Finally, I would like to refer back to what I believe I said this morning, an agreement had been reached on 5 November 1943 that the agency of the military commander was not to take part in any retaliation measures carried on in the Peloponnes.
These I think are the most essential points, but as a matter of principle, I would like to remark, it can only be a troop commander on the spot in the midst of the events and at the scene of the acts who is able to judge whether and when retaliation measures become necessary and whether and when they are not.
Q. General, I would like to ask you now can you remember that you were informed about these events?
A. I feel quite sure that at some time or other I was informed when this happened, but in what manner it was done I cannot recall as much as I would like. The strange thing is that three-men of my staff, or at least men serving in my area on the basis of their position should know about these things and whom I asked about them, could not remember them. This was, first, the administrative sub-area Headquarters commander of Athens, secondly, the A.D.C. of the 1A who kept the war diaries and thirdly, the 1A, who at that time also was the deputy chief of staff because the full time chief of staff was no longer there. That is all I can say about that.
Q. In this connection, if the Tribunal please, I should like to have reference to the following documents: (1) the affidavit by Erich Eisenbach, former Brigadier General, contained in document book 2 for Speidel on page 72 and subsequent pages. It is Speidel document No. 37, which I have offered before as exhibit 13. From page 74 of that document I should like to read paragraph 8, it is the last paragraph on that page 74. May I mention again that the affiant, the former Brig, Gen. Eisenbach was in that period of time concerned here, that is from the beginning of April and in May was the administrative sub-area commander in Athens, He says as follows:
"Also I have not the slightest recollection about reprisal measures for the murder of General Krech. I had no part in it as administrative Sub-area Headquarter's Commander of Athens because it was a matter of troop Tosses. Had this measure been ordered by the i Military Commander, I certainly should have heard of it because of my close official relations to him.
I only heard that General Krech had been murdered on the same day on which his funeral took place. On that day I had returned from a longer duty tour." End of quote.
And then I would like to have reference to the affidavit by the A.D.C. to the 1A whom General Speidel has just mentioned and to the affidavit by the 1A himself. Those two affidavits are contained in Speidel document book IV, the translation of which is not ready yet. At least I have not heard that it was up to date. If the Tribunal permits, I would like to offer those two affidavits in evidence now. Should the Tribunal think that this suggestion is not a good one, I shall offer the affidavits at a later date.
JUDGE CARTER: I think you can offer them now if you care to, just like you did the other day.
DR. WEISGERBER: I beg to offer first the affidavit by Anton Heilingbrunner, as contained in document book Speidel IV on page 40. It is Speidel document No. 73 and it is offered as exhibit Speidel exhibit No. 28. The affiant Anton Heilingbrunner was an A.D.C. with the department 1A with the Military Commander Greece between June 1942 and 1944, that is to say in the time which we are concerned now. He was the A.D.C. with 1A. The affiant says on page 43 of the document book IV, under paragraph 7?
"As for the incident which occurred to General Kruch, all I can say is that as far as I know General Speidel was not concerned with the ordering of reprisal measures. Had General Speidel ordered that 200 hostages be shot, we on the staff would have discussed that order very intensely for the simple reason that an order of that sort would have been in out--spoken contrast to General Speidel's usual attitude toward the Greek people."
The third document in this context will be an affidavit given by Dr. Karl Muchlmann. This is Speidel document No. 71, contained in document book Speidel No. IV on page 31, which is offered as Speidel exhibit 29.
The affiant. Dr. Karl Muchlmann, former Senior government Councillor in December of 1943 to the staff of the military commander Greece where he remained until September, 1944 and he was in charge of the business looked after by 1A and deputized for the chief of staff when the latter was on leave of absence for a lengthly period of time. As far as the case of General Krech is concerned, which we are discussing here, the affiant says as follows on page 32:
"I have indeed heard about the case of Krech. I was informed about his being murdered and also of the fact that retaliation measures had been ordered, however, we had ordered them, at what ratio and whether they were ever carried out is not known to me."
Now, General, to conclude the Kruch incident, I ought to ask you this final, question, how do you picture the actual conclusion?
A. I am unable to clear this up completely, as I do not remember anything definitely, but this is what I can assume. I particularly want to stress that this is an assumption which I offer. The most important thing to state seems to me to be this; at that time, General Felmy did not command the LXVIIIth Corps. At that time, he was deputizing for the Commander-in--Chief of Army Group E.
Two, in that capacity as a deputy Commanding General, there was at that time present in Athens the commanding officer of the 117th Light Infantry Division, which is shown by the War Diary. That is to say, Combat Commander Peloponnesus and the Commanding General of the LXVIIIth Combat were both subordinate and superior officer in one and the same person.
The three retaliation measures which are reported as intended as early as 28 April 1943 show, as far as I can make out, a uniform direction behind it. It therefore appears to be logical to assume that it was ordered and carried out by one and the some agency, because, as I said before, retaliation measures could be taken only by the units, it was entirely up to the unit itself to look after it. That is all I can say about that.
Q. Well let us leave the case of General Krech now, and we have thus discussed the three counts of the indictment as far as you are concerned. I should now like to discuss two reports with you contained in Document Book 18, and which appear to belong to the sphere of your responsibility. Will you please turn to Document Book 18, prosecution's Exhibit 439, on page 81 of the English version and 80 of the German? The first report is a 1C evening report of 5 May 1944 from Military Commander Greece and it reproduces a report by the administrative Sub Area Headquarters Athens. Here we have, for the first time, a mention of the SD. What is the meaning of that report?
A. This is a very characteristic report, characteristic of the situation of that time in Athens where communists were obviously trying to control the streets, and when this road block as it were was raided, shots apparently were exchanged between the communists and the SD, an exchange of shots which was quite usual in Athens of that day?
Q. Was the SD subordinate to you?
A.- No, in no sense of the word.
Q. What did you know about the assignments of the SD?
A. Really nothing. At the beginning, the SD was both a vague and an uncanny term as far as I was concerned. I once asked the Higher SS and Police Leader what the SD was supposed to be doing, and he replied as I remember. "I don' t know myself" "They received their orders from the Reichsfuehrer SS", and of course I couldn't do very much with that answer.
Q. Did you at any time have official contact with the SD?
A. The man in charge of the SD was subordinate as far as I was concerned, quite definitely to the Higher SS and Police Leader. I had contact only with the latter Official. I remember only two personal encounters with the man in charge of the SD. The first one was at the very beginning and I assume that i b was on the occasion of his first visit. The second encounter occurred a little later, I was a bit surprised that the man in charge of the SD called on me in my apartment late in the evening and told me something. What it was I no longer recall: I didn't even remember it at that time because once he had left my apartment, all recollection of the purpose and contents of that conversation had completely slipped my mind; therefore, it can't have been anything very important.
Q. Did you at any time issue orders, directives, or instructions to the SD?
A. No. I was scarcely in a position to give them orders because it was not subordinate to me. Moreover, I must admit quite frankly I had no intention of being connected with it.
Q. Why not?
A. They were not subordinate to me in any sense. The SD was an organization which was completely alien to me and ultimately the situation was that I in my position felt that these people were watching me, although I couldn't prove it.
Q. Now let me turn to the second report which is contained on page 82-that is to say the next page in this document book and in German it is on page 80. This is the Ic evening report of 3 May 1944. It concerns an announcement by the Sub-Area Headquarters in Athens concerning the shooting of 50 communists. To make this quite clear, General, you said before today that the man in charge of the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters of Athens was immediately subordinate to you.
A. That is quite true.
Q. How much can you remember from this report?
A. I recall this report just as little as I do the many others contained in the document books. When I read this report for the first time. I must say I felt that this looks as though the Commander of the SubArea headquarters in Athens had carried out the shooting of 50 communists. As I myself did not know what to do with this report. I asked the man in change of the Sub-Area Headquarters to give me his comments.
Q. I now have reference to the affidavit by General Eisenbach,who at that time was the commander of the Administrative Sub-Area Headquarters of Athens. This, if the Tribunal please, is Speidel Document No. 37. contained in Speidel Document Book II, on page 72. This document was offered as Speidel Exhibit No. 13. The affiant says as follows:
"l.) In Athens the Military Administrative headquarters was subordinated to the military Commander, subordinated to the former were the Garrison headquarters in Athens and the Area-Headquarters Piracus. Besides that the police carried on its independent activity, permitting no interference of any kind with its measures. Once I myself reported to superior police headquarters on autocratic measures of the police in Athens and demanded a decision. I received a short and rude reply that the Higher-SS and Police Leader was acting in the name of the Reichsfuchrer SS and his measures were to be upheld.
2.) This independence especially affected the field of reprisals.
In spite of the reprisal order of 22.12.1943, which was known to me, the Higher SS. and Police Leader regularly passed over the Military Administration Headquarters and acted entirely on its own. The police again and again referred to direct orders from the Reichsfuchrer-SS.
3.) The military units also, while taking reprisal Measures, only in the rarest of cases informed the Military Adm. Headquarters in the sense of the order mentioned or permitted its participation. Therefore the new regulation with few exceptions remained mostly theory."
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
"Both cases reported on 3.5. 1944 were such exceptions. I recall the connections again. As can be gathered from previous reports of 14.4.1944 and 25.4.1944, the cause for one case was an attack upon troops. According to the reprisal order of 22.11.1943. I could order no reprisals and did not order any. However the publication was ordered. This publication of the shooting of 50 Communists, is thus one of the cases, which I caused either or remand by a military unit on the basis of their own measures, or upon request of the Greek population, or on the basis of information from other sources.
"Further, I must assume that the 10 Communists hanged because of the attack on the railway of 25.4.1944 were executed by a military unit charged with responsibility for the safety of the railway, stationed along the railway line. These military units were not subordinated to me and, as far as I know, also not to the Military Commander. I do not know anymore what kind of units these were. Also this publication took place for the reasons stated.
"In principle, I should like to remark the following to this question: Whenever publications of executed reprisals appeared in the press, whether they were divulged by the Military Adm. Hqu. or the Military Commander, they always were given out because of the duty to publicize them. In no case is the conclusion justified that these reprisal measures were ordered by one of these two headquarters. This has no bearing on the responsibility. The publication was merely a matter of press-technique, also possible only through one of these headquarters in Athens - by intervention of the Ambassador's office. The reprisal measures could have effect only by publishing them for the purpose of intimidation.
"In many cases publication was ordered on request by the Greek population, who wished to learn the fate of arrested relatives, since other agencies could give no information.
"For that reason the names of the victims were sometimes made known, if these could be learned. That I did myself, for instance in Court No. V, Case No. VII Corinth, on request of Archbishop Michael there.
From this measure in favor of the population no conclusions could, however, be drawn as to co-responsibility."
This affidavit by the commander of the subarea headquarters in Athens concerned the reprisal measures taken and ordered by different agencies. In this particular case which we have just discussed it shows the principle behind it.
Q Now, General are you in a position, referring to the document books of the prosecution, to explain to us that in the case before us now the retaliation measures had been published by the subarea headquarters commander of Athens but not ordered by him?
A Proof of this assertion by the commander of the subarea headquarters in Athens is, I am happy to say, fully contained in the document books, Surprisingly enough, I found this when I listened to General Felmy's interrogation who dealt with the incidents relevant here. It is important to note in this report that in the first case reference is made to a raid of 14 April 1944 and in the second case reference is made to a raid on a railway train on 25 April 1944. These subarea commander reports referred to those two incidents. Any particulars at the back of this report are lacking from the documents with which the military commander Greece is to be incriminated but they appear in the documents incriminating the LXVIII Corps.
Would you please give us the number of those documents, Dr. Weissgerber?
Q The list of reports shows the following: the incidents are contained (1) in Document Book XX of the prosecution exhibit 480, on page 142 of the English and 102 of the German text. This is an entry into the war diary by the LXVIII Corps of 3 May concerning operation "Geier". It says there for 50 hostages were shot for an attack on base of Chani-Derweni and for railroad sabotage east of Megalopefko, 10 hostages are being hanged. This was in Document Book XX, Exhibit 480, on page 142 of the English and 102 of the German text.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
The second proof is contained in Document Book XXV of the prosecution. It is Exhibit 571 on page 83 of the English and 65 of the German text. This is the daily report of 4 May addressed to Army Group E and the contents are identical, and the same incident is also contained in Document Book XXV an Exhibit 579. This is on page 123 of the English and 93 of the German, again a IC report of 4 May 1944, the contents again being identical.
In the latter report we find the first case referred back to the IC report, of 14 April whereas the second case is being referred to a IC report of 25 April. I, therefore, state that these reports about a measure having been carried out by the LXVIII Corps is identical with those by the administrative Subarea Headquarters Athens both as far as the figure of hostages is concerned, the reason for the measure taken and the date on which they were taken.
Is that correct, General?
A By enumerating these proofs and facts clear proof has been furnished that the affidavit given by the former commander of the Administrative Subarea Headquarters in Athens concerning the publication of retaliation measures taken by him is in accordance with the truth. It becomes clear, therefore, first, that the two reprisal measures taken were carried out by the units and, secondly, that the commander of the subarea headquarters merely published the incident which becomes clear from the way the report is worded in the documents.
He published these things, in one case 20 days, in another 8 days, after the event itself: that means on the same day on which, according to the documents submitted, the LXVIIIth Corps reported these events to higher quarters.
Following up what she commander of the administrative subarea headquarters said, I should like to mention one point which is that the reasons why he published these things are connected with the following factors: (1) the incidents occurred in his territorial area, (2) by virtue of what was known as the Loehr Order -- that is to say, the Court No. V, Case No. VII.
retaliation order of 22 May 1942 -- I believe this is Exhibit 379 -this thing had to be published. Retaliation measure must be made public; and, finally (3) I can only assume that in addition there were the reasons which General Eisenbach explained, reasons which were connected with concern for the population.
Q The commander of the subarea headquarters in Athens, General Eisenbach, has stated that the making public of retaliation measures in these cases was completely unconnected with questions of responsibility for the measure. How is that as far as you are concerned, you the superior agency above Eisenbach?
A I should like to state that the responsibility for the reprisal measure as such was never in the hands of General Eisenbach. Therefore, the same went for me, as his superior officer.
Q Now, we have discussed the incidents contained in Document Book XVIII which have been used to charge you in the indictment and also two cases where your responsibility has been alleged by virtue of your connection with the administrative subarea headquarters in Athens.
Now, in Document Book XVIII of the prosecution there are a number of daily reports which your agency -- that is to say, the Military Commander Greece -- passed on to the Military Commander Southeast. I suppose you scrutinized all these reports carefully. What is the result of your perusal of these documents?
A Having scrutinized and compared all those reports, I found that all of them are concerned with passing on for informative purposes reports which had reached the military commander from the most varying sources and agencies, concerning incidents which had occurred outside the scope of his responsibility. I recall here statements concerning the technique of reporting such as I have made myself and such as become clear from a number of the affidavits submitted. In other words, here we have measures taken by other command posts or agencies who were passed on to the military commander for information purposes.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q What type of reports were these?
A These reports could be broken down into six different groups. First of all these are the reports which came in from the Higher SS and Police Leader concerning incidents and measures in his band area Boeotia, for the pacification of which he was solely responsible.
The second group represents reports by the Higher SS and Police Leader, also passed on for purposes of information from the sphere of his police duties.
The third group concerns reports of facts and incidents from the area of the Combat. Commander of the Peloponnes; that is to say, of incidents of measures taken by the units inasmuch as they had not been touched upon before in this examination of mine.
The fourth group is concerned with incidents and events which had been resorted to by different agencies and units in Greece for which the Military Commander was in no way responsible and the measures taken he passed on for purposes of information in as far as he had been informed himself.
To summarize the fifth group I might say that these include all the reports made during my absence from Greece; that is to say, those things which occurred between 23 January and 17 March 1944 which, therefore, do not touch on my responsibility a prior.
And, finally, a sixth complex -- the many reports contained in the documents concerned with the period of time aftEr I had left Greece which, nevertheless, have been used to incriminate me.
That, I think is the breaking down of these reports into six groups.
DR. WEISSGERBER: May it please the Tribunal, in order to simplify the oral examination of this witness, I have compiled the six groups of reporting technique and have included them in Speidel Document Book No. III, as Document No. 60. It may be found on page 87 and subsequent pages of that document book. This document is offered as Speidel Exhibit No. 30.
Court No. V, Case No. VII.
Q Will you please take this document book? It is on page 87 and subsequent pages. General, the first compilation concerns reports which came from the band territory of the Higher SS and Police leader in Boeotia. This is a list of a total of 15 reports. Is there anything you have to add about this?
AAs far as this and the other compilations are concerned, I would like to say that the number of reports does not coincide with the number of incidents. All reports have been included as a matter of course if they reported one and the same incidents in several version.
Q The second compilation concerns events occurring in the sphere of police tasks of the Higher SS and Police Leader. Is there anything you wish to say about that.
A Only the same thing I should emphasize.
Q Number 3 compiles reports by the combat commander of the Peloponnes, a total of 7 cases, or 7 reports I should say. Anything you wish to remark here?
A No.
Q The next one comprises incidents occurring in the areas of other troops. Anything you wish to say about that list?
A I should state here that most of these reports concern reports of engagements with the bands by the commander Salonika Aegean. who was the competent officer as the tactical leader. They also concern measures of the railway security staff at Larissa who were subordinate to the military commander Salonika Aegean or Army Group E.
Q The next compilation concerns reports from the time of your absence. I hardly think you want to say anything about that.
A Well, at the most I should like to say that the figure of "18" could be increased to 31 if the reports mention this morning under the second Count of the indictment -- that is to say, shooting of 200 hostage as reprisal measure for a band attack near Tripolis Sparta -- would be included therein.
Q And the last compilation comprises reports of the period of Court No. V, Case No. VII.
time after you had left Greece.
A Yes quite.
Q You mentioned just now the railway security staff.
A Yes.
Q Would you tell us very briefly what they did, what their tasks were and who it was subordinate to?
A The railway security staff in Larissa, as far as I know, had the assignment of securing the railway Lines or line Salonika, Athens up to the border line of Boeotia near Polonia, with the units under its command. The staff was subordinate, as I said before, to the commander Salonika Aegean and/or Army Group E. I believe it fluctuated a little.
Q Now, there is one incident I should mention now which is connected with General Lanz's cross examination. This concerns Document NOKW-1641 contained in prosecution's document book XXI or page 111 of the English and 97 of the German text. This incident concerns the shooting of 71 Greeks, In the affidavit submitted by the defense by affiant Lenthe, the fact that the Evzones did the shooting is described as a possibility and a connection is hinted at between the Evzones and the administrative subarea headquarters in Messalongion. This is Lanz Exhibit 125 submitted by defense counsel for General Lanz.
General, you know that report as contained in Volume XXI. What could you tell us about this report"
A You showed me this report the other day after General Lanz's cross-examination and I found out that it stated 31 July 1944. At that period of time I had already been absent from Greece for two months. I had left Greece for good.
Q So, therefore, this incident should be made part of the list of incidents which occurred after you had left Greece.
A Yes, quite.
Q There is only one more point to be cleared up in this connection. What were the connections between an administrative subarea Court No. V, Case No. VII.
headquarters and Evzones?
A. Nothing at all; none whatsoever. This, it seams to me, is guesswork on the part of this affiant which I cannot quite understand why. The Evzones, as I said this morning, ware instruments under the Greek government and were used and committed by the Higher SS and Police Leader. The administrative subarea headquarters were subordinate to me and were members of my administrative organization. I cannot find any connection between the two.
Q This brings us to the end of discussing Document Book XVIII of the Prosecution, and brings us to Document Book XIX. There are three documents in that book which have been used by the Prosecution to incriminate you. The relevant Exhibit numbers are No. 447, to be found on Page 17 of the English Document Book and Page 10 of the German Document Book, and Exhibit No. 449 on Pare 37 of the English and Page 35 of the German text, and Exhibit No. 455, on Page 136 of the English and Page 148 of the German text. The two exhibits No. 447, which has eight pages, and No. 449, which has a pages, contain a number of individual reports from the year 1943 from the Greek area.
Did you scrutining these documents carefully.
A. Yes, I did indeed very carefully.
Q. Is there a single report contained in these documents coming from the Military Commander Greece?
A. Not one.
Q Is there in these documents a single report announcing measures taken by the Military Commander Southern Greece, or the Military Commander Greece?
A. No.
Q In looking at these documents carefully, which are contained in Document Book XIX, one finds that they one reports by the Commander in Chief Southeast, with the following contents: a) Reports and measures taken by the battalions: b) Reports and measures taken by the Military Commander Salonika Aegean, who was the tactical officer and subordinate to Army Group E direct: c) Reports and measures taken by other units which was at no time were subordinate to the Military Commander Southern Greece or the Military Commander Greece--reports of which he had no knowledge at the time. Finally, they are reports and measures by a number of command posts connected with the Italian capitulation. The Military Commander in Greece was not connected with those. Is that correct?
A. Yes, it is correct.
Q Now, I would now like to turn to Exhibit No. 455, in particular on Page 139 of the English, in Document Book XIX, which is on Page 150 oi the German text. This particular passage concerns special measures ordered by the First Mountain Division on the 29th of October 1943. Was the First Mountain Division, at any time, subordinate to you?
A. Not for their tactical purposes; but for territorial purposes it was under me, just as any other unit was in that area.
Q. Did you hear about the measures ordered in this Exhibit No. 455 at any time?
A. Not in the old days. I learned of them only through the documents here.
Q. What are your comments on this document?
A. That the First Mountain Division should refer to the Military Commander, such as is contained in Paragraph la, is quite incomprehensible to me because in contact existed at any time between the two command poets. It was occurred to me that the Division wanted to obtain the particulars for the basic hostage order from the Sub-area Administrative Headquarters in Joannina. which was under my command. Here we are obviously concerned with the same order which I mentioned yesterday but this assumption does not quite hold good because the order is dated the 25th of October 1943, whereas, according to the War Diary of the Military Commander, the sub-area Administrative Headquarters in Joannina was established only a fortnight later, that is, on the 9th of November because of the fact that the First Mountain Division was about to leave tho area again. But in any case this order proves that the First Mountain Division knew the retaliation order which I mentioned yesterday, which I called the "Felber Order," because the figures are the same--and this at a period of time when this order reached the Military Commander Greece. The order also proves that the units had clear orders to take their own retaliation measures for losses suffered in fighting the bands, without calling in the Military Commander, In other words, the way I look at this order is that the First Mountain Division needed the particulars for this measure from their former generals of subordination in this area, and that these particulars hailed from a period of time when the First Mountain Division was still serving in Serbia, because, up to that time, this order was not known in Greece.
This is my explanation.
Q. Now, did the First Mountain Division, at any time, turn to you to obtain your approved for retaliation measures concerning special orders in the IC area?
A. No, in no case at all.
Q. This brings us to the end of our discussion of Document Book XIX, and I shall now turn to Document Book XX. In that volume there are four documents which have been used by the Prosecution to incriminate you. There is, first of all. Exhibit No. 464, to be found on Page 46 of the English and Page 33 of the German test. Will you please give us the benefit of your comments on this incident?
A. This is quite obviously connected with the incident at Kallithea, which I mentioned yesterday, where I threatened to carry out retaliation measures but did not actually do so. This report from the Activity Report of the 117th light Infantry Division is concerned with the same contents and the name period of time as this incident; but it does not furnish us with any new point of view about this incident.
Q You're talking about the incident in connection with which I submitted the affidavit by Premier Logo the topoules?
A. Quite so. That is the same incident.
Q. And the affidavit showed quite unequivocally that the hostages were released later. The second document in this Document Book is Exhibit No. 467 on Page 56 of the English text and Page 42 of the German text. The first report mentioned here is dated the 13th of August 1944. In other words, it concerns a period of time after your departure from Greece.
A. Exactly.
Q. On the next page, Page 57 of the English, which is Page 43 of the German text, there is a report mentioned, dated the 9th of October 1943, but this is a report by the Sub-area Administrative headquarters 395.
What can you tell us about that?
A. Looking at the contents of the report we are obviously concerned with a clear-cut report about an engagement with the bands. This document was probably put to my credit because Sub-area Administrative Headquarters 395 is mentioned here as the executive commanding authority. I have already described the twin possession of that agency-Commander Salonika on the one hand and Sub-area Administrative Headquarters 395 on the other. This report proves that people dealing with the two designations were always being confused. One called the agency Headquarters Salonika, and another called it Sub-area Administrative Headquarters 395. But the contents make it quite clear that the firm names are owing mixed up. There the contents refer quite definitely to the tasks in connection with the band fighting by the military command Salonika. The Military Commander Greece is obviously not being touched upon by this report.
Q. The next document-
THE PRESIDENT: Well take our afternoon recess at this time.
(A RECESS WAS TAKEN)