Q. I will now turn to the second case with which you are charged in the indictment, and which is set down in the Indictment under Count 1, Paragraph 5r ("r" for "Roger"). This is an incident which is contained in Prosecution Document Book XVIII, Exhibit No.435, on page 25 and Page 26 of the English, and on Page 31 of the German text. This is a report of the Military Commandant of the Peloponnes 45 hostages shot to death in Corinth; 52 in Tripolis; and 44 in Sparta."
Could you please explain this report?
A. Yes, I can. In spite of the fact that it is quite clear from the report that the Combat Commandant Peloponnes ordered and carried out these reprisal measures, the Military Commander Greece is charged with this because he passed on it, although, at the same time, it can be seen that the measure took place at a time when I was not there at all. The whole connection in this case, nevertheless, can be reconstructed quite definitely and clearly, since, with regard to this case alone, 13 reports are in existence, and these are all contained in the document books, Although General Felmy has already discussed this case, it is necessary to consider all the reports in this connection in order to find the reason why the Military Commander Greece has been charged with this measure.
Q. Your Honors, I have summarized all the reports which deal with this incident, and I have included them in Speidel Document Book II, as Speidel Document No. 33, on Pages 64 and 64a. I offer this compilation as Speidel Exhibit No. 26. First of all, I would like to look at the reports in chronological order. The chronological order is set sown at the end of each passage. The first report is the report of the LXVIIIth Army Corps, dated the 11th of March 1944. The second and third reports, in chronological order, are the last one and the one before the last, and they are again dated the 12th of March 1944. The fourth report is second from the end, and it is also, together with report No. 7, the third and the fourth from the end. These are dated the 13th of March 1944.
Here I would like to state that up until this time a report of the Military Commander Greece had not yet appeared. As report No. 8 there appears a report, on the second place, of the Military Commander Southeast to Army Group F, dated 13th of March. In the report dated the 13th of March, which is report No. 9 in this compilation, there appears, for the first time, a report of the Military Commander Greece. It is dated the 15th of March 1944. Nos. 10, 11, and 12 are reports dated the 22nd of March 1944, and these are three reports of the Military Commander Greece. The 13th and last report is contained in the Prosecution Document Book as a Daily Report of the Military Commander Southeast to Amy Group F, dated the 23rd of March 1944.
General, you know all these reports from the prosecution's document books and from this compilation. What can be seen, summarizing from this, on investigation?
A On investigation of the 13 reports there, it can be seen that it concerned an attack on the Peloponnesus dated the 11th of March. The reports are also concerned with the reprisal measures in connection with this surprise attack. Secondly, from the compilation it can be seen that the first reports, namely the ones 1 to 7, are reports and affairs of the 117th Division. Thirdly, the reports which came in later of the Military Commander Greece or then the Military Commander Southeast, are merely again, which I have already stressed so often --- information, but not reports about their own measures. And finally, fourthly, I must state that I personally couldn't have had anything to do with these measures at all because I only arrived on the 17th of March in Greece again, while the event took place on the 11th of March.
Q We now come to the next count of the indictment as contained under paragraph 2; figure 5-W. This is the so-called case Krech. Please turn to Document Book 18, Exhibit No. 439, page 85 in the English and page 83 in the German, Exhibit 439, Document Book 18, page 85 in the English. This is a teletype of the Military Commander Greece, Department IC to the Military Commander Southeast from Army Group E, dated the 30th of April, 1944, and under figure 4 it states the following: "200 Greeks will be shot to death as a reprisal measure for the killing of General Krech and his escort detachment on the first of May 1944. Furthermore, a hundred Communists have been shot by Greek volunteer units."
Do you remember this case?
A When I saw for the first time in the indictment about the murder of a General Krech, I had to ask General Felmy who was this General Krech. When I heard more about it, I remembered that in spring 1944 in Athens I was present at the burial of a General and that was Krech, but I didn't remember any more about it.
Q I will now try to clear up this case on the basis of the reports about the event. First of all, what was the Ic report of the Military Commander of Greece dated the 30th of April 1944 which I have just read about?
A This is a report for information only, as so many others.
Q Then you want to say that it is the passing on of a report which reached you from the third place?
A Yes.
Q Can one see from the report where it originated?
A Yes, the report bears the heading under figure 3 "Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters Corinth reports." Then follows a report about deportation of Greek families through the bands and under paragraphs 1 and 2, the two previous ones there are set down events and incidents in Athens. Figure 1 is missing in the document, but in the original one can see that figures 1 and 2 bore the heading "Athens," and so it can be seen that the two first paragraphs refer to Athens and the reports 3 and 4 are reports from the Administrative SubArea Headquarters Corinth about events in the Peloponnesus, and the report in figure 4, also reports come from the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters Corinth to its superior office.
Q Now this report is also not the only report with regard to the Krech case, which has been submitted by the prosecution; looking through all the documents I have found out that the Krech case is mentioned altogether eight times in the reports, and for the purpose of explanation, in Document Book Speidel II, I have in the same way made a compilation of these eight reports.
This is Speidel Document No. 34, on page 65, of Speidel Document Book No. II, and I offer this compilation as Speidel Exhibit No. 27.
General, would you please comment briefly on this compilation according to its chronological order?
A This compilation gives all the documents about this case which are available in the books -- there is the number of the book, the NOKW number, the exhibit number, the page number, and the numbers in brackets are the English page numbers and there is a short statement of the contents of the report and finally the report, the office in which the report originated and the office to which the report went. finally, the last column shows the chronological order of these reports which in themselves in this compilation are set down in the order in which they appear in the documents.
Therefore, I begin with the discussion in the chronological order and would ask first of all that the Tribunal would look at the first report which is dated the 23th of April and which is a report of the 68th Army Corps to Army Group E. Contents report on the death of General Krech. That is the fact.
The second report in chronological order also is dated the 28th of April. This is a Ix daily report of the 68th Corps. The contents of this report are "As a reprisal measure for Krech, intended shooting of 200 reprisal prisoners in Athens as a first measure. As a second measure, the shooting of all men who were found outside their villages within a certain area in the Peloponnesus, and the third measure is the shooting of 100 communists by Greek volunteers."
That is, three separate measures are set down here as intended measures.
The third report is dated two days later, the 30th of April, and comes from the Military Commander Greece, addressed to the Military Commander Southeast. In other words, that is the report which has just been read from Document Book 18.
And the fourth report is simply the rather brief passing on of this report of the Military Commander Greece to the Military Commander Southeast. It bears the same date, the 30th of April, and that finishes with the area of the Military Commander as far as the reports go.
The next report in chronological order is the fifth. This is contained in the War Diary of the 68th Army Corps dated the first of May and the entry states that as reprisal measure for the Krech case, on the Peloponnesus, 335 communists and band suspects were shot.
The sixth report in chronological order is dated one day later, dated the 2nd of May, 1944, and it comes from the 68th Corps to Army Group E. Here the same report is repeated again with the difference that 325 shootings are mentioned.
In the seventh report, that is the daily report of the 2nd of May, 68th Army Corps Ic reports as reprisal measure Krech in Athens, 200 in Athens on the Peloponnesus, 100 were shot by Greek volunteers; and the eight report is merely the passing on of this report by Army Group E to the OKH dated the 2nd of May.
Those are the facts which can be seen from this survey if one regards them in chronological order.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The Tribunal will recess until one-thirty.
(A recess was taken until 1330 hours.)
AFTERNOON SESSION
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
JUDGE CARTER: You may proceed.
BY DR. WEISGERBER:
Q. General, before the recess we discussed the case Krech, we have here this compilation of reports which we discussed as contained in document book Speidel No. 2 on page 65. You discussed the details of this compilation before the recess and initially you declared that you do not remember the incidents concerned with the murder of General Krech. Does it help you recollection if you look at this list so that you can give us information as to whether the Military Commander Greece was connected with these reprisal measures?
A. From my own recollection I can only say that as far as the reprisal measures for the murder of General Krech wore concerned, I had nothing to do with them and I can offer proof of this from the documents.
Q. What are the facts you can quote in this connection?
A. I once again turn to this list, which has been puttogether in a chronological manner and discussed by me this morning. I want to say this, the only repeat by the Military Commander Greece in this whole complex is the one which was discussed here this morning.
Secondly, in this report by the sub-area headquarters Corinth, it says, "In retaliation for General Krech, 200 hostages will be shot on 1 May." The sub-area headquarters in Corinth thus reports to me its superior officer that it intended to take that measure. Now, had I ordered the shotting of these 200 hostages the sub-area Corinth would have had no cause for reporting to me a measure, which I myself had ordered because after all the sub-area headquarters Corinth was an agency subordinate to me.
Thirdly, if I look at the second report in this chronological order the one by 1c report of the LXVIII Corps of the 28th April. I find therein that two days previous to the report by the military commander that the intended measures are mentioned, because it says expressly "intended". If the military commander had ordered that measure, it would have been quite impossible for that measure to have been reported on to a different agency, where as my own agency was reported to only two days later on April 30th, and Fourth.
Not in this list nor as there any mention in the war diary of any reference to the measure having been carried out namely the shooting of those 200 hostages. Had the military commander issued that order, there would have been in the war diary, without any doubt, an entry to the effect and finally the last point, in that connection, is that the reports, inasmuch as they do not come from the military commander, are much more precise in the details they give concerning the measures than those by the military commander himself. Had I or my agency been concerned with those measures, my agency would have been the one who would have been best informed about it, that is what I meant to say, first of all to explain this compilation.
Q. To clarify conditions, let me ask you this, what was the position held by General Kruch?
A. General Kruch was the commanding general of the XII Division.
Q. Where was his office situated, his headquarters?
A. In the Peloponnes.
Q. And where was it that General Kruch had been murdered by the partisans?
A. In the southeastern part of the Peloponnes in the area infested by bands.
Q. In view of this state of affairs was there any necessity for the Military-Commander Greece to take reprisal measures?
A. To take retaliation measures in the band area of the Peloponnes was up to the commanding officer of the OX division. I explained this morning. General Kruch was murdered in the band area and therefore retaliation measures could only be taken by the troops.
Q. General, you will recall that in connection with the Krech affair, Colonel Papadongonas was mentioned, did you know Colonel Papadongonas?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Was Colonel Papadongonas somehow or other subordinate to you?
A. No - I had no points of contact with him at all.
Q. In the reports discussed it says in reports which do not come from your agency, that the shouting of the 200 hostages was to be carried out in Athens, or have been carried out in Athens, when did you hear about that?
A. I am afraid I could not make any statements from my recollection there, as much as I would like to.
Q. Well, let us suppose that you had been informed before hand, why did yon not take any action and prevent retaliation measures, provided of course that you disapproved of the retaliation measures you thought perhaps might lead to danger, because on 30 April you presumably were aware of these things and on 1 May the execution was to be carried out?
A. From the report by the sub-area headquarters Corinth, which was read out this morning and mentioned just now, all I could gain from this was this one thought, wherein the Peloponnes, on the occasion of surprise attacks by the bands four German soldiers were killed, including General Krech and five had been wounded.
Furthermore this report made it quite clear to me that the commander of the Peloponnes, the combat commander of the Peloponnes, had ordered the relevant retaliation measures. As the report shows, some of the retaliation measures had been carried out and some were to be carried out later. Where and when and by whom, could not be seen from the report as submitted to me, but it could be assumed that they would be carried out in the Peloponnes because after all it was not the first report of this type concerning retaliation measures in the Peloponnes.
Q. Well, Generel, nevertheless I should ask you in view of the state of affairs, would it have been possible for you to take any steps?
A. In this particular case, as indeed in other previous cases, there was no reason for me to interfere, as you call it, and these are my reasons.
First of all, I had no right to do so, to interfere with measures taken by the troop commander, because they were not subordinate to me and had their own superior offices.
Secondly, nor had I the duty to do so. It was not my duty to control and supervise the troops. I did not know what orders applied to them, which they carried out, on the basis of orders issued by their own superiors.
Another point is, it was quite clearly established by an order that retaliation measures were not within the sphere of administrative duties, they were combat measures. I should like to recall here the order contained in exhibit 306 by Army Group E, which I mentioned yesterday.
Finally, I would like to refer back to what I believe I said this morning, an agreement had been reached on 5 November 1943 that the agency of the military commander was not to take part in any retaliation measures carried on in the Peloponnes.
These I think are the most essential points, but as a matter of principle, I would like to remark, it can only be a troop commander on the spot in the midst of the events and at the scene of the acts who is able to judge whether and when retaliation measures become necessary and whether and when they are not.
Q. General, I would like to ask you now can you remember that you were informed about these events?
A. I feel quite sure that at some time or other I was informed when this happened, but in what manner it was done I cannot recall as much as I would like. The strange thing is that three-men of my staff, or at least men serving in my area on the basis of their position should know about these things and whom I asked about them, could not remember them. This was, first, the administrative sub-area Headquarters commander of Athens, secondly, the A.D.C. of the 1A who kept the war diaries and thirdly, the 1A, who at that time also was the deputy chief of staff because the full time chief of staff was no longer there. That is all I can say about that.
Q. In this connection, if the Tribunal please, I should like to have reference to the following documents: (1) the affidavit by Erich Eisenbach, former Brigadier General, contained in document book 2 for Speidel on page 72 and subsequent pages. It is Speidel document No. 37, which I have offered before as exhibit 13. From page 74 of that document I should like to read paragraph 8, it is the last paragraph on that page 74. May I mention again that the affiant, the former Brig, Gen. Eisenbach was in that period of time concerned here, that is from the beginning of April and in May was the administrative sub-area commander in Athens, He says as follows:
"Also I have not the slightest recollection about reprisal measures for the murder of General Krech. I had no part in it as administrative Sub-area Headquarter's Commander of Athens because it was a matter of troop Tosses. Had this measure been ordered by the i Military Commander, I certainly should have heard of it because of my close official relations to him.
I only heard that General Krech had been murdered on the same day on which his funeral took place. On that day I had returned from a longer duty tour." End of quote.
And then I would like to have reference to the affidavit by the A.D.C. to the 1A whom General Speidel has just mentioned and to the affidavit by the 1A himself. Those two affidavits are contained in Speidel document book IV, the translation of which is not ready yet. At least I have not heard that it was up to date. If the Tribunal permits, I would like to offer those two affidavits in evidence now. Should the Tribunal think that this suggestion is not a good one, I shall offer the affidavits at a later date.
JUDGE CARTER: I think you can offer them now if you care to, just like you did the other day.
DR. WEISGERBER: I beg to offer first the affidavit by Anton Heilingbrunner, as contained in document book Speidel IV on page 40. It is Speidel document No. 73 and it is offered as exhibit Speidel exhibit No. 28. The affiant Anton Heilingbrunner was an A.D.C. with the department 1A with the Military Commander Greece between June 1942 and 1944, that is to say in the time which we are concerned now. He was the A.D.C. with 1A. The affiant says on page 43 of the document book IV, under paragraph 7?
"As for the incident which occurred to General Kruch, all I can say is that as far as I know General Speidel was not concerned with the ordering of reprisal measures. Had General Speidel ordered that 200 hostages be shot, we on the staff would have discussed that order very intensely for the simple reason that an order of that sort would have been in out--spoken contrast to General Speidel's usual attitude toward the Greek people."
The third document in this context will be an affidavit given by Dr. Karl Muchlmann. This is Speidel document No. 71, contained in document book Speidel No. IV on page 31, which is offered as Speidel exhibit 29.
The affiant. Dr. Karl Muchlmann, former Senior government Councillor in December of 1943 to the staff of the military commander Greece where he remained until September, 1944 and he was in charge of the business looked after by 1A and deputized for the chief of staff when the latter was on leave of absence for a lengthly period of time. As far as the case of General Krech is concerned, which we are discussing here, the affiant says as follows on page 32:
"I have indeed heard about the case of Krech. I was informed about his being murdered and also of the fact that retaliation measures had been ordered, however, we had ordered them, at what ratio and whether they were ever carried out is not known to me."
Now, General, to conclude the Kruch incident, I ought to ask you this final, question, how do you picture the actual conclusion?
A. I am unable to clear this up completely, as I do not remember anything definitely, but this is what I can assume. I particularly want to stress that this is an assumption which I offer. The most important thing to state seems to me to be this; at that time, General Felmy did not command the LXVIIIth Corps. At that time, he was deputizing for the Commander-in--Chief of Army Group E.
Two, in that capacity as a deputy Commanding General, there was at that time present in Athens the commanding officer of the 117th Light Infantry Division, which is shown by the War Diary. That is to say, Combat Commander Peloponnesus and the Commanding General of the LXVIIIth Combat were both subordinate and superior officer in one and the same person.
The three retaliation measures which are reported as intended as early as 28 April 1943 show, as far as I can make out, a uniform direction behind it. It therefore appears to be logical to assume that it was ordered and carried out by one and the some agency, because, as I said before, retaliation measures could be taken only by the units, it was entirely up to the unit itself to look after it. That is all I can say about that.
Q. Well let us leave the case of General Krech now, and we have thus discussed the three counts of the indictment as far as you are concerned. I should now like to discuss two reports with you contained in Document Book 18, and which appear to belong to the sphere of your responsibility. Will you please turn to Document Book 18, prosecution's Exhibit 439, on page 81 of the English version and 80 of the German? The first report is a 1C evening report of 5 May 1944 from Military Commander Greece and it reproduces a report by the administrative Sub Area Headquarters Athens. Here we have, for the first time, a mention of the SD. What is the meaning of that report?
A. This is a very characteristic report, characteristic of the situation of that time in Athens where communists were obviously trying to control the streets, and when this road block as it were was raided, shots apparently were exchanged between the communists and the SD, an exchange of shots which was quite usual in Athens of that day?
Q. Was the SD subordinate to you?
A.- No, in no sense of the word.
Q. What did you know about the assignments of the SD?
A. Really nothing. At the beginning, the SD was both a vague and an uncanny term as far as I was concerned. I once asked the Higher SS and Police Leader what the SD was supposed to be doing, and he replied as I remember. "I don' t know myself" "They received their orders from the Reichsfuehrer SS", and of course I couldn't do very much with that answer.
Q. Did you at any time have official contact with the SD?
A. The man in charge of the SD was subordinate as far as I was concerned, quite definitely to the Higher SS and Police Leader. I had contact only with the latter Official. I remember only two personal encounters with the man in charge of the SD. The first one was at the very beginning and I assume that i b was on the occasion of his first visit. The second encounter occurred a little later, I was a bit surprised that the man in charge of the SD called on me in my apartment late in the evening and told me something. What it was I no longer recall: I didn't even remember it at that time because once he had left my apartment, all recollection of the purpose and contents of that conversation had completely slipped my mind; therefore, it can't have been anything very important.
Q. Did you at any time issue orders, directives, or instructions to the SD?
A. No. I was scarcely in a position to give them orders because it was not subordinate to me. Moreover, I must admit quite frankly I had no intention of being connected with it.
Q. Why not?
A. They were not subordinate to me in any sense. The SD was an organization which was completely alien to me and ultimately the situation was that I in my position felt that these people were watching me, although I couldn't prove it.
Q. Now let me turn to the second report which is contained on page 82-that is to say the next page in this document book and in German it is on page 80. This is the Ic evening report of 3 May 1944. It concerns an announcement by the Sub-Area Headquarters in Athens concerning the shooting of 50 communists. To make this quite clear, General, you said before today that the man in charge of the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters of Athens was immediately subordinate to you.
A. That is quite true.
Q. How much can you remember from this report?
A. I recall this report just as little as I do the many others contained in the document books. When I read this report for the first time. I must say I felt that this looks as though the Commander of the SubArea headquarters in Athens had carried out the shooting of 50 communists. As I myself did not know what to do with this report. I asked the man in change of the Sub-Area Headquarters to give me his comments.
Q. I now have reference to the affidavit by General Eisenbach,who at that time was the commander of the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters of Athens. This, if the Tribunal please, is Speidel Document No. 37. contained in Speidel Document Book II, on page 72. This document was offered as Speidel Exhibit No. 13. The affiant says as follows:
"l.) In Athens the Military Administrative headquarters was subordinated to the military Commander, subordinated to the former were the Garrison headquarters in Athens and the Area-Headquarters Piracus. Besides that the police carried on its independent activity, permitting no interference of any kind with its measures. Once I myself reported to superior police headquarters on autocratic measures of the police in Athens and demanded a decision. I received a short and rude reply that the Higher-SS and Police Leader was acting in the name of the Reichsfuchrer SS and his measures were to be upheld.
2.) This independence especially affected the field of reprisals.
In spite of the reprisal order of 22.12.1943, which was known to me, the Higher SS. and Police Leader regularly passed over the Military Administration Headquarters and acted entirely on its own. The police again and again referred to direct orders from the Reichsfuchrer-SS.
3.) The military units also, while taking reprisal Measures, only in the rarest of cases informed the Military Adm. Headquarters in the sense of the order mentioned or permitted its participation. Therefore the new regulation with few exceptions remained mostly theory."
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
"Both cases reported on 3.5. 1944 were such exceptions. I recall the connections again. As can be gathered from previous reports of 14.4.1944 and 25.4.1944, the cause for one case was an attack upon troops. According to the reprisal order of 22.11.1943. I could order no reprisals and did not order any. However the publication was ordered. This publication of the shooting of 50 Communists, is thus one of the cases, which I caused either or remand by a military unit on the basis of their own measures, or upon request of the Greek population, or on the basis of information from other sources.
"Further, I must assume that the 10 Communists hanged because of the attack on the railway of 25.4.1944 were executed by a military unit charged with responsibility for the safety of the railway, stationed along the railway line. These military units were not subordinated to me and, as far as I know, also not to the Military Commander. I do not know anymore what kind of units these were. Also this publication took place for the reasons stated.
"In principle, I should like to remark the following to this question: Whenever publications of executed reprisals appeared in the press, whether they were divulged by the Military Adm. Hqu. or the Military Commander, they always were given out because of the duty to publicize them. In no case is the conclusion justified that these reprisal measures were ordered by one of these two headquarters. This has no bearing on the responsibility. The publication was merely a matter of press-technique, also possible only through one of these headquarters in Athens - by intervention of the Ambassador's office. The reprisal measures could have effect only by publishing them for the purpose of intimidation.
"In many cases publication was ordered on request by the Greek population, who wished to learn the fate of arrested relatives, since other agencies could give no information.
"For that reason the names of the victims were sometimes made known, if these could be learned. That I did myself, for instance in Court No. V, Case No. VII Corinth, on request of Archbishop Michael there.
From this measure in favor of the population no conclusions could, however, be drawn as to co-responsibility."
This affidavit by the commander of the subarea headquarters in Athens concerned the reprisal measures taken and ordered by different agencies. In this particular case which we have just discussed it shows the principle behind it.
Q Now, General are you in a position, referring to the document books of the prosecution, to explain to us that in the case before us now the retaliation measures had been published by the subarea headquarters commander of Athens but not ordered by him?
A Proof of this assertion by the commander of the subarea headquarters in Athens is, I am happy to say, fully contained in the document books, Surprisingly enough, I found this when I listened to General Felmy's interrogation who dealt with the incidents relevant here. It is important to note in this report that in the first case reference is made to a raid of 14 April 1944 and in the second case reference is made to a raid on a railway train on 25 April 1944. These subarea commander reports referred to those two incidents. Any particulars at the back of this report are lacking from the documents with which the military commander Greece is to be incriminated but they appear in the documents incriminating the LXVIII Corps.
Would you please give us the number of those documents, Dr. Weissgerber?
Q The list of reports shows the following: the incidents are contained (1) in Document Book XX of the prosecution exhibit 480, on page 142 of the English and 102 of the German text. This is an entry into the war diary by the LXVIII Corps of 3 May concerning operation "Geier". It says there for 50 hostages were shot for an attack on base of Chani-Derweni and for railroad sabotage east of Megalopefko, 10 hostages are being hanged. This was in Document Book XX, Exhibit 480, on page 142 of the English and 102 of the German text.