away, nor do I know what unit carried this out. The lines of debarkation were not very tightly drawn at the time this had been Italian territory and what German units were committed there now I do not know. I think you are asking too much.
Q Let us look now, General Felmy, to a particular three week period, Court No. V, Case No. VII.
the period covering the three weeks from 25 November 1943 to 16 December 1943 in document book 17 at page 71 in the German and page 98 in the English. You will note there under "LXVIII Infantry Corps: In reprisal for band attack on Aighion 20 Communists shot to death." Then if you will turn to pages 93 and 94 in the English, page 69 in the German, you will note four days later on the 29th of November, 1943? "100 hostages shot in reprisal for the band attack on the road Tripoli Sparta." And if you will turn next to page 92 in the English and page 68 in your German document book, the daily report of the 5th of December, just a few days after the few preceding reports, "50 hostages shot in Aighion." Do you recall any of those three incidents, the total number of persons shot is 170 by these reports?
A On direct examination I said that I do not recall these individual incidents. I don't know whether the case of the 100 hostages was discussed or not. For the attack on the trucks on the Tripolis-Sparta road, I cannot recall at this point the sum total of German losses incurred there. For that I would have to refer to the war diary where more details are possibly given and where perhaps you might get more information.
Q Those three incidents were on the 25th of November, 29th of November and 5th of December; then on the 6th of December, 1943, 50 more hostages were hanged for an attack on the railroad base Southeast of Tripoli. You will find that on page 68 of your book and 92 of the English and finally on 8 December.....
AAs for the 6th of December, I remember the figures. I found them afterwards in the war diary, because they are not contained in the report itself. In the case of the surprise attack on the railway base, 10 German soldiers were killed and 4 wounded. That is, 14 casualties altogether.
Q Will you look at the war diary notation for that, General Felmy, in document 20 page 64 in the German, page 90 in the English; do you find any notation there regarding your last statement?
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
A Do you mean reprisal measures for a surprise attack on 1 December, 50 hostages hanged at the station of Andritsa, or which one do you mean on page 64?
Q Where do you find the reference that 10 Germans were killed and 4 wounded prior to the attack for which 50 hostages were executed?
A If I remember right, from the photostatic copy, which is not contained here. Here we have only extracts from the war diary. Unless I am very much mistaken, that figure must be correct. I think I am almost certain to be right here, because I looked for the reason why and I found the confirmation of the figure, which I gave, namely 10 killed and 4 wounded.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q On the 8th of December, 1943, General Felmy, 25 hostages were shot as reprisal for band attack Southeast of Gythion, that is on page 67 of your book and 91 of the English, do you happen to know that reason for which those persons were executed?
A I could not tell you, I am afraid I have found nothing in the documents so far, but not all the documents are available here. One reason or another must have been at the bottom of this reprisal measure.
Q The total number of persons shot, General Felmy, is: 20 on 25 November, 100 on 29 November, 50 on 5 December, 50 on 6 December and 25 on 8 December, or a total of 245 hostages shot between the 25th of November and 8th of December; is that a particularly high figure do you know; is that a representative figure for the time span involved.
A In that case I would have to have the precise information so that I could give you the total German losses at the same time, because only then I would be in a position to draw a conclusion. As it is, I am not in a position to give you an answer here.
Q General Felmy, if there were German losses as a result of these various attacks on railroads and other attacks, would they not have been noted in your reports?
AAs far as I remember, losses were reported every ten days to the Army Group. On some occasions one also finds some indication in which the reprisal measure itself is reported.
Q The last attack we mentioned was on 8th of December, 1943; you will remember between the 12th and 16th the operation Kalavrita was going on; would you tell us again what the losses were during that operation?
A I know the losses very precisely in the case of Kalavrita, because General von LeSuire reported them to me, there were 696.
Q And how many villages were burned?
A More than 20, I believe 24 were reported.
Q Do you recall the testimony of the Greek witness Spiliopoulis to the effect that 1,300 persons were killed at the village of Kalavrita Court No. V, Case No. VII.
alone plus 140 persons who were foreign to the area, who happened to be in the area of Kalavrita that day?
A I recall that his statements mentioned a higher figure; how many there were in detail I don't know.
Q Do you believe his figure is too high?
A Yes.
Q You have indicated, General, that the prosecution's excerpts have been taken out of the context of the reports; would you look therefore at your own war diary which is in your own defense document book 4, turn to page 7a, the entry for 17 January, 1944 states that in retaliation for an attack on one officer, 20 Communists were executed; did you know about that?
A No, I know nothing about that.
Q Do you know whether or not the officer was killed or was it simply an attack upon him?
A If 20 people are reported as having been executed in reprisal, I am inclined to assume that not only the officer was killed but probably also his driver and his escort and several other persons would probably have been injured.
Q If that had happened, General Felmy, would not that have been reported the same as attacks on other convoys are reported with some detail as to the number of persons killed or injured?
A They were not always reported, these entries in the war diaries are never 100% correct. In this case the loss of the officer was particularly stressed and this I only assume, of course.
Q Will you look now at page 15 of your own Corps war diary, the entry for the 7th of February, 1944, it talks about the destruction of three villages and the execution of 100 Communists in retaliation for an attack near Skela. There the losses are specifically mentioned, the guerilla had 100 dead and Germans had 10 dead and one wounded, Did General LeSuire consult with you before he took that reprisal measure?
A I believe this is the reprisal measure carried out by the naval Court No. V, Case No. VII.
commander, that becomes clear quite definitely from other reports. On direct examination, I explained that it had been the third surprise attack on a column of naval trucks, and if I remember correctly there occurred two attacks on naval trucks and this was the third such attack on a naval truck column, whereupon this reprisal measure was ordered by the naval commander.
Q Who was the combat commander of the Peloponnesus; was that General LeSuire?
A The man in charge of the defense of the Peloponnesus was General von LeSuire, his position or his functions went into effect as soon as the Allies landed and in that event he did not have the possibility of issuing orders to the Navy, but collaboration became rather more intimate should the Allies land. The task of the Navy insofar as the mainland was concerned was mainly that the naval artillery and batteries were to adjust their commitment to the fighting be it on sea or after the landing, also on land. This was a highly complicated affair and we never found a particularly happy or complete solution for this as to how to adjust the naval batteries and the army coastal batteries to each other.
Q Would you look at document book 18, General Felmy, just momentarily, at page 20 in the German and page 17 in the English. This is a report dated 11 February 1944 from the military commander Southeast, General Felmber, the report itself is signed by Geitner and it states: "By order of the Combat Commander of Peloponnesus, 3 neighboring localities burned down and 149 inhabitants shot as reprisal measure.." Doesn't this state "the combat commandant" at that time?
A Yes, of course, but I explained that this statement is incorrect. There was a mistake made here, namely by the Military Commander Southeast who was stationed in Belgrade and as he was stationed on the mainland, all he knew about water was the Danube and Save. He had no idea that two naval commandants would be stationed on the Peloponnes, one in Kalamata and one in Patras. Other reports as far as this case is Court No. V, Case No. VII.
concerned always mention the naval commander. Only the Military Commander Southeast reports combat commandant. This is quite obviously a mistake on his part.
Q Would you look next on page 21 of your document book 4, the 68th Corps War diary, the entry for the 23rd of February 1944. This is a report of an attack on a truck convoy and again the losses are listed. German losses 15 dead and 7 wounded. Then will you note the following reprisals which were to be taken, the shooting of 200 hostages from the Tripoli hostage camp are to be shot at the place of the attack. LeSuire consult with you before ha took this reprisal measure?
A I pointed out in direct examination and I can offer evidence from the documents that some days previously, namely on the 20th of February, as I remember it, in the area of Megalopolis there was an attack made on trucks of the 117th Division where fairly considerable losses were suffered -- according to my recollection 10 or 15 killed and a number of people wounded and a large number of people kidnapped, so that the second attack unfortunately does not say here... Oh, yes, it says under paragraph 2, in Tripolis and Megalopolis, in other words, on the same road, or to be very, very cautious in my statements, in the same area, there was the second attack.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Well, let's look, GeneraL Felmy, at the losses from the attack of the two days previous to which you refer. That is found on page 20 of the Document Book under the entry of the 20th of February 1944 losses are 9 dead and 3 missing so the totals for the two attacks would be 24 dead and 9 wounded and 3 missing; and in retaliation for those losses 200 hostages were ordered executed.
You don't think that is a particularly high retaliation quota?
A Thirty eight German losses were to be retaliated for the two attacks.
Q Did you consider the execution of hostages in retaliation for the wounded with the same degree of severity as for those who were killed?
A These sums which were laid down in the OKW regulations of 50 to 100 for one German killed, and I think 25 for one German wounded, and another ratio for one wounded Greek or wounded Serb who was serving with us, I never made these calculations. The Germans had lost a total of 38 men and for that 200 hostages were shot. In other words, the proportion figures about 6 or 7, if you work it out.
Q Another attack was in February 1944 and there was another one in March of 1944. Will you turn to page 27 and page 28 in your corps war diary? The losses for the attack upon the convoy on the 11th of March 1944 were 18 dead and 44 wounded. Ten villages were also destroyed, I believe. You testified that actually only 141 persons were shot although 200 hostages had been ordered from all hostage camps. Were you consulted beforehand, before that retaliation measure was taken? As a matter of fact, I believe you said you had been consulted and had approved that measure.
A General von LeSuire asked me for my approval for the carrying out of this reprisal measure. I have testified to this. I referred back to Colonel Papadongeas about the villages which had been reported to be band nests and, he having confirmed them as being band nests, I gave my approval that they might be destroyed. As later reports show, Court No. V, Case No. VII.
not 200 hostages were shot but 141, so that, if you bear in mind the German losses, the figure of people killed increased from 18 to 21 some of the wounded died, so the figure of the wounded originally figured at 45 had now been decreased by 3 with the result that we arrived at the figure of 63 German soldiers lost, and that should be compared with the 141 hostages which were actually shot.
And then I further emphasized that after these band nests had been burned down throughout the whole period of time when we were still in the Peloponnes -- that is to say, almost 6 months -- not one single attack occurred on a truck column along this Sparta-Tripolis road. In other words, we had taken the correct measure -- namely, burning down the villages and eliminating the band nests.
Q The month of April 1944 was apparently an active one, judging from your corps war diary. Would you look on page 35, the entry for the 1st of April 1944? There under the Attica-Boeotia area it is stated that there were 10 Communists in reprisal. That would appear to be a ratio of 5 to 1 for each German wounded. Did you know about that ratio before the Communists were actually executed?
Here I should point out that the SS Police Mountain Regiment 18 was under the orders of the Higher SS and Police Leader, General Schimana, who as far as band warfare was concerned, received orders from his own SS agencies. That he happened to be serving in my area is another paid of shoes.
Q You mean to say, General Felmy, that you could be combat commander over a whole corps area and that particular units could be engaging in military operations with one partisan within your corps area and you could not give them tactical instructions not to take reprisal measures?
A That is entirely correct because I was, as I said, the commandant in my area. As soon as the Allies landed, then, similarly to what I said about the Peloponnesus and General von LeSuire, I had a certain amount of latitude in taking measures and my authority would have been Court No. V, Case No. VII.
extended, but not for, let us say, normal times.
Q You mean Schimana who was commander of the 18th Police Mountain Light Infantry Regiment had to phone Berlin and talk to Himmler before he could execute these 10 Communists in retaliation for these 2 wounded?
A I don't think so. The Commander of the Police Regiment 18 was not Schimana. Schimana was the Higher SS and Police Leader and among others the Police Regiment 18 was subordinate to him. As far as I know, the Commanders of the Police and the Greek Gendarmerie also under him. The Evzones Battalions were under him.
Q You could order Schimana to attack a given point or you could order him to secure the Lavadia area, but you couldn't tell him not to take reprisal measures?
A I did not commit Schimana in that area. That was the army group. Schimana was not subordinate to me in any sense of the word, unless The allies landed.
Q That regiment was transferred later in 1944 to the Peloponnes. Was he subordinate to you then?
A By an order of Himmler's which I mentioned in direct examination, he was transferred to the Peloponnesus in order to pacify the Peloponnesus. That shows again hos independently Himmler could give orders to Schimana, that he transferred him to an area where the 117th Division was in command. It had not been our idea, but the order came down from above. We, or the corps headquarters, which becomes clear from the corps war diary, drew attention to the fact that this was not a proper thing to do because the area in Boeotia which he was also to pacify at Himmler's orders, had not been pacified yet. If you withdrew him from there, a gap, a vacuum, would arise there. When at Himmler's wish he was transferred to the Peloponnes, the notorious Police Regiment 7 about which we have heard before from testimonies, was transferred to that area.
Q Look at page 41 of your Corps War Diary, General, to the entry for the 22nd of April 1944. You note there that in Tripolis 12 well known Communists were shot in retaliation for the murder of a rural police officer. Who was responsible for that?
A Yes, a rural police officer. The report does not shew what sort of a police officer this was on the 22nd of April, whether he was a Greek policemen or a police officer of the corps headquarters, and I said on direct examination I do not know what he was because we only had the commanding officer of the police platoon with the corps headquarters. Had he been shot I would certainly have remembered it. I do not know to what or whom this police officer belonged and who ordered the reprisal measure. I do not recollect any such incident and it was here in the documents that I read the information the first time.
Q No matter whether he was a Greek or a German police officer, the General would have had to approve the retaliation execution, would he not?
A That is not necessarily so. Just as the SS behaved generally, they would behave in this particular context. I don't think they asked the military commander first whether they would be allowed to order reprisal measures.
Q Turn to page 44, General. Here is a retaliation measure which you stated on direct examination you really did know about, General. The entry for the 27th of April 1944 concerns the retaliations taken for the attack upon General Krech. Four were killed, five seriously wounded and two vehicles destroyed and your own war diary states on the 1st of May 1944 that 335 persons were shot in retaliation. The entry for the 1st of Hay is on page 47. Could that be, General Felmy, a retaliation quota of 93 to 1 for the 4 persons killed, or a total of 200, and 25 to 1 for the 5 persons wounded, or a total of 125, a grand total of 325, plus perhaps 10 extra shot by mistake?
AAs for the Krech case, I said the following on direct examination.
I learned about the surprise attack on General Krech's escort when I stayed in Salonika to consult with General Loehr. On that occasion or shortly afterwards, it was reported to me that Colonel Papadongulas had 100 Communists who had been suspected of being band members, had been arrested by him and he had had them shot, I also testified that I do not know of anything of 200 allegedly shot in Athens. I endeavored to explain, in which I do not seem to have succeeded, the discrepancy between the various reports. Once it says "125 shot in Peloponnesus, 200 shot in Athens," and then "a total of 335 people are reported as shot." from among whom 200 are probably shot in Athens and the rest in Peloponnesus. I said that I was unable to explain the contradiction.
Q Do you doubt, General, that at least 325 were shot in retaliation for this attack?
A I know that 100 were shot by Colonel Papadongulas. That was confirmed later by a report from the liasion officer who served with Colonel Papadongulas. He was Colonel Gigow. Who gave the order to have 200 people shot in Athens. I am unable to state.
In Athens no hostages or reprisal prisoners were shot by troops of the 68th Corps. That is what I remember and that is the statement I can make under oath.
Q General Felmy, your war diary states that 335 were shot. Would you assume that your war diary was correct or incorrect?
A I said that the discrepancy between 300, 335 or 325 exists, and I am not able to clear it up. I said before that the war diary is not a document of 100% reliability. Mistakes creep in; there are typing mistakes, people have misheard, all sorts of things happen.
Q Colonel Papadongulas could not have shot the 100 without getting the approval of the German military commander beforehand could he?
A Colonel Papadongulas was entirely dependent. He was under the Greek Ministry of the Interior who had established him. Furthermore I do not know whether he contacted anybody beforehand, I hardly think so.
Q The 335 Communists and suspected guerillas who were shot in retaliation for this attack would you consider that too high, too disproportionate?
A 4 people were killed on the German side and five wounded. We were here concerned with the special case. A divisional commander had been shot which called justifiably for a higher reprisal quota. Had I been consulted -- namely, if I would have agreed to the figure of 325 --- I could not state that now; but I would probably have said "no", but I was not consulted. Therefore, I cannot state anything definite.
Q After the Kalavrita incident of General von LeSuire, you instructed him not to take any future retaliation measures without first consulting you. When he did not consult you in this case, did you reprimand him?
AAfter the Kalavrita incident I told General LeSuire before any large scale destructions or reprisal measures were carried out corps headquarters must be consulted. This he adhered to. When the question arose about taking reprisal measures for the attack on a truck column on II March which we discussed recently.
Q Would you look, General Felmy, on page 43 of your corps war diary under the entry for the 25th of April 1944 dealing with events in Boeotia? There there was an attack on a motor convoy of the SS and Police Mountain Light Infantry Regiment 18. Two officers were killed; one officer and four men were missing. In retaliation 50 Communists were shot there and then.
Now will you turn to page 45, the entry for the 28th of January 1944 and again under Boeotia, the report that the Light Lafantry Regiment 18 shot 60 more Communists in retaliation for that same motor convoy attack.
Now, if you will turn to page 51, the entry for the 10th of May 1944, under Boeotia, in reprisal for the attack on motor vehicles on the 26th of April 1944, a hundred more hostages were shot in Athens. There was a total then of 210 hostages shot in retaliation for 2 killed and 5 missing, members of the 18th SS and Police Mountain Regiment, a retaliation quota of 30 to 1.Did you have any knowledge of that?
A I knew nothing about this. The police regiment, the commander of the regular police and whoever else was mentioned here, were not subordinate to me. All I learned was that a column of the B.D.O. -- that is to say, commander of the regular police -- had been attacked at such and such a place and suffered losses. I was not informed as to the details of the reprisal measures, nor did the police have any cause to do so. I was not their superior.
Q How did these reports find their way into your war diary, General, if they are not from subordinate units?
A I have attempted to clear that up. The Army Group wanted to be informed about every incident. The Army Group had also the Ic office. Only it had other means of collecting news because the army group represented the highest level for collecting news. There we had, far instance, the Chief of Secret Field Police, as he called himself, and all information was concentrated, in the army group, and the army group ordered that every incident must be reported to them, which is the reason why this was done. No matter who had reported the matter, when it concerned reprisal measures, no matter who had reported it, when enemy matters were concerned, I have attempted to clear that up before.
Q I can understand why you might send on the Army Group E everything that happened within your corps area by way of report, but we are speaking now of your own war diary. Weren't you more discriminating about what it contained? Didn't it only contain statements regarding activities of units particularly subordinate to you?
A How did the war diary come about? One of the ADC's usually gives the name and at what period of time it was kept. He had to keep the war diary apart from his other tasks. Now, he would contact the news source, that is the Ic of the corps and receive reports from him. He received reports from the Ia. He compiled them according to what he regarded as necessary in his judgment and that is how they came into the war diary without being able to judge whether we had caused them, or whether other people caused them.
I myself was surprised to find these things contained in the war diary. After every six months I signed the war diary but I didn't read all the contents, especially not day to day statistical material.
Q Did you use the technique of danger hostages in your corps area? By that I mean, did you put hostages on trains to secure them from attack?
A Well, when it was ordered, in order to decrease the many attacks on railroads we did so and I think we were very effective.
Q Look on page 62 of your corps war diary, General, under the entry of the 5th of June, 1944 under Boeotia. There is talk there of sabotage on the Athens--Lamia railroad line and, as counter measure increased use of the route defense train, and armored self-propelled railroad cars and employment of hostage coaches.
A Yes, employment of the railroad defense trains and armored selfpropelled railroad cars, employment of hostage cars and armored trains ordered which was another method of fighting the bands along the track. Execution of dead zone and blockade zone measures -- that means that immediately along the railroad track you had a dead zone, that is to say, nobody must be found there, and an extended blocked--off zone where all traffic was to be checked up on. All these were measures to prevent people from interfering with the railroad track by means of high explosives or any other acts of sabotage to derail the trains.
Q With this device, General, you could have prevented legitimate military attacks by British Commando units, if you didn't think that the regular Greek partisans were regular military units.
A I don't mean what you mean by regular attacks by sabotage units in this question. I cannot regard attacks by sabotage units directed against me as regular. That is the interpretation only on the part of the prosecution but it is not my impression against whom it was directed.
(Mr. Fenstermacher)
Q. If British Commandos in full uniform sabotaged a railroad train, on which certain hostages were riding, do you consider that the use of the hostages on the train beforehand a legitimate use?
A. That again is construing a hypothetical case. The British did not make any sabotage attacks against the railroad tracks after -- In November in 1942, the Gorgopotamus bridge was blown up, but I think this was the last surprise attack.
Q. In Document Book 18, General Felmy, at page 69 in the German, and page 69 of the English, -
A. What German page, please?
Q. 69. In this report of the Commander of Greece, dated 8 August 1944 there is a statement that there was railroad sabotage on the 5th of August, 1944, on the transport train Korinth-Tripoli. "Cars derailed; no losses of our own. In reprisal 18 hostages who had been taken along were shot to death".
Were the hostages supposed to be killed only if there were attacks on the train which resulted in the wrecking of the train, or did you also kill them if there had been attack and no losses suffered?
A. I am afraid I could not tell you. I do not remember this individual incident.
Q. That happened in your Corps area did it not?
A. Yes. The Corinth-Tripoli track was in my Corps area.
Q. How large were the various Greek partisan units when you took over in Greece for the second time in May, 1943?
A. Indications fluctuated about that. Edes' groups were numerically comparatively small, and in the course of the summer and mainly autumn of 1943, were expelled from the Peloponnesus or rather destroyed and annihilated by the Elas; the Edes formations were to be found only in the Spirus, - those I mean who were fighting us, inasmuch as they had not arrived at a truce, as General Lanz explained; then Elas' units collaborated with us in Euboea since the beginning of 1944. I mentioned on direct examination that the leading spirit among the Edas group was different from the war report of General Zervas, who deemed it necessary to collaborate with us.
I also explained -- I do not want to mention his name -
Q. General Felmy let me interrupt you. I simply asked you how many there were. One of your affiants states that the number of Elas units increased on the Pelopennes from May to November from 8000 to 40,000. Do you believe that is true?
A. Well, these statements based themselves on reports by what we call our confidential agents, on statements made by members of the bands, who had become prisoners, and in the area of Greece, not only in the Peloponnesus, not only in Southern Greece, that EAM comprised a total of 40,000 members, might approximately be correct, but figures like that are always to be regarded cautiously because enemy reports, -- I mean, I am unable to make a roll call of the enemy and call their numbers. I am always supposed to rely on estimates, and estimates frequently contain exaggerations. That is only natural. For a man who carries intelligence around feels himself to be more important and believes he will receive a higher reward if he reports big figures, but as I say, 40,000 for the whole of Greece, I think might be approximately correct.
Q. They were organized regiments, divisions, battalions and companies, weren't they? Your War Corps Diary speaks of enemy offensives and bands in company strength. They were regular military units weren't they?
A. Mr. Fenstermacher, you are very much mistaken there. I will grant a certain amount of military formation to the Edes formation. On direct examination I stated that in our area, -- in Southern Greece where the 68th Corps was stationed, the bands had taken over the numbers of the old Greek Units, from their old recruiting areas. For instance, a band in Argolis bore the regimental number of the Greek regiment, which formerly had been stationed in Nauplia, but that did not make them a regiment nor a battalion.
Q. Please look at your own War Diary, Book No. IV.
A. Yes.
Q. Page 19, there on the 17th of February, 1944 under Boetia, is a statement that the Guerillas lost two prisoners, one of them being the Finance Officer of the 36th Andartes Regiment.
A. Just a moment, I have not found the page yet. Nothing is said there about Boetia? Oh, yes. I beg your pardon, I have found it. You are quite right. Boetia is here. "In the course of a fire engagement between a reconnaissance patrol of the Regiment Brandenburg and bandits, the guerillas lost two prisoners from the 36th Andarto Regiment".
Q. Bands do not ordinarily have Finance Officers do they, General?
A. I said just now that they had adopted the old Greek Regimental numbers, of the old Greek Recruiting Districts as they did in this case.
Q. Look at page 55 of that Corps Diary, the entry for the 22nd of May, 1944. There is a reference to attack by bands in company strength, and on page 60 (a) -
A. Were on page 55 please?
Q. The last entry under Peloppenesus for 22nd May 1944.
A. This band attack on Skela, that means simply that there were about 100 or 150 men which we would say was a company, in order to show how many members were fighting or attacking.
Q. Now look at Document Book 24, at page 169 in the German, and page 227 in the English. You note the diagram there, stating precisely how the Elas units were organized. This is contained in a report of the 5th July, 1943, of the Commanding General and Commander in Southern Greece who at that time, I believe was General Speidel. If General Speidel knew about that organization, you certainly must have, General Felmy. Look through this particular report and note the number of bands and their leaders, their size and weapons.
A. Excuse me, if that report did not reach me, and you cannot see whether it did or not from here, then it is only one of the reports such as the men working on it would see it, and he describes it in this manner.
He says there, on page 168, "About 70 from among the 100 bands have been apprehended by the Elas". 20 per cent of the bands are National Bands. I do not quite see what the diagram means. It also says First General staff, Second General staff, and Third General staff, then men, men, men. A military organization would be comprised of Corps, one division, two divisions, but there it merely says, General Staff, General Staff, General Staff. Anybody can identify himself as General Staff. In my opinion this is not a clear picture of the conditions of the band organization. This was the individual opinion of the person who made the report. It mentioned the leaders under General Staff. For instance, Second General Staff, or Chief of General Staff, Karantau. The name, "Karantau" is a code name. In these General Staffs hundreds of officials of the communist party are incorporated. I should imagine that a communist official has given tasks indulging military work. They all bear code names. Legal military functions of the Communist party have also been incorporated under orders -----.
Q. General Felmy, let me interrupt you please. Is there any doubt that these bands were under the British Middle East Command, who gave them orders and to whom they sent reports?
A. Yes, there is a very grave doubt; that is a highly one-sided statement. I know that here in the course of this trial it was mentioned that, I believe General Scobie, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the British in the Middle East, expressed that such-and-such bands were under him, and that they represented part of the British Army.