I myself saw hew an Italian armored column of 10 or 12 cars passed part of the demonstration procession and shot arbitrarily and wildly with machine guns into the mass of people.
I myself later on counted 40-50 dead and wounded lying in the streets of Athens. It seemed to me interesting that behind the demonstration procession three large ambulance convoys drove which were immediately ready to take care of the wounded. This is a proof for the fact that these demonstrations had been organized according t plan and that one counted on armed clashes.
Q. Did you in your capacity of Military Commander for Southern Greece have occasion and authority to take measures against this behavior of the Italians?
A. No, that was exclusively an Italian concern and I believe that the Italian Commander-in-Chief would have been very astonished indeed if a German commander had come and stated that he did not agree with the measures taken by the Italians in their own area of sovereignty. Vice versa, I would have had the same feelings.
Q. You mean to say, then, that the reprisal measures which you ordered in retaliation for the sabotage act against the steamer Citta di Savona were based on an absolute military necessity?
A. Yes. And that for the tactical reasons which I gave before.
Q. Did this measure have the success you aimed at?
A. Yes, it was a complete success; to the best of my knowledge later on no more sabotage acts on skipping space occurred.
Q. I am certain, General, that in your situation at that time, you reflected how you could stop these sabotage acts and raids.
Didn't you see any possibilities other than the ones you took to achieve that aim, namely the stopping of further sabotage acts and surprise attacks?
A. These surprise attacks and sabotage acts had of course a very close inner connection with the development of the band movement. In order to eliminate or at least to restrict the band movements with all the effects and consequences which it had, there were actually basically only two possibilities. One was a large scale military action to annihilate the bands, and this should have been done through a joint action by the Italian and German occupation troops. The second possibility was to try again to pacify the country through kindness.
Q. And which one of those two possibilities was pursued by you initially?
A. At first, I tried to take the second course but I would like to state expressly that it was not I who took that course. It was my superior agency, Army Group E, together with the Italian High Command and in close conjunction with the Greek government who attempted to do this. At the beginning of May, 1943, a so-called band amnesty on a large scale was pronounced, and was made known all over the country through posters, leaflets, dropping of leaflets, etc. This band amnesty had a deadline dated the 20th of May, 1943, and contained in substance the request that band members were to return to their home villages and to carry out their normal daily work. They were also to deliver their arms to the nearest available authority of the military government. In answer to this, they were to be granted reprieve of all punishment.
Q. That amnesty then had a deadline dated the 20th of May, 1943?
A. Yes.
Q. And what was the result of this band amnesty?
A. The result was exactly the same as the result gained today by the Greek government with the amnesty which the government offered to the guerrillas in Northern Greece. By this I mean no result whatsoever. Therefore, we only had the other solution which I mentioned before, the fighting of bands with military means and force.
Q. General, I would now like to discuss with you another chapter which falls chronologically into the same period of time which was under discussion just now. You are charged by the prosecution with having passed on and applied the so-called Commissar Order and the so-called Kommando Order. I shall first of all discuss with you the Commissar Order. It is the order as contained in Document Book I as Exhibit 13 and 14 on page 49 in the English Document Book and page 34 and subsequent pages in the German Document Book. I assume that you know this so-called Commissar Order. Did you ever receive orally or in writing this Commissar Order from any and of your superior agencies?
A. No.
Q During the years 1941 and 1942 you were in Roumania, as you stated yesterday, as Chief of the German Air Force Mission. Was this order published there?
A No. I was merely a member of the Air Defense in Roumania and had nothing to do with the operations in Russia.
Q In October, 1942, you received your assignment as Military Commander for Southern Greece. Was the Commissar Order made known to you there?
A No, the Commissar Order was only valid and applicable for the East, not for the South-East.
Q It is correct to say then that you never had any contact with the Commissar Order; that you did not receive it and that; therefore, you did not pass it on to your subordinate agencies?
A That is correct.
Q This then brings me to the so-called Commando Order which is contained in Document Book 9, on page 28 and subsequent pages in the English document book, and on page 41 and subsequent pages of the German document book. This was Exhibit 225 of the prosecution.
You know this order from the document book.
A Yes, I do.
Q Did you receive this order?
A Yes, but to put it very clearly, I did not receive the explanations and reasons given by Hitler for the Commando Order as they are contained in the document book. I only received at the time the actual Commando Order which was presented by the prosecution during the cross examination of General Foertsch. That is the Commando Order I know.
Q From whom did you receive this order?
A From Army Group E.
Q And when?
A Well, that must have been around the end of October, beginning of November, 1943.
Q What did you do in accordance with this order? What measures did you take?
A If I remember correctly, I didn't do anything. I did not pass it on.
Q And why didn't you pass on this order?
A I saw no cause to do so in the situation at that time. I had no combat assignment in Southern Greece and, as I testified yesterday on the basis of a sketch, I only had a few local defense battalions and supply units under me and, furthermore, the actual waging of the war was a concern of the Italians.
Q But didn't you actually fell oblige to pass on such an important order?
A I must confess that at the time I was very glad indeed that I had no factual cause to pass on this order. I quite frankly admit that I had considerable misgivings concerning this order which I discussed in great detail with my chief judge, but, as I stated, I had no actual necessity to pass on this order.
Q If I understood you correctly, you saw no factual necessity to pass on this order because at the time you only had a few local defense battalions and a few supply units under you?
A Yes, I had no combat assignment.
Q I see. Now, looking at the organizational sketch yesterday, we found that the 11th Air Force Division was also subordinated to you. Didn't you see any reason to pass on the order to this unit?
A When I received the order, the 11th Air Force Division was not subordinated to me. It only arrived at the end of December or the beginning of January, 1943, in my area. Since it was a newly organized unit, which was not yet ready for combat action, it had to be trained. As I stated yesterday, it was subordinated to me for purposes of training. I did not have to dispose of the committment of this division because in this respect, it was subordinated to Army Group E.
Q My attention had just been drawn to the translation of the word "Landesschuetzenbataillon". I would like to have the translation checked.
THE INTERPRETER: The military dictionary gives the same translation I used for Landesschuetzenbataillon - local defense units. It comes from the military dictionary.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q General, since it is possible that it is not quite clear what Landesschuetzen were on the basis of the translation, will you please explain briefly what they were?
A I can do that quite clearly in one word. At least, one word which signifies the assignment these units had at the time. That is, guard battalions.
Q And of what kind of men did those battalions consist?
A They were old men who were not physically fit for front service. They mere used for guard duties, etc. At least, that was done in my area in Southern Greece. I did not get to know any other such units.
Q General, you did not pass on the Commando Order in October, 1942, when you received it from Army Group E. Did you possibly pass it on during a subsequent period?
A No.
Q If it please the Tribunal, in this connection I would like to offer further in evidence Speidel Document #6 contained in Speidel Document Book 1, page 14, which I shall offer under Speidel Exhibit #11. This is an affidavit executed by the former General of the Air Force, Karl Drum. General Drum was, from the beginning of January until the beginning of November, 1943, Commander of the 11th Air Force Field Division in Greece. General Drum describes in this affidavit his contact with General Speidel and mentions a conference of commanders which General Speidel held during the first few months of his, General Drum's stay in Greece. During this conference, as General Drum states:
"General Speidel discussed, among others, the following questions:
"a. His attitude towards country and people.
"b. His requests to the troops with respect to their conduct towards the population.
"c. His policy in the treatment of the country.
"d. His economic principles.
"e. His moderate opinions with regard to retaliation measures and the question of hostages."
Concerning the Commando Order in particular, the affiant General Drum states on page 15 in the last but one paragraph as follows and I quote:
"The fact is that I never received an order from General Speidel, nor did I hear of any order providing reprisal measures of any kind against the population. As far as I remember, neither the so-called Commissar Oder, which dealt with the treatment of Jewish-Bolshevik Commissars of the Soviet Army, nor the so-called Commando Order, which purported the annihilation of those taking part in the so-called Commando Raids, was forwarded to me by General Speidel as Military Commander of Southern Greece, resp. Greece."
I recommend the balance of this document to the judicial notice of the Tribunal.
In this connection I further have reference to a document already offered as Speidel Exhibit 10, which is Document Speidel #56, contained in Speidel Document Book 3 on page 72. This is a report of the Military Commander Southern Greece, dated 3 May 1943, and here, under Paragraph C, the following is stated:
"In the night of the 30th of April and 1st of May, four Britishers in uniform, a British naval lieutenant, a sergeant and 2 NCOs were captured five miles North-East of the northern tip of the Island of Hydra by members of the naval defence units."
General, do you remember that incident?
A Yes, quite clearly.
Q Did you, on that occasion, act in accordance with the Commando Order and did you order the liquidation of the captured Britishers?
A No, I did not. They were sent to Germany as prisoners of war.
Q I further offer from Speidel Document Book 2 a document which is Document Speidel #22. It is contained on page 27. This is an affidavit executed by one Hermann Boedecker which I am offering as Speidel Exhibit #12. On page 28, under II, this affiant makes the following statements. I might add that this witness was ADC on General Speidel's staff and during March, 1944, he was in charge of the Adjutant's Office. He was ADC on General Speidel's staff as of December, 1943. This affiant makes the following statement. Page 28.
"During my activity on the staff of the military commander I have not experienced that shootings of members of commandos or hostages took place by order of General Speidel."
Finally, I refer to Document #37 in the same document book, which is contained on page 72 of both the German and the English document books. This is an affidavit executed by the former Brigadier General Erich Eisenbach which I am offering under Speidel Exhibit #13. General Eisenbach was subordinated to General Speidel as commander of the sub-area administrative headquarters in Athens. In this connection I am only going to read from paragraph 3 on page 74. It reads as follows:
"The Commissar Order and the Commando Order I neither saw at the Military Administrative Headquarters in Korinth nor in Athens. Also in Greece I never heard of it in Greece either, especially the Military Commander did not speak to me about it during my activity there."
This brings us to the end of the chapter of the Commissar and the Commando Orders, and at this point, because of the connection which exists, I would like to discuss with you Prosecution Exhibit 284 which is contained in Document Book 11 of the prosecution on page 76 of the English text and page 59 of the German text. You are charged by the prosecution with this document. This is an activity report of the 1-A department of the Commander-in-chief South East covering the period from January to June, 1943. Unfortunately I am not able to recognize the significance of this document for your case. Did you gather anything from this document which could load to the conclusion that you were responsible in any of the incidents mentioned?
A I read the document in great detail and, in spite of my best will and diligent search, I could not find anything to incriminate me. This is also hardly possible because it's an activity report of a different department and a different agency.
Q That brings us to the end of the discussion of the first six months of 1943. Now, towards the end of August or beginning of September, 1943, a change took place in the organization of the South Eastern area.
When, how and in what form did you learn about this change?
A In August, 1943, one day I received, to my intense surprise, a teletype which I can still very well picture - ateletype on red paper, which said briefly, in substance:
"1. The Command of Army Group E will be taken over by Field Marshal Rommel as of immediately.
"2. Military Commander Southern Greece will be appointed Military Commander for Greece.
"3. He will receive executive power for Greece.
"4. He will be subordinated to the Military Commander South-East," (an agency up to that point not known to me.)
Q Well, at that time, towards the end of August, 1943, the Italians were the actual occupiers of Greece. How was it possible that you could take over the post of the Military Commander for Greece?
A That is entirely correct. The order was and remained purely a theoretical one. It was never applied or carried out. A change of the situation only occurred when the Italians left the alliance which was the frequently mentioned date, the 8th of September, 1943.
Q You mean to say then that until the 8th of September, 1943, the organization as it existed at the time in Greece did not change for all practical purposes?
A No, it did not change for all practical purposes.
Q How did you experience the capitulation of the Italians yourself? Did you have any connection with capitulation and with the subsequent disarming of the Italians?
AAlthough we had anticipated the capitulation of the Italians for some time previously, the exact date, of course, was not known to us. Therefore, I decided just on the 8th of September, in the morning, to fly to Belgrade in order to report to this Military Commander SouthEast whom I knew up to that time only by name, and in order to ascertain what the situation was and what intentions existed at the time.
I had not yet received any orders. Thus it happened that on the evening of the 8th of September I received the news of the Italian capitulation in Belgrade and it was only in the late afternoon of September 9 that I returned to Athens. Up until that time all measures had already been taken and carried out which was dealt with in great detail during General Lanz' examination. In the meantime, General Felmy had arrived, according to orders, as he stated on his own examination, and he was in charge of the disarming and transporting home of the Italians. Thus, I myself had nothing at all to do with the capitulation of the Italians, and in the subsequent days and weeks I was not concerned with practical measures in connection with this capitulation.
Q General, the prosecution has submitted a number of documents which contain orders for the new organization of channels of command in the Balkans. Apparently, the prosecution wants to prove with these documents your responsibility for the period after this re-organization. For this reason, I think it is necessary for us to discuss these documents briefly. The first document which I would like to discuss with you is Exhibit 297 which is contained in Document Book 12 of the prosecution on page 75 and subsequent pages of the English text? and on page 66 and subsequent pages of the German text. This is the socalled Fuehrer directive #48. If I may repeat, the document is contained in Document Book 12 of the prosecution. It is Exhibit 297 and the page is 75 in the English document book -- 66 of the German document book.
General, would you, on the basis of this document, tell us briefly what significance this document had with regard to your appointment as Military Commander Greece?
A The so-called Fuehrer Directive 48 had the purpose of clarifying the channels of command in the event of an invasion and concerned the threat of an invasion. It dealt with the defense of the South-East area.
As Commander of Southern Greece, I did not receive this order. It was only the basis for order of higher agencies. The order further assumed that the Italians were still present in the country. Consequently it did not concern me at all that under Paragraph 2 it was provided that the 11th Italian Army, on the 27th of July, took over the German combat units in southern Greece. Regarding paragraph V, I would like to state the Military Commander Greece is mentioned here for the first time, in actual fact he did not yet exist.
I mentioned just before when I learned for the first time of this assignment as Military Commander Greece. This agency could not yet have been established because, at that time, the Italians were still there and the previously mentioned special instruction was not received on this basis at all, but the final instruction was only received five months later. The further provisions that the German military agencies were to influence the military administration as carried out by the Italians remained merely theory.
In summary, I can say that the whole Fuehrer Directive #48 remained a theoretical one and never had any effect whatsoever on the Military Commander Greece.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our noon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
(Following recess.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q General, before the recess we discussed Prosecution Exhibit 297, which is Fuehrer Directive No. 48 and you testified that this Fuehrer Directive had remained pure theory, what did you mean when you said that?
A It remained more theory where the actual reorganization of the Army channels of command were concerned.
Q To the extent to which there are positive provisions in this Fuehrer Directive in other fields, do you mean to say that this Fuehrer Directive remained theory there too?
A No, of course not, because a Fuehrer Directive was binding. In the case of the reorganization, the events superseded the order and that is why it remained theory, but as to the individual provisions which were given it remained valid on principle.
Q If you look at page 70 of Document Book 12, which is page 79 of the English text, you will find that the last sentence on this page reads:
The authority of the supreme Reich authorities to issue directives concerning their particular spheres remains intact. However, channels go via the Military Commander."
Is that one of those provisions of which you said just now that to the extent of those, of course, the Fuehrer directive was binding?
A I did not mention that passage before because it does not seem to me to be one of the significant provisions of the directive with regard to organization, but because you ask me about it, I have to state that this basic provision of course remained valid. Of course, in subsequent time, in actual fact, I cannot remember that it became necessary to be applied. In any case, if a German agency which was not part of the Armed Forces was incorporated in a military staff, then that was purely an organization measure.
I would like to call it an administrative measure, which however excluded a factual taking of influence on this agency, because it says, "...Authority of the supremo Reich authorities to issue directives concerning their particular spheres remains intact." it merely means that the channels go via the military commander; i.e. mail, etc.
Q The next prosecution document, which I would like to discuss with you, is Prosecution Exhibit 310, which is in the same Document Book 12, on page 160 and subsequent pages, page 134 of the German test. This Prosecution Exhibit 310 is contained in Document Book 12. General would you please give us your brief comments to this document of the prosecution?
A This order is the basic reorganization order for the Balkans. It was of particular importance to me as Military Commander and I received it. It is brief and only gives few detailed provisions. It contains the establishment of Army Group F, the appointment of the Military Commander Southeast and the appointment of the Military Commander Greece, although at that time there were still Italian occupation forces in Greece. The order refers to the brief intermediate period when German and Italian troops together stayed in the area of the Military Commander. The reorganization is mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 7. Of great importance, and this is the only positive aspect of this order, are the enclosures, above all enclosure three, which is an organization sketch.
Q That is contained on page 138 in the German text, you mean this sketch, do you, General?
A Yes.
Q It is page 163 in the English document book.
A This sketch for the first time gave a clear picture of the organization. The Military Commander Southeast in Belgrade was subordinate to the Military Commander Greece.
Two elements are subordinate to the Commander Crete and the Commander 395 in Salonika, however, there are decisive restrictions.
Q Just a moment, General, please. If it please the Tribunal I have to correct this, it is not page 163, it is page 164 of the English text where this sketch is.
A On one side we see the Commander of Crete and it is mentioned that he is only territorially subordinate and even this subordination was restricted at a later time and............
Q General, would you please continue with the discussion of this sketch which is on page 164 of the English text and 138 of the German text?
A The last thing which I had mentioned was a subordination of the commandant of Crete under the Military Commander for Greece and I stressed the footnote according to which this subordination was only a subordination in the territorial aspect. This form of subordination was further restricted by later orders so that eventually the Commandant in Crete was immediately subordinate to Army Group E.
According to a service regulation issued later, it is provided that he is subordinate to the Military Commander Greece merely and I quote:
"Concerning matters of basic importance for the military administration," which had the result in actual fact that decisive questions of economy, currency, et cetera were ordered by the Military Commander also for Crete while in current economy matters he was independent in Crete because this representative and independent economic area.
I shall now move to the left of the sketch where it says: "Subarea Administrative Headquarters 395". There is a footnote which says: "Up to now Military Commander Salonika-Aegean." In actual fact the situation was that both agencies remained in existance and were under one military commander. The Commander Salonika-Aegean had two heads. He was (Commanding General, Commander Salonika-Aegean and as such he was for tactical purposes subordinate to Army Group E and (2) he was in charge of Subarea Administrative agency was subordinate to the Military Commander Greece.
That is one of these ambiguous subordinations which was not infrequent in the Balkans. This subordination under Army Group E as tactical command agency was qualified in a later mentioned directive as follows: he is simultaneously at the disposal of Army Group E concerning combat assignments.
This then is a sketch which forms the first basis of the reorganization of channels of command and the appointment of the Military Commander Greece.
The order was issued on 15 August. Therefore, I should have received it around the 20th or 25th of August.
Q The prosecution in this connection has submitted a further document which is a draft of the basic order concerning the channels of command in the Southeast Area. This is Prosecution Exhibit 351 contained in Document Book XIV of the prosecution, on page 89 and the subsequent pages of the English text, page 65 and the subsequent pages in the German text.
General, will you quite briefly give us your comments on this order?
A This order which is dated 30 October 1943 represents a draft of the execution provisions for the reorganization in the Balkans. The draft of the execution provisions for the reorganization in the Balkans. The draft was only made available two months after the reorganization. When I actually received it and it reached me, I say that because the last but one paragraph of this order shows that this order was allowed to be passed on in excerpt only to those agencies which were actually concerned with it. That was in accordance with the then customary procedure that every agency was only informed, only received a minimum of information which was necessary for it to know, this was done so in order to guard secrecy.
This mutual distrust and this secrecy led, of course, to great difficulties in cooperation. One could only survey one's own modest sector but one could not gain a picture of the whole situation. This, however, was a principle which Hitler himself had invented in 1940.
As to this document, mentioned before, I don't know in which form I received this order, whether I received an excerpt or whether I received only the main points only by way of teletype, these main points which I can remember quite well.
The organization order is subdivided into two parts: (1) Operational channels of command and (2) Territorial channels of command. I shall first of all deal with paragraph I which deals with the operational channels of command.
Paragraph 4 I would like to discuss in particular. According to this, the Commander for Greece is subordinate to the Commander in Chief of Army Group E in all questions of security of the land, combatting of bands, and counteracting of sabotage acts. This in the same way as the Military Commander for Serbia is subordinated to the Commander in Chief Southeast i.e., Army Group F. However, there was one basic difference in these two subordinations. Serbia had at its disposal for the carrying out of this task the necessary forces and reigned supreme in its area and also Serbia had a tactical operational staff. In contract to these conditions, the Military Commander Greece had no area or only a very small area, had no tactical staff, and no forces at his disposal; thus this passage of the order also remained theory, because it had as its basis a wrong comparison and a wrong presupposition.
In the subsequent paragraph it says: "The Commander in Chief is authorized to charge military commanders with certain security duties, "et cetera. In Greece the actual situation was that Army Group E had subordinated to it all security units and that Army Group E decided over the commitment of these units. In this sense, as we shall later see, Army Group E decided about the commitment of the Higher SS and Police Leader and his units.
And finally there is a further formulation of this order. The Commanders in Chief can transfer to the Military Commanders certain security duties and put at their disposal for this purpose the necessary security units. This "may" provision did not become effective. Security duties were only transferred to Military Commanders at the very beginning in a timely limited extent and for the rest the the security units required for this purpose were not subordinated to the Military Commanders as provided. These are my comments on the draft of this order.
I shall now deal with the passage under "Territorial Channels of Command". About Paragraph 2 I would like to mention the following: that this particular paragraph is very flexible indeed because what means "interest of troop leadership", what means "military interpolation", what means "decisive questions"? In actual practice I am sure that this paragraph later caused the Army Group E to intervene in all spheres of administration, economy, finances because in the final analysis, troop interests could always be made a pretext.
This provision and regulation presented a further source of unclearness and for the notorious overlappings of channels of command Army Group E had and - I believe on the basis of that particular paragraph, - the endeavor to have the Military Commanders entirely subordinated to their own agency. However, the Army Group never succeeded in achieving this?
To put it differently, the channels of command formulated in this provision which I read there, for the first time, remained in substance mere theory and the orders for the practical execution were received by me by way of teletypes, individual communications, et cetera, in the course of time.
Behind the scenes there was a battle waged for many months, for the achievement of the demands of Army Group E in contrast to those of the Military Commander Greece. I could merely adhere to the clear orders which I had received and for the balance attempt to maintain my own sphere of competency and responsibility.
I believe those are my main comments to this draft of an order.
Q Would you please describe very briefly, General, what practical effects this reorganization had on your task and on your staff?
A In actual practice the situation was as follows -- I can only describe it in large outlines.
Q Well, I want you to do it very briefly, please.
A. The troop tasks which I had up to that point no longer existed nor did my supply tasks which up to then had represented a large part of my sphere of work. The staff was reorganized to deal with purely administrative matters and the final consequence was that the staff was reorganized accordingly. That meant a considerable and rather sudden reorganization. With one blow three active general staff officers were taken away from me. My chief of staff, my Ia and my Ic. Further, the entire quartermaster department was taken from me, which was quite an extensive one. The entire signal communications department was taken away and also my planes which the air force had up to then put at my disposal.
Q. Did that reorganization mean that only your sphere of work was changed, or did it mean that the quality of your staff became worse?
A. It meant both. The quality of the staff naturally decreased. I stressed that I lost three active, young, very well trained general staff officers. I didn't have a single one left. I was given as a chief of staff a former retired colonel who was 15 years older than I. My Ia was an Oberregierungsrat who was twelve years older than I, and this Ia only arrived just before New Year 1943-1944. These facts alone show that the tactical tasks no longer applied.
Q. The change of the tasks which you had had up until then, demanded a complete reorganization of the administration of Greece, particularly when the Italians had left. Would you please quite briefly tell us what administrative agencies you had and what administrative agencies were added, in the military sphere?
A. Up to then the German area had been in the the South, the small area of the Military Commander Southern Greece which I pointed out yesterday on this map.