12 Feb 1948_E_MSD_26_8_Arminger (Juelich)
1.) The prosecution submitted as evidence for the alleged criminal activity of the defendant in Russia, first of all the report of events No. 173, of 25 February 1942. This report states:
"Through the Sonderkommando IV b, 861 summary shootings were carried out during the time of 14 January to 12 February 1942. Among the victims were 649 political functionaries, 52 saboteurs and partisans and 139 Jews." (Prosecution Document Book I, pg. 118 Document No. NO 3340 exhibit No. 22) because he was at this time, as had been proved, still in Berlin.
2.) Next, the defendant is charged with an action about which the report of events No. 177, of 6 March 1942, mentions the following: (Prosecution document book, p. 65 II C, document No. NO-3240 exhibit No. 80) "Owing to the extremely low temparatures and the snow drifts.
The Police actions were reduced following the lull at the front, which because of the protracted stay of the Kommandos brought about a considerable number of incidents.
Through the Sonderkommando IV b a total of 1317 persons (among them 63 political activities, 30 saboteurs and Partisans and 1224 Jews) were executed. As a result of these measures the community of Artomowsk became free of Jews also." No. 11, made up about 8 weeks later and submitted as a supplement by the prosecution, which stated; the following about this incident:
"In the remaining areas of the Eastern front the task of the Security Police and the SD apart from the actions against individual Jews who were politically or criminally active, consisted in the general parting of larger communitions. Thus in Rakow alone 1500 Jews and in Artemowsk, 1224 Jews were shot, so that these communities are not free of Jews." (Prosecution document book I page 51 document No. NO-2662 exhibit No. 13) 12 Feb 1948_E_MSD_26_9_Arminger (Juelich) above mentioned community Rakow belonged at no time to the area under the command, of SK IV b and that this is also not maintained by the Prosecution, Rakow is situated about 30 kilometers west of Minsk and belonged at that time to the area of the Einsatzgruppe A. Therefore, I must concern myself only with the shootings carried out in Artomowsk.
neither of the two reports quoted. One thing is certain; they must have been carried out before 6 March 1942, the date of report of events No. 177, because otherwise it would have been impossible to mention them in the report. Moreover, the shootings must have been executed before 4 March 1942, because the report winds up with this date. This alone in itself should be sufficient proof that the defendant had no connection with these measures, because he was not yet assigned to this command.
However, the shootings at Artemowsk cannot be determined as having taken place at a certain period. I stress this question because it is significant also for another reason which I shall discuss later on. Obviously the prosecution agrees with me that the events took place prior to 4 March or at least prior to 6 March 1942. On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the activity and situation report No. 11 mentions the report-period from 1 March until 31 March 1942 and hence infers that the shootings at Artemowsk must have taken place in March 1942. This, however, is a false conclusion. ports represent monthly reports. In order to make a comparison, I request that reference be made to report No. 9 covering the period from 1 February to 28 February 1942. They were intended for the Foreign Office according to the accompanying letters attached to them, and represent a concise summary of the reports of events of the corresponding month. Therefore, the mentioned report period does not prove by any means that the reported events actually took place during this time, but that the reports of events based on the events were drawn up at this period. Both, i.e. the operational - as well as the activity and situation reports, were compiled at the Reich Main Security Office. the actual events and their recording in the report of events, often a period of 6 to 8 weeks elapsed. If, therefore, the report of events No. 177 of 6 March 1942, mention is made of shootings at Artemowsk then this alone, in all probability, infers, that these shootings were carried out not just a few days before but considerably earlier. This becomes a definite fact if one considers the further contents of the report of events No. 177. same report by one concerning the EK V in which it states:
"As a result of the activity of the Einsatzkommando V b, a total of 1880 have been shot; among them political activists, 114 sabo teurs and looters as well as 1580 Jews.
This Kommando also car ried out an operation against members of the Bandera group."
and not even in February 1942. I refer in this connection again to report of events No. 154 of 12 January 1942 and others in which the EK V is no longer mentioned in the garrison strength rosters. Report of events No. 177, of 6 March 1942, concern therefore events which must have taken place prior to the destination of EK V, that is during January 1942 at the latest. port of events No. 189, of 3 April 1942, in the form of a photostat and an excerpt. The text of the excerpt contains only two paragraphs. They read:
"In Shitomir the soldier's cemetary at Cayssin had been desecra ted by persons unknown.
In the course of the subsequent inves Among them were:
1 mentally deranged person." ity of Shitomir, I proved that the SK IV b was never active in this area. The report itself does not mention anything as to who had carried out this measure. I could have been done only by the local Police offices, which had already been established there in February 1942 and which were subordinated to a special command of the Security Police and the SD. I may point out that this commander had also been definitely mentioned in the report of events No. 188, of 1 April 1942, which the prosecution submitted together with report of events No. 189, of 3 April 1942, already dealt with in this connection.
No other security units existed at this time. cribe the further mentioned execution of 434 persons, among them 352 Jews, to the SK IV-b. The submitted excerpt from report of events No. 189, of 3 April 1942, is misleading in that respect. Because it contains only the two paragraphs quoted it is apt to cause the impression that the shooting of 434 persons, including the 352 Jews, also took place in Shitomir. However, the photostat of the entire report gives quite another picture. According to it, the excerpt has been taken from an extensive report of Einsatzkommando C, altogether comprising seven paragraphs. Paragraphs one and two of this summary report concerns Kiew, the third concerns Schepetowka, the fourth concerns Nikelajew, the fifth Illowainschka, and the sixth Shitomir. The seventh and last paragraph then states in conclusion, how many persons had been subjected to special treatment during the time from 28 March to 31 March inclusive, in total i.e. in the entire area of Einsatzgruppe C. however, SK IV b did not participate in all these events, since all the localities quoted were outside of its sphere of activity at that time.
Finally, the report from the occupied Eastern territories, No. 6, dated 6 June 1942, was shown to the defendant. This report contains the following:
"Toward the end of April beginning of May 1942, several exten munists in the Commander's jurisdictional area Gorlowka.
Of the 1,038 persons arrested 727 were given 'special treatment', tivists and NKWD agents."
were carried out in the area of SK IV b but executed by the Wehrmacht and not by SK IV b. The Wehrmacht had reserved for itself the combatting of partisans and similar elements in those areas where extensive measures were necessary, and had organized special units for this purpose. A small Sonderkommando such as SK IV b, with a strength of only seventy men, and which, in addition, was split up into several Teilkommandos in various locations, would never have been able to carry out such operations, since it was not up to a completely organized and armed band simply for the reason that they were outnumbered. Consequently, when the report speaks of several large-scale operations then it can already be established from the very beginning that these operations were conducted by the Wehrmacht. They were mentioned in the reports of the Einsatzgruppen only because the reports of events and the reports from the occupied Eastern territories were supposed to provide as complete a picture as possible of the security measures which had been taken. tions mentioned here only in so far as a few experienced criminal police officials of the Kommando had been requested by the Wehrmacht for their assistance and assigned there in one or two cases. These officials for the length of their assignment were subject to the sole order of the leader of the particular Wehrmacht unit who thereby assumed sole responsibility for their actions. They were never used for executions. because the incidents happened at a time when he was absent from the Kommando temporarily for the second time, namely, on the occasion of his trip to Berlin and Prague. Also, he had nothing to do with the transfer of the officials; rather, this was initiated through his deputy at that time. These events became know to him only from the report which he had received from his deputy following his return from the above-mentioned trip. Also, this report contained information to the effect that a few such Wehrmacht operations had taken place, and this has been substantiated by the defendant on the witness stand.
which could be regarded as a crime. The containing of partisans, members of the Destruction Battalions, saboteurs, and looters is an action permissible according to International Law. I believe I do not have to touch upon this matter further. The report also shows that those persons apprehended were not killed indiscriminately but that only some 75 percent were actually affected by the so-called "special treatment". In other words, the cases were all investigated.
executed there were also a few Communist activists and NKWD agents, then this does by no means mean that these persons had been executed only because of their membership in the Communist Party or belonged to the NKWD without otherwise being particularly incriminated by other facts.
The focal point here rests on the fact, that, as can be clearly seen from the report, these were Communist activists and NKWD agents. These were no innocuous civilians but men who worked for the cause of the Soviets behind the German lines. The offices to which the report was transmitted did not have to be informed in detail as to how and in what nature this activity took place, since the operations of Communist elements, which had taken on active proportions, had long been known. These very persons created the chief danger to the security of the fighting troops since they were the ones who incited the resistance of the civilian population secretly but all the more effectively, and who created and maintained secret communication with the Soviet armed forces and the Soviet leadership.
II. The Activity According to the Statements of the Defendant it charges the defendant with war crimes and crimes against humanity, is completely exhausted. However, this will still require a certain elaboration as to what the defendant himself has stated regarding his activity with the SK IVb. him by Streckenbach, Director of AMT I in the RSHA, as well as by Heydrich, to the effect that he was to be responsible within his area of command for the security of the combat zone according to the directives as issued by the Wehrmacht. The instructions which he received from Thomas, Chief of the Einsatzgruppe C, were identical. An order, the execution of which would have been a crime according to the principles of humanity and according to the recognized rules of war, was never transmitted to him from any quarters.
In addition, up to the time who had been designated as inferior.
I shall return to this point termed as allegedly inferior.
However, at the time the defendant Haensch This was confirmed as well by the witness Martenz, in his affiDoc.Book I, p.15, davit, dated 23 October 1947. With the exception of a few Jewish Doc. No. 12 Exh. Panje drivers, who were there were never any Jews, gypsies, or No. 15 dant until during this trial.
In Gorlowka, the garrison of the Pros. following the measures carried out by Einsatzkommando VI. This Doc.Bk. IIC,p. is shown by the report of events No. 177, dated 6 March 1942. 65,Doc. No. NO- As has already been established, that was the same case following 3240,Exh No.80 the operation in Artemewski, which was previously mentioned. This area.
In this connection refer to the statements by the Co Spring 1942.
My colleague Durchholz has expressed the same in his final plea for the Co-Defendant Schulz.
Consequently, the de in toto were carried out, that is, two by the main Kommando in Gorlowka, one by the Teilkommando in Artemowsk, and one by the Teilkommando in Berwenkowa.
In each case, these had to do with small groups, in all some 60 parsons. These were exclusively saboteurs, spies, looters, and similar elements who as has been established, had acted unmistakably against the decrees which had been issued and made public for the security of the fighting troops. tions which were carried out by specialists thoroughly trained in criminology -- I interpolate -- and every accused person was given a hearing. The results of the investigations were then written down, the officials in charge of the investigations were then heard again verbally, and thereafter the decision was reached. May I again call particular attention to the fact, in this connection, that the defendant, as a professional lawyer, who had passed his State examination, was capable, according to German law, of holding the office of a judge. This was also true of the Director of the Executive Department. It can make no difference in the evaluation of the trial whether in this connection the defendant functioned formally as a judge or not; in practice, however, he reached his decisions in the only way that this could be expected of a judge. The executive procedure in the SK IVb was, therefore, at the time of the defendant, at least just as legally tenable as a procedure in a court martial, at which persons experienced in criminal law and judges, for the most part, are not to be found. Apart from that, a proceedings had been regulated by the OKW and the OKH, that is, the highest authority, and the defendant had been told not to change this. It was not up to him to change the procedure and to investigate it. that this was initiated, and decided upon by the Wehrmacht. The Wehrmacht had only commissioned the Teilkommando located there with the execution of punishment.
of execution. I interpolate: he found full understanding for this D. Closing Comment to Part I to the activities of the defendant in Russia.
If I may just briefly the slightest involved.
The evidence which has been submitted for this fact by the prosecution has been incontestably refuted.
On the under his command , was confirmed.
The charges raised against him fendant.
From this he has been suffering, and shall continue to suffer The defendant'smembership in the SD and the SS.
I shall now deal with the part which covers the defendant's contained in the transcript of my Opening Statement.
It is stated therein, that the defendant was a member of the General-SS.
However, this is not correct.
As I shall prove with the following, the de A. Data Concerning the SD Membership
1.) Date of Joining the SD of the SS.
This was in connection with his work as Rats assessor in Daeboln (Saxony). These activities were the reason for interfering in the city administration.
This, in turn, Haensche been a member since 1931, and that he also lost his job with Doc. Bk. I, Pg.10 the city of Daeblen. The above-mentioned facts can be suband 11, Doc. No. stantiated by the findings of the Daebeln Circuit Court of 1 8 and 9, Exh. No. July 1935, and by the affidavit of the former Daebeln Mayor, 12and13.
Arne Nietzsche, of 17 October, 1947, by which the defendant's statements are corroborated.
When the defendant made out the leadership.
At that time he did not know that the SS had and considering such reports, that is, the SD.
He only learned Prosec. Doc. Bk. fendant of his curriculum vitae dated 22 August 1937, which had III C.Pg. 86,Doc.No. been drafted for the personnel files , and in which it is stated 3261, Exh. No. that he had submitted the reports in his capacity as SD Confi141 dential Agent.
From this, the Prosecution thought it could prior to this incident.
However, by this statement, as re in the report he had become a confidential agent for the SD, but he certainly did not intend to show that he had acted in accordance with an already existing SD instruction.
There were no such confidential connections in this sense. Only in this particular case was the defendant working as SD Confidential Agent, but he did not act in that capacity either before or after this incident. by his stand for an orderlycity administration, which was to be protected against arbitrary Party interference, they approached him to take over the office for legal consultation and judicial, matters with the newly activated SD administrative District Chemnitz. The defendant agreed to this, as being an expelled Party member, he had no chances for the time being to receive another appointment. He considered the Chemnitz job only an emergency and transitary solution, as he had decided to follow a civil service career. He joined the Chemnitz SD on 1 august 1935 on the basis of a purelyprivate contract. However, the defendant intended to return to civil service afterhis expulsion from the Party had been rescinded, which he tried to expedite. unexpectedly. The defendant, without submitting a corresponding application, was formally transferred as an Unterscharfuehrer to the SS Special Formation, the SD in 1 May 1936. This did not affect his activities at all. He had still the choice of resigning, as soon as he could return to civil service.
II. His Continued SD Membership. were concluded. The final decision decreed that the defendant's expulsion from the Party was rescinded, and that the defendant was to be punished only by being reprimanded and warned. The Gauleiter of Saxony decreed, in addition to this, that the defendant was not to be appointed to any party office for the duration of three years. Because of this, he was unable to reenter civil service for the same period, as no government authority would have dated to employ a reprimanded Party Member, particularly inconsideration of the unity of Party and State firmly enacted by law, and in contradiction to the intentions as expressed by the Party Leadership.
In spite of that, the defendant had repeatedly tried to reenter government service. However, his efforts were of no avail.
to remain with the SD for an indefinite period, and to wait for the expiration of the ban. On 1 November 1936, he was transferred from Chemnitz to the SD Main Office in Berlin, the predecessor of the future Reich Security Main Office, where he was assigned to take over Personnel Main Department I as special advisor on disciplinary matters. When the Reich Security Main Office was established, his department was incorporated in Department I of the Reich Security Main Office. In order to prove this I refer to the affidavit by Walter Schellenberg of 23 October 1947. Also the testimony of defendants Ott and Sandberger.
Haensch Document Book I, Page 12; Document No. 10, Exhibit No. 14.
war had meanwhile broken out. The defendant was not in a position any longer to resign from his SD job. Even though, this would not have been possible before, especially since he had been permanently employed, without special arrangements being made. The Chief of the Security Police and the SD had prevailed with the Wehrmacht that in case of war the Reich Security Main Office members were to be exclusively under his assignment command. The induction centers made a corresponding special entry in the military passports of Reich Security Main Office members. By virtue of this special power of command, the Chief of the Security Police and the SD demanded that each member of the Reich Security Main Office should remain in his position. He even resorted to the extreme measure by instigating disciplinary action in reply to all release applications for joing the Army. This is shown by the affidavit of Gettfried Klingemann of 30 October 1947, who was the Chief of the Personnel Department for the Reich Security Main Office in 1939. From then on the defendant was really tied down. He was subject to martial law and had to continue his work with the Reich Security Main Office whether he liked it or not. Just as before, it was his task to deal with disciplinary matters within Department I.
Haensch Document Book I, Page 16, Document No. 13, Exhibit No. 16.
assigned to the Eastern Einsatz for a period of approximately three months. Actually he was still a member of Department I, with the sole exception that his particular official duties rested during that period, and after concluding his assignment to the Eastern Einsatz he had no difficulties in returning to his old position. Only this and nothing else was the reason for his missions towards the interrogator Mr. Wartenberg, when he - the defendant - stated that he had been assigned to Russia as special adviser for disciplinary matters. In the statement drafted by Mr. Wartenberg on 8 July 1947, which the defendant did not see until it was submitted during the cross-examination, these, his statements, were found to erreneously formulated, and this is the reason whyc the defendant refused to sign the affidavit which was written down by Mr. Wartenberg based on his erroneous initial draft.
Prosecution Document No. NO-5572, Exhibit No. 187. Reich Security Main Office Departments. If the indictment states to Count III under B,: that he had been also a member of Departments III, VI, and VII, this statement is false. The defendant himself never made any such statement, nor did the Prosecution submit any relevant evidence. This evidence can never be submitted, because it is an irrefutable fact that the defendant was never a member of Departments III, VI, and VII. Here, I want to make a special point that the Prosecution has made a very fundamental mistake. tion before, to resign from the Reich Security Main Office during the war, the defendant tried everything to attain this long-wished for aim, as he felt in his position, which he had been forced to accept in order to tide him over his period of unemployment at that time, and in which he was being retained against his will because of the exegencies of war. This has been substantiated by the affidavits of Herbert Dossier of 23 October 1947, of Lisa Krueger-Mettus of 29 September 1947 and 2 November 1947, of Elisabeth-Charlette Ebeinghaus of 23 October 1947, of Gottfried Klingemann of 30 October 1947, of Erika Coulon of 24 November 1947, and of Frau Charlette Hermstaedt of 31 October 1947.
Frau Hermstaedt was the defendant's secretary in the RSHA and consequently, was particularly well informed of his endeavors in this respect.
Haensch Doc. Bk, I, Pg. 2 Doc. No. 2, Exh. No. 6, Bk. I, Pg. 3, Doc.
No. 3, Exh. No. 7, Bk I, Pg. 5, Doc.
No. 5. Exh. No. 8. Bk. I, Pg 16, Doc. No. 13, Exh.
No. 16. Bk. 2, Pg. 4, Doc. No. 18, Exh. No. 21, Bk No. 2, Pg. 7, Doc.
No. 20, Exh. No. 23. quested via the Foreign Office for service in the Office of the Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark. The Chief of the Security Police and the SD granted this request. In July 1943, the defendant ceased to work for the Reich Security Main Office. After a short informatery orientation the defendant, on 1 September 1943, reported the Office Of the Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark, where he continued up to the end of the war as Referent in the Main Department Administration and legal matters. This is proved by the Affidavits of Friedrich Stahlmann of 27 October 1947 and 4 December 1947, as well as of Werner Best of 31 October and 26 December 1947. Stalhmann was a senior administration official in the Office of the Reich Plenipotentiary. The Court knows the person of Herr Best.
Haensch Doc. Bk. No. I, Pg. 18, Doc. No. 14, Exh.
No. 17, Bk II, Pg 6 Doc. No. 19, Exh.
No. 22. Bk. I, Pg. 20, Doc. No. 15, Exh. No. 23.
Bk. III, Pg. 5, Doc. No. 26, Exh. No. 29.
The defendant's new position was not a transfer by the Reich Security Main Office, but a was an entirely independent assignment. The defendant also ceased to receive his salary from the Reich Security Main Office; he was now paid by the Legation Pay Office of the Foreign Office in Berlin, as is proved by the money order stub of March 1944. Consequently, this transfer from the Reich Security Main Office did not only concern his removal from the personnel roster but also his being cancelled in the pay office recrods.
Otherwise, he had no further contacts with the SD after that time.
Haensch Doc. Bk. II, Pg. 8, Doc. No. 21, Exhibit No. 24.
It most now to be examined as to how the defendant's SD membership should be evaluated in the light of a criminal responsibility. The IMT verdict states that only those SD members belonged to a criminal group, to whom the following three requirements applied:
1.) They were to have occupied a specially defined position
2.) They were to have been SD members before 1 September 1939 This verdict does not show quite clearly which positions the IMT had in mind as regards the first requirement. Of the Reich Security Main Office Department, only Departments III, VI, and VII have been mentioned. Department I, which was the defendant's department, has, therefore, been excluded.
istrative District in Chmenitz cannot be included, because both factually and in organizational matters, this office was headed by Central Department I of the former SD Main Office, the predecessor of Department I in the Reich Security Main Office. to do with the SD. This was a military assignment. The Einsatzkommando and Sonderkommando were military units, which had not been activated solely from SD and Gestapo members, but also by drafting members of the criminal police, the constabulary, the Waffen-SS, and other groups or formations, which have not been declared criminal. This is not the point in question, as all other prerequisites do not apply to the defendant. his own free volition, but was forced to remain in this organization in accordance with the war laws and the regulations which the Chief of the Security Police and the SD had decreed concerning the commitment of members of the Reich Security Main Office in the Wehrmacht. Above all, his assignment to the Kommandos in Russia was not a voluntary act. It was based on the Einsatz order of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, which if not carried out would have been tantamount to mutiny and would have incurred most severe punishment for the defendants. The defendant could not have been expected to assume this responsibility. As to the question whether this could be expected of the defendant, I refer to the arguments of my colleague Lummert, with whom I fully agree. of the Einsatz and Sonderkommandos, he had absolutely no reason for not taking over the command of SK IV b. He only knew that these Kommandos were assigned in order to obtain the necessary security and order for carrying out the military operations in the occupied area and specifically at the rear of the front lines. Of what was otherwise done by the Einsatz and Sonderkommandos, the defendant had no knowledge and he was other organizations served over and above what they were actually supposed to do.
him no opportunity for finding out about these particular things. The accounts and reports from the Eastern front, from which he could have gained the knowledge, were not accessible to him. As the distribution key in the various reports of events shows, they were sent only to specific groups within specific departments, besides being sent to the department Chiefs. In addition Department I is not even listed. For example, I cite report of events No. 47 of 9 August 1941. even mentioned in the official conferences within department I. In accordance with the express order of Hitler the most rigorous secrecy was maintained before those persons who were not directly concerned with it in their official capacity. From the evidence, the court knows that for the handling of matters pertaining to the Jews, there was even a secret department which was kept completely apart and secluded from the other offices in a separate place to which no one had entrance except those persons employed there. other groups regarded as inferior, were kept from the special advisers for disciplinary matters, apparently with special care. investigation. The disciplinary officials would have lost every standard for judging official lapses on the part of those members of the Security Police and the SD employed in Germany, and would have experienced the most grave internal conflicts if they had learned what was going on in the occupied Eastern territories as performed according to order by the members of these organizations assigned to these territories. The prosecution is obviously of the opinion that the defendant must have connection with his own activity in Russia.