Q Look at page 41 of your Corps War Diary, General, to the entry for the 22nd of April 1944. You note there that in Tripolis 12 well known Communists were shot in retaliation for the murder of a rural police officer. Who was responsible for that?
A Yes, a rural police officer. The report does not shew what sort of a police officer this was on the 22nd of April, whether he was a Greek policemen or a police officer of the corps headquarters, and I said on direct examination I do not know what he was because we only had the commanding officer of the police platoon with the corps headquarters. Had he been shot I would certainly have remembered it. I do not know to what or whom this police officer belonged and who ordered the reprisal measure. I do not recollect any such incident and it was here in the documents that I read the information the first time.
Q No matter whether he was a Greek or a German police officer, the General would have had to approve the retaliation execution, would he not?
A That is not necessarily so. Just as the SS behaved generally, they would behave in this particular context. I don't think they asked the military commander first whether they would be allowed to order reprisal measures.
Q Turn to page 44, General. Here is a retaliation measure which you stated on direct examination you really did know about, General. The entry for the 27th of April 1944 concerns the retaliations taken for the attack upon General Krech. Four were killed, five seriously wounded and two vehicles destroyed and your own war diary states on the 1st of May 1944 that 335 persons were shot in retaliation. The entry for the 1st of Hay is on page 47. Could that be, General Felmy, a retaliation quota of 93 to 1 for the 4 persons killed, or a total of 200, and 25 to 1 for the 5 persons wounded, or a total of 125, a grand total of 325, plus perhaps 10 extra shot by mistake?
AAs for the Krech case, I said the following on direct examination.
I learned about the surprise attack on General Krech's escort when I stayed in Salonika to consult with General Loehr. On that occasion or shortly afterwards, it was reported to me that Colonel Papadongulas had 100 Communists who had been suspected of being band members, had been arrested by him and he had had them shot, I also testified that I do not know of anything of 200 allegedly shot in Athens. I endeavored to explain, in which I do not seem to have succeeded, the discrepancy between the various reports. Once it says "125 shot in Peloponnesus, 200 shot in Athens," and then "a total of 335 people are reported as shot." from among whom 200 are probably shot in Athens and the rest in Peloponnesus. I said that I was unable to explain the contradiction.
Q Do you doubt, General, that at least 325 were shot in retaliation for this attack?
A I know that 100 were shot by Colonel Papadongulas. That was confirmed later by a report from the liasion officer who served with Colonel Papadongulas. He was Colonel Gigow. Who gave the order to have 200 people shot in Athens. I am unable to state.
In Athens no hostages or reprisal prisoners were shot by troops of the 68th Corps. That is what I remember and that is the statement I can make under oath.
Q General Felmy, your war diary states that 335 were shot. Would you assume that your war diary was correct or incorrect?
A I said that the discrepancy between 300, 335 or 325 exists, and I am not able to clear it up. I said before that the war diary is not a document of 100% reliability. Mistakes creep in; there are typing mistakes, people have misheard, all sorts of things happen.
Q Colonel Papadongulas could not have shot the 100 without getting the approval of the German military commander beforehand could he?
A Colonel Papadongulas was entirely dependent. He was under the Greek Ministry of the Interior who had established him. Furthermore I do not know whether he contacted anybody beforehand, I hardly think so.
Q The 335 Communists and suspected guerillas who were shot in retaliation for this attack would you consider that too high, too disproportionate?
A 4 people were killed on the German side and five wounded. We were here concerned with the special case. A divisional commander had been shot which called justifiably for a higher reprisal quota. Had I been consulted -- namely, if I would have agreed to the figure of 325 --- I could not state that now; but I would probably have said "no", but I was not consulted. Therefore, I cannot state anything definite.
Q After the Kalavrita incident of General von LeSuire, you instructed him not to take any future retaliation measures without first consulting you. When he did not consult you in this case, did you reprimand him?
AAfter the Kalavrita incident I told General LeSuire before any large scale destructions or reprisal measures were carried out corps headquarters must be consulted. This he adhered to. When the question arose about taking reprisal measures for the attack on a truck column on II March which we discussed recently.
Q Would you look, General Felmy, on page 43 of your corps war diary under the entry for the 25th of April 1944 dealing with events in Boeotia? There there was an attack on a motor convoy of the SS and Police Mountain Light Infantry Regiment 18. Two officers were killed; one officer and four men were missing. In retaliation 50 Communists were shot there and then.
Now will you turn to page 45, the entry for the 28th of January 1944 and again under Boeotia, the report that the Light Lafantry Regiment 18 shot 60 more Communists in retaliation for that same motor convoy attack.
Now, if you will turn to page 51, the entry for the 10th of May 1944, under Boeotia, in reprisal for the attack on motor vehicles on the 26th of April 1944, a hundred more hostages were shot in Athens. There was a total then of 210 hostages shot in retaliation for 2 killed and 5 missing, members of the 18th SS and Police Mountain Regiment, a retaliation quota of 30 to 1.Did you have any knowledge of that?
A I knew nothing about this. The police regiment, the commander of the regular police and whoever else was mentioned here, were not subordinate to me. All I learned was that a column of the B.D.O. -- that is to say, commander of the regular police -- had been attacked at such and such a place and suffered losses. I was not informed as to the details of the reprisal measures, nor did the police have any cause to do so. I was not their superior.
Q How did these reports find their way into your war diary, General, if they are not from subordinate units?
A I have attempted to clear that up. The Army Group wanted to be informed about every incident. The Army Group had also the Ic office. Only it had other means of collecting news because the army group represented the highest level for collecting news. There we had, far instance, the Chief of Secret Field Police, as he called himself, and all information was concentrated, in the army group, and the army group ordered that every incident must be reported to them, which is the reason why this was done. No matter who had reported the matter, when it concerned reprisal measures, no matter who had reported it, when enemy matters were concerned, I have attempted to clear that up before.
Q I can understand why you might send on the Army Group E everything that happened within your corps area by way of report, but we are speaking now of your own war diary. Weren't you more discriminating about what it contained? Didn't it only contain statements regarding activities of units particularly subordinate to you?
A How did the war diary come about? One of the ADC's usually gives the name and at what period of time it was kept. He had to keep the war diary apart from his other tasks. Now, he would contact the news source, that is the Ic of the corps and receive reports from him. He received reports from the Ia. He compiled them according to what he regarded as necessary in his judgment and that is how they came into the war diary without being able to judge whether we had caused them, or whether other people caused them.
I myself was surprised to find these things contained in the war diary. After every six months I signed the war diary but I didn't read all the contents, especially not day to day statistical material.
Q Did you use the technique of danger hostages in your corps area? By that I mean, did you put hostages on trains to secure them from attack?
A Well, when it was ordered, in order to decrease the many attacks on railroads we did so and I think we were very effective.
Q Look on page 62 of your corps war diary, General, under the entry of the 5th of June, 1944 under Boeotia. There is talk there of sabotage on the Athens--Lamia railroad line and, as counter measure increased use of the route defense train, and armored self-propelled railroad cars and employment of hostage coaches.
A Yes, employment of the railroad defense trains and armored selfpropelled railroad cars, employment of hostage cars and armored trains ordered which was another method of fighting the bands along the track. Execution of dead zone and blockade zone measures -- that means that immediately along the railroad track you had a dead zone, that is to say, nobody must be found there, and an extended blocked--off zone where all traffic was to be checked up on. All these were measures to prevent people from interfering with the railroad track by means of high explosives or any other acts of sabotage to derail the trains.
Q With this device, General, you could have prevented legitimate military attacks by British Commando units, if you didn't think that the regular Greek partisans were regular military units.
A I don't mean what you mean by regular attacks by sabotage units in this question. I cannot regard attacks by sabotage units directed against me as regular. That is the interpretation only on the part of the prosecution but it is not my impression against whom it was directed.
(Mr. Fenstermacher)
Q. If British Commandos in full uniform sabotaged a railroad train, on which certain hostages were riding, do you consider that the use of the hostages on the train beforehand a legitimate use?
A. That again is construing a hypothetical case. The British did not make any sabotage attacks against the railroad tracks after -- In November in 1942, the Gorgopotamus bridge was blown up, but I think this was the last surprise attack.
Q. In Document Book 18, General Felmy, at page 69 in the German, and page 69 of the English, -
A. What German page, please?
Q. 69. In this report of the Commander of Greece, dated 8 August 1944 there is a statement that there was railroad sabotage on the 5th of August, 1944, on the transport train Korinth-Tripoli. "Cars derailed; no losses of our own. In reprisal 18 hostages who had been taken along were shot to death".
Were the hostages supposed to be killed only if there were attacks on the train which resulted in the wrecking of the train, or did you also kill them if there had been attack and no losses suffered?
A. I am afraid I could not tell you. I do not remember this individual incident.
Q. That happened in your Corps area did it not?
A. Yes. The Corinth-Tripoli track was in my Corps area.
Q. How large were the various Greek partisan units when you took over in Greece for the second time in May, 1943?
A. Indications fluctuated about that. Edes' groups were numerically comparatively small, and in the course of the summer and mainly autumn of 1943, were expelled from the Peloponnesus or rather destroyed and annihilated by the Elas; the Edes formations were to be found only in the Spirus, - those I mean who were fighting us, inasmuch as they had not arrived at a truce, as General Lanz explained; then Elas' units collaborated with us in Euboea since the beginning of 1944. I mentioned on direct examination that the leading spirit among the Edas group was different from the war report of General Zervas, who deemed it necessary to collaborate with us.
I also explained -- I do not want to mention his name -
Q. General Felmy let me interrupt you. I simply asked you how many there were. One of your affiants states that the number of Elas units increased on the Pelopennes from May to November from 8000 to 40,000. Do you believe that is true?
A. Well, these statements based themselves on reports by what we call our confidential agents, on statements made by members of the bands, who had become prisoners, and in the area of Greece, not only in the Peloponnesus, not only in Southern Greece, that EAM comprised a total of 40,000 members, might approximately be correct, but figures like that are always to be regarded cautiously because enemy reports, -- I mean, I am unable to make a roll call of the enemy and call their numbers. I am always supposed to rely on estimates, and estimates frequently contain exaggerations. That is only natural. For a man who carries intelligence around feels himself to be more important and believes he will receive a higher reward if he reports big figures, but as I say, 40,000 for the whole of Greece, I think might be approximately correct.
Q. They were organized regiments, divisions, battalions and companies, weren't they? Your War Corps Diary speaks of enemy offensives and bands in company strength. They were regular military units weren't they?
A. Mr. Fenstermacher, you are very much mistaken there. I will grant a certain amount of military formation to the Edes formation. On direct examination I stated that in our area, -- in Southern Greece where the 68th Corps was stationed, the bands had taken over the numbers of the old Greek Units, from their old recruiting areas. For instance, a band in Argolis bore the regimental number of the Greek regiment, which formerly had been stationed in Nauplia, but that did not make them a regiment nor a battalion.
Q. Please look at your own War Diary, Book No. IV.
A. Yes.
Q. Page 19, there on the 17th of February, 1944 under Boetia, is a statement that the Guerillas lost two prisoners, one of them being the Finance Officer of the 36th Andartes Regiment.
A. Just a moment, I have not found the page yet. Nothing is said there about Boetia? Oh, yes. I beg your pardon, I have found it. You are quite right. Boetia is here. "In the course of a fire engagement between a reconnaissance patrol of the Regiment Brandenburg and bandits, the guerillas lost two prisoners from the 36th Andarto Regiment".
Q. Bands do not ordinarily have Finance Officers do they, General?
A. I said just now that they had adopted the old Greek Regimental numbers, of the old Greek Recruiting Districts as they did in this case.
Q. Look at page 55 of that Corps Diary, the entry for the 22nd of May, 1944. There is a reference to attack by bands in company strength, and on page 60 (a) -
A. Were on page 55 please?
Q. The last entry under Peloppenesus for 22nd May 1944.
A. This band attack on Skela, that means simply that there were about 100 or 150 men which we would say was a company, in order to show how many members were fighting or attacking.
Q. Now look at Document Book 24, at page 169 in the German, and page 227 in the English. You note the diagram there, stating precisely how the Elas units were organized. This is contained in a report of the 5th July, 1943, of the Commanding General and Commander in Southern Greece who at that time, I believe was General Speidel. If General Speidel knew about that organization, you certainly must have, General Felmy. Look through this particular report and note the number of bands and their leaders, their size and weapons.
A. Excuse me, if that report did not reach me, and you cannot see whether it did or not from here, then it is only one of the reports such as the men working on it would see it, and he describes it in this manner.
He says there, on page 168, "About 70 from among the 100 bands have been apprehended by the Elas". 20 per cent of the bands are National Bands. I do not quite see what the diagram means. It also says First General staff, Second General staff, and Third General staff, then men, men, men. A military organization would be comprised of Corps, one division, two divisions, but there it merely says, General Staff, General Staff, General Staff. Anybody can identify himself as General Staff. In my opinion this is not a clear picture of the conditions of the band organization. This was the individual opinion of the person who made the report. It mentioned the leaders under General Staff. For instance, Second General Staff, or Chief of General Staff, Karantau. The name, "Karantau" is a code name. In these General Staffs hundreds of officials of the communist party are incorporated. I should imagine that a communist official has given tasks indulging military work. They all bear code names. Legal military functions of the Communist party have also been incorporated under orders -----.
Q. General Felmy, let me interrupt you please. Is there any doubt that these bands were under the British Middle East Command, who gave them orders and to whom they sent reports?
A. Yes, there is a very grave doubt; that is a highly one-sided statement. I know that here in the course of this trial it was mentioned that, I believe General Scobie, who was the Commander-in-Chief of the British in the Middle East, expressed that such-and-such bands were under him, and that they represented part of the British Army.
If Goebbels would have made a rador speech suddenly I would have grave doubt that the Allies would have reacted to it.
Q. Look at page 171 in the German Document Book 24, page 232 in the English, - this is still part of General Speidel's report. You will note under "Estimate of the situation", he says that the, "central direction of these operations rests in the hands of the English Officers who were with the bands and who certainly are also temporarily with the direction of the EAM in Athens". This coordinated leadership leads one to expect coordinated measures in the event of an enemy landing either in the Pelopennesus or on the West Coast of Central Greece."
You further knew about large Allied Military missions with the bands, did you not, missions numbering 1 to 3 and 4 hundred men.
A. I do not know that, I only know from one report, which deals with the Pelopennesus that about 5 British officers and a certain number of Greek officers and 21 Italian Communist officers were with the bands. I know that later on British, and after that American officers, were with the bands, but from that stipulation, as far as I am concerned, I do not recognize them; in addition they would have the possibility through their diplomatic channels to inform the German government officially, that such a unit in Greece was increased, many of what we called bands, were now a part of the British army.
I believe that something similar was done by General Eisenhower with the Maquis in France, where an official step was undertaken in order to make us recognize the Maquis as being a belligerent unit under International law. This is only hearsay because I was not in France. A step of that sort was not made by us in Greece; otherwise I would have learned about it. A step of that type such as was made by General Eisenhower, would have been entitled to official recognition. Where we had every justification because it was an official measure through official diplomatic channels, and we received official knowledge of it; here we had nothing but vague pronouncements over the wireless.
Q. You never knew that Great Britain or the Greeks claimed belligerent status other than these radio announcements to which you referred?
A. Yes, and I knew that there was a Green Government in existence for a time in Cairo. When things became a little hot there they either went to South Africa or went into exile; the king went into exile in London and Papandreo, the Prime Minister, resided in Cairo, we heard quite a lot about this.
Q. You talked, in direct examination also General, about the terrible treatment the bands meted out to the captured German soldiers. Would you look at Document Book No. 20, at pages 40 and 41 in the German and page 54 in the English? These are enclosures to the War Diary of the 1st Panzer Division.
A. Yes.
Q. And it states under the entry for the 2 October 1943, about missing German soldiers and that 12 hostages would be seized and hanged unless they were turned over to German authorities. The entry on the 3rd of October makes it clear that the German soldiers were only detained by the partisans and they were not killed at all.
A. Yes.
Q. Is this an exceptional circumstance in your opinion?
A. First of all it is an entry in a War Diary of the 1st Panzer Division which I did not see at the time. Secondly, it is an exception because the majority of the reports which were received, were worded very differently, and on many occasions, we found mutilated -we found corpses of people who had been killed or - no - and mutilated when we searched the fighting area.
Q. General, will you point out a single instance of maltreatment on the part of the partisans of German soldiers in any portion of your own 68th Corps War Diary from January to June, 1944, which is completely translated in your Document Book IV?
A. I have not read the Diary from that point of view. I know beyond any doubt the case of Inoi of the Luftwaffe field companies, Kalavrita, and then from some affidavits, or perhaps there are letters - no, they are affidavits which will be submitted later; from newspaper reports, with pictures, which we received rather late from Athens, which therefore have not yet been submitted here; they are from Greek newspapers under the German occupation, which on every third or fourth page showed such mutilations, carried with pictorial evidence.
Q General, if the German soldiers had mutilated the Partisans would that be noted in the German war diaries and in the German reports?
A A German does not do a thing like that. I don't think a case like that occurred. That is a typical Balkan affair. Only the other day the British papers got highly indignant that pictures were published about the period of time about which I am not supposed to talk, and they looked somewhat Balkanese.
Q You said, General Felmy, that the bands wore no uniform insignia. Didn't they usually wear a Soviet star, at least a Soviet star, perhaps full uniform most of the time?
A Uniforms and insignia were the exceptions. From the documents here I saw a report also by the first Panzer division, war diaries of the first Panzer division which at that time were not accessible to me. I found it only here and on direct examination I made statements about that. It said there that Partisans, led by an officer, wear uniforms and are part of Elas, and when my defense counsel asked me a question I said that this was an exception because you don't report as a rule that a member of the enemy's army wears a uniform because that you should take for granted.
Q Was a Soviet star generally worn or was that an exception too?
A I am not able to tell you. I personally never saw the white in the eyes of a single partisan in combat. The only operation at the beginning of June, I believe, 1944, in Southern Argolis in which I participated, the bands took evasive action and I was not actually personally introduced to them. I can say nothing from my own experience. In frequent cases they are supposed to have worn the Greek cockade and up in the Peloponnesus I think some turned up who wore an "X" which is a Greek national unit.
Q Would you accept the statement of the Ic Kleykamp as true when he says in your document book 2, at page 34, that the Soviet star was generally worn?
A Yes, that may be correct. I do not wish to deny it.
Q You also spoke, General Felmy, about the effectiveness of the military occupation of Greece, particularly with reference to your own corps area.
I would like you to look now at document book 20, at page 45 in the German and page 61 in the English. Note in this report it states that, "Except for coastal areas which were occupied by German Forces, the whole Northwestern Peloponnesus is entirely dominated by Communist bands." It goes on to list the supreme command of the insurgents.
A I believe you should read a little more precisely -- "the Northwestern part of the Peloponnes", it reads. It does not mean the whole of the Peloponnes.
Q What does it mean by saying "entirely dominated by Communist bands"?
A That at that time the bands there were ruling, at that time.
Q In other words, you didn't dominate that particular area?
A Not at that particular moment. That does not mean that we would not have dominated it had we wished to do so, because there are always these ups and downs.
Q Look at your document book number 5 at page 64.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: Before we go into that I believe we will take our morning recess.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
Q. (By Mr. Fenstermacher) General Felmy, just before the recess we were discussing the question of the effectiveness of the German occupation of Greece. Would you look at your document book number 5 at page 64? This is from your own Corps War Diary, the entry for 1730, teletype letter to High Command Southeast. The entry states there that, "The band situation on the Peloponnes is so critical that merely a few constantly occupied coastal sections, including ports and towns located in these sections, as well as the cities of Tripolis and Sparta and their immediate surroundings, are still under the control of the troops." I take it the rest of the territory was under the control of the Partisans; is that correct?
A. That is undoubtedly correct regarding the situation at the time, otherwise we would not have reported it, but when the Peloponnes was declared a combat zone the picture changed completely. After all I don't have to be everywhere in every spot with my troops to effect an occupation. I only have to be in a position to reach every spot I want to reach, and I have to have the forces for this purpose.
Q. The entry goes on to state that there is, in effect, a state of war actually prevailing on the Peloponnes. Do you agree with that?
A. That is why the combat zone was established. Well, whether this expression was used in the meaning of international law or as provided in some clause, in some regulation, I cannot possibly say because this entry was made at the time without consulting any legal expert, namely, the entry that there was a state of war in existence. It says so under the 17th of May. That is why the Peloponnes was declared a combat zone in order to finish this existing state of affairs.
Q. Do you maintain, General, that even though there are references in your war diaries to regiments and battalions and divisions of the Partisans, even though they numbered about 40,000, they did not wear any uniforms or insignia?
A. Just a moment. Where does it say anything about regiments and companies? Before there was once mentioned an attack in company strength. Now you interpret it as though we recognized that an enemy company attacked. That is a onesided point of view. I said there were as many men as would establish a company -- a hundred or a hundred fifty. Furthermore, the number of the bands, the Elas bands, I established for the whole of Greece, not just applying to the Peloponnes because there were never that many on the Peloponnes. I realized and recognized that the bands took the numbers of the old Greek regiments without thus representing a regiment.
Q. Isn't it true, General, that you took these reprisal measures in order to make up for a shortage of troops? You couldn't defeat the bands in regular military combat so you resorted to reprisal measures; is that correct?
A. No, that has no factual connection.
Q. You didn't have enough troops in your Corps Area, did you?
A. If you ask a soldier he will never have enough troops. That's an old story and something that applies to all troops everywhere because, after all, one does not know what one is supposed to do at a certain point and what requirements one has to fill, and I would rather say I have too little than too much. I said on direct I did not have enough troops to encircle the bands on the Peloponnes, That's what I said. I could not eliminate them in one go.
Q. Look at your document book 2 again, General Felmy, on page 35. This again is an affidavit of your own Ic Kleykamp, and he says in paragraph 2: "The few German units which were available did not suffice to effectively control the extensive area. This especially applied to the Peloponnes.
As a result of this large areas in the interior of the country were stripped of German troops and entirely in the hands of the Elas."
A. It is not necessary that to control the occupied area at all times. These statements I took from your own excerpts which you were kind enough to give us. It says there approximately it would be unjustified to demand that the occupation forces use more forces than their own government used as police force in peacetime in order to establish its authority, and compared with the police forces used by the Greeks in peacetime we had in any case as much as that, even more.
Q. Look at your document book 5, at page 16. This is a situation report of the Military Commander Greece for the 16th of February, 1944, and he says under "Summarizing Judgment and Plans: The weakness of our own forces makes increased formation of native units necessary in order to use them for combating Partisans." Isn't it quite clear that you didn't have enough troops to control the area which you were assigned to control, General?
A. No, that's not correct. If the Military Commander suggests here to use more indigenous units and if the Corps Headquarters say that the own troops are too weak, that only means that it is simpler for me to have a small mesh net spread over the occupied area, if I have many troops, and that the small mesh net of occupation makes it easier for me to occupy the country than would a loose mesh net of occupation.
Q. Isn't it true, General, that reprisal measures are militarily unwise; that they, in fact, increase the opposition when they are applied, or didn't you oppose them for that precise reason?
A. Mr. Fenstermacher, reprisal measures seen from a purely humane point of view are always an unpleasant matter. However, in view of the conflict which we, all of us, faced at that time, we could not do anything but this as the population forced us to it, namely, to take reprisal measures as a deterring factor in order to deter the bands at last from their methods of fighting which were in contradiction to international law and to protect out own troops for whom I was responsible.
It is never a pleasant business. I can assure you that it isn't, but unfortunately it was necessary. We are not proud that we had to do it.
Q. Look at your document book 3, on page 34. One of your affiants states there that you, General Felmy, "always made difficulties concerning reprisals because it would only cost more lives of German soldiers."
A. I made difficulties, or rather, I tried to teach my people that this ratio established by the OKW of fifty or one hundred seemed too high to me personally, that it was too general a measure and did not take into consideration the individual case, so that some soldiers even had the impression that I protected the Greeks more than my own troops. I wrapped the Greeks in cotton wool, as one affiant said in an affidavit here. I demanded that the bullets had to whistle around their heads before something was finally done. You see what an effect that can have on the troops.
Q. Look again at the affidavit of your Ic Kleykamp on page 38 of your Document Book II. It states there about six lines from the bottom "Reprisal measures which were wrongly applied could have the opposite effect and drive the sensible part of the population to the partisans."
Do you believe that reprisal measures within your Corps area were wrongly applied or properly applied?
A. Just a moment please, what page? Yes, thank you, I have got it. What passage again, please?
Q. The passage stating, in effect, that reprisal measures, if improperly applied, will have an opposite effect and drive the sensible part of the population into the hands of the partisans?
A. Yes, thank you, I have got it.
Q. Did the reprisal measures which were executed in your Corps area have that effect?
A. The wrong reprisal measure in my case was only applied in the Kalavrita incident, wrong because it was done too hastily. Other than that, I don't know that we took any reprisal measures which could be called wrong. The tactics of the bands, as we found out after some time, were aimed at making us take wrong reprisal measures. Fortunately, we weren't taken in by these methods. I would like to give an example and tell you what we actually experienced at one time. Towards the end of July, a Corps supply column was attacked on the Pylos-Kyparessia road; that is in the Western area of the Peloponnes in the area Gargaliani. I will show it to you on the map.
Q. I don't think it will be necessary for you to go into that, General. We will accept your opinion that in your Corps area you believed that reprisal measures were properly applied. Now a few questions regarding the deportation of persons within your Corps to Germany for forced labor. How many persons do you believe were sent to Germany from your area for forced labor?
A. I can't tell you that. I saw from the files that at one time 3,000 were supposed to be transported but in no document it is said that this transport actually took place and was carried out.