ask you more details. They are the real subjects of the trial here, concerning you personally. Please describe to me your professional career after you returned from Russia in the middle of August 1941? resumed my activity as Personal Referendar in the Reich Main Security Office. My superior was the Office Chief of Office-I, the SS-Gruppenfuehrer Streckenbach. During my activity there I was appointed ministerial councillor. I remained in this position until approximately July 1942. At this time I was transferred to Duesseldorf, as Inspector of the Security Police and the SD. Before I started my work, which was at the order of the RSHA, I had been given a special task in the Upper Ukraine, which took about eight weeks. Then I started to work in Duesseldorf, and remained their until October 1943. Then I was appointed Commander of the Security police in the SD in Athens, in Greece, and retained these from October 1943 until August 1944. After we left Greece, I returned to Berlin. For a few weeks I was unemployed, because Kaltenbrunner, chief of the RSHA, disapproved of me, and he did not even receive me. Kaltehbrunner said at the time, and told my superior in Athens, Schimana who was in Athens, "Blume has supported the Greek policy, and not the German policy. He can not obey. I shall transfer him to the Reich Ministry of Finance," but this never actually happened. In any case, temporarily, as in 1941 and 1942, I was sent from there to a position in the RSHA, and paid by them, and in the Fall of 1944 the office chief of Office -I appointed me to assist in the customs supervision of the which Ministry of Finance, in the Security Police. My special subject was personnel transfers. Before completing this task in Marcy 1945, I was transferred to Blankenburg in Thuringia, in order to deal with vim censorship of the Wehrmacht there, and to transfer it into the Security Police. There my professional career ended, because the American troops approached.
I did military service for a short while, and on 8 May 1945 I was taken into American captivity in Austria. second main section of your examination, namely, your activity during the -approximately-seven weeks in the Rest. I intend to sub-divide this into three parts. First of all, I shell question you concerning the time during those seven weeks. After that I shall question you in particular concerning some documents, in which the prosecution charges you with certain things. Finally I shall ask you about your views at the time. whether the Fuehrer's Decree concerning the executions was right or wrong, and when conclusion you drew owing to your opinion at the time. Witness, you already mentioned that in June 1941 for about eight days before the Russian campaign, you were sent to Pretsch on the Elba River. This was, as you were told, at the time for a temporary assignment in the Security Police. Please give me all details you remember? purpose of this assignment was not known to me. After arriving in Pretsch I found several leaders who held approximately the same rank as I did; the men and sub-leaders who had been in Pretsch and Duben for several weeks, I found doing military training. They had been formed into companies. The conclusion I drew from this was that it was to assist the Security Police during military enterprise. In the discussions, presumptions were mentioned concerning England or Russia. A few days before the Russian Campaign, suddenly SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Streckenbach, of Office-I of the RSHA appeared in Pretsch, and he told the leaders who were gathered there most of them late because the first leaders of the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatz and Senderkommandos - that we were going to attack Russia.
He announced the intentions of the Security Police task, and in particular the division in which the Einsatzgruppen and kommandos were formed, and, he explained our relations to the Army. During this speech he announced to us the Fuehrer Decree, which said that during the Russian Campaign the Eastern Jews in Soviet Russia were to be exterminated. These persons who were there were speechless about this decree. Then came the reaction. Those who held the same rank as Streckenbach called out loudly, and other people present in spite of the usual strict discipline were very restless, and remarks were made to the effect: how can this be done, it is impossible and can not be carried out. Steckenbach answered these remarks and said he could understand our reaction of disapproval, but nothing could be done here because it was a Fuehrer Decree, and this had to be complied with. For the Fuehrer Decree he gave the following reasons: First, a necessity of securing the conquered territory against partisan activity which was to be expected, as it was to be expected that Eastern Jews were the natural helpers of the partisans, and, secondly, that the Eastern Jews were the intellectual supporters of World Bolshevism, and this total destruction was necessary, in order to make the victory over Soviet Russia final. Finally Streckenbach pointed out the fact that for our activity in the Einsatzgruppen, military law applied, and he ordered us to instruct the men in our kommandos that each individual was under military law with all its consequences, in case they disobeyed an order; courtmartial or SSPolice Courts proceedings would be used, and possibly death sentences would be pronounced. Apart from that Streckenbach said expressly, that the Fuehrer had instructed the Army kommandos that the fight against Bolshevism could not be conducted under European laws and rules, it was not war in the usual sense, but a worldwide political ideological difference, thus, political police were appointed for the prospective war of the West, and had officially been built into an offical military plan, and that cooperation between the Army and the Security Police would have to be carried out.
DR. LUMMERT: Your Honor, I would like here to submit Document Blume No. 1, before I continue to ask the witness questions. In order to explain this, I want to mention that disobedience against the State orders under the dictatorship of Hitler was a crime punishable by death. No matter whether the disobedience concerned military or civilian subjects. This fact is well known. I believe that this Tribunal might like me to compile the laws which applied to the police at the time, and, therefore, also for the defendant Blume. I only chose the most important laws and decrees for this, and ask the Tribunal to take official notice of this. Your Honor, to make the same easier to identify, I submit this as Blume Document No, 1. The document is in Document Book No. 1, pages 1 to 13. It contains first of all a few chapters on the military penal code, which concerns in particular desertion, disobedience, and refusal of obedience, which the Tribunal will find that for all of these offenses in case of war, part I, the death sentence can be passed as well as also other sentences. The second law is the so-called special war decree, which was published at the beginning of the war. It contains sentences which are stricter and concern in particular the subject of undermining the military strength.
MR. FERENCZ: Your Honor, please, I must object at this time to any detailed analysis of law in this case. These are matters which will probably be raised In the closing argument and have no place at this time.
THE TRIBUNAL: I do believe, Dr. Lummert, that we will get into some difficulties if we begin to argue on the law while the witness is on the stand. Now if there is any specific question you desired to put to the witness on the law with which he is personally familiar, that, of course, is entirely in order, but to address an argument of law to the Tribunal in the midst of an examination of a witness might be a little difficult to follow in accordance with the procedure.
Another thing is that it places a rather unusual burden on the interpreters to translate extemperaneously a rather involved legal situation.
DR. LUMMERT: Your Honor, I understand this to the effect that the introduction of Document 1, is not objected to, and that only the explanation on this document should take place at a later time?
THE PRESIDENT: Of course there is entirely no objection to the introduction of the document book. On the contrary we recommend the introduction of the book and congratulate you on the speed with which you prepared and submitted it to the Tribunal. He especially want to thank you for the trouble you went to to have it translated on your own motion and through your own energies. The only point we make at this time, Dr. Lummert, is that to present a legal argument while a witness is on the stand is just slightly contrary to the usual procedure in a trial.
DR. LUMMERT: May I hand you Document Book No, I, and I ask the Court to take judicial notice of it.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and do you wish to introduce it as your exhibit?
DR, LUMMERT: It is only an exhibit for identification only.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well. The Secretary-General will note that exhibit.
DR. LUMMERT: I will then take the liberty to discuss the contents of this document after the examination of the Defendant Blume. I now continue with the examination of the Defendant Blume. BY DR. LUMMERT: Streckenbach in Pretsch. I now ask you, what were your personal considerations and feelings when Grupperfuehrer Streckenbach announced this Fuehrer Decree during his speech in Pretsch?
A. I remember very well that already during Streckenbach's speech a whole number of various questions and thoughts and feelings arose. I immediately realized that this was an unusual, even an immense decree, but I presumed at the time that the leadership of the German people and the German Reich had carefully considered this decree and had approved it.
I thought of all the authorities who obviously requested that this decree should be fulfilled, namely, the Fuehrer himself, the Reich Government, the supreme command of the Army, the Reichsfuehrer-SS and the Chief of the Security Police and the SD. At the time it did not even occur to me that all those authorities only had to obey one dictator in this, but for me at the time it was natural that such an important decree had been discussed by all high authorities. Also for me, like for all Germans an order was an ethical conception, and I was convinced that such a law soldiers had to obey unconditionally. the particular importance of the Fuehrer Decree which was law at the time in Germany. For that reason I realized the consequences of not obeying such an order according to the military code and to other codes. I emphasize here that the entire German police since the beginning of the war was considered to be carrying out a special commitment. A special decree had been issued, which my defense counsel has mentioned previously, and the competent regulations of increased severity for the police were also applied for the military forces. civilized people could carry out such an extermination order, and I felt particularly concerned that we who were present at the time all of us were intellectually inclined - had to be given such an order. The execution of such an order seemed impossible to me, although I thought of it that Soviet Russia itself would disregard the usual laws of civilied states neither for their own nationals nor for others. In particular I knew that Soviet Russia had not participated in the Geneva Convention. Added to this was the fact that during my work of many years as Chief of the State Police Offices I had read the interrogations of all people who had returned from Russia, and according to instructions had reported about all that happened; the State Police officers interrogated them about this.
These interrogations confirmed to me that in Soviet Russia no European standards were applied, and that for Europe the Communist problem, was problem No, 1. I know that in Soviet Russia during the last twenty years many millions of people had been killed in order to materialize the ideology of Communism. I also knew that the Jews in Soviet Russia were one of the main supports of the Soviet dictatorship and the intellectual bearers of the idea of Bolshevism. In short, my thoughts and feelings were in a turmoil.
Q. What did you do, owing to these contradictions in your feelings and your thoughts?
A. I looked for a way out. After some consideration I thought I would be able to find this if I was not put in charge of a Hauptkommando, a main kommando in the rear Army territory but rather was put in charge of a small advance kommando, a Vorkommando, with the fighting units. I hoped to be able to remain with the fighting forces and through that restrict my activity and the activity of the subordinate men to combating partisans, whom we expected, and to Security Police assignments, and particularly securing documents of Soviet authorities, in particular of the N.K.W.D., and the study of the general and political situation of the newly occupied territories and the reporting of the findings.
That same day I went to Streckenbach for the reason. I knew him very well because he had been my superior in Berlin. I could fully trust him and I asked him, would he give me a small Vorkommando, an advance kommando, although owning to my rank I could have asked for a larger kommando. I told him as the reason quite openly that I did not want to have anything to do with mass executions and that I hoped as the leader of a Vorkommando to be restricted only to working in security tasks. Streckenbach replied to me that he could fully understand my views and agreed to give me a Vorkommando, Sonderkommando 7a.
Q. Witness, apart from this discussion with Streckenbach, did you get any other instructions about the Russian assignment?
A. Yes, the future leaders for the Einsatzgruppen, for the Einsatz and Sonderkommandos, including myself, the following day or the day after the next, were called to Berlin, to the Prince Albert Palast, the headquarters of the RSHA. There Heydrich made a speech. He took for granted that we knew about the Fuehrer order and based his speech on this and therefore talked about our relation with the Army. He informed us that strict agreements had to be made with the Army chiefs about our assignment and our cooperation and had already been agreed upon and that our tactical orders concerning the advance and so forth, we would receive from the superior Army officers. He also mentioned as Streckenbach had done, that the Fuehrer had ordered that for the expected war in the East no European rules would be applied, but in this fight Germany would have to use the same ruthless methods as Bolshevism had always used in order to achieve its aims. Heydrich was very serious and said that the Security Police in the assignment in the East would have to make a test and prove themselves in their soldierly attitude. In the East, partisan fightings of serious proportions in the roar territory which had been captured, were expected. The rear territory according to the will of the Fuehrer, had to be secured against partisans and their assistants by all means. As was imminent danger Heydrich described at the time, the entirety of the Eastern Jews.
Q. What happened after that speech by Heydrich?
AAfter that we traveled to Pretsch or a locality near Pretsch. We returned, if I remember correctly, to Schmiedeberg. There Heydrich appeared shortly before we left in order to supervise the march of the personnel of the kommandos. namely the speech by Streckenbach and the speech by Heydrich, get any special detailed instructions about the carrying out of the Fuehrer decree? at the time it was left open how it should be carried out in detail. In any case, I myself did not quite know how it would be done. I was moved by the fact that without instructions we were left to our own fate. This moved me almost as much as the actual Fuehrer decree. I could only calm myself a little because I had been given Sonderkommando 7a, and I hoped that because of this I could avoid carrying out the Fuehrer decree because of the immediate connection which I expected with the fighting units. I still want to mention that in Pretsch or Schmiedeberg I heard two other speeches. One, as far as I remember, concerned the Communist World organization, Comintern. The other lecture concerned general measures about the political, economical and military conditions in Soviet Russia, and was as far as I remember given by a younger member of the Ministry of the Exterior. other, from the very beginning, to avoid carrying out security assignments in the East?
A No. As I have already stated, without my knowledge and without my assistance, and without knowing what was concerned, I had been transferred from Berlin to Pretsch. After the fuehrer decree had been announced, owing to the strict discipline in the RSHA and in the entire German police, it was quite impossible, from the very beginning, to ask to be released from participation in the assignment which had been ordered. The written orders by Heydrich existed for all of us.
A special penal code which applied for the police during the war I have already mentioned as well. Any pretense, pretending to be ill or something of that nature, I would not have considered worthy of myself. That never occurred to me. My immediate and almost instinctive reaction was, therefore, only the attempt to avoid myself, and to protect the men under my supervision, from having to carry out this Fuehrer decree and to protect them from a collision.
DR. LUMMERT: Your Honor, I would now like to introduce Document Flume No. 4 as evidence. I had the intention, in order to give a complete picture, to ask the witness Blume also about the organization and the personalities in his Sonderkommando 7a, and about a number of other smaller points, but since mostly they are technical details, it probably is not necessary that they all appear in the record. I, therefore, choose to use an affidavit by the Defendant Blume himself about this, and I ask for permission to Introduce it as Blume document No. 4. The affidavit is in Document Bock I, pages 15 to 29. On page 13 there is on index. The first part of the affidavit concerns the personalities in the Sonderkommando 7a, the ranks, the organization, the most important Security Police tasks, the reporting, the medical supplies, and the organization of the group staff of Einsatzgruppe B which was superior to Sonderkommando 7a. with explanations of the channel of command. The third part finally contains a map - that is page 28 of Document Book I - and this map, the record of the march which Sonderkomnando 7a followed in Russia during the time when Defendant Blume was in charge of Sonderkommando 7a. More important cities are mentioned in this map. Also a time plan, a chart for the most important localities is given. I have a few other copies of this, photostatic copies of this sketch, and I ask for permission to give them to the Tribunal in order to make things easier.
BY DR. LUMMERT: Document Blume No. 4, in front of you and whether you know the contents of it?
Q Can you confirm the contents of this affidavit? tells me. berg toward the Best, and where did you go to first? East via Posen, Warsaw, East Prussia, to the Soviet-German demarkation line at the time, and our first point which we were ordered to reach by the Ninth Army was the city of Wilna. I arrived in Wilna with my Sonderkommando with our tracks. We were fully motorized. We arrived there on 30 June 1941 late in the evening.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lummert, since the witness is now about to relate the events of a certain campaign or itinerary, perhaps we night begin with that immediately after the recess.
DR. LUMMERT: Yes, sir, certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. II-A, Case No. IX.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: If the Tribunal please, yesterday afternoon Dr. Heim, defense counsel for Blobel, objected against Document No-4498B, which is a statement of Rudolf Hoess. The prosecution explained that this statement is an unsworn statement of said Rudolf Hoess and that prosecution has received a certificate verifying the fact that this statement could not be made by Hoess under oath, as he was at that time under indictment and the rules of evidence of Poland do not permit the administering of an oath to such a person. If the Tribunal please, I would like to submit to the Tribunal now this certificate. I however found out that Dr. Heim is not present. Dr. Lummert will be kind enough to hand a copy of this certificate to Dr. Heim.
THE PRESIDENT: The certificate outlines what you have just told the Tribunal?
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL: Very well. It will be admitted.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: May I hand it to you now, Your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: Thank you. If Your Honors please, I do not think it necessary that I read this certificate into the record, out if the Tribunal so desires, I certainly shall do so.
THE PRESIDENT: Will it have an exhibit number?
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: If the Tribunal desires that I mark it as an exhibit, I will do so. It is a certificate which belongs to an exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: But I do think it is not necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Soeight makes this very good suggestion, that you give it the same exhibit number as the exhibit to which it referrs, or, if you wish to add the letter A to that exhibit number.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: I do know, Your Honor, that it is in Document Book III-C on page 17, but as I haven't got the document book with me, I would respectfully suggest if the bench would -
THE PRESIDENT: He would ask the Secretary General to supply that number and see that it is affixed to the certificate which you have presented. It appears that the number is 134, Exhibit 134.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: So Document No-4498C will then be Exhibit 134a.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. LUMMERT (Attorney for the defendant Blume): Your Honor, I am very glad to give Dr. Heim a copy of this affidavit of the witness Hoess. I would merely like to reserve for him the right to raise any kind of objection against this document later.
THE PRESIDENT: That request will be granted in behalf of Dr. Heim.
DR. LUMMERT: May I now continue with the direct examination of the Defendant Blume?
THE PRESIDENT: You may. BY DR. LUMMERT (Attorney for the Defendant Blume): beginning of your advance into Russia and you had testified that you arrived in Wilna on the 30th of June, 1941 late in the evening. May I now ask you what was the activity of your Special Kommando 7-A in Wilna?
Court No. II-A, Case No. IX.
A. Late in the evening when we arrived we put out vehicles on a market square in Wilna. I sent a small detachment immediately to the NKWD building in order to safeguard whatever was in that building. On the following morning, that is to say, the 1st of July, I moved my entire kommando into the NKWD building. Two of my groups searched the building and sorted out and translated the documentary material which was left there. The third group I sent into the city in order to gather information from Lithuanian and Polish leading circles, and in order to establish contact with officers and soldiers of the German army. After I had gathered general information I went to the town commandant and discussed the situation with him; especially, I recommended to him to restrain himself in the setting up of national Lithuanian combat commands since there were strong differences between the Lithuanian and the Polish population. Vilna had always been an object of dispute between the Poles and the Lithuanians. And it was still uncertain what attitude the German leadership would assume towards the Lithuanian ambition of independence. Furthermore, I was thinking that the army command would eventually intend to let me participate with the last detachment of the fighting troops in its advance. This would have conflicted with my intentions about avoiding the execution of the Fuehrer order about the mass executions by a stay in the front line. Therefore, on the same day on which I had spoken with the town commandant I went to the G-2 of the staff of Army Command 9, who was superior to me. The latter showed no understanding for my desire to say immediately with the combat troops. He pointed to the impediments to the troop movements caused by long columns since my special kommando always had 25 to 30 vehicles of various types. Furthermore, he pointed out that the forests were hiding many soviet troops with whom we could not cope, and he refused my request to give me an order to advance with the fighting troops.
After I returned from this conference I made out a teletype to Einsategruppe 7-b -at that time it was still called C -- and in this message I informed them about the fact that I had been prohibited from advancing with the army. I also reported to them that there were armed national Lithuanian partisan bands who had already become active before the German troops came in, and that they had shot, summarily, Communists as well as Jews who has supported these Communists. All this was on the 1st of July. On the next day, the 2nd of July, I heard that a kommando of Einsatzgruppe 9 had also made its appearance in Wilma. At the same time I heard that Minsk had been captured by German troops. In my effort to accomplish my plan of advancing with the combat troops I gave my men orders against the directives of the G-2 to advance in the direction of Minsk on the next morning. On the 2nd of July we immediately began to prepare this advance. I reported the fact of my advance from Wilma toward Minsk to Nebe on the 2nd of July.
Q. Witness, what happened then?
A. Early in the morning of the 3d of July we left Wilna. The road between Wilna and Minsk made a good impression, good European impression, and was not destroyed. Out vehicles kept their prescribed distance because of air attacks. The tempo was set by the slowest truck. We did not take any rest, and therefore we arrived in Minsk on the same day, but very late at night, after it had become dark. The city of Minsk had not been cleaned of snipers. Units of the army gave us a place near the theater, where we awaited the next morning. This, then, was the 4th of July 1941. On this day I immediately occupied the most important building of the Soviet authorities, especially the big house of the Soviets with its two to three hundred rooms.
It was completely undestroyed and contained most of its materials, especially documents and libraries. My three detachments had their hands full of work in order to safeguard this material, and also, to find a scientific institute in the city to safeguard their material, etc.
Q. Were the men of your special kommando 7-a in Minsk exclusively occupied with the safeguarding of material, or did they do anything else?
A. The men not suitable for safeguarding this material were ordered by me to go with the drivers to see that each inefficient equipment was completed, and to replace missing equipment from the military material which was lying around in the vicinity. Thus we received a field kitchen, trailers for out trucks, and tents.
Q. What else is noteworthy about your stay in Minsk?
A. On the 4th of July, in the evening, a part of Special Kommando 7-b also appeared in Minsk. On the 5th of July, early in the morning, I was ordered to report to G-2 of Army Command 9, who received, me very cooley and explained to me that the Chief of Staff wished, to speak with me. After I reported to the Chief of Staff he called me on the carpet because of my independent advance to Minsk. He spoke of lack of discipline and disobedience. I told him in a quiet manner the reasons for my conduct which was against orders. I pointed to the fact that as was well known the Soviets burned their cities when they evacuated them, and that we could only find material then if we would advance with the combat troops. I further pointed out that the soldiers were accustomed to destroy the documents in official buildings when they went through them, and that for this reason we would have to get there immediately with the fighting troops.
Finally, I told him about sucesses in the case of Minsk. During this conversation I managed to gain the sympathy of the Chief of Staff, and his consent, that in the future he would give me orders to advance in time, so that I would get to the important places with the fighting troops. The G-2 was called in, and received his directives accordingly. Furthermore, my Special Kommando 7-a had their hands full with sorting out the material on the 5th and 6th of July in Minsk.
Q. Witness, you are charged with liquidations in Minsk. What do you have to comment on this?
A. On the evening of the 5th of July, to my great surprise Nebe suddenly appeared in Minsk. On the next day his staff followed him, that is, the Staff of Einsatzgruppe B. Nebe already called me on the carpet on the evening of his arrival in Minsk because of my independent action. But I was able to quieten him down by pointing to the success of my conference with the Chief of Staff of the Army Command 9. On the following morning, that is to say, the 6th of July, I received an order from Army Command 9, first to advance from Minsk in the direction of Polosk, which was the next object of the operations of the troops; and second, to advance in the direction of the Witebsk as soon as that city was taken. In that military operation it was a matter of the attack of the Stalin Line which was considered as the last Military fortress before Moscow. I immediately made the necessary preparations for my advance for the next day, that is, the 7th of July. I say Nebe on the afternoon of the 6th of July. I gave him a lengthy report about our findings and information in the house of the Soviets in Minsk. He was very much satisfied by this, out he did tell me very definitely after that, that he wanted to know why my Special Kommando did not attack according to the Fuehrer order so far, and why it had not undertaken executions of Jews.
I tried to excuse my inactivity in this field by giving him practical reasons, for I could not discuss the Fuehrer order itself with Nebe, who was my superior and who demanded the execution of this order. I therefore pointed out to him that measures of my advance kommando would only cause the Jews to flee, and to make them thus join the partisans. Nebe did not see my point of view. He said it was impossible that he would mention the garrison of a kommando in a city in his reports without at the same time reporting about executions of Jews. They expected him, in Berlin, to show activity in this respect, and he would also have to demand that from me.
Also, for temporary actions on the part of my advance kommando reasons would have to be found. He then pointed out that the Jews had set their houses in Minsk on fire when the local combat commander had told them to leave their houses to make them available to White Russians who no longer had homes. Nebe had seen these fires on the evening of his arrival, that is, the night before. This, he said to me, he an excellent reason for a reprisal action. He then asked me who my executive officer was. I answered him that in my special kommando I had formed three detachments. Each of these detachments included men from all branches of the security police. I the refore had not formed a special executive detachment and I did not need such. Nebe now explained to me that he wished, and he ordered, that before I left Minsk a Jewish execution were to take place, namely, as reprisal for the burning of those houses. I told him, therefore, that the officers of two detachments of those three detachments of my special kommando were still young and somewhat immature men who had not even received a military training, and who therefore were not suitable to carry out such an execution. The only officer who was militarily trained was the commanding officer of the third detachment, Obersturmfuehrer Voltis, who personally was a hard soldierly character. Since Nebe clearly realized my basic revulsion against such an execution he left me out of it and told me to get Voltis. This happened. In my presence Nebe gave Voltis the order to proceed with a reprisal action against the Jews on the next morning before leaving Minsk, and to start preparations for that immediately; especially, to set up the execution kommando. He ordered me to convince myself that this order be executed, and to report to him on the next morning that it had been carried out.