this was a war assignment which would be concluded by December at the latest. I was not told anything further.
Q As what were you being called to duty for? office for the repatriation of ethnic Germans, since December of the year 1940, I was not even allowed to wear any insignia of rank and did not wear any such. Book III-C, page 45 of the German text. It is Document NO-4771 (i), Exhibit 139.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 22?
MR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: It starts on page 22 but Dr. Ratz wants to read from a later date, 1 will try to get the page.
INTERPRETED: The letter "i" is on page 29, your Honor.
DR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: It is on page 29, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. BY DR. RATZ:
Q. There it says, "Under cancellation of his assignment to the BdS Ukraine, the SS Sturmbannfuehrer (NDV) Waldemar von Radetzky was transferred." Will you the Tribunal what the initials "NDV" mean?
Q Who put you on such p status? of personnel for the performing of missions of special state political importance on 15 October 1938. This status was immediately announced by the regional office, by the Mayor of the City of Posen, who was competent according to an announcement which said that government agencies could demand emergency service. This was on the 8th of July 1939. During my war emergency status in May 1941 I was busy with the advisory agency for Baltic Germans in Posen.
this emergency status or of evading it?
Q What effect did this have? order to be drafted which had to be complied with. Whoever refused to comply with this had to expect the same consequences as one who would have refused to do any war service. The compulsion of this war emergency status can be seen from the fact that this was announce, even though the office for the repatriation of ethnic Germans, who had incorporated the advisory agency for resettlers, had deferred me.
Q Would you please explain what the designation "UK" means, to be deferred? man power and means that the person concerned can not be drafted for the army. became a member of the SD? of the SD, either in full time capacity or in an honorary capacity. The war emergency status merely started an activity in the SD and this activity had to last as long as this status was effective.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Ratz, would you went to suspend now for the afternoon recess? The Tribunal will be in recess 15 minutes.
(A recess was taken) Court No. II, Case No. IX.
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT: Proceed.
Q (By Dr. Ratz) Witness, we spoke of your war emergency status. Could you on such a status, object to your call to report to Schmiedeberg? on that basis, I came under the jurisdiction of the Chief of the RSHA and apart from that I was subordinated to the SS and Police court. As I have already said, war emergency service had the same effect as a military draft. Blobel on the 19th of October, 1947, -- it is in the transcript, German text page 1751 -- in connection with your own person, witness, the question was raised whether it was true that those on a war emergency status were supposed only to serve in the Reich Security Main Office, but they would not serve in an Einsatzgruppe. Would you please comment on this? in the RSHA and not for service in the Einsatzgruppe. I would like to clarify this again. The war emergency status is imposed by the Department I, Personnel Department of RSHA, for service in the Einsatzkommandos. Only based on the war emergency status could I begin my activity in the SK 4A. Until the end of my activity in the SK 4A and after that, up to the end of my activity in the Reich Security Main Office, I was on this war emergency status.
Q When did you first learn of your war emergency status?
AAbout two weeks after I had arrived in Schmiedeberg. I received a temporary registration card, in which my war emergency service for the Department I of the RSHA was explained, and a certain Hauptsturmfuehrer Ulrich in Schmiedeberg informed me that I, in accordance with my recruitment, was due to have war emergency status for the Reich Security Main Office and would have to take part regularly in military training.
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
and did you also receive a police training? consisted of exercises and weapons training and than regularly physical exercises and games. ever discussed at that time?
Q Witness, we are now coming to the SK 4A. When did you join the SK 4A? of June, 1941.
Q Who was the chief of SK 4A? often mentioned here, with Streckenbach or in Berlin? learn anything about the discussions having taken place, except here in Nurnberg.
Q What ware you told when you were detailed to the SK 4A? as expert on the country. Furthermore, I had to take part in a discussion at which general directives for reporting were given and I had such a discussion with an officer of the Office VI of the RSHA. reporting? Dept III on the Staff of Einsatzgruppe C, in Schmiedeberg at the beginning of our activities. The Departmental Chiefs were present and were informed about the character of their futura work. It was explicitly pointed out that the Departmental Experts for reporting would work in their own sphere of activities.
MR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD : If the Tribunal please, it seems inadmissible Court No. II, Case No. IX.
that the witness testifies to facts which he does not know. He told the Tribunal very explicitly that he did not know a thing about these meetings in Schmiedeberg, but now he is going into great detail in order to explain to the Tribunal what happened there.
THE PRESIDENT: The observation is entirely a logical one. What do you have to say to that, Dr. Ratz?
DR. RATZ: I believe that the witness is testifying from his own experience, and he has said this remark only concerns the name of this chief who was discussed, Hennicke, of whom I shall submit an affidavit and whose name the witness probably did not know at the time.
MR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: If the Tribunal please, if Dr. Ratz has some proof for these facts from Hennicke it seems to be entirely immaterial that the witness testifies what Hennicke told him here in the jail or what are the contents of the affidavit. The affidavit is the proof before the Tribunal, but what the witness says he heard here from Hennecke generally, meanwhile, after the trial here started, is no proof at all, no proof whatsoever. An affidavit of Hennecke is available. The witness is available for cross-examination, but I do not think that this is the proper subject for the interrogation of a third person, in this case, the defendant, who does not know anything from his own knowledge about this fact.
DR. RATZ: Your Honor, it is here a matter of two discussions. One is the discussion with Streckenbach and one is the discussion with Hennecke. As for the discussion with Hennecke, the witness can tell us about it from his own experience. I should like to ask the witness whether he himself can state facts about this discussion according to his own experience or only by way of the affidavit, Witness, will you please comment on this?
THE WITNESS: I answered your question whether I took part in any discussions with Streckenbach or in Berlin, by saying that I did not take part in these discussions. I further went on to say that I took part in other discussions, for instance, one discussion concerning Court No. II, Case No. IX.
reports and reporting and then another discussion with an officer from Office VI. In those days I was new and I do not know the names of these people who had these discussions, but I made sure that this discussion about reporting was presided over by Hennecke at the time in Schmiedeberg and therefore I said, "As I know now."
Q (By Dr. Ratz) But you know from your own memory about this discussion? don't know whether it was Hennicke or somebody else from my recollection of that time, but when I attempted to clarify matters now, I found out that Hennicke must have actually preside over the discussion then.
Q A further question. What special subjects did these reports include? education, theatres, religion, and so on.
Q How were the reports actually issued?
A The work was of a reporting nature. First, the material for the reports had to be found. This was done by contacting the population and by looking for the sources for reports. Then reports were made out of this material. Responsible for this were the departmental experts of Office III,
Q To whom did these reports go?
A That depended. They went to the Chief III who was with the Staff of the Einsatzgruppe.
Q Was executive activity mentioned in these reports? and they were issued by experts, that is, the Departmental Experts IV, but I had nothing to do with that, because I was Departmental Expert III, time?
Q When did you leave Schmiedeberg and where did you go? went via Liegnitz, Gleiwitz, Cracow, to Rubirshow Here, Blobel, who had left the kommando meanwhile, rejoined it and with one part of the kommando he went to Sokal, while the remainder, including myself, followed him.
Q Did you on that occasion have discussions with Blobel? that ruthless security measures against Communist functionaries had been ordered by the Fuehrer, I asked that my activity to be outlined because I did not want to have nothing to do with this kind of police task. When this order was proclaimed, Blobel said that in this, Jewry had to be regarded as the essential bearer of Bolshevism. Healso said that when the security of the unit made it necessary, collective measures were possible too, however, these could only be ordered by the battalion commander or a higher-ranking officer. Blobel then ordered me, after I had objected to deal with the documents and utilize them for my reports for the SD as the Departmental Chief of Office III and to report to him and to the Einsatzgruppe about Ukrainian affairs. Further directives I did not receive from him concerning this activity. He only said that I would not be employed in the same manner as all the other officers of the commando as I did not fulfill the necessary conditions.
Q What conditions were these? of the kommandos? SD insignia, the distinction perhaps be comes most evident from the fact that I received a daily payment of One Mark Twenty, that is the price of a pack of cigarettes, while a Hauptsturmfuehrer or one of the officers of the RSHA in those days received Twelve Marks for his personal expenses. That is about ten times as much.
Q You said, "apart from a few external insignia." Did you wear SD insignia on your sleeve, or did you not? the course of time?
A No, no, and I had to use my own money occasionally. Later I received 75 Marks on one occasion when I was no longer in a position to pay my debts at the Officers Club. officer in the SK 4A?
A No, no. I was and I remained under war emergency status. I brought along my uniform from the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle. Neither the uniform nor the rank would give any cause to think that I was an officer in the Security Police and SD. For this, other conditions were necessary; by that I mean, membership and previous training. executions? fact that I had an officer's rank did not alter this fact. My executive power did not go beyond my field of activities. This field of activities was the field of interpreting and reporting, and, later on, I became a liaison officer, as well. commander of SK 4A, Blobel, of 6 June 1947. It is contained in Document Book I, page 129 of the English text, page 163 of the German text, No 3824, Exhibit 31, and it says:
MR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: If the Tribunal please, I do think that Dr. Ratz will quote from para. 9, which is on the top of page 132.
Q (By Dr. Ratz) There it says, and I quote: "During the period of my absence the kommando was taken over by Dr. Rasch, Hauptsturmfuehrer Waldemar von Radetzky and Hauptsturmfuehrer Dr. Beyerp and under their direction a jumber of mass executions took place too." I now ask you, Witness, were you appointed by Blobel as his deputy or were you given the leadership of SK 4a in any form? ing this question when he was on the witness stand and he said that I was not his deputy, just as little as, according to my knowledge, Dr.
Rasch and Dr. Beyer were his deputies, and I wasn't either.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Ratz, will you refresh my memory? Perhaps my colleagues recall it, but at the moment I don't recall whether the Defendant Blobel was questioned by you on this statement of his that the present defendant von Radetzky conducted mass executions.
DR. RATZ: Your Honor, I asked the Defendant Blobel on the 29th of October in detail about this matter. This is on page 1660 of the German transcript and it goes on to page 1667.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Hochwald, can you give us the reference in the English transcript?
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
MR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: If the Tribunal please, I do not have the English transcript with me at the moment, but tomorrow morning I shall be glad to inform the Tribunal,
THE PRESIDENT: I should like to know this afternoon so that I can read it tonight and tomorrow morning I will know what it's all about.
MR. HORLICK-HOCHWALD: If Your Honors please, I will have it ready about five o'clock this afternoon.
THE PRESIDENT: Fine. Thank you very much.
DR. RATZ: It was the afternoon session of the 29th of October.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
Q (By Dr. Ratz) Witness, you said that you moved on to Sokal. What happened in Sokal? Kommando to Luck.
Q In what capacity did you join the kommando in Luck? written material which was an activity within the general acitivy of an interpretar and as a departmental expert III.
Q What did you have to do in this assignment? material in the interest of the Reich, as the term was then used, and to safeguard such material. For this purpose I received a packet of confiscation posters which I had to affix to the buildings for this purpose. Then I was given the order on the way to Luck to pass by the Army Headquarters and to obtain general staff maps of the advance area and to take care of them in the future. Apart from that I was supposed to take care of the reporting.
Q Who was in charge of the kommando that proceeded to Luck? kommando. Funk was in charge of the kommando, as I found out later, that is, in Luck. He had to prepare the quarters for the SK 4A which Court No. II, Case No. IX.
was due there and Janssen was in charge of the executive activities.
Q To whom were you responsible in the fulfillment of your task?
Q And who gave you the order? othar officers in the Kommando were concerned?
Q What did you do in Luck? quarters. Then with the aid of the inhabitants, I searched public buildings and inspected them briefly. Wherever I thought there would be files I put up these confiscation posters in order to safeguard them in this way. Then I recruited some Poles and Ukrainians who knew Russian as well as German, and with the six men, who had been put at my disposal by the kommando and those inhabitants I started working on these files. The main task had to be done by myself as the German members of the kommando were vary difficult to train. For this purpose, I had to make many changes in the personnel. The files thus seized were always transported to the main building and there they were stacked up. Then I looked carefully through these files. In this activity I was helped by Counter-Intelligence officers, who also deposited their files in my office. We worked day and night in this activity and we managed to secure extensive material of which one part was sent to the Army. submitted concerning the responsibility of the Defendant Radetzky, in Document Book III-C, on page 20 of the English copy, it is page 28 of the German text, there is Document NO-4438. It is Exhibit 132. It is the affidavit of Radetzky of the 25th of July, 1947. In the summary it is said that you were in charge of an advance kommando in Luck. Did you ever make such a statement?
Court No. II, Case No. IX.
A No, in my affidavit of the 25th of July, 1947, under No. 3, I said the following, and I quote:
A. (continued) I quote: "First I went to Hrubgoschow with the Special Kommando and from there to Luck, where I was assigned to a subunit of Sonderkommando 4-A."
THE PRESIDENT: What are you reading from there, witness? You say this is what you said.
DR. HOCHWALD: This is the affidavit of the defendant in Document Book III-C page 20, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: I know, I have that affidavit before me but he indicates that the affidavit is in error and he says that he said something different from what appeared in the affidavit and then he read a statement.
DR. HOCHWALD: As far as I could understand he wanted to say that the statement of the Prosecution that he was a leader of a sub-kommando is in error and that he has said in his affidavit only that he was in this sub-komnando. That is how I understood the testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, then the affidavit remains as it is before us.
DR. HOCHWALD: He did not contest the affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT: I am very sorry, I had misunderstood that. BY DR. RATZ:
Q. Your Honor, I merely showed the witness the summarization of the Prosecution documents concerning the affidavit of the defendant Radetzky and in contrast to this I showed him his own affidavit. On the basis of this affidavit it is confirmed that he was not the leader of this advance Kommando Luck. 21 August 1947, Document Book III-C, page 30 of the English document book, page 47 of the German text, NO-4765 which is Exhibit 137, made a statement where it says, and I quote:
"The Vorkommando had three officers, namely SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Waldemar von Radetzky and two Obersturmfuehrers whose names I do not remember any more. I remember that one evening a conference was held during our stay at Ludsk, in the course of which Waldemar von Rudetzky as senior officer gave orders to the assembled non-coms safeguard documents and other important materisl in certain buildings.
At that time I had the impression that Radetzky was the head of the Vorkommando although he had never been pointed out to me as such."
Will you comment on this?
A. I have already explained that I was not the chief of Vorkommando Luck, and that it could not have been so. I have already mentioned that I was not familiar with Security Police tasks and for this purpose there were special experts in the advance Kommando who had to deal with these assignments. If the witness Kraege believes that he had gained the impression at the time that I was in charge of the Advanced Kommando then this impression can only have been created because I had a higher rank than the two actual officers of the Kommando. This fact itself, however, does not justify the assumption that I was the responsible officer, especially for exective measures. The chief of Sonderkommando 4-A, Blobel, stated who the officer was in charge of Vorkommando Luck when he was on the witness stand.
Q. Your Honor, I shall submit this statement from the testimony of the defendant Blobel immediately to the Tribunal. Perhaps I can meanwhile proceed. Witness, what rank did you hold at the time and what rank did the other officers hold?
A. I was Hauptsturmfuehrer, or Captain, and the two others were Obersturmfuehrer, or 1st Lieutenants.
Q. The witness Kraege in the affidavit which has just been mentioned also said that in Ludsk one evening there was a discussion in which you, as the highest-ranking officer, gave instructions to the other officers. Now, what did you discuss on that occasion?
A. Soon after my arrival in Ludsk I had a discussion with the non-coms, that is with those people who had been assigned to me for the carrying out of my mission. I gave them directives for securing of enemy documents but no officer of the Kommando was present here because this discussion concerned my particular sphere of activities which was the securing of documents.
Q. Your Honor, I would now like to show you this particular passage from the Blobel statement. It is the transcript of 28 October 1947. It is the morning session and is page 1549 of the German.
Witness, what kind of documents did you then find and secure?
A. There was a great mass of material which had been left behind by the surprising withdrawal of the Russians. I had to pay particular attention to those documents which were of a basic and general significance. I now only remember the following spheres. First of all, documents dealing with the mobilization of the Russian armed forces in case of war with Germany; secondly, documents dealing with the line of advance of a Russian Army; third, purely military files; 4, material concerning activities of Russian agents in non-European states. I remember distinctly I was most surprised to find these documents at Luck of all places covering a period of five years. The remainder were economic files, land distribution schemes, food quotas, taking over of industry by the State, and State decrees to that effect.
Q. Witness, I may show you Document Book II-A, page 76 of the English text, page 84 of the German text, NO-2938, Exhibit 44, "Report of Events No. 24" of the 16 July 1941, and it says, I quote:
"In Luck, furthermore, in the buildings of the Soviet Administration and in various Communist centers, important material was seized in safes, among other things, a list of agents in various countries."
That's the end of the quotation, Please comment on this.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us find it, please, first. What is the original page number?
DR. HOCHWALD: Page 14 of the original. If I am not mistaken your Honor, it's on page 81 of the Document Book.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we found it.
DR. RATZ: May I perhaps repeat my quotation. "In Luck, furthermore, in the fuildings of the Soviet Administration and in various other Communist centers, after the safes had been forces open, important material, including, among other things, records relating to Russian agents in various countries, could be discovered."
THE PRESIDENT: Well I don't find that.
MR. HILDESHEIMER: Middle of the page, page 81, page 14 of the original.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, yes, I find some of it but I don't see the reference to "In Luck". There is one paragraph which begins "Moreover, important material, including, among other things, etc," but I don't find this reference to Luch.
DR. HOCHWALD: In the German mileograph it says "in Luck", your Honor. But, it says a little later in the next sentence "buildings of the Luch authorities".
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the phraseology differs between the German and the English.
MR. HILDESHEIMER: Well, I am afraid I just translated it as the defense cousel said it, I didn't have the document. I didn't read it from the document.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, that explains it. BY DR. RATZ:
Q. What did the remainder of the Kommando do during this time as far as you know?
A. The Kommando had secured a number of Wehrmacht camps and was guarding these, otherwise it was occupied with finding quarters.
Q. When did special Kommando 4-A arrive in Luck?
A. I don't remember today exactly. It arrived with Standartenfuehrer Blobel after 4 to six days it arrived in Luck and took up quarters in the quarters that had been prepared.
Q. Were there any other Kommandos in Luck?
A. Yes, one Kommando of the Security Police and SD of the Commander of the General Government and after that the Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln arrived with his staff and subordinate units in Luck.
Jeckeln took up quarters in the billets of the Kommando.
Q. The Prosecution, witness, in their submission of evidence on 30 September 1945, has made you responsible for the killing of 1460 Jews, 20 saboteurs, and deputized for the chief of Sonderkommando 4-A. I refer to Document Book II-A, page 76 of the English document book, page 84 of the German document book, NO-2938, Exhibit 44. It is the report of events No. 24, of 16 July 1941.
MR. HOCHWALD: That's page 80, your Honors. The second to the last paragraph on the bottom.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we have it.
Well, it's the same document that he has been quoting from.
DR. RATZ: There it says and I quote: "We succeeded in arresting 200 Jews as well as 20 plunderers who were shot on 30 June. As the corpses of a total of 10 German members of the Wehrmacht had been found on 2 July, 1060 Jews were shot as reprisal for the assassination of the German soldiers and the Ukrainians with the help of one platoon of the police and one platoon of the infantry. Finally on 6 July, it was possible to disciver altogether 50 Polish agents and spies who were liquidated also."
Did you find out anything about these executions?
A. Yes one or two days after my arrival in Luck Janssen informed me that the local commander or the responsible division commander had ordered a retaliation measure for these 3000 Ukrainians who had been shot by the Russians, If and when such an operation took place I don't know because neither I nor any of the men who were subordinated to me for this particular operation took part in such an action.
THE PRESIDENT: Who did you say ordered the execution?
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I heard that it was the town commander of Luck who had ordered a retaliation measure.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, there is nothing in the report to suggest that.
THE WITNESS: Your Honor, I can only say what I heard then.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, all this is listed under the activities of Einsatzkommando 4a, isn't it?
THE WITNESS: Yes, that is so. It says so in the report of events.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, do you attack the reliability of that statement, that all this was done by Einsatzkommando 4a?
THE WITNESS: That I cannot doubt, your Honor, I have no exact knowledge about who carried out this execution, and I can only say what I know about it, and I know that I was informed at the time by Janssen that the town major had ordered a retaliation measure to take place.
THE PRESIDENT: Who is Janssen?
THE WITNESS: Janssen was an officer of the kommando who had the order for the executive activity. He was in charge of executive measures in the Vorkommando Luck.
Q. (By Dr. Ratz) Do you mean one of the officers of SK 4a?
A. Yes, an officer of SK 4a.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, proceed.
Q. (By Dr. Ratz) What else did you learn about this?
A. When Blobel arrived in Luck he informed us that Field Marshal Reichenau, the Supreme Commander of the Sixth Army; had issued the order to eliminate an equal number of Jews for the murdered 3,000 Ukrainian members of the intelligentsia. Blobel had arrived in Luck and he was ill. According to my memory, a physician was called immediately who wanted to take him to the field hospital. As far as I heard, Blobel resisted this and agreed with the physician on intensive treatment. The officers of the kommando met, and discussed what to do next, Hauptsturmfuehrer Karlsen to whom Blobel had transferred the command of the Einsatzkommando presided over this meeting. At the end of this discussion my advice was sought. Nobody knew what was to be done, and I suggested to take Blobel to the field hospital in any case, as on the one hand the physician thought he had dysentery, and on the other hand this would be a good opportunity not to carry out the order. I said that I would be prepared to take over the job of taking Blobel to the field hospital. I went to see the chief of the Wehrmacht field hospital in Luck. I described to him what it was all about, and I went to see Blobel, together with him. He was the Oberstabsarzt, Dr. Braeuer, chief medical officer of the hospital. Blobel had a high temperature and was delirious. The physician was most upset about the state of health of his colleague. He made out an admission card for the field hospital in Lublin, and he treated Blobel. Blobel was taken to his car, and I went to Lublin with him the same evening, where we arrived in the morning and took him to the hospital there. I took a disinfecting bath the next day in Lublin, and I returned to Luck the day after that where I confirmed the task of seizing documents which I have already dealt with.