This, however, the studio of Frau Schreyer in Berlin-Zehlendorf.
This can (Haensch be proved by Frau Schreyer's order-pad, and her customers' Doc. Exh.No. record both of which show under the consecutive number 391, 1-4.
which was taken at that time. All these objects have been (transcr. p.3374 ff given by Frau Schreyer, and her former employee, Frau Frieda Reich, the occasion of the latter's detailed examination (transcr.
in court. It is mainly due to Frau Reich on the name of p. 4590 trial.
May I also mention here that from the time of Frau Schreyers's examination those negatives were constantly in Prosecu- I further refer to the first questioning of Frau Reich by tion Doc.
No. the interrogator, Mr. Sachs on 3 December 1947 and to her NO-5698, 5699 and affidavit of 4 December 1947. The defense wishes to 5718 ment and was questioned by him.
If Frau Reich, during the interrogation on 3 December 1947, termed it "improbable" 12 Feb 1948_E_MSD_25_5_Gallagher (Juelich) -the English version even says wrongly "impossible" - that the defendant should have been entered into Frau Schreyer's due to an error.
This mistake is all the more understandable had been kept in Frau Schreyer's studio at that time, as well therein may serve as proof that the defendant's picture must have been taken at the stated time.
Finally I refer to mentioned Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr. Erwin Weinmann, was also Transcr.
She had accompanied her husband to the station and could p. 3106ff left at the same time.
Frau Weinmann, too, is unable to give the exact date of departure, but remembers the following:
12 Feb 1948_E_MSD_25_6_Gallagher (Juelich) the front "hardly three weeks" after the birth of the Hanesch bers this fact, especially in connection with the time Doc.
Book I,p. 5 of the birth of her child. If it had happened hardly Doc. No. 4 Exh. No. 8 three weeks after the birth of the child, the departure February 1942.
This is the date given in an affidavit picture had been taken in Frau Schreyer's studio.
12 Feb 1948_E_26_1_ MSD_ Arminger (Juelich) his first letter from Russia, about their trip. There he mentioned that they, i.e. he and the defendant, stopped for some days both in Lemberg and in Kiew, and that following the journey by train they had covered another long distance by car. Considering that they were traveling during that winter. which was extraordinarily cold even by Russian standards, which already at that time almost brought German military operations in the East to a standstill, and that the transportation difficulties, which already in Remberg caused an interruption of the journey lasting several days, which grew in proportion as they approached the front-lines, then it becomes clear that the whole journey must actually have taken not only days but weeks. Unfortunately no witnesses are now available who could testify directly as to the time when the defendant finally joined the Kommando. But on the witness stand the co-defendant V. Radetzky stated the time when Obersturmbannfuehrer, Dr. Erwin Weinmann, joined the Sonderkommando IVa in Kharkov. This happened in the middle of March. The defendant must have also reached his destination about the same time. (German transcript p. 4321 and following) that Dr. Erwin Weinmann had been on active duty already since 13 January 1942, (Prosecution document No. NO-3251) These efforts were, however, unsuccessful.
The letter submitted by the Prosecution from the SS Main Personnel Office to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, dated 21 November 1942, concerning the release of the Oberburgermaster of Tuebinger has no probative value since it is based on mistaken identity. According to the inquiry which I made by wire to the municipal administration of Tuebingen on 22 January 1948, and according to the information given to me in the telegraphic answer dated 23 January 1948, not Dr. Erwin Weinmann but a Dr. Ernst Weinmann (the family name "Einmann" contained in the second wire is a typing error) holds the office of Oberbuergermeister. This is confirmed 12 Feb 1948_E_MSD_26_2_Arminger (Juelich) also by the affidavit of Professor Wilhelm Gieseler, dated 28 January 1943, interpol to which I shall still hand in, who at that time was Ratsherr of Tuebingen.
The Oberbuergermeister, Dr. Ernst Weinmann, is a brother of Dr. Erwin Weinmann, the person referred to. (Haensch Doc. Book IV pp. 1 and 2 Doc. No. 29 and 30 Exh. No. 31 and 32) I admit that it is probable that Dr. Erwin Weinmann already received his order of transfer in January 1942 like the defendant.
But he did not actually take over the Kommando until the middle of March 1942. transfer a more or less prolonged period elapsed before the person concerned actually entered upon duty. Thus, e.g. the co-defendant Biberstein on the witness stand stated that he did not join his Kommando until 18 September 1942 although the appointment as leader of the Kommando dates back to 14 July 1942. Another similar case is that of the Defendant Braune. Martenz, dated 23 October and wO November 1947 are of importance. Martenz was attached to the Sonderkommando IVb as investigator during the term of service of the defendant, but also already under his predecessor Braune. (Haensch Doc. Book I, p. 15 and II, p. 1 Doc. No. 12 and 16 Exhibits No. 15 and 19) As he explains in the period from February till May 1942 he was detailed for a skiing course. When he left the Kommando at the beginning of February 1942, Braune was still leader of the Kommando but was at that time away on leave returning from this leave to join the Kommando in the middle of February. Interpolate: Martenz met him in Kiev on that occasion. also thereby been confirmed. Not until his return from the skiing course at the beginning of May did Martenz find that in the meantime the defendant had become leader of the Kommando.
12 Feb 1948_E_MSD_26_3_Arminger (Juelich) the command of the Sonderkommando VI b until 15 March 1942. The erroneous statement in the garrison strength roster of report of events No. 156, dated 16 January 1942, which losts both the defendant and Dr. Weinmann as Kommando leaders already at that time, can be explained simply by the fact that the report office of the RSHA which made up the reports of events used the dates of the orders of transfer as a basis. again terminated. (Haensch Doc. Book I, p.8, Doc. No. 6 Exhibit No. 10) This appears from the submitted army postcard which the defendant sent to his wife on 17 June 1942. Therein he says that he had just been ordered by radiogram back to Berlin but that for offiical reasons he could not leave until 24 June 1942. Further a telegram from Sturmbannfuehrer Braune, dated 24 June 1942, has been submitted to the Tribunal as evidence, in which Braune once more informs the defendant's wife that her husband had been ordered to return, asking her to be in Berlin again 27 June 1942 on. This also proves the accuracy of the statements of the defendant concerning the date of his return from the Kommando. (Haensch Doc. Book I, p. 9, Doc. No. 7 Exhibit No. 11.) 1942, however, the defendant was not constantly with the Kommando either at first. In April 1942, he was in Kiew on official business for several days. Then at the end of April 1942 he was ordered to a meeting in Prague, from which he did not return until the last third of May. In Prague the defendant and the co-defendant Schulz met each other, as was definitely as confirmed by the latter. The defendant combined this official trip with a visit to his wife in Berlin which lasted several days. In Prague he visited Frau Marie Krueger-Martius, the sister-in-law of Lisa Kruegger-Martius, already mentioned. In this connection I once more refer to the affidavits of Lisa Krueger-Martinus and Frau Erika Coulon, dated 2 November and 24 November 1947, as well as to the affidavit of Frau Marie Krueger 12 Feb 1948_E_MSD_26_4_Arminger (Juelich) Martius and Frau Erika Coulon, dated 2 November and 24 November 1947, as well as to the affidavit of Frau Marie Krueger-Martius, dated 16 October 1947.
(Haensch Doc. Book II, p.2 Doc. No. 17 Exhibit No. 20 Haensch Doc. Book II, p.4, Doc. No. 18 Exhibit No. 21 Haensch Doc. Book I, p. 7 Doc. No. 5 Exhibit No. 9) B. Locale of activity as specified.
the command of the defendant, the garrison strength roster in the reports of events, on which again the Prosecution founds its charges, to a certain extent also represents a false picture. Up to and including report No. 190, dated 8 April 1942, the garrison locations of Sonderkommando IV b are given as follows: (Prosecution Doc. Book II D, p. 1. Doc. No. NO-3359, Exhibit No. 84) Kramatorskaja with detachments in Shitomir, Rovno, Winnica. Then in subsequent reports, starting with No. 191, dated 10 April 1942, only Gorlowka is listed as a garrison. (Prosecution Doc. Book III A, p. 74, Doc. No. NO-3256Exh. No.) Kommandoo the Kommando with its staff was actually in Gorlowka. For this report of events No. 183, dated 20 March 1942, contains irrefutable proof. The garrison strength roster of this report states, it is true, that the garrisons hitherto reported were not changed. (Prosecution Doc. Book III A, p. 80 Doc. No. NO-3234 Exhibit No. 108) This should then mean with respect to Sonderkommando IV b that the Hauptkommando was still located in Krammtorskaja. However, the text of the report reads: "As reported by Sonderkommando IV b, Gorlowka, ...". It is indicative of the unreliability of the garrison strength roster in the beginning of the reports of events that the persons preparing the reports do not notice this error in the garrison strength roster, of report of events No. 183, dated 20 March 1942, but allowed it to be repeated 6 times until finally correcting in report of events. No 191, dated 10 April 1942, which, as already mentioned, for the first 12 Feb 1948_E_MSD_26_5_Arminger (Juelich) time lists Gerlowka as a garrison.
If based hereon it can be maintained that the lists given in the garrison strength roster of the reports of events are not correct for the Hauptkommando, this applies still more to the Teilkommandos. In no period of the term of command of the defendant were any detachments of Sonderkommando IV b stationed in Shitomir, Rowno and Winnica. But such Teilkommandos were located in Artemovsk, Kramatorskaja, and finally also in Barvenskova. All these places, including Gorlowka, are located in the area between Slaviansk and Stalino directly on the Eastern border of the Ukraine in the Donez district, whereas Shitomir, Rowne, and Winnica are on the western border of the Ukraine, Rowne even in former Polish territory. to no less than between 700 and 900 kilometers in a straight line, shows that Sonderkommando IV b at that time could not possibly have had anything to do with Shitomir, Rowno, and Winnica. As Sonderkommando advancing together with the combat troops, the Kommando had exclusively security tasks in the front lines and was therefore never used in any other place than in the operational area of the army. This appears from the defendant's own statements as well as from all reports in which the Sonderkommando IV b is in any way referred to. I refer once more to report of events No. 183, dated 20 March 1942, in which the proximity of the front is expressly mentioned. (Prosecution Doc. Book III A, p. 80. Doc. No. NO-3288 Exhibit No. 108) before the Tribunal. (Transcript p. 2914 ff.) In the spring of 1942, Hartl was deputy consultant of personnel matters with Einsatzgruppe C in Kiew, and therefore familiar with the assignments of the various groups. Even though he cannot recall now the exact limitations of the area under the command of Sonderkommando IV b, he still remembers with certainty that the Kommando was operating in the industrial area of Southern Russia, i.e. in the Donez River Valley. But this is something quite different from the territory of Western Ukraine around 12 Feb 1948_E_MSD_26_6_Arminger (Juelich) Shitomir, Rowne, and Winnica.
never at all garrisones in these towns. (Transcript p. 4096 ff.) According to the statement of the co-defendant Fendler, who belonged to the Kommando from the beginning of the Eastern compaign until 2 October 1941, the Sonderkommando IV b never was in the towns of Shitomir and Rowno, but once stopped in Winnica for 8 or 10 days, leaving the place again in closed formation. At no stage of the advance were detachmentments of the Kommando left behind in any place, nor were they later sent back anywhere. Neither did the Kommando have any other connections with the rear area. This is proved also by the route of the Sonderkommando IV b according to the reports of events preceding report No. 154, dated 12 January 1942, which has for the first time the incorrect location of the alleged Teilkommando. Shitomir, Rowne, and Wihnica, was already under civil administration when the defendant arrived in Russia. (Prosecution Doc. Book III A p. 63, Doc. No. NO-4533 Exhibit No. 107) E.g. report of events No. 168, dated 13 February 1942, already lists separate commanders of the Security Police and the SD for Rowne and Shitomir respectively. I interpoltate: namely Dr. Putz and Dr. Ratze Berger. As soon as a certain district of the occupied territory was turned over to civil administration, all activities of the Einsatz-and Sonderkommandos were suspended, as explained by the co-defendant Ohlendorf, since the security duties were then taken over by the local police offices. Shitomir, Rowne and Winnica, which however, was never actually the case, their activity had to be concluded in February 1942 at the latest. (Transcript page 594 ff.) explained if one studies the report of events No. 129 of 5 November 12 Feb 1948_E_MSE_26_7_Arminger (Juelich) 1941 and those of subsequent dates.
In these reports the Teilkommandos in Shitomir, Rowno and Winnica are surprisingly enough referred to as such of EK V and even under exactly the same designation. This makes it clear that they belonged to the forces of EK V and not to those of the SK IV b. This statement is further substantiated by the fact that the garrison of EK V has located at Kiew. The Teilkommandos in Shitomir. Rowno and Winnica were therefore situated in its area of authority. Therefore, this is an obvious mistake. (Porseuction document book II D, page 8 No. NO-3159 Exhibit No. 85) Starting with report of events No. 154, of 12 January 1942, EKV is no longer mentioned in the garrison strength Roster.
It had been abolished in the course of the establishment of the Civil Administration. It is therefore not likely that the Teilkommandos stationed even to the West of Kiew should have remained activated after this date. They must have been affected too by the deactivation and were mentioned for a time as still being with the SK IV b only on account of an error of the reporting office, until also this mistake in the garrison strength rosters had finally been corrected in the report of events No. 191 of 10 April 1942. (Prosecution document book II A page 113 No. NO-3278 Exhibit No. 51) jurisdictional areas, therefore amounts to the following, that is, that SK IV b was only operating in the east Ukrainian sector at the time the defendant was there, which sector is marked by the towns of Gorlowka, Artemowsk, and Krmatorskoja and Barwenkowa.
C. The Activity Itself. questions concerning the Kommando period and the Kommando spheres, I turn now to the individual events with which the defendant, in his capacity as leader of SK IV b, has been charged.
12 Feb 1948_E_MSD_26_8_Arminger (Juelich)
1.) The prosecution submitted as evidence for the alleged criminal activity of the defendant in Russia, first of all the report of events No. 173, of 25 February 1942. This report states:
"Through the Sonderkommando IV b, 861 summary shootings were carried out during the time of 14 January to 12 February 1942. Among the victims were 649 political functionaries, 52 saboteurs and partisans and 139 Jews." (Prosecution Document Book I, pg. 118 Document No. NO 3340 exhibit No. 22) because he was at this time, as had been proved, still in Berlin.
2.) Next, the defendant is charged with an action about which the report of events No. 177, of 6 March 1942, mentions the following: (Prosecution document book, p. 65 II C, document No. NO-3240 exhibit No. 80) "Owing to the extremely low temparatures and the snow drifts.
The Police actions were reduced following the lull at the front, which because of the protracted stay of the Kommandos brought about a considerable number of incidents.
Through the Sonderkommando IV b a total of 1317 persons (among them 63 political activities, 30 saboteurs and Partisans and 1224 Jews) were executed. As a result of these measures the community of Artomowsk became free of Jews also." No. 11, made up about 8 weeks later and submitted as a supplement by the prosecution, which stated; the following about this incident:
"In the remaining areas of the Eastern front the task of the Security Police and the SD apart from the actions against individual Jews who were politically or criminally active, consisted in the general parting of larger communitions. Thus in Rakow alone 1500 Jews and in Artemowsk, 1224 Jews were shot, so that these communities are not free of Jews." (Prosecution document book I page 51 document No. NO-2662 exhibit No. 13) 12 Feb 1948_E_MSD_26_9_Arminger (Juelich) above mentioned community Rakow belonged at no time to the area under the command, of SK IV b and that this is also not maintained by the Prosecution, Rakow is situated about 30 kilometers west of Minsk and belonged at that time to the area of the Einsatzgruppe A. Therefore, I must concern myself only with the shootings carried out in Artomowsk.
neither of the two reports quoted. One thing is certain; they must have been carried out before 6 March 1942, the date of report of events No. 177, because otherwise it would have been impossible to mention them in the report. Moreover, the shootings must have been executed before 4 March 1942, because the report winds up with this date. This alone in itself should be sufficient proof that the defendant had no connection with these measures, because he was not yet assigned to this command.
However, the shootings at Artemowsk cannot be determined as having taken place at a certain period. I stress this question because it is significant also for another reason which I shall discuss later on. Obviously the prosecution agrees with me that the events took place prior to 4 March or at least prior to 6 March 1942. On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the activity and situation report No. 11 mentions the report-period from 1 March until 31 March 1942 and hence infers that the shootings at Artemowsk must have taken place in March 1942. This, however, is a false conclusion. ports represent monthly reports. In order to make a comparison, I request that reference be made to report No. 9 covering the period from 1 February to 28 February 1942. They were intended for the Foreign Office according to the accompanying letters attached to them, and represent a concise summary of the reports of events of the corresponding month. Therefore, the mentioned report period does not prove by any means that the reported events actually took place during this time, but that the reports of events based on the events were drawn up at this period. Both, i.e. the operational - as well as the activity and situation reports, were compiled at the Reich Main Security Office. the actual events and their recording in the report of events, often a period of 6 to 8 weeks elapsed. If, therefore, the report of events No. 177 of 6 March 1942, mention is made of shootings at Artemowsk then this alone, in all probability, infers, that these shootings were carried out not just a few days before but considerably earlier. This becomes a definite fact if one considers the further contents of the report of events No. 177. same report by one concerning the EK V in which it states:
"As a result of the activity of the Einsatzkommando V b, a total of 1880 have been shot; among them political activists, 114 sabo teurs and looters as well as 1580 Jews.
This Kommando also car ried out an operation against members of the Bandera group."
and not even in February 1942. I refer in this connection again to report of events No. 154 of 12 January 1942 and others in which the EK V is no longer mentioned in the garrison strength rosters. Report of events No. 177, of 6 March 1942, concern therefore events which must have taken place prior to the destination of EK V, that is during January 1942 at the latest. port of events No. 189, of 3 April 1942, in the form of a photostat and an excerpt. The text of the excerpt contains only two paragraphs. They read:
"In Shitomir the soldier's cemetary at Cayssin had been desecra ted by persons unknown.
In the course of the subsequent inves Among them were:
1 mentally deranged person." ity of Shitomir, I proved that the SK IV b was never active in this area. The report itself does not mention anything as to who had carried out this measure. I could have been done only by the local Police offices, which had already been established there in February 1942 and which were subordinated to a special command of the Security Police and the SD. I may point out that this commander had also been definitely mentioned in the report of events No. 188, of 1 April 1942, which the prosecution submitted together with report of events No. 189, of 3 April 1942, already dealt with in this connection.
No other security units existed at this time. cribe the further mentioned execution of 434 persons, among them 352 Jews, to the SK IV-b. The submitted excerpt from report of events No. 189, of 3 April 1942, is misleading in that respect. Because it contains only the two paragraphs quoted it is apt to cause the impression that the shooting of 434 persons, including the 352 Jews, also took place in Shitomir. However, the photostat of the entire report gives quite another picture. According to it, the excerpt has been taken from an extensive report of Einsatzkommando C, altogether comprising seven paragraphs. Paragraphs one and two of this summary report concerns Kiew, the third concerns Schepetowka, the fourth concerns Nikelajew, the fifth Illowainschka, and the sixth Shitomir. The seventh and last paragraph then states in conclusion, how many persons had been subjected to special treatment during the time from 28 March to 31 March inclusive, in total i.e. in the entire area of Einsatzgruppe C. however, SK IV b did not participate in all these events, since all the localities quoted were outside of its sphere of activity at that time.
Finally, the report from the occupied Eastern territories, No. 6, dated 6 June 1942, was shown to the defendant. This report contains the following:
"Toward the end of April beginning of May 1942, several exten munists in the Commander's jurisdictional area Gorlowka.
Of the 1,038 persons arrested 727 were given 'special treatment', tivists and NKWD agents."
were carried out in the area of SK IV b but executed by the Wehrmacht and not by SK IV b. The Wehrmacht had reserved for itself the combatting of partisans and similar elements in those areas where extensive measures were necessary, and had organized special units for this purpose. A small Sonderkommando such as SK IV b, with a strength of only seventy men, and which, in addition, was split up into several Teilkommandos in various locations, would never have been able to carry out such operations, since it was not up to a completely organized and armed band simply for the reason that they were outnumbered. Consequently, when the report speaks of several large-scale operations then it can already be established from the very beginning that these operations were conducted by the Wehrmacht. They were mentioned in the reports of the Einsatzgruppen only because the reports of events and the reports from the occupied Eastern territories were supposed to provide as complete a picture as possible of the security measures which had been taken. tions mentioned here only in so far as a few experienced criminal police officials of the Kommando had been requested by the Wehrmacht for their assistance and assigned there in one or two cases. These officials for the length of their assignment were subject to the sole order of the leader of the particular Wehrmacht unit who thereby assumed sole responsibility for their actions. They were never used for executions. because the incidents happened at a time when he was absent from the Kommando temporarily for the second time, namely, on the occasion of his trip to Berlin and Prague. Also, he had nothing to do with the transfer of the officials; rather, this was initiated through his deputy at that time. These events became know to him only from the report which he had received from his deputy following his return from the above-mentioned trip. Also, this report contained information to the effect that a few such Wehrmacht operations had taken place, and this has been substantiated by the defendant on the witness stand.
which could be regarded as a crime. The containing of partisans, members of the Destruction Battalions, saboteurs, and looters is an action permissible according to International Law. I believe I do not have to touch upon this matter further. The report also shows that those persons apprehended were not killed indiscriminately but that only some 75 percent were actually affected by the so-called "special treatment". In other words, the cases were all investigated.
executed there were also a few Communist activists and NKWD agents, then this does by no means mean that these persons had been executed only because of their membership in the Communist Party or belonged to the NKWD without otherwise being particularly incriminated by other facts.
The focal point here rests on the fact, that, as can be clearly seen from the report, these were Communist activists and NKWD agents. These were no innocuous civilians but men who worked for the cause of the Soviets behind the German lines. The offices to which the report was transmitted did not have to be informed in detail as to how and in what nature this activity took place, since the operations of Communist elements, which had taken on active proportions, had long been known. These very persons created the chief danger to the security of the fighting troops since they were the ones who incited the resistance of the civilian population secretly but all the more effectively, and who created and maintained secret communication with the Soviet armed forces and the Soviet leadership.
II. The Activity According to the Statements of the Defendant it charges the defendant with war crimes and crimes against humanity, is completely exhausted. However, this will still require a certain elaboration as to what the defendant himself has stated regarding his activity with the SK IVb. him by Streckenbach, Director of AMT I in the RSHA, as well as by Heydrich, to the effect that he was to be responsible within his area of command for the security of the combat zone according to the directives as issued by the Wehrmacht. The instructions which he received from Thomas, Chief of the Einsatzgruppe C, were identical. An order, the execution of which would have been a crime according to the principles of humanity and according to the recognized rules of war, was never transmitted to him from any quarters.
In addition, up to the time who had been designated as inferior.
I shall return to this point termed as allegedly inferior.
However, at the time the defendant Haensch This was confirmed as well by the witness Martenz, in his affiDoc.Book I, p.15, davit, dated 23 October 1947. With the exception of a few Jewish Doc. No. 12 Exh. Panje drivers, who were there were never any Jews, gypsies, or No. 15 dant until during this trial.
In Gorlowka, the garrison of the Pros. following the measures carried out by Einsatzkommando VI. This Doc.Bk. IIC,p. is shown by the report of events No. 177, dated 6 March 1942. 65,Doc. No. NO- As has already been established, that was the same case following 3240,Exh No.80 the operation in Artemewski, which was previously mentioned. This area.
In this connection refer to the statements by the Co Spring 1942.
My colleague Durchholz has expressed the same in his final plea for the Co-Defendant Schulz.
Consequently, the de in toto were carried out, that is, two by the main Kommando in Gorlowka, one by the Teilkommando in Artemowsk, and one by the Teilkommando in Berwenkowa.
In each case, these had to do with small groups, in all some 60 parsons. These were exclusively saboteurs, spies, looters, and similar elements who as has been established, had acted unmistakably against the decrees which had been issued and made public for the security of the fighting troops. tions which were carried out by specialists thoroughly trained in criminology -- I interpolate -- and every accused person was given a hearing. The results of the investigations were then written down, the officials in charge of the investigations were then heard again verbally, and thereafter the decision was reached. May I again call particular attention to the fact, in this connection, that the defendant, as a professional lawyer, who had passed his State examination, was capable, according to German law, of holding the office of a judge. This was also true of the Director of the Executive Department. It can make no difference in the evaluation of the trial whether in this connection the defendant functioned formally as a judge or not; in practice, however, he reached his decisions in the only way that this could be expected of a judge. The executive procedure in the SK IVb was, therefore, at the time of the defendant, at least just as legally tenable as a procedure in a court martial, at which persons experienced in criminal law and judges, for the most part, are not to be found. Apart from that, a proceedings had been regulated by the OKW and the OKH, that is, the highest authority, and the defendant had been told not to change this. It was not up to him to change the procedure and to investigate it. that this was initiated, and decided upon by the Wehrmacht. The Wehrmacht had only commissioned the Teilkommando located there with the execution of punishment.