Q. Was not the fuehrer order made known to you about the killing of the Jews in Smolensk?
A. No, Strangely, not one single word either from Oberfuehrer Naumann nor from Hannicke or of the other two officers I spoke of.
Q. Didn't you read any reports about it?
A. No, the SD reports said nothing about a fuehrer order or Jewish executions.
Q. When and where did you reach Sonder-Commando 7B?
A. On the 18th or 19th of February 1942 I reached Sonder-Commando 7 B in Bryansk.
Q. How large was this commando and how was it divided up -how was it organized?
A. The commando had approximately a hundred men, about 50 officers and men came from the state police and the criminal police, 10 came from the SD, about 10 to 15 drivers came from the security police and the same number of drivers who were on an emergency war status. Then there were two signal men. The organization was as follows. In each town, Kursk and Orel there was a sub-commando.
Q. Wasn't there one in Bryansk, too?
A. Bryansk had the headquarters of the commando and also the local subcommando.
Q. Were any subcommandos dissolved, transferred, or newly activated during your time?
A. Yes, about the end of March the subcommando Kursk was dissolved because the Kursk area was placed under another army. Furthermore, around May or June I set up the commando in Karatschew and shortly afterwards about the end of June, on instructions from the army, I sent a small detachment to Lokot -- L-O-K-O-T.
Q. How many officers did you have in Sonder Commando 7 B?
A. 8.
Q. To what branches of the SS and police did the officers of your staff and those in the subcommandos belong?
inspector of the state police. Chief 3 was an Obersturmfuehrer of the SD. Chief 4 was a Hauptsturmfuehrer, Captain, and a police inspector of the state police at the same time, he was the commanding officer of the subcommando located at the same time where the headquarters of the commando was. Further, there was an Untersturmfuehrer who was the motor pool officer. I think he came from the SD or he came from Berlin, I think. The commanding officers of the subcommandos, in as far as there were sufficient in munbers, were police inspectors.
DR. KOESSL: The witness has made a sketch or a chart in order to show his own area, and I would like to submit to the Tribunal photostats of this chart.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Koessl, would you please first indicate on the large map where this area is located?
DR. KOESSL: Yes, Sir. Witness, will you please go over to the map and show where your Einsatz area is?
THE WITNESS: The headquarters of the commando was first in Bryansk, and then at the end of March I moved it to Orel where the headquarters of the army was. Here was the subcommandoo Kursk, which was later dissolved, and the later established subcommando Karatschew was set up a few weeks later in Lokot was south of Bryansk in a large forest.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
the Kommando 7-B on the basis of the chart. in the Army area of the Second Armored Army. That is the area as I have drawn in on the chart. In the East the border is the front line which is shown on the chart by thick lines interspersed with dots. In the South the Army area bordered on the line of Ver Yove Malo Archangelsk. In the west the border runs eastward along the villages Sseredina Buda, Trubtschewsk, Potschep, in the north the line Bytosch Kletnia. from Mr. Naumann. I indicated Kletnia in the northwest of the chart. The border must run where the vertical rod line is. What is left of that line belongs to the Rear Army area, not to my subkommando.
THE PRESIDENT: when you speak of the red line, do you mean actually the color red or the Soviet line?
THE WITNESS: It is marked in by pencil on these photostats.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it is only black and white on ours. Oh, I see.
THE WITNESS: Everything that is left of that line belongs to the Rear Army area, not to my Kommando.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
THE WITNESS: The area is traversed by the main road Bryansk-Orel and by the railroad on the same line, and this road cuts the area into two parts, into a northeastern one and into a southwestern part. The main towns were Bryansk and Orel where the roads and railroads were converging in a radius. First Bryansk was the headquarters of the kommando, but the end of March, 1942, I moved it to Orel which is about 130 kilometers away from Bryansk. The chart is drawn according to a scale 1 to 1,250,000. One centimeter on the chart represents twelve and a half kilometers in the actual area. This chart shows at various places areas which are marked by criss-crossing lines. These are those areas where members of the Kommando hardly over wont to because there the danger of the partisans was not so great as on the road Bryansk-Orel and its surroundings.
Some areas are dotted. That is the area of the socalled self-administration Lokot which was subordinate to the well-known Russian Kaminsky. The Sonder Kommando 7-B had to concentrate its forces in combatting the partisan and sabotage acts on the road Bryansk-KaratschewOrel. In the front line area the Kommando was active in the towns Schistra near Jagodnija, Krassnikowo and Bolchoff as well as Dumtschino. These are the areas directly at the front. In the south the area between Mokrasi Malo Archangelsk and Nischne Salegosch -- that is at the bottom right -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Koessl, don't you think it might be more interesting if he points out these places on the map as he relates the story of the actions of his Kommando? It would be more helpful to us, if he gives it to us abstractly, geographically, doesn't convey the image and picture which I am sure you want us to have.
DR. KOESSL: We shall then refer to the map when the witness talks about individual actions.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I think that would be much more illuminating. BY DR. KOESSL:
Q What communications existed between the subkommandos? or if the roads were not impassable because of mud in the spring, were to be reached by vehicle without any trouble. The Kommando in Lokot which was in the so-called partisan war area could only be reached by going via Bryansk. From Bryansk to Lokot an armored column of the Army traveled about twice a week, and the rail line was guarded by security troops.
Q Did you have any telephone or radio communications? Einsatzgruppe but telephone communications existed via the Army headquarters to every subkommando.
Q How often did you have an opportunity to visit the Sub-Kommandos? kommandos was often disturbed.
dos? and Bryansk. As far as the subkomnando Lokot is concerned, which was about two hundred kilometers away and which would mean a trip of four hundred kilometers both ways. I visited this Kommando three times altogether, once with the armored train of the Army. The trip lasted five days even though the conference in Lokot took only two hours. The second time the General made available to me his airplane, and the third time I flew by plane with Oberfuehrer Naumann -- who I think had become a Brigadier General by this time.
Q Did the assignment area change during your time? away from us and given to an army in the South, and along the front line there were only small gains and small losses.
Q To whom was the special Kommando 7-B subordinate? taneously it was subordinate to the Second Armored Army in Orel.
DR. KOESSL: Your Honor, the witness has also made a chart in order to make clear the various channels of command, and I would like to submit this to the Tribunal because the relationship to the Army is important. two channels, the straight lines, those which are not interrupted, that is, the channel of command of the Security Police, and SD. That is to say, that is the channel of the orders which came through Einsatzgruppe B, or those orders which the Sonder Kommando 7-B passed on to its subkommando. The dotted line is that channel of command the Army used to give orders to the Einsatzgruppe and which were then passed on to the Sonder Kommando or to the subkommandos.
from the Security Police and SD in Berlin, Also from the Higher SS and Police Leader of central Russia, and from the Army, and from the Army group center, and from the Commander of the rear Army area. The Sonder Commando VII-B, which is drawn in as a triangle to the right at the bottom (referring to the chart) received orders or the one hand from Einsatzgruppe-B; on the ether hand from the Second Armored Army, and from the Commander of the rear Army area of Bryansk.
Q. What orders did you get from Einsatzgruppe-B, and which one did you get from the Armored Army?
A. From Einsatzgruppe-B I received those orders which concerned the activity of the Commandos which were necessary as the situation demanded it. Furthermore, I got orders about the SD reporting, as well as about changes in personnel and changes in the situation. The Second Armored Army gave orders about the Security police measures of most varied types, as well as orders about Partisan warfare, and anti-sabotage acts.
Q. What orders did you get
A. I have some more. Furthermore, the Army demanded reports continuously about the conditions in the civilian sphere, and about the Partisan reconnaisance. Outside the Commander of the rear area, . the Field Commander in Orel also gave orders, and sofar as the subcommanders were concerned, they received orders from the town commandants, and the local commandants.
Q. With the agency of the Army did you cooperate? In order to show these many Army agencies, the witness has made a third and final chart from which the Tribunal can see the great number of Army agencies which cooperated with the Sonder Commando. Just explain this chart briefly?
A. Yes. In this Chart I have drawn in the triangle which re presents Sonder-Commando 1 B, and the three samll triangles below represent the sub-commandos.
Up on top is the Army group center, which gave orders via Einsatzgruppe-B. Then to the right is the second Armored Army in Orel. I mention these agencies which belong to the Staff of this Army, and with which I had to deal directly. First of all the Commander-in-chief himself, second of all the Chief of Staff, third the Department I-A, the Department I-C, G-II; then the counter-intelligence officer, and then the Quartermaster General the Economic Command, as well as the Department for Agriculture. All the way on the right I put in the town and field commandant in Orel, that was General Theo Haman. Then I listed the G-II of the Corps, and below the Combat Division. Then comes Counter Intelligence of the Army. Then comes the Field Police; another Army Police Unit, and the Command Hutzel and the Combat Field Police; another Army Police Unit, and the Command Hutzel and the Combat Command Fuchs. Then the Air Squadron Moelders, a unit of his was in Orel, as well as the Special Unit of the socalled Indigenous people, these were the Russian volunteers who fought against the Russians under German leadership. At the left top we have the Commanding General of the rear Army area, center, in Smolensk, that was General von Schenkendorf, who gave instructions via Einsatzgruppe-B. Then comes the Commending General of the rear Army area, who gave directives and orders directly to the Commando. Then comes the Security Divisions of Counter Intelligence No. 1, the Secret Field Police and which was called G.F.P.; then the town and village commandants, the Administrative Chief, these were administrative districts under the charge of an Army administrative officer. Then the socalled Liaison Staff Lokot. That was the liaison Staff between the militia of Kaminsky and the Chief of the self Administrative Lokot, the Russian Kaminsky.
Q. You have already described this?
A. No, I have not. This Russian Kaminsky had his own militia with the approval of the Commanding General, of about two-thousand men strong. That was the detachment of Russian volunteers trained by German non-comms but led by Russian officers against Partisans.
Q. That suffices, witness. After you arrived at the Sender commando VII-B, did you immediately take over the leadership of the commando?
A. No. I have already said that for about three weeks I acquainted myself with the work.
Q. When did you take over the leadership?
A. The 15th of 16th of March, 1942, the then Oberfuehrer Naumann came to Smolensk and said farewell to commander leader Rausch gave me the command.
Q. In Document Book II-D, that is, in the English page 64, and the German page 57, which is your affidavit of 24 April 1947, NO-2393Prosecution Exhibit No. 67, under No. 3 of this affidavit it reads: "On the 15th February 1942 I was sent to Sender commando VII-B of Einstazgruppe-B. I became commanding officer of this commando and successor of Obersturmbannfuehrer Rausch." End of quote. When you were interrogated by Mr. Wartenberg, did you mention to him the time that you spent in acquainting yourself with the work?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you also tell him that you did not finally take over the commando until three weeks later?
A. Yes. I told him in great detail about my information in Smolensk, and I told him about the way in which the commando was handed over to me by Naumann.
Q. How long did you lead the Commando VII-B?
A. I was in charge of the Sonder Commando VII-B from the 15th or 16th of March until the 27th or 28th of January, 1943.
Q. In what periods of time between the 15 March 1942 and the end of January, 1943, were you prevented from conducing the leadership of the Commando?
A. The leadership of the Commando can be divided up into three phases. The first period -
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Koessl, you are now going into a more active phase of the narrative. Suppose we take it up after our usual morning recess.
DR. KOESSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
( recess.)
THE MARSHAL: The Tribunal is again in session.
DR. FRITZ: Dr. Fritz for the defendant Fendler. excused this afternoon from attendance in Court, and for you to rule that he report to Room 57, because I want to discuss his defense with him.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant Fendler will be excused from attendance in Court this afternoon, and the appropriate authorities are hereby instructed he be conducted to Room 57 so he may there confer with his attorney.
DR. FRITZ: Thank you very much, your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: You are welcome.
DR. KOESSL: I would like to proceed now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Koessl. BY DR. KOESSL:
Q. During what period, witness, between 15 March 1942, and the end of January, 1943, were you the leader of the Commando?
A. The first time, from 27 April 1942, until 3 June 1942; then I was appointed to Einsatzgruppe-B in order to get supplies, a number of articles, and I went to my home country, and to Lorraine. On 27 April I left; the 3rd of June I returned, and on the 4th of June I was in charge again of the Commando.
THE PRESIDENT: I didn't quite catch that?
DR. KOESSL: From 27 April until 3rd June the witness was not with the Commando.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. You mean he was in Germany.
DR. KOESSL: Yes, he was in Germany. BY DR. KOESSL:
Q. Any further interruptions?
A. The next interruption began on 14 August. I fell off a horse and broke my left lower thigh. On 14 August I came to the Field Hospital No. 156 in Orel. I was there for about four or six days, and then I was to be taken to Warsaw in a train for wounded. At that tide, at least for a few days before the attack near Bolchoff had started, and the Field Hospital was "full-up". Then I went to my own quarters in Orel. I was lying there and the physician of the Field Hospital attended me. He visited me every two or three days, and apart from that I was also treated by the physician of the Unit Moelders.
Q How long was this interruption of your service with the Kommando? Government Councillor Dr. Allinger came who was to be put in charge of the Kommando. He remained for a few weeks in Orel but he was then transferred back to Einsatzgruppen B and the new Kommando chief SS_ Sturmbannfuehrer Wilhelm Bluhm was appointed. At this time I was to be retransferred which is noted in the documents here. mentioned, 4747, in Document Book III_B which the President already looked at during the morning.
THE PRESIDENT: How long was he disabled after August 14th?
Q How long had you been away? September. When I could walk with crutches, on 28 September 1943 when my retransfer had already been decided I went homo first.
Q Did you remain at home? I could only walk on crutches at the time. After five weeks when my leg had more or less been healed I was ordered to Russia again. I was detailed to Russia again upon special request by the supreme chief of the 2nd Armored Army Corps General Schmidt who had sent a report about Einsatzgruppen B to the Reich Security Main Office. This request of the General was supported by the chief of Einsatzgruppen B Brigadefuehrer Naumann.
Q How long did you then remain with the Kommando?
THE PRESIDENT: When did he return first?
Q And when did you take over the Kommando?
THE PRESIDENT: You went on 28 September 1942, is that correct?
AApproximately on the 8 September I went back. It took me seven days to get there and then I took over the Kommando.
tion until January 1943?
THE PRESIDENT: It came through that approximately September 8, undoubtedly November 8 is intended.
A Yes. I left home on 8 November and on the 15th I arrived or there abouts and on the next day, 16 November 1942. I took over the Kommando again. were they in agreement with your idea of what the work was going to consist of? the information service and intelligence work I knew from former assignments. Apart from that I had certain experiences which I had already at the beginning in the Russian territory during my Russian assignment made in connection with combating partisans. Already at that time a part of the roads could only be passed in convoys and only in daytime.
Q Did your expectations conform to conditions as they were?
A No I couldn't say that because Rausch informed me about the fact that this Fuehrer order was in existence.
Q What did Rausch tell you about the Fuehrer order?
THE PRESIDENT: When was this?
A That was when I arrived at Kommando VII_B in Bryansk. That was 18 or possibly 19 February 1942.
THE PRESIDENT: That's the first time you had heard of the Fuehrer order, February 1943? carrying out within the territory of sub-Kommando VII_B. in the evening. He was on a short service trip and in the evening we sat down in his own room and we discussed matters until midnight.
He first explained to me the marching route of the Kommando since it had left in June 1941 from Pretsch and Dueben. He also told me about the collaborations with the Wehrmacht and also he said, "Now, I am going to explain to you the hardest task which I had". And that was the Fuehrer order. I asked Bausch what Fuehrer order and Bausch said, "Of course, the Fuehrer order concerning the extermination of the Jews." Upon that I said, "What extermination of the Jews?" So Bausch said, "Were you not informed in Smolensk about that?" So I said "No, not a word was mentioned to me". Thereupon Bausch informed me about the Fuehrer order as he had informed the marching Kommando in June of the preceding year in Pretsch and Dueben or as the Fuehrer order had then been made known by Heydrich and Streckenbach. I requested Bausch to tell me whether this order had also been issued in writing. He said, "No, this order has not been written down." people concerned? Fuehrer order, the Jews would have to be eliminated for reasons of security. I asked him"what Jews" and he said, "All Jews". When I asked him "does that also concern women and children" he said "Yes, they also have to be eliminated".
Q What did he direct you to do or what did he give you as a tank? that the front had come to a stop near Orel as early as October, I think at the end of October 1941, and that the front line from that date on could not be moved forward. He told me that the Kommando for as long as five months had been stationed in Orel and Bryansk and had carried out the Fuehrer order concerning the elimination of the Jews. As far as I was concerned the order would become topical when Tula had been reached. The chief cities which by then were still occupied by the Russians were Suchinitschi and Mzensk.
main Russian part. They mention Mzensk which is east of Orel and Suchinitschi which is east of Bryansk. As far as your own territory was concerned which had already been in the hands of sub-Kommando VII-B for some time was this Fuehrer order to be carried out in this territory? concluded more or less in this particular territory. He said that towns were already free from Jews; that, however, probably in the far away places between the woods and swamps there would probably without any doubt be Jews, but that the Kommando was not string enough and not well manned enough to carry at operations in this territory which was over three hundred kilometers wide.
Q What was your reaction to this order then?
complete surprise to me and came out of the blue, I was horrified and I intended after the period of three weeks of my getting used to my work and when, Brigadefuehrer Naumann would arrive, I should have this order confirmed by Naumann. I did not only consdier this order very severe and serious for the people concerned but also for the men who had to carry out this order.
Q Didn't it occur to you to refuse to carry out this order, to object to it, and refuse the carrying out of it?
A That wasn't possible for me because as far as this territory was concerned it had already been carried out for five months. Naumann and what did he tell you?
A Yes. Brigadefuehrer Naumann arrived the 15 or 16 of March. It was a Saturday and he remained until Sunday noon and when he turned over the Kommando to me on this Sunday morning I asked him whether this order would have to be carried out in the form as told to me by Rausch and whether it was quite correct in this shape. Brigadefuehrer Naumann replied, "Yes, this order has been given in this particular form. I myself have very serious misgivings about it and I reject it psychologically but we have to carry it out." were chief of the Kommando to apprehend Jews and to execute them according by the Fuehrer order?
A No. When I took over Kommando VII_B there were no operations of any kind in order to seize Jews. which might possibly be in the territory concerned? confirmed, I could not detail this small unit of about 100 men into these partisan infested territories. I could not dispurse them there.
I depended on my own securing of supply routes, mainly the road BryanskKapatschew-Orel and the parallel railway line and in making partisan reconnaissance. Added to this in the southwest and south of Bryansk there was a forest and swamp area around Lokot. In this territory there were partisans numbering about 3,000 men strong.
Q How did the partisan warfare express itself in your territory? question because it is very decisive for conditions in the territory of the 2nd Armored Army, As I have already said that Lokot, south of Bryansk, could only be reached by an armoured train. The road Bryansk-Kapatschew-Orel and the railway line of the same route was in constant danger of partisan attacks. The same applied for the supply routes and the railway lines from Bryansk and Lokot to the frontal sector. In the territory in the north of Bryansk near Biat, Kowo, I put into this sketch, there also was partisan and sabotage not work here. The partisans even had an air base and they had regular aerial service. The losses through partisan warfare were very high. In the fall of 1942 shortly before I left at that time, for instance, the railway administration authorities Orel had lost 80% of their locomotives through blastings and sabotage acts. Each month hundreds of German soldiers and numerous Russian civilians were killed through partisan warfare. Even the trains with wounded and the supply trains were often blasted by mines. On the main road Bryansk_Orel according to statistics received by the Army.
THE PRESIDENT: How large was this partisan organization? territory?
A It was 6 to 7,000 men. We had groups of partisans.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. There were 5 to 7,000 engaged in those activities which you have now described is that what you are saying?
THE PRESIDENT: How many men did you have? 100 men.
THE PRESIDENT: You are not going to try to tell us that you with 100 men were going to try to compete with 6 to 7,,000 armed forces who had an air drome and possessed of explosives and were organized and carried out what really amounted to organized warfare? the reconnaissance of the Partisans, a number of Wehrmacht units also took part, The 6 to 7,000 -
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that really became then a military operation?
THE PRESIDENT: The Wehrmacht wouldn't allow such a major situation as that to be solved only by your small group?
THE PRESIDENT: well then what you are doing at present is merely giving us a history of the situation of the area.
A Your Honor, I want to make clear the following things. One has to distinguish here between two different activities, First is partisan combating and the other is the reconnaissance,
THE PRESIDENT: That is enough that you indicate that there were vast partisan groups, in fact of such size and of such force that they engaged the attention of the Wehrmacht. Now, tell us what you did, what your Kommando did because if you go into the history of the whole partisan movement in Russia, it is entirely too vast to be related here in your own case. I would suggest, Dr. Koessl, that you would try to confine your questions to what his Kommando did. BY DR. KOESSL: Kommando in the whole of the Partisan warfare. Therefore, witness, tell us briefly about the tasks of your own Kommando.
two things were necessary. First was to actually fight the partisans which was mainly being dealt with by the Wehrmacht and the other thing was the Partisan reconnaissance which was mainly the task of my Kommando. I may point out, this is mentioned in a number of documents from which it becomes evident that the Kommando first of all dealt with reconnaissance of the partisan bands. documents. Please proceed witness.
so many units from the security sectors, for these tasks even temporarily in fact not enough to carry out a successful combat of partisan hands. The Wehrmacht was merely in the position, sometimes, only for a few days, anyway only temporarily, to put at our disposal a unit of the size of a regiments and to take from the front, and thus try and carry out an effective partisan warfare. I may refer here to a document which is contained in the document books here and which deals with the Operation Eisbaer, which is Polar Bear. That was a partisan operation in which I myself took part and which was conducted by the Wehrmacht, in January, 1943, briefly, how was it possible that you, with your lack of men and manpower, that you could do anything at all in the matter of the partisan warfare? O.D. That is the regualr service, Ordnungsdienst, the Ordnungsdienst, the regular service in the territory of the Einsatzgruppe B, as ordered by the Wehrmacht, was set up by ken from the Sonder commandos, selected men, who were then trained. They were Russian volunteers who had volunteered for police service. Added to this it was the task of the commandos to create a network of intelligence and agents who were in position to find out about all movements and changes in the partisan bands as far as possible, and as far as possible find out the directives issued by the partisans among themselves. It was by no means the task of the partisans to form closed units and to fight openly. It was rather the aim of the partisans to disperse into smallest units and carry out acts of sabotage and small attacks. actions. partisans then?