I had not yet received any orders. Thus it happened that on the evening of the 8th of September I received the news of the Italian capitulation in Belgrade and it was only in the late afternoon of September 9 that I returned to Athens. Up until that time all measures had already been taken and carried out which was dealt with in great detail during General Lanz' examination. In the meantime, General Felmy had arrived, according to orders, as he stated on his own examination, and he was in charge of the disarming and transporting home of the Italians. Thus, I myself had nothing at all to do with the capitulation of the Italians, and in the subsequent days and weeks I was not concerned with practical measures in connection with this capitulation.
Q General, the prosecution has submitted a number of documents which contain orders for the new organization of channels of command in the Balkans. Apparently, the prosecution wants to prove with these documents your responsibility for the period after this re-organization. For this reason, I think it is necessary for us to discuss these documents briefly. The first document which I would like to discuss with you is Exhibit 297 which is contained in Document Book 12 of the prosecution on page 75 and subsequent pages of the English text? and on page 66 and subsequent pages of the German text. This is the socalled Fuehrer directive #48. If I may repeat, the document is contained in Document Book 12 of the prosecution. It is Exhibit 297 and the page is 75 in the English document book -- 66 of the German document book.
General, would you, on the basis of this document, tell us briefly what significance this document had with regard to your appointment as Military Commander Greece?
A The so-called Fuehrer Directive 48 had the purpose of clarifying the channels of command in the event of an invasion and concerned the threat of an invasion. It dealt with the defense of the South-East area.
As Commander of Southern Greece, I did not receive this order. It was only the basis for order of higher agencies. The order further assumed that the Italians were still present in the country. Consequently it did not concern me at all that under Paragraph 2 it was provided that the 11th Italian Army, on the 27th of July, took over the German combat units in southern Greece. Regarding paragraph V, I would like to state the Military Commander Greece is mentioned here for the first time, in actual fact he did not yet exist.
I mentioned just before when I learned for the first time of this assignment as Military Commander Greece. This agency could not yet have been established because, at that time, the Italians were still there and the previously mentioned special instruction was not received on this basis at all, but the final instruction was only received five months later. The further provisions that the German military agencies were to influence the military administration as carried out by the Italians remained merely theory.
In summary, I can say that the whole Fuehrer Directive #48 remained a theoretical one and never had any effect whatsoever on the Military Commander Greece.
THE PRESIDENT: We will take our noon recess at this time.
(A recess was taken.)
(Following recess.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q General, before the recess we discussed Prosecution Exhibit 297, which is Fuehrer Directive No. 48 and you testified that this Fuehrer Directive had remained pure theory, what did you mean when you said that?
A It remained more theory where the actual reorganization of the Army channels of command were concerned.
Q To the extent to which there are positive provisions in this Fuehrer Directive in other fields, do you mean to say that this Fuehrer Directive remained theory there too?
A No, of course not, because a Fuehrer Directive was binding. In the case of the reorganization, the events superseded the order and that is why it remained theory, but as to the individual provisions which were given it remained valid on principle.
Q If you look at page 70 of Document Book 12, which is page 79 of the English text, you will find that the last sentence on this page reads:
The authority of the supreme Reich authorities to issue directives concerning their particular spheres remains intact. However, channels go via the Military Commander."
Is that one of those provisions of which you said just now that to the extent of those, of course, the Fuehrer directive was binding?
A I did not mention that passage before because it does not seem to me to be one of the significant provisions of the directive with regard to organization, but because you ask me about it, I have to state that this basic provision of course remained valid. Of course, in subsequent time, in actual fact, I cannot remember that it became necessary to be applied. In any case, if a German agency which was not part of the Armed Forces was incorporated in a military staff, then that was purely an organization measure.
I would like to call it an administrative measure, which however excluded a factual taking of influence on this agency, because it says, "...Authority of the supremo Reich authorities to issue directives concerning their particular spheres remains intact." it merely means that the channels go via the military commander; i.e. mail, etc.
Q The next prosecution document, which I would like to discuss with you, is Prosecution Exhibit 310, which is in the same Document Book 12, on page 160 and subsequent pages, page 134 of the German test. This Prosecution Exhibit 310 is contained in Document Book 12. General would you please give us your brief comments to this document of the prosecution?
A This order is the basic reorganization order for the Balkans. It was of particular importance to me as Military Commander and I received it. It is brief and only gives few detailed provisions. It contains the establishment of Army Group F, the appointment of the Military Commander Southeast and the appointment of the Military Commander Greece, although at that time there were still Italian occupation forces in Greece. The order refers to the brief intermediate period when German and Italian troops together stayed in the area of the Military Commander. The reorganization is mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 7. Of great importance, and this is the only positive aspect of this order, are the enclosures, above all enclosure three, which is an organization sketch.
Q That is contained on page 138 in the German text, you mean this sketch, do you, General?
A Yes.
Q It is page 163 in the English document book.
A This sketch for the first time gave a clear picture of the organization. The Military Commander Southeast in Belgrade was subordinate to the Military Commander Greece.
Two elements are subordinate to the Commander Crete and the Commander 395 in Salonika, however, there are decisive restrictions.
Q Just a moment, General, please. If it please the Tribunal I have to correct this, it is not page 163, it is page 164 of the English text where this sketch is.
A On one side we see the Commander of Crete and it is mentioned that he is only territorially subordinate and even this subordination was restricted at a later time and............
Q General, would you please continue with the discussion of this sketch which is on page 164 of the English text and 138 of the German text?
A The last thing which I had mentioned was a subordination of the commandant of Crete under the Military Commander for Greece and I stressed the footnote according to which this subordination was only a subordination in the territorial aspect. This form of subordination was further restricted by later orders so that eventually the Commandant in Crete was immediately subordinate to Army Group E.
According to a service regulation issued later, it is provided that he is subordinate to the Military Commander Greece merely and I quote:
"Concerning matters of basic importance for the military administration," which had the result in actual fact that decisive questions of economy, currency, et cetera were ordered by the Military Commander also for Crete while in current economy matters he was independent in Crete because this representative and independent economic area.
I shall now move to the left of the sketch where it says: "Subarea Administrative Headquarters 395". There is a footnote which says: "Up to now Military Commander Salonika-Aegean." In actual fact the situation was that both agencies remained in existance and were under one military commander. The Commander Salonika-Aegean had two heads. He was (Commanding General, Commander Salonika-Aegean and as such he was for tactical purposes subordinate to Army Group E and (2) he was in charge of Subarea Administrative agency was subordinate to the Military Commander Greece.
That is one of these ambiguous subordinations which was not infrequent in the Balkans. This subordination under Army Group E as tactical command agency was qualified in a later mentioned directive as follows: he is simultaneously at the disposal of Army Group E concerning combat assignments.
This then is a sketch which forms the first basis of the reorganization of channels of command and the appointment of the Military Commander Greece.
The order was issued on 15 August. Therefore, I should have received it around the 20th or 25th of August.
Q The prosecution in this connection has submitted a further document which is a draft of the basic order concerning the channels of command in the Southeast Area. This is Prosecution Exhibit 351 contained in Document Book XIV of the prosecution, on page 89 and the subsequent pages of the English text, page 65 and the subsequent pages in the German text.
General, will you quite briefly give us your comments on this order?
A This order which is dated 30 October 1943 represents a draft of the execution provisions for the reorganization in the Balkans. The draft of the execution provisions for the reorganization in the Balkans. The draft was only made available two months after the reorganization. When I actually received it and it reached me, I say that because the last but one paragraph of this order shows that this order was allowed to be passed on in excerpt only to those agencies which were actually concerned with it. That was in accordance with the then customary procedure that every agency was only informed, only received a minimum of information which was necessary for it to know, this was done so in order to guard secrecy.
This mutual distrust and this secrecy led, of course, to great difficulties in cooperation. One could only survey one's own modest sector but one could not gain a picture of the whole situation. This, however, was a principle which Hitler himself had invented in 1940.
As to this document, mentioned before, I don't know in which form I received this order, whether I received an excerpt or whether I received only the main points only by way of teletype, these main points which I can remember quite well.
The organization order is subdivided into two parts: (1) Operational channels of command and (2) Territorial channels of command. I shall first of all deal with paragraph I which deals with the operational channels of command.
Paragraph 4 I would like to discuss in particular. According to this, the Commander for Greece is subordinate to the Commander in Chief of Army Group E in all questions of security of the land, combatting of bands, and counteracting of sabotage acts. This in the same way as the Military Commander for Serbia is subordinated to the Commander in Chief Southeast i.e., Army Group F. However, there was one basic difference in these two subordinations. Serbia had at its disposal for the carrying out of this task the necessary forces and reigned supreme in its area and also Serbia had a tactical operational staff. In contract to these conditions, the Military Commander Greece had no area or only a very small area, had no tactical staff, and no forces at his disposal; thus this passage of the order also remained theory, because it had as its basis a wrong comparison and a wrong presupposition.
In the subsequent paragraph it says: "The Commander in Chief is authorized to charge military commanders with certain security duties, "et cetera. In Greece the actual situation was that Army Group E had subordinated to it all security units and that Army Group E decided over the commitment of these units. In this sense, as we shall later see, Army Group E decided about the commitment of the Higher SS and Police Leader and his units.
And finally there is a further formulation of this order. The Commanders in Chief can transfer to the Military Commanders certain security duties and put at their disposal for this purpose the necessary security units. This "may" provision did not become effective. Security duties were only transferred to Military Commanders at the very beginning in a timely limited extent and for the rest the the security units required for this purpose were not subordinated to the Military Commanders as provided. These are my comments on the draft of this order.
I shall now deal with the passage under "Territorial Channels of Command". About Paragraph 2 I would like to mention the following: that this particular paragraph is very flexible indeed because what means "interest of troop leadership", what means "military interpolation", what means "decisive questions"? In actual practice I am sure that this paragraph later caused the Army Group E to intervene in all spheres of administration, economy, finances because in the final analysis, troop interests could always be made a pretext.
This provision and regulation presented a further source of unclearness and for the notorious overlappings of channels of command Army Group E had and - I believe on the basis of that particular paragraph, - the endeavor to have the Military Commanders entirely subordinated to their own agency. However, the Army Group never succeeded in achieving this?
To put it differently, the channels of command formulated in this provision which I read there, for the first time, remained in substance mere theory and the orders for the practical execution were received by me by way of teletypes, individual communications, et cetera, in the course of time.
Behind the scenes there was a battle waged for many months, for the achievement of the demands of Army Group E in contrast to those of the Military Commander Greece. I could merely adhere to the clear orders which I had received and for the balance attempt to maintain my own sphere of competency and responsibility.
I believe those are my main comments to this draft of an order.
Q Would you please describe very briefly, General, what practical effects this reorganization had on your task and on your staff?
A In actual practice the situation was as follows -- I can only describe it in large outlines.
Q Well, I want you to do it very briefly, please.
A. The troop tasks which I had up to that point no longer existed nor did my supply tasks which up to then had represented a large part of my sphere of work. The staff was reorganized to deal with purely administrative matters and the final consequence was that the staff was reorganized accordingly. That meant a considerable and rather sudden reorganization. With one blow three active general staff officers were taken away from me. My chief of staff, my Ia and my Ic. Further, the entire quartermaster department was taken from me, which was quite an extensive one. The entire signal communications department was taken away and also my planes which the air force had up to then put at my disposal.
Q. Did that reorganization mean that only your sphere of work was changed, or did it mean that the quality of your staff became worse?
A. It meant both. The quality of the staff naturally decreased. I stressed that I lost three active, young, very well trained general staff officers. I didn't have a single one left. I was given as a chief of staff a former retired colonel who was 15 years older than I. My Ia was an Oberregierungsrat who was twelve years older than I, and this Ia only arrived just before New Year 1943-1944. These facts alone show that the tactical tasks no longer applied.
Q. The change of the tasks which you had had up until then, demanded a complete reorganization of the administration of Greece, particularly when the Italians had left. Would you please quite briefly tell us what administrative agencies you had and what administrative agencies were added, in the military sphere?
A. Up to then the German area had been in the the South, the small area of the Military Commander Southern Greece which I pointed out yesterday on this map.
A further German area had been a large area in the North which had been under the jurisdiction of the Commander Salonika-Aegean. Between these two areas which had been German up until then, there was now a vacuum. Also there was a vacuum in Boeotia, Attica and the Peloponnes. In this vacuum the Italian units dissolved and were transported home. Simultaneously, the bands infiltrated the empty country and eventually the German troops marched to occupy this same part of those areas which until then had been Italian occupation area; that is the development in outline.
Q. It became necessary to have a new administration. How was this organized? How was it composed?
A. The administration was built up as follows: the main sub-area administrative headquarters in Salonika already existed which was formed of part of the staff of the Commander Salonika and seven administrative sub area headquarters were added, which arrived during the last three months of 1943.
Q. Two questions which would like you to answer. General: did you have any security tasks on the basis of this reorganization?
A. Army Group E at the end of August had given me certain security tasks which I maintained under the new label, "Military Commander." For this purpose I had been given during the last ten days of August an SS Mountain Police Regiment 18. The assignment was to secure with this regiment three important pass highways. I will briefly point them out on the map: the Thermopyles Pass, in a southerly direction, the pass highway west of the Parnass Mountains, and a pass highway between Thebes and Athens.
Those were the security tasks which I received towards the end of August and which I had to carry on until about the beginning of November.
Q. From the end of August until the beginning of November 1942 -- is that correct?
A. Yes, approximately.
Q. Did your tasks comprise combatting of bands on the basis of this reorganization?
A. No, I had no commission concerning the combatting of bands because I had, first of all, no troops for this purpose nor an operational staff.
Q. You have already mentioned before, General, that a Higher SS and Police Leader was attached to your staff.
When did that happen?
A. A Higher SS and Police Leader was sent to Athens to the best of my knowledge towards the middle of September 1943.
Q. Middle of September 1943?
A. Yes, somewhere between the 10th and 20th of September 1943.
Q. It seems to me necessary, General, that we discuss in detail what the tasks of this Higher SS and Police Leader were, where and to whom he was subordinated. Were these questions clearly provided for?
A. All this can be seen from a service directive for the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece dated the 7th of September 1943. It is contained in Document Book XVII under Exhibit 419, page 75 of the German text, and I am afraid I don't know the English page.
Q. This is Document NOKW-1438, prosecution exhibit 419, contained in Document Book XVII of the prosecution and page 104 and subsequent pages of the English text and page 75 and subsequent pages of the German text.
Before we come to the discussion of this service regulation, General, I would like to ask you one more question concerning the Higher SS and Police Leader. Was the Higher SS and Police Leader subordinate to you in a disciplinary respect?
A. No.
Q. To whom was he subordinated in this respect?
A. To the Reichfuehrer SS, his superior.
Q. Was he subordinated to you for administrative purposes?
A. No, for these purposes he was also subordinated to the SS through channels.
Q. Was he economically subordinated to you?
A. Only partially because the SS had their independent supply channels -- at least partially.
Q. Were the SS and police leaders judicially subordinated to you?
A. No, in this sphere also he was subordinated to his supreme superior SS agencies.
Q. Now, let us have a look at the service regulations for the Higher SS and Police Leader in Greece in some detail. On the 17th of September 1945 the OKW issued this regulation in the Fuehrer headquarters and Keitel signed it. Paragraphs 1 and 2 -- Under paragraph 1 it says: "Reichfuehrer SS, and Chief of the German Police by agreement with the Chief of the OKW and appoints an SS and Police Leader for the area of Military Greece."
Under this paragraph 2 it says: "The Higher SS and Police Leader is an office of the Reichfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police which is subordinate to Military Commander Greece for the period of its employment in Greece."
General, will you please briefly give us your comments to these two paragraphs where you were concerned?
How did you regard the newly created office of the Higher SS and Police Leader?
A. Paragraphs 1 and 2, which were just read, show clearly that the Higher SS and Police Leader was an office of the Reichsfuehrer SS and was appointed by him. Then comes the vague expression that "he is subordinated to the Military Commander Greece for the period of his employment in Greece." This provision could, according to the customs of that period, refer purely to a subordination in military questions, as has been clearly and correctly expressed in General Taylor's Opening Statement, and I quote. It says there on Page 24 of the German and English texts: "The Higher SS and Police Leaders remained personally responsible to Himmler; they were, however, for tactical purposes, subordinated to the senior Military Commander of their area." This is a confirmation of the fact that this subordination referred purely to the military sphere. Thus far the situation is clear. The next paragraphs, however, show the exact opposite and the cancellation of this general rule; so they represent exceptions. It seems to me to be necessary that we discuss in great detail the following paragraphs.
Q. All right, General, we will discuss, than, Paragraph 3, which says in its first paragraph: "In the area of the Military Commander Greece the Higher SS and Police Leader embraces all duties which are incumbent on the Reichfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police in the Reich." This means that the Higher SS and Police Leader had purely police tasks, corresponding to those which the Reichsfuehrer SS had in the Reich, and which, according to Paragraph 7 of this directive, he received directives from the Reichsfuehrer SS and carried out his tasks independently. I would like to read Paragraph 7 in this connection, it says: "The Higher SS and Police Leader will receive directives and instructions for the execution of these duties from the Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police. He will carry them out independently, currently, and opportunely for the Military Commander Greece, insofar as he does not receive any restricting directives from the later."
I would like to ask you a general question concerning this paragraph: What was the situation in actual fact with the current and the direct reports to the Military Commander Greece?
A. That depends on what kind of reports you mean. I never saw any reports concerning purely police matters. They went immediately to the Reichsfuehrer SS, therefore, I knew nothing about them.
Q. That, then, was the chapter on purely police tasks. Now, let us deal with Paragraph 4. The primary duty of the Higher SS and Police Leader is the command of the SS and Police units (without the Waffen SS units subordinated to Army Group E.), in combat against bands and sabotage, pursuant to the general directives of the Reichsfuehrer SS. For this purpose definite combat areas to be their own responsibility are to be assigned to them by the Military Commander."
What are your comments on this Paragraph 4?
A. Before I deal with this Paragraph 4 I would like to add something which we missed. An important sentence was not mentioned, which is the second part of Paragraph 3. "He has authority to direct and supervise the Greek authorities and police forces within the sphere of these duties." This shows that the Corps operation, or rather the relation of subordination with respect to the Greek agencies, is part of the task of the Higher SS and Police Leader, for which he receives his directives from the Reichsfuehrer SS. Now, I shall deal with Paragraph 4 which you just quoted. This paragraph means that the Higher SS and Police Leader is to wage the combatting of bands a) in accordance with instructions of the Reichsfuehrer SS, and b) in his own definite combat area under his own responsibility. This paragraph and the provision made in accordance with this passage, in Greece the Military Commander, as such, does not bear any responsibility for the band combatting.
Q. But it says here in Paragraph 4 that the Military Commanders can give certain definite combat areas with regard to band sabotate under their own responsibility, to the Higher SS and Police Leader.
A. This sentence has as its basis the wrong assumption --that the Military Commander in Greece has the task to combat the bands in Greece--and, therefore, disposes of such band combat. That is probably stated in conjunction with the entirely different conditions in Serbia, where the Military Commander had under him the whole of the area, had the necessary troops at his disposal, and had the necessary operational staff. In Greece, however, the band combatting was the tactical and operational task of Army Group E, and only this Army Group could, within the scope of its total program, cut out a band sector and assign it to the Higher SS and Police Leader.
Q. Did Army Group E, in actual fact, intervent in this question?
A. Yes, of course. At the time, on the basis of the reorganization, we received a teletype order of a general nature which contained the provision that Army Group E was authorized to issue tactical orders in certain cases. It was rather vague. And then I believe I can remember very clearly, it was at the beginning of November--it might have been in October, but most likely it was at the beginning of November--we received a teletype from Army Group E which started with the words: "On the basis of the authority vested in me I order," and in this order the Higher SS and Police Leader was assigned a band combat area--the district of Boeotia. I am pointing it out on the map.
Q. The assignment of the Boeotia area to the Higher SS and Police Leader, as band combat area, was carried out by Army Group E?
A. Yes, and not only the assignment of this area, but also, at that time, there were fairly extensive and detailed combat orders given at the same time.
Q. And this also by Army Group E?
A. Yes.
Q. So these orders actually just passed through your agency?
A. The Military Commander of Greece was more or less the "passing on" agency--the "postal transmitter."
Q. Couldn't you commit police forces militarily?
A. No, I could not do that on the basis of Paragraph 5b, which is very important. It reads: "The Military Commander is only authorized to employ units of the general police for military tasks when the fulfillment of the tasks set to the Higher SS and Police Leader by the Reichsfuehrer SS permits." To put it differently, the orders of the Reichsfuehrer SS had preference over my orders.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps we had better take our noon recess at this time.
(The Tribunal adjourned at 1215 to Resume at 0130.)
AFTERNOON SESSION (The hearing reconvened at 1330 hours, 11 December 1947.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
WILHELM SPEIDEL - Resumed DIRECT EXAMINATION - Continued BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q General, we stopped with the discussion of whether you would use police forces in a military way, Document NOKW-1438, contained in Prosecution Document Book XVII, Exhibit No. 419, on page 104 of the English and page 75 of the German text. Would you please repeat your answer to this question?
A I believe that I said that my right of competency over the police forces was restricted in such a way that I had no way of commanding them for practical purposes, because the orders of the Reichsfuehrer SS had priority.
Q Is your opinion, really expressed in this order?
A Yes, in the second line of paragraph No.
Q Will you please read that paragraph in order to clarify this?
A Page 105 of the English. It reads as follows: 'The Military Commander is authorized to employ units of the Regular Police only for military commitments only on the fulfillment of the task set by the Senior SS and Police Leader as the Reichsfuehrer SS permits."
Q For how long did you, in actual practice, have the possibility of using forces of the Regular Police for military assignments?
A I believe I already mentioned this is brief this morning. It was from the last third of August, when the Police Regiment 18 was subordinated to me for tactical assignments until about the end of October, or the beginning of November--around the turn of the month.
Q Let us look again at Figure 6 of this service regulation for the Higher SS and Police Leader. This Paragraph 6 contains the authorization of the Military Commander to issue directives to the Senior SS and Police Leader. Would you please give a short explanation of this paragraph?
A Directives for destructions of which are necessary for Wehrmacht operational tasks. This directive has a theoritical significance, since I had nothing to do with the operations of the Wehrmacht. Therefore this paragraph would have referred to a right of the Commander in Chief Army Group E.
Q We have already discussed this document in detail. I am of the opinion, General, that you very willingly renounced competencies which remained to you at all, which as such were small, to the Higher SS and Police Leader. Now, I would like to ask you: Is this an interpretation which you yourself have given to this Service Regulation, or did you think out this interpretation for this concrete case?
A No, that is not so. I remember this Service Regulation very well. At that time, of course I was very much concerned about it. It was, at that time, something entirely new for me and furthermore it was of an amazingly contradictory nature with regard to the channel of command; so I can very well remember that I reflected upon and very thoroughly studied this Service Regulation of the Higher SS and Police Leader. I did not read it only once, but I read it repeatedly. On the basis of these reflections I had to conclude the very opinion that I have expressed here. This interpretation of the Service Regulations was, at that time, the yard stick for my action. In other words, I strongly adhered to this Service Regulation just as I have interpreted it here.
Q Did this present interpretation of yours agree--if I may say that--with the interpretation of your superior officers?
A Whether and in how far I discussed this with my superior that is, the Commander in Chief Southeast I do not remember. However, I know very well that my interpretation in this direction and the interpretation of Army Group E, were entirely in conformity. However rarely, we agreed in other spheres.
Q In this connection I would like to submit as a further exhibit from Speidel Document Book I, Speidel Document No. 5, on page 11, to which I shall give Exhibit No. 14.