of execution. I interpolate: he found full understanding for this D. Closing Comment to Part I to the activities of the defendant in Russia.
If I may just briefly the slightest involved.
The evidence which has been submitted for this fact by the prosecution has been incontestably refuted.
On the under his command , was confirmed.
The charges raised against him fendant.
From this he has been suffering, and shall continue to suffer The defendant'smembership in the SD and the SS.
I shall now deal with the part which covers the defendant's contained in the transcript of my Opening Statement.
It is stated therein, that the defendant was a member of the General-SS.
However, this is not correct.
As I shall prove with the following, the de A. Data Concerning the SD Membership
1.) Date of Joining the SD of the SS.
This was in connection with his work as Rats assessor in Daeboln (Saxony). These activities were the reason for interfering in the city administration.
This, in turn, Haensche been a member since 1931, and that he also lost his job with Doc. Bk. I, Pg.10 the city of Daeblen. The above-mentioned facts can be suband 11, Doc. No. stantiated by the findings of the Daebeln Circuit Court of 1 8 and 9, Exh. No. July 1935, and by the affidavit of the former Daebeln Mayor, 12and13.
Arne Nietzsche, of 17 October, 1947, by which the defendant's statements are corroborated.
When the defendant made out the leadership.
At that time he did not know that the SS had and considering such reports, that is, the SD.
He only learned Prosec. Doc. Bk. fendant of his curriculum vitae dated 22 August 1937, which had III C.Pg. 86,Doc.No. been drafted for the personnel files , and in which it is stated 3261, Exh. No. that he had submitted the reports in his capacity as SD Confi141 dential Agent.
From this, the Prosecution thought it could prior to this incident.
However, by this statement, as re in the report he had become a confidential agent for the SD, but he certainly did not intend to show that he had acted in accordance with an already existing SD instruction.
There were no such confidential connections in this sense. Only in this particular case was the defendant working as SD Confidential Agent, but he did not act in that capacity either before or after this incident. by his stand for an orderlycity administration, which was to be protected against arbitrary Party interference, they approached him to take over the office for legal consultation and judicial, matters with the newly activated SD administrative District Chemnitz. The defendant agreed to this, as being an expelled Party member, he had no chances for the time being to receive another appointment. He considered the Chemnitz job only an emergency and transitary solution, as he had decided to follow a civil service career. He joined the Chemnitz SD on 1 august 1935 on the basis of a purelyprivate contract. However, the defendant intended to return to civil service afterhis expulsion from the Party had been rescinded, which he tried to expedite. unexpectedly. The defendant, without submitting a corresponding application, was formally transferred as an Unterscharfuehrer to the SS Special Formation, the SD in 1 May 1936. This did not affect his activities at all. He had still the choice of resigning, as soon as he could return to civil service.
II. His Continued SD Membership. were concluded. The final decision decreed that the defendant's expulsion from the Party was rescinded, and that the defendant was to be punished only by being reprimanded and warned. The Gauleiter of Saxony decreed, in addition to this, that the defendant was not to be appointed to any party office for the duration of three years. Because of this, he was unable to reenter civil service for the same period, as no government authority would have dated to employ a reprimanded Party Member, particularly inconsideration of the unity of Party and State firmly enacted by law, and in contradiction to the intentions as expressed by the Party Leadership.
In spite of that, the defendant had repeatedly tried to reenter government service. However, his efforts were of no avail.
to remain with the SD for an indefinite period, and to wait for the expiration of the ban. On 1 November 1936, he was transferred from Chemnitz to the SD Main Office in Berlin, the predecessor of the future Reich Security Main Office, where he was assigned to take over Personnel Main Department I as special advisor on disciplinary matters. When the Reich Security Main Office was established, his department was incorporated in Department I of the Reich Security Main Office. In order to prove this I refer to the affidavit by Walter Schellenberg of 23 October 1947. Also the testimony of defendants Ott and Sandberger.
Haensch Document Book I, Page 12; Document No. 10, Exhibit No. 14.
war had meanwhile broken out. The defendant was not in a position any longer to resign from his SD job. Even though, this would not have been possible before, especially since he had been permanently employed, without special arrangements being made. The Chief of the Security Police and the SD had prevailed with the Wehrmacht that in case of war the Reich Security Main Office members were to be exclusively under his assignment command. The induction centers made a corresponding special entry in the military passports of Reich Security Main Office members. By virtue of this special power of command, the Chief of the Security Police and the SD demanded that each member of the Reich Security Main Office should remain in his position. He even resorted to the extreme measure by instigating disciplinary action in reply to all release applications for joing the Army. This is shown by the affidavit of Gettfried Klingemann of 30 October 1947, who was the Chief of the Personnel Department for the Reich Security Main Office in 1939. From then on the defendant was really tied down. He was subject to martial law and had to continue his work with the Reich Security Main Office whether he liked it or not. Just as before, it was his task to deal with disciplinary matters within Department I.
Haensch Document Book I, Page 16, Document No. 13, Exhibit No. 16.
assigned to the Eastern Einsatz for a period of approximately three months. Actually he was still a member of Department I, with the sole exception that his particular official duties rested during that period, and after concluding his assignment to the Eastern Einsatz he had no difficulties in returning to his old position. Only this and nothing else was the reason for his missions towards the interrogator Mr. Wartenberg, when he - the defendant - stated that he had been assigned to Russia as special adviser for disciplinary matters. In the statement drafted by Mr. Wartenberg on 8 July 1947, which the defendant did not see until it was submitted during the cross-examination, these, his statements, were found to erreneously formulated, and this is the reason whyc the defendant refused to sign the affidavit which was written down by Mr. Wartenberg based on his erroneous initial draft.
Prosecution Document No. NO-5572, Exhibit No. 187. Reich Security Main Office Departments. If the indictment states to Count III under B,: that he had been also a member of Departments III, VI, and VII, this statement is false. The defendant himself never made any such statement, nor did the Prosecution submit any relevant evidence. This evidence can never be submitted, because it is an irrefutable fact that the defendant was never a member of Departments III, VI, and VII. Here, I want to make a special point that the Prosecution has made a very fundamental mistake. tion before, to resign from the Reich Security Main Office during the war, the defendant tried everything to attain this long-wished for aim, as he felt in his position, which he had been forced to accept in order to tide him over his period of unemployment at that time, and in which he was being retained against his will because of the exegencies of war. This has been substantiated by the affidavits of Herbert Dossier of 23 October 1947, of Lisa Krueger-Mettus of 29 September 1947 and 2 November 1947, of Elisabeth-Charlette Ebeinghaus of 23 October 1947, of Gottfried Klingemann of 30 October 1947, of Erika Coulon of 24 November 1947, and of Frau Charlette Hermstaedt of 31 October 1947.
Frau Hermstaedt was the defendant's secretary in the RSHA and consequently, was particularly well informed of his endeavors in this respect.
Haensch Doc. Bk, I, Pg. 2 Doc. No. 2, Exh. No. 6, Bk. I, Pg. 3, Doc.
No. 3, Exh. No. 7, Bk I, Pg. 5, Doc.
No. 5. Exh. No. 8. Bk. I, Pg 16, Doc. No. 13, Exh.
No. 16. Bk. 2, Pg. 4, Doc. No. 18, Exh. No. 21, Bk No. 2, Pg. 7, Doc.
No. 20, Exh. No. 23. quested via the Foreign Office for service in the Office of the Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark. The Chief of the Security Police and the SD granted this request. In July 1943, the defendant ceased to work for the Reich Security Main Office. After a short informatery orientation the defendant, on 1 September 1943, reported the Office Of the Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark, where he continued up to the end of the war as Referent in the Main Department Administration and legal matters. This is proved by the Affidavits of Friedrich Stahlmann of 27 October 1947 and 4 December 1947, as well as of Werner Best of 31 October and 26 December 1947. Stalhmann was a senior administration official in the Office of the Reich Plenipotentiary. The Court knows the person of Herr Best.
Haensch Doc. Bk. No. I, Pg. 18, Doc. No. 14, Exh.
No. 17, Bk II, Pg 6 Doc. No. 19, Exh.
No. 22. Bk. I, Pg. 20, Doc. No. 15, Exh. No. 23.
Bk. III, Pg. 5, Doc. No. 26, Exh. No. 29.
The defendant's new position was not a transfer by the Reich Security Main Office, but a was an entirely independent assignment. The defendant also ceased to receive his salary from the Reich Security Main Office; he was now paid by the Legation Pay Office of the Foreign Office in Berlin, as is proved by the money order stub of March 1944. Consequently, this transfer from the Reich Security Main Office did not only concern his removal from the personnel roster but also his being cancelled in the pay office recrods.
Otherwise, he had no further contacts with the SD after that time.
Haensch Doc. Bk. II, Pg. 8, Doc. No. 21, Exhibit No. 24.
It most now to be examined as to how the defendant's SD membership should be evaluated in the light of a criminal responsibility. The IMT verdict states that only those SD members belonged to a criminal group, to whom the following three requirements applied:
1.) They were to have occupied a specially defined position
2.) They were to have been SD members before 1 September 1939 This verdict does not show quite clearly which positions the IMT had in mind as regards the first requirement. Of the Reich Security Main Office Department, only Departments III, VI, and VII have been mentioned. Department I, which was the defendant's department, has, therefore, been excluded.
istrative District in Chmenitz cannot be included, because both factually and in organizational matters, this office was headed by Central Department I of the former SD Main Office, the predecessor of Department I in the Reich Security Main Office. to do with the SD. This was a military assignment. The Einsatzkommando and Sonderkommando were military units, which had not been activated solely from SD and Gestapo members, but also by drafting members of the criminal police, the constabulary, the Waffen-SS, and other groups or formations, which have not been declared criminal. This is not the point in question, as all other prerequisites do not apply to the defendant. his own free volition, but was forced to remain in this organization in accordance with the war laws and the regulations which the Chief of the Security Police and the SD had decreed concerning the commitment of members of the Reich Security Main Office in the Wehrmacht. Above all, his assignment to the Kommandos in Russia was not a voluntary act. It was based on the Einsatz order of the Chief of the Security Police and the SD, which if not carried out would have been tantamount to mutiny and would have incurred most severe punishment for the defendants. The defendant could not have been expected to assume this responsibility. As to the question whether this could be expected of the defendant, I refer to the arguments of my colleague Lummert, with whom I fully agree. of the Einsatz and Sonderkommandos, he had absolutely no reason for not taking over the command of SK IV b. He only knew that these Kommandos were assigned in order to obtain the necessary security and order for carrying out the military operations in the occupied area and specifically at the rear of the front lines. Of what was otherwise done by the Einsatz and Sonderkommandos, the defendant had no knowledge and he was other organizations served over and above what they were actually supposed to do.
him no opportunity for finding out about these particular things. The accounts and reports from the Eastern front, from which he could have gained the knowledge, were not accessible to him. As the distribution key in the various reports of events shows, they were sent only to specific groups within specific departments, besides being sent to the department Chiefs. In addition Department I is not even listed. For example, I cite report of events No. 47 of 9 August 1941. even mentioned in the official conferences within department I. In accordance with the express order of Hitler the most rigorous secrecy was maintained before those persons who were not directly concerned with it in their official capacity. From the evidence, the court knows that for the handling of matters pertaining to the Jews, there was even a secret department which was kept completely apart and secluded from the other offices in a separate place to which no one had entrance except those persons employed there. other groups regarded as inferior, were kept from the special advisers for disciplinary matters, apparently with special care. investigation. The disciplinary officials would have lost every standard for judging official lapses on the part of those members of the Security Police and the SD employed in Germany, and would have experienced the most grave internal conflicts if they had learned what was going on in the occupied Eastern territories as performed according to order by the members of these organizations assigned to these territories. The prosecution is obviously of the opinion that the defendant must have connection with his own activity in Russia.
In this connection I must say the following: initiate him into these matters, because, as I have described, he came to an area in which there were no more Jews. Of course, his superiors in the RSHA, Heydrich and Streckenbach and also Thomas, the Chief of Einsatzgruppe C, had exact information about these natters. Therefore, they consciously avoided brining up the subject before him. It can even be assumed that the defendant was ordered to this part of the Eastern front because here he could gain the front-line experience which Himmler required of every member of the RSHA, without coming into contact with things of which he was supposed to know nothing, considering his future activity as special adviser in disciplinary matters. of Jews which had taken place earlier. The last execution of this sort, i.e. the one in Artemowsk, had occurred, not as the prosecution says, a few days before the defendant took over the leadership of the Kommando, but a number of weeks prior to this. In this connection may I refer to the statements I made in the first part of my final plea. Minutes or other written documents were no longer available, therefore, since it was forbidden to keep them. Moreover, may I once again remind you that the staff of SK IV b was not located in Artemowsk, but only a Teilkommando was stationed there. The defendant only visited the latter, lasting perhaps one and a half hours at a time, for purposes of inspection. On these occasions only current matters were discussed. At any rate, neither the predecessor of the defendant, Braune nor the non of the Kommando over uttered a word about the fact that there had been shootings of Jews by SK IV b. resumed his activities as RSHA special adviser for disciplinary matters, the situation was the same as before. The reports of events or, as they were not sent to department I, and their contents were otherwise kept strictly secret.
The practical effects of the handling of the racial problem was a matter concerning which the little man on the street knew much more than the officials in the RSHA who were not directly connected defendant knew nothing of the persecution of Jews also explain why he did not know anything about the Fuehrer order, which was supposed to have been the basis for these measures. He did not need to be familiar with this order in order to perform his tasks as Fuehrer of SK IV b, since at his time it no longer had any significance in the Kommando areas.
Knowledge of such an order, however, would have had nothing less than a tragic effect for the activities of the defendant as RSHA special adviser for disciplinary matters.
III. The question of the defendant's participation in criminal also had he personal connection of any sort with crimes against humanity and war crimes, neither as a perpetrator nor as a participant. the defendant constantly conducted himself as can only be expected of a humane and just man. As Kommandofuehrer in the East, he saw to it that no one was persecuted without cause and that the civilian population of the occupied territory was spared unnecessary oppression. The affidavit of Hans Steinwede, of 22 December 1947, to cite only this one example, proves how he was regarded as a special advisor for disciplinary matters. Steinwede's error with regard to the defendant's authority in department I of the RSHA has been corrected by the affidavit submitted by the codefendant, Erwin Schulz, of 12 January 1948. an assistant judge, an assessor, of the Gestapo in Berlin, and he had him punished because he had maltreated a Jew. Reich Plenipotentiary in Denmark is of particular significance in this connection. Of course, these activities have nothing further to do with his membership in the SD, but they demonstrate the over-all personal conduct of the defendant with penetrating distinctness. There the defendant intervened in every possible way for a compromise between the interests of the German Wehrmacht and the concerns of the Danish civilian population, including the American and English citizens interned in Denmark, and in numerous cases where there were indications of undue severity, he interceded in a helpful manner, in direct and shart contrast to the German police.
I will not go into the multitude of details here, but will refer to the affidavits of Friedrich Stalmann, of 4 November and 4 December 1947, and of Werner Best, of 31 October and 26 December 1947. praisal of the character of the defendant. The same applies to the affidavits of Elizabeth Charlotte Ebbinghaus, of 23 October 1947, Frau Lisa Krueger-Martius, of 29 September and 2 November 1947, of Frau MariaKrueger-Martius, of 16 October 1947, of Frau Erika Coulon, of 24 November 1947, and of Frau Charlotte Harmstaedt, of 21 October 1947. I would also like to call the attention of the court to these.
C. Closing comment to Part II. not guilty on count III of the indictment.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now be in recess until tomorrow morning at 9:30 o'clock, and tomorrow's session will take place in Courtroom No. 1.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 13 February 1948, at 0930 hours.)
THE MARSHAL: The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal II.
PRESIDENT: Some time ago'several weeks ago the Tribunal discussed with counsel of both sides the order of presentation of the final pleas or summations. Several of defense counsel were of the impression that they were entitled to the final word. We indicated at the time, and we repeat today that the order of the presentation is not of paramount importance. After all, it is the substance of the speech and not the order in which it is heard which determines just how much it helps to elucidate the issued involved. In Anglo-American procedure the prosecution invariably terminates the argument because the prosecution has the burden of proof. We decided that the prosecution would make the final speech in this case, not so much because of the burden it must sustain, but because of the physical and mechanical difficulties with which it was confronted and which were more numerous than those which confronted defense counsel. Nonetheless, although the prosecution will have the final speech in this case, defense counsel will still be allowed an opportunity to make further remarks. In keeping with the policy which has been demonstrated rather repetitiously throughout this trial and which perhaps sometimes it has been demonstrated we fear to the annoyance of the prosecution, we allow the defense every possible latitude in the presentation of arguments or of evidence which they believe are of importance in the defense. Thus, after the prosecution will have completed its final speech this morning, such of defense counsel who believe that they should reply to what is new in the prosecution's final utterance will be permitted to make those extemporaneous remarks. We will insist that these extemporaneous remarks be addressed only to what is new in the argument presented by prosecution counsel and not merely be a duplicate of some argument which has already been made by defense counsel in final statement or summation already delivered.
We will now hear from the prosecution.
GENERAL TAYLOR: May it please the Tribunal. dence in support of the indictment which has been brought against these defendants. On 30 September, 136 days ago, the prosecution rested its ease. In view of the nature of the crimes charged here, and the conclusive documentary proof in support thereof, the desperate nonsense which has been chattered during the twenty-one intervening weeks may jar the ear but it can hardly surprise the mind. week for each defendant the prosecution sees not the slightest necessity for or benefit from a tedious rehearsal of the details of the record. We are filing briefs summarizing the evidence against each individual defendant. In this oral statement, we will confine ourselves to the very few general matters raised by the defense which warrant a few words. briefly what the prosecution's evidence showed with respect to the organized program of murder of which these men are the chief surviving executors. It is only too well known that anti-semitism was a cardinal point of Nazi ideology. Throughout the early years of the Third Reich, the Jews of Germany were subjected to ever more severe restrictions, persecutions, and barbarities, and by 1939 life in Germany was all but intolerable for them. The war presented Himmler and Heydrich with what, to them, was a golden opportunity to carry these doctrines to their logical and terrible conclusion--the extermination of all Jews in Germany and in the countries overrun by the Wehrmacht. But practical problems soon cropped up. No one, at least for centuries, had ever tried to eradicate an entire antional and racial group, and it rapidly became apparent that such a project was.....
PRESIDENT: General Taylor, I suggest that you speak a little more slowly for the benefit of the interpreter.
GENERAL TAYLOR: ...an ambitious undertaking which required time and money and manpower and planning! With the invasion of the Soviet Union, the project was put on a really systematic footing. the most part, the approximately 3,000 members of the four so-called "Einsatzgruppen" of the SS, whose leading members are indicted here. The members of these units were carefully instructed as to their mission by Heydrich himself. Their general task was to insure the "political security" of the conquered territories in Russia, and as part of this function they were directed to exterminate all Jews, Gypsies, government officials, Communist party leaders, and other so-called "undesirable elements" in their assigned territories. With the support of the Army leaders, this program was faithfully carried out, and resulted in the murder of at least a million Jews and other human beings during the first two years of the Russian campaign. The defendants have not seriously endeavored to controvert these facts, which conclusively prove the crimes of genocide and the other war crimes and crimes against humanity charged in the indictment. Nor, with a few exceptions as to precise dates -- for the most part insignificant -- have the defendants attempted to contradict the clear proof that they commanded or were otherwise connected the Einsatzgruppen as charged in the indictment. All of the foregoing is clearly established by the documents introduced by the prosecution, consisting chiefly of the defendants' own reports of their activities. escape the damning effect of the conclusive proof afforded by their own records? Only a few of them have been so utterly foolish as to deny that they knew that the Einsatzgruppen had been directed to kill Jews and government officials as described above, or that such executions indeed took place, and in the face of the proof, such a defense is, preposterous.
These defendants who were in charge of these units at the outset of the Russian campaign received instructions which were terribly clear. Those who came in later learned about it from their superiors and predecessors. Mass executions of Jews by the Einsatzgruppen took place in all sectors of the Russian front. We may well believe that the members of the Einsatzgruppen were brutalized by what they did and what they saw being done around them, but they did not become so blase as to carry out these mass executions without even talking about it among themselves. The subject matter of this proceeding is horrible, but it is hardly boring. And furthermore, quite apart from the inherent incredibility of this defense, it is easy to see why very few of the defendants have ventured to put it forth. Most of the defendants have relied upon the so-called defense of "superior orders", and if no order was given to kill Jews and others, or if such an order was not perfectly well-known to all the members of the Einsatzgruppen, then of course the defense that these executions were committed under the compulsion of such an order can not be made. In any event, the very idea that the defendants did not know of both the order and of the executions is so ridiculous that we have already dignified it overmuch.
various times during the trial which deserve some comment. Some of the defendants have sought refuge in the contention that they as individuals did not take an active or direct part in the actual executions, but were primarily concerned with administrative matters or other phases of the operations of the Einsatzgruppen. Other defendants claim that the units under their command did not carry out the order for the killing of Jews and Gypsies and Government Officials, and other undesirables. With respect to reports showing that their units did in fact execute large numbers of people, the excuse is given that the victims were either proven criminals or were all executed by way of reprisal in the course of the anti-partisan warfare being waged behind the front in Russia. And the third point - made by numerous defendants - is that they acted under the compulsion of "superior orders". we will, shortly, make a few observations on what effect, if any, a few of the defendants - most notably the defendant Ohlendorf - have advanced as a defense the very motives which led them to commit these murders; they have bluntly taken the position that under the circumstances which confronted them, the killing of all Jews - even Jewish children - was a necessary and proper part of warfare. This sinister doctrine we will deal with in conclusion. available, conclusive, and susceptible of very brief statement. We do not propose now to examine the evidence, or the application of these arguments, with respect to each of the individual defendants; that has been done in the written briefs which we have filed or are filing with the Tribunal, we have no desire to protract the trial on this, its last day, by laboring the obvious or burdening the transcript with a detailed refutation of flimsy and desperate contentions.
What we may call the defense of "lack of direct participation" has been made by two distinct groups of defendants.
Some of them - for example, Jost and Naumann, and Blobel - were the commanders or deputy commanders of the Einsatzgruppen or their subordinate units the Einsatzkommandos and Sonderkommandos, with slightly greater plausibility. Thus the argument has also been put forth by the lower ranking defendants - such as Ruehl, Schubert and Graf - who were officers and staff members, but not in command of these units. participate directly , the elementary principle must be borne in mind that, neither under Control Council Law no. 10 nor under any known system of criminal law, is guilt for murder confined to the man who pulls the trigger or buries the corpse. In line with recognized principles common to all civilized legal systems, paragraph 2 of article II of Control Council Law No. 10 specifies a number of types of connection with crime which are sufficient to establish guilt. Thus, not only are principals guilty but also accessories, those who take a consenting part in the commission of crime or are connected with plans or enterprises involved in its commission, those who order or abet crime, and those who belong to an organization or group engaged in the commission of crime. These provisions embody no harsh or novel principles of criminal responsibility, and a moment's reflection on their meaning will indicate how inadequate is the defense which we are now considering. matters which they affirm establish that their responsibility is, in fact, deeper than that of some of the other defendants. It is, of course, highly probable that these defendants did not, at least very often, participate personally in executions. And it would indeed be strange had they done so. Not even a regimental or battalion commander in battle spends much of his time personally shooting a gun -- it is his task to organize and direct the shooting by the men who serve under him.