A special penal code which applied for the police during the war I have already mentioned as well. Any pretense, pretending to be ill or something of that nature, I would not have considered worthy of myself. That never occurred to me. My immediate and almost instinctive reaction was, therefore, only the attempt to avoid myself, and to protect the men under my supervision, from having to carry out this Fuehrer decree and to protect them from a collision.
DR. LUMMERT: Your Honor, I would now like to introduce Document Flume No. 4 as evidence. I had the intention, in order to give a complete picture, to ask the witness Blume also about the organization and the personalities in his Sonderkommando 7a, and about a number of other smaller points, but since mostly they are technical details, it probably is not necessary that they all appear in the record. I, therefore, choose to use an affidavit by the Defendant Blume himself about this, and I ask for permission to Introduce it as Blume document No. 4. The affidavit is in Document Bock I, pages 15 to 29. On page 13 there is on index. The first part of the affidavit concerns the personalities in the Sonderkommando 7a, the ranks, the organization, the most important Security Police tasks, the reporting, the medical supplies, and the organization of the group staff of Einsatzgruppe B which was superior to Sonderkommando 7a. with explanations of the channel of command. The third part finally contains a map - that is page 28 of Document Book I - and this map, the record of the march which Sonderkomnando 7a followed in Russia during the time when Defendant Blume was in charge of Sonderkommando 7a. More important cities are mentioned in this map. Also a time plan, a chart for the most important localities is given. I have a few other copies of this, photostatic copies of this sketch, and I ask for permission to give them to the Tribunal in order to make things easier.
BY DR. LUMMERT: Document Blume No. 4, in front of you and whether you know the contents of it?
Q Can you confirm the contents of this affidavit? tells me. berg toward the Best, and where did you go to first? East via Posen, Warsaw, East Prussia, to the Soviet-German demarkation line at the time, and our first point which we were ordered to reach by the Ninth Army was the city of Wilna. I arrived in Wilna with my Sonderkommando with our tracks. We were fully motorized. We arrived there on 30 June 1941 late in the evening.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lummert, since the witness is now about to relate the events of a certain campaign or itinerary, perhaps we night begin with that immediately after the recess.
DR. LUMMERT: Yes, sir, certainly.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess for fifteen minutes.
(A recess was taken.)
Court No. II-A, Case No. IX.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: If the Tribunal please, yesterday afternoon Dr. Heim, defense counsel for Blobel, objected against Document No-4498B, which is a statement of Rudolf Hoess. The prosecution explained that this statement is an unsworn statement of said Rudolf Hoess and that prosecution has received a certificate verifying the fact that this statement could not be made by Hoess under oath, as he was at that time under indictment and the rules of evidence of Poland do not permit the administering of an oath to such a person. If the Tribunal please, I would like to submit to the Tribunal now this certificate. I however found out that Dr. Heim is not present. Dr. Lummert will be kind enough to hand a copy of this certificate to Dr. Heim.
THE PRESIDENT: The certificate outlines what you have just told the Tribunal?
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: Yes.
THE TRIBUNAL: Very well. It will be admitted.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: May I hand it to you now, Your Honor?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: Thank you. If Your Honors please, I do not think it necessary that I read this certificate into the record, out if the Tribunal so desires, I certainly shall do so.
THE PRESIDENT: Will it have an exhibit number?
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: If the Tribunal desires that I mark it as an exhibit, I will do so. It is a certificate which belongs to an exhibit.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: But I do think it is not necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: Judge Soeight makes this very good suggestion, that you give it the same exhibit number as the exhibit to which it referrs, or, if you wish to add the letter A to that exhibit number.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: I do know, Your Honor, that it is in Document Book III-C on page 17, but as I haven't got the document book with me, I would respectfully suggest if the bench would -
THE PRESIDENT: He would ask the Secretary General to supply that number and see that it is affixed to the certificate which you have presented. It appears that the number is 134, Exhibit 134.
MR. HORLICK HOCHWALD: So Document No-4498C will then be Exhibit 134a.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. LUMMERT (Attorney for the defendant Blume): Your Honor, I am very glad to give Dr. Heim a copy of this affidavit of the witness Hoess. I would merely like to reserve for him the right to raise any kind of objection against this document later.
THE PRESIDENT: That request will be granted in behalf of Dr. Heim.
DR. LUMMERT: May I now continue with the direct examination of the Defendant Blume?
THE PRESIDENT: You may. BY DR. LUMMERT (Attorney for the Defendant Blume): beginning of your advance into Russia and you had testified that you arrived in Wilna on the 30th of June, 1941 late in the evening. May I now ask you what was the activity of your Special Kommando 7-A in Wilna?
Court No. II-A, Case No. IX.
A. Late in the evening when we arrived we put out vehicles on a market square in Wilna. I sent a small detachment immediately to the NKWD building in order to safeguard whatever was in that building. On the following morning, that is to say, the 1st of July, I moved my entire kommando into the NKWD building. Two of my groups searched the building and sorted out and translated the documentary material which was left there. The third group I sent into the city in order to gather information from Lithuanian and Polish leading circles, and in order to establish contact with officers and soldiers of the German army. After I had gathered general information I went to the town commandant and discussed the situation with him; especially, I recommended to him to restrain himself in the setting up of national Lithuanian combat commands since there were strong differences between the Lithuanian and the Polish population. Vilna had always been an object of dispute between the Poles and the Lithuanians. And it was still uncertain what attitude the German leadership would assume towards the Lithuanian ambition of independence. Furthermore, I was thinking that the army command would eventually intend to let me participate with the last detachment of the fighting troops in its advance. This would have conflicted with my intentions about avoiding the execution of the Fuehrer order about the mass executions by a stay in the front line. Therefore, on the same day on which I had spoken with the town commandant I went to the G-2 of the staff of Army Command 9, who was superior to me. The latter showed no understanding for my desire to say immediately with the combat troops. He pointed to the impediments to the troop movements caused by long columns since my special kommando always had 25 to 30 vehicles of various types. Furthermore, he pointed out that the forests were hiding many soviet troops with whom we could not cope, and he refused my request to give me an order to advance with the fighting troops.
After I returned from this conference I made out a teletype to Einsategruppe 7-b -at that time it was still called C -- and in this message I informed them about the fact that I had been prohibited from advancing with the army. I also reported to them that there were armed national Lithuanian partisan bands who had already become active before the German troops came in, and that they had shot, summarily, Communists as well as Jews who has supported these Communists. All this was on the 1st of July. On the next day, the 2nd of July, I heard that a kommando of Einsatzgruppe 9 had also made its appearance in Wilma. At the same time I heard that Minsk had been captured by German troops. In my effort to accomplish my plan of advancing with the combat troops I gave my men orders against the directives of the G-2 to advance in the direction of Minsk on the next morning. On the 2nd of July we immediately began to prepare this advance. I reported the fact of my advance from Wilma toward Minsk to Nebe on the 2nd of July.
Q. Witness, what happened then?
A. Early in the morning of the 3d of July we left Wilna. The road between Wilna and Minsk made a good impression, good European impression, and was not destroyed. Out vehicles kept their prescribed distance because of air attacks. The tempo was set by the slowest truck. We did not take any rest, and therefore we arrived in Minsk on the same day, but very late at night, after it had become dark. The city of Minsk had not been cleaned of snipers. Units of the army gave us a place near the theater, where we awaited the next morning. This, then, was the 4th of July 1941. On this day I immediately occupied the most important building of the Soviet authorities, especially the big house of the Soviets with its two to three hundred rooms.
It was completely undestroyed and contained most of its materials, especially documents and libraries. My three detachments had their hands full of work in order to safeguard this material, and also, to find a scientific institute in the city to safeguard their material, etc.
Q. Were the men of your special kommando 7-a in Minsk exclusively occupied with the safeguarding of material, or did they do anything else?
A. The men not suitable for safeguarding this material were ordered by me to go with the drivers to see that each inefficient equipment was completed, and to replace missing equipment from the military material which was lying around in the vicinity. Thus we received a field kitchen, trailers for out trucks, and tents.
Q. What else is noteworthy about your stay in Minsk?
A. On the 4th of July, in the evening, a part of Special Kommando 7-b also appeared in Minsk. On the 5th of July, early in the morning, I was ordered to report to G-2 of Army Command 9, who received, me very cooley and explained to me that the Chief of Staff wished, to speak with me. After I reported to the Chief of Staff he called me on the carpet because of my independent advance to Minsk. He spoke of lack of discipline and disobedience. I told him in a quiet manner the reasons for my conduct which was against orders. I pointed to the fact that as was well known the Soviets burned their cities when they evacuated them, and that we could only find material then if we would advance with the combat troops. I further pointed out that the soldiers were accustomed to destroy the documents in official buildings when they went through them, and that for this reason we would have to get there immediately with the fighting troops.
Finally, I told him about sucesses in the case of Minsk. During this conversation I managed to gain the sympathy of the Chief of Staff, and his consent, that in the future he would give me orders to advance in time, so that I would get to the important places with the fighting troops. The G-2 was called in, and received his directives accordingly. Furthermore, my Special Kommando 7-a had their hands full with sorting out the material on the 5th and 6th of July in Minsk.
Q. Witness, you are charged with liquidations in Minsk. What do you have to comment on this?
A. On the evening of the 5th of July, to my great surprise Nebe suddenly appeared in Minsk. On the next day his staff followed him, that is, the Staff of Einsatzgruppe B. Nebe already called me on the carpet on the evening of his arrival in Minsk because of my independent action. But I was able to quieten him down by pointing to the success of my conference with the Chief of Staff of the Army Command 9. On the following morning, that is to say, the 6th of July, I received an order from Army Command 9, first to advance from Minsk in the direction of Polosk, which was the next object of the operations of the troops; and second, to advance in the direction of the Witebsk as soon as that city was taken. In that military operation it was a matter of the attack of the Stalin Line which was considered as the last Military fortress before Moscow. I immediately made the necessary preparations for my advance for the next day, that is, the 7th of July. I say Nebe on the afternoon of the 6th of July. I gave him a lengthy report about our findings and information in the house of the Soviets in Minsk. He was very much satisfied by this, out he did tell me very definitely after that, that he wanted to know why my Special Kommando did not attack according to the Fuehrer order so far, and why it had not undertaken executions of Jews.
I tried to excuse my inactivity in this field by giving him practical reasons, for I could not discuss the Fuehrer order itself with Nebe, who was my superior and who demanded the execution of this order. I therefore pointed out to him that measures of my advance kommando would only cause the Jews to flee, and to make them thus join the partisans. Nebe did not see my point of view. He said it was impossible that he would mention the garrison of a kommando in a city in his reports without at the same time reporting about executions of Jews. They expected him, in Berlin, to show activity in this respect, and he would also have to demand that from me.
Also, for temporary actions on the part of my advance kommando reasons would have to be found. He then pointed out that the Jews had set their houses in Minsk on fire when the local combat commander had told them to leave their houses to make them available to White Russians who no longer had homes. Nebe had seen these fires on the evening of his arrival, that is, the night before. This, he said to me, he an excellent reason for a reprisal action. He then asked me who my executive officer was. I answered him that in my special kommando I had formed three detachments. Each of these detachments included men from all branches of the security police. I the refore had not formed a special executive detachment and I did not need such. Nebe now explained to me that he wished, and he ordered, that before I left Minsk a Jewish execution were to take place, namely, as reprisal for the burning of those houses. I told him, therefore, that the officers of two detachments of those three detachments of my special kommando were still young and somewhat immature men who had not even received a military training, and who therefore were not suitable to carry out such an execution. The only officer who was militarily trained was the commanding officer of the third detachment, Obersturmfuehrer Voltis, who personally was a hard soldierly character. Since Nebe clearly realized my basic revulsion against such an execution he left me out of it and told me to get Voltis. This happened. In my presence Nebe gave Voltis the order to proceed with a reprisal action against the Jews on the next morning before leaving Minsk, and to start preparations for that immediately; especially, to set up the execution kommando. He ordered me to convince myself that this order be executed, and to report to him on the next morning that it had been carried out.
After giving these orders he once more told Voltis about the necessity of such executions by pointing to the Fuehrer Order. He then again gave me, as well as Voltis, the basic order for the future to carry out such executions, for even an advance kommando could not exclude itself from such executions. Voltis and I then left Nebe. It was clear to me that I could not get around the order which Nebe directly had given to Voltis that as far as the reprisal actions are concerned only men could be considered, not women and children -- only able bodied men. Outside of that I did not bother for the preparation of this execution, for I was depressed that my hope had come to nothing -namely, that I might not be concerned with execution orders. Furthermore, I felt depressed because Voltis who was my inferior, had been given order directly and I resented it. Voltis carried out the executions ordered by Nebe on the next morning, that is, on the 7th of July. As far as I remember it lasted about one to one and one-half hours. How Voltis chose the men to be executed was, and is, unknown to me. I merely know because I was partly present at the execution that always ten men would be brought there to the execution place at a time with a truck from Minsk. There was a tank ditch. The ten men were put at that ditch and in a military manner were shot by rifles by the execution commando , which included about 40 men. Three men always shot at a victim because a part of the kommando was busy getting the people and blocking off the area. As I said, I was only partly present. No doctor was present because my special kommando did not have a doctor at all. But as far as I was present I convinced myself that the victims were dead. But any way, this was the job of the leader of the commando, Voltis.
The number of victims amounted to about fifty to sixty. I cannot give the exact number. I then told Nebe about the execution of the order as I had been ordered. At the same time I said good-bye to him because on the some day I was to advance in the direction of Polosk. victims in Minsk? kommando. The victims were buried in their things without having had anything taken away from them, that is, they were covered with earth by the men of the kommando. executions there? departure from Minsk, we tried to join the fighting troops directly. How many days we spent on the way towards Polosk I do not exactly remember. At any rate, the roads were partly very bad, and the vehicles had to proceed second gear almost constantly. When we had reached the fighting troops we were about two days in the front lines until the tanks finally passed through the city. I went into the city with my commando immediately, and even before the infantry. Still we arrived too late, for the streets had already been set on fire by the Communist arson units and the NKVD building too, was up in flames.
A (Continued) We were only able to enter for a moment on the first floor. This must have been between the 10th and 12th of July. We only spent one day in Polosk. I had the Ethnic Germans interrogated, whom we found among the Russian prisoners of war and had then asked about general conditions in the Soviet Union. We picked out two interpreters from among these ethnic Germans in Polosk. I did not prepare any executions nor did I carry any out. In order not to yet in a forced situation where I would have to undertake executions I proceeded on the next day in the direction of Vitebsk, which had been captured by the Germans on the 11 July. After my arrival in Vitobsk I wired a report to Nebe about the events in Polosk. In order to obviate his criticism about nonexecutions I emphasized that the city had been completely burned out and that the population was hardly there any more, and that was why I immediately proceeded, but this was somewhat exaggerated. In reality the conditions in Polosk were about the same as those in Minsk, that is to say, a considerable part of the population was, of course, still there, and certainly not all houses had been burned.
Q Witness, when did you arrive in Vitobsk? What general conditions did you find there and did you carry out any executions? commando in Vitobesk. At any rate we spent several days on the road between Polosk and Vitobsk. We probably arrived there about the 15th of July. The general conditions in Vitobsk were already somewhat orderly because the city had been in German hands since the 11th of July. I would have preferred just as I did in Polosk to advance very soon in the direction of Smolensk, but at that time during the advance of the 9th Army between Vitobsk and Smolensk we had been brought to a stop. The Ninth Army had advanced north of the Dnjepr and then waded ahead north of the Dnjepr to the smaller part of the city of Smolensk but could really not get near there, whereas the neighboring army advancing South of the Dnjepr already penetrated into the southern part of the city on the 16th of July.
Even after this, part of the city was still fought over in the following days. Therefore Army Command 9 did not give me permission and an order for the time being to proceed in my advance from Vitobsk. Therefore, in this interval in Vitobsk, I occupied Voltis,who was such an active man, with the forming of a Jewish Council registering and marking the Jews and drafting them for labor service with the army agencies. Furthermore, I kept my men busy with making out SD reports. I gave the order to solve the Jewish question in the white Ruthenian area. The number of Jews in Vitobsk was proportionally quite large. In all the White Ruthenian area about one and a half million Jews were living. We gathered material about the Jewish question with the cooperation of the Mayor of Vitobsk who was installed by us and with other members of the White Ruthenian intelligencia. I went over the entire material and made out a detailed report to Nebe. In this report I pointed out that an execution of Jews by small Einsatz commandos seemed impossible to me of execution. Instead, I suggested that the Jews be collected in ghettos and proposed that they wait there until the end of the war when they would then be re-settled. In this report I again made the attempt, which was not very hopeful, to point to the Fuehrer order in reference to it's impossibility of execution and to try to manage something in that respect. Furthermore, I thought I could find an escuse not to have to undertake executions in Vitobsk. Furthermore, from the situation reports which have become known to me in Nurnberg, I have seen that Nebe used this report of mine in his reports to Berlin.
Q Doesn't the fact that Nebe used your reports contradict his usual strict conduct about executions?
A No, even Nebe would have been glad to be rid of this order. Nevertheless, he continued his pressure on us, the pressure which was applied to him from Berlin.
The use of my report on the part of Nebe was for him either an almost hopeless attempt to achieve a change in the Fuehrer Order or - whatsis more probable - with this report he wanted to excuse the bad execution of the Fuehrer Order up to this date.
Q How did Nebe react towards you as a result of your report? executions. For until his report would have an effect perhaps up on top, a lot of time had to pass by, even considering that such a change might occur, and for this long a time he probably did not dare to remain inactive. At any rate, a short time after sending my report, I received a very severe message from Nebe in which he demanded a detailed report about Vitobsk, and especially about the execution of Jews. I considered it certain that it was just my report which induced him to send me this message, because probably in it he saw a renewed attempt on my part not to have to undertake the executions.
Q What did you do then? lity to evade the execution of this order. I therefore gave Voltis the order to prepare a Jewish action and limited the order exclusively to able-bodied men and I directed that a labor detachment was to be set up and its members were then to be shot. Voltis did not stick very closely to this order, for even before the action which had been ordered and without my knowledge he had a number of Jews shot in the streets in Vitobsk because they had refused to appear at work which had been ordered of them. Voltis in this connection acted on the basis of the order which Nebe had given to him in Minsk. When Voltis reported this execution to me 1 reported to Nebe about Vitobsk by telling him about and announcing the action which I had ordered in order to quiet him down. One or two days later in my presence the announced execution was carried out. As far as I remember about 80 able-bodied men were shot in the same manner as they had been shot in Minsk.
Voltis was the commanding officer of the execution commando. before or after the execution?
A No, this did not occur to me. The Jewish men when they were brought in were shot in their clothing and were then covered with earth by men of the commando. your own inner attitude which you had when you saw that execution in Vitobsk? ing and executing this execution, whereas I merely had to report to Nebe that the execution had been carried out. But in Vitobsk the case was different. Here I was myself under the immediate compulsion of an order on the part of Nebe, and this was because of this radio message. I myself gave Voltis that order to prepare and carry out this execution and differently from Minsk I attended the entire execution which lasted about two hours. By my presence I wanted to show the men of my execution commando that I would not ask of then any more than I would ask of myself. If I am now asked about my inner attitude which I then hold, I can only say that it was absolutely split. On the other hand there was the strict order of my superior about carrying out the Fuehrer Order and as a soldier I had to obey. On the other hand I considered the execution of this order cruel and humanly impossible. My very presence at this execution convinced me of this in a final manner. I still know that I wanted to make the situation easier for my men who were certainly moved by the same feelings. When ten men were shot there was always a pause until the next had been brought in. During these pauses I let my men sit down and rest and I joined them. I still know that I said exactly about the following words to them at that time: "As such it is no job for German men and soldiers to shoot defenseless people but the Fuehrer has ordered these shootings because he is convinced that these men otherwise would shoot at us as partisans or would shoot at our comrades and our women and children were also to be protected if we undertake this executions.
This we would have to remember when we carried out this order." Furthermore, I tried by talking about neutral subjects to make the difficult spiritual situation easier and to overcome it. As for myself personally I did not know any way out of this repulsive situation. Had I refused to carry out the order of Nebe it was clear that I would be put before a Court Martial and would be sentenced to death because of disobedience since it was a specific Fuehrer order. A false report did not occur to me. I would have considered it unworthy of myself. Apart from this my personal altitude about giving a false report, it would- have been discovered very soon and it would have brought the same results as an open refusal to obey, namely, my sentence to death. BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Well, witness, you gave us two explanations there. Now on which one do you depend. You said first that you did not contemplate a false report because that was unworthy of you and clashed with your principles, then you say you did not give a false report because they would have discovered it anyway and then you would still be in the same position as you were before. How, these two do not coincide. Which one do you give us as the real reason? which one of those two thoughts dominated at the time, but they were both very close and both faced me barring a way out.
Q But those two reasons can't be reconciled. It is like a person who must decide whether to steal a hundred dollars or not and this is the conflict in his mind: If I steal this money I am being dishonest and I would not be true to myself. It is not correct, it is not moral, that is one reason, and then for the second reason I may get caught and they might send me to jail and if we take the second reason that completely eliminates the first reason because he doesn't consider it upon principle or morality at all.
Q I would assume that already the feeling that a false: report was unworthy of me induced me not to take such a way out. BY DR. LUMMERT: the execution in Vitobsk I ask you to continue. BY THE PRESIDENT: Pardon me, Judge Dixon seems to recall that the witness stated he sent a false report on the fire in Polosk. Did you send a false report on the fire in that town? not a false report. I think my soldierly conscience was not violated very seriously here if I changed the fact that the city was burned and the population had left and colored it in such a form that in it I found an escuse for my conduct.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. LUMMERT: Hay I say something? As far as I remember the witness said that the report was somewhat exaggerated. shocking. When I came back to my office I was seized by stomach cramps and I had to vomit. I , therefore, renewed my earnest decision to avoid a further such situation with all possible means. In this I did succeed with my being recalled which happened about one month later. Vitobsk is the first and last case of an execution which was ordered by me and carried out. It probably took place on the 19th of 20th of July 1941. The total number of men shot in Vitobsk by my special commando amounted to about 100, as far as I recollect. This includes the 20 which were shot by Voltis who had refused to appear for work and the 80 who were shot during the execution about one or two days later.
your special commando 7a then? Commando 9 had arrived in Vitobsk. At the same time I received the news from Army Command 9 that the advance through the railroad station area of Smolensk north of the Dnjepr was close at hand. Therefore, I left Vitobask and with my special commando I was in the artillery field position of the troops for several days. Then with the head of the company we advanced into the northern part of Smolensk where we immediately started to interrogate prisoners as soon as the fighting had stopped. I remained in Smolensk only one dry . Smolensk was then under heavy artillery bombardment, and since the public buildings were located in the southern pert of the city and therefore belonged to the area, of Special Commando 7b I was not competent there. I, therefore, limited myself to report to Nebe by radio that I had only undertaken temporary security measures. Later I heard that on the same day men of the advance commando Moscow were already in Smolensk. I now received from Army Commando 9 a mission for partisan counter-intelligence for the area Northwest of Smolensk and I stationed my commandos at a large lake, at Lake Loswitha, at a former estate. On order of the Army Commando 9. a short time later, I had to send a sub-commando to Welish where strong partisan units had set themselves up in the vicinity. I gave this independent mission of gathering intelligence about partisans to Hauptsturmfuehrer Voltis, the only trained officer of my commando.
DR. LUMMERT: Your Honor, I think this would be an excellent time to recess.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will be in recess until 1:45.
(The Tribunal adjourned for the noon recess).
(The Hearing reconvened at 1345 hours, 31 October 1947.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. LUMMERT (Attorney for the Defendant Blobel): Your Honor, I would like to continue with my examination of the Defendant Blume. Sonderkommando 7-a advanced and went to Loswitha Lake, which the Tribunal can firm in the map I gave them as being northwest of Smolensk. The witness reported that from the Loswitha Lake he met Hauptsturmfuehrer Foltis and gave him the job of doing partisan reconnaisance with a part of the Sonderkommando at Welisch. Welisch is north east of the lake. BY DR. LUMMERT (ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT BLOBEL): Lake. for about ten days and then was given the job of doing band reconnaisance in the large wooded territories north east of Smolensk. The AOK-9 asked me to move there. I remember the localities Sloboda and Baklanowa, because the kommando was also stationed there close to beautiful lakes and I still have photographs of these, which I took during one of these transfers of the Kommando, when I once mere got in closer contact with Foltis after carrying out the reconnaisance mission in Welisch. Foltis reported to me that before he left he had carried out an anti-Jewish action and had dot about 50 to 60 able bodied men in Welisch. This was not to my like and I had not asked Foltis to do anything of the kind. My order, as well as the instructions of the AOK-9 merely referred to partisan reconnaisance, but Foltis by his execution, in Welisch-acted following the order which Nebe expressly had given to him in Minsk, and apart from that of course of the basis of the Fuehrer Order.
Q Did you report about the executions is Welisch? Did you report