That was the substance of it, wasn't it? And after that, I understood you to say you received a secondary post to furnish reports to Heydrich.
WITNESS: No, Heydrich sent four or five of his men to me to accompany me as a sort of guard. These guards had orders to report what I did to Heydrich. BY MR. STEINBAUER: Gruppenfuehrer you received no award with the exception of the consent that you would become Reichs Minister?
A This was said at the end of April, 1936. I refer to a question. in the cross examination of the Reichsmarshall. Before the 13th of March, 1936, I did not have any contacts in the Reich or anything. I had no obligation to anyone in the Reich. choslovakian question briefly. You are accused, on the basis of a congratulatory letter to the Fuehrer, that you took an active part in the Anschluss of Czechoslovakia. Governor in Austria. I received refugees from the border areas, and lodged and fed then in Austria. Henlein and a few other leaders I know personally without mingling in their politics, or without knowing their relations to the Reich.
Q What can be said about Czechoslovakia? the old Austrian monarchy. I had relatives in Bratislava. The Slovaks and the Germans knew each other well. We knew the complaints of the Slovaks that the promise of Pittsburgh was not kept, and that they had not received full automny in Czechoslovakia, but later Pater Hlinka advocated complete automny and he is honored like a Saint in Czechoslovakia. The great majority of the Czechoslovakian people were behind him. He maintained independence of the parliament. After March 1936, or rather, after September 1936, I met a few Slovakian politicians, Sidor, Dr.Tisor, Dr.Churchansky, and perhaps one or two ethers. vakian conditions, and this I assigned to two of my co-workers to get this information. I assigned this to people who had very good personal relations.
there. In March, 1939, I talked to Sidor and Dr.Tisor, because they wanted to talk to me about possible Berlin-Prague developments and about the results for Slovakia.
That is what my co-workers who invited me said. In these discussions, the possibility of a Berlin-Prague clash was mentioned, and the concern about the Slovakian territories, because there was danger that the Hungarians and the Polish might take advantage of the opportunity to occupy Slovakian territory. to do, and how they could preserve their country from harm. I spoke very openly to the gentlemen. I did not challenge them to declare their intentions, I had to leave this decision to the Slovakian gentlemen, but in discussing the conditions, there were differences between Slovakian and German interests and in ascertaining if that was not the case.
Q In this connection I should like to refer to two documents. One is No.71, Page 181. This is reference to the proposed treaty, and the second document is No.72, Page 183, submitted by the Prosecution as USA-112 as proof that the Defendant was in illegal contact with the Slovakians. I submit this document to you. It is an account of Viscount Halifax of 13 March 1941. He was in Bratislava at that time. Were you there?
in order to ask certain questions of the Slovakian Government. Buerckel and I refused to take over such a task. That was one of the few cases when I agreed with Buerckel. As Territorial Administrative Chief, it was my task to prepare for the visit to Bratislava, and it was agreed that State Secretary Keppler would go to Bratislava in my car. Buerckel and I accompanied Keppler. No generals of the Wehrmacht had any part in it. The document says that five German Generals were present. That is false. fact that the Slovakian Minister Sidor and the later President Tiso both declared that they negotiated only with Buerckel. The name Seyss-Inquart does not appear at all. Then, to sum up, I can ask, was there any activity on your part in regard to Czechoslovakia in the sense in which the Prosecution alleges? in such cases. I did not.... Representing German interests of the German Reich, I did not overstep the limits justified in representing legal interests. without Portfolio, is that true? of the Secret Defense Counsel of the Cabinet? to be attacked? opinion on the matter to Hitler? I hope that this letter is in my Vienna files. I wrote a copy of it about a year and a half ago, and I remember the contents quite well.
I called Hitler's attention to the fact that German people were not enthusiastic, On the contrary, there was most serious concern that it would be a life and death struggle. I expressed my opinion that the war would not have a military solution, but that it would have to be solved by means of politics, and on the basis for a political solution was the alliance with the Soviets, which should be extended to a military alliance if possible. Consideration would have to be given to the fact that the Soviets would never give up their interests in the Balkans any more than in Czarist Russia, and that Pan-Slavism would play a role in the results, and in the Czechoslovakian and polish question, Russia would have to be counted on as an equal. states. Then the war on the Western Front would stop of its own accord. The Italian policy could not be charged against Germany, and an agreement would have to be reached with Greece and Turkey. England could not be defeated by air or by submarine, and a Mediterranean position would have to be attained in order to make peace. to Hitler? made a remark which showed clearly that he had received the letter. We said, "I do not want to destroy the British Empire," whereby he made it clear that he misunderstood my letter.
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, I am of the opinion, if the Court agrees, that it is time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
(A recess was taken) (The Tribunal reconvened, at 1400 hours, 10 June 1946.)
BY DR. STEINBAUER:
Q Mr. Witness, you last spoke about your attitude with regard to Czechoslovakia. You talked about your activities as Reich Governor in Vienna and you talked about your relationship to Buerckel, which was the reason why you changed your work and went to Poland. What functions did you carry out in Poland? Poland, which actually come within the organization of the Armed Forces. The administration, however, was never really established. The Government Genera, was created at once and I became the deputy of the Governor General. The sphere of influence is contained in a law but depends, of course, upon the question of the cases in which the Governor General uses my office, my job. On the 19th of January, 1940, he stated that, in a conference. which is an extract from Dr. Frank's diary, where on page 14 he describes the functions of Seyss-Inquart, and then on page 30 he states something which he has told me personally, that he assumes responsibility for what has happened there. Minister you were actually higher, and you actually exercised certain function there. Under PS-2278 a report has been held against you which you yourself have written. You are accused of certain indivual action, and I want you to speak about this report.
A My secretary wrote that report. I certainly read it -Governor of Lublin had made the suggestion that the Jews were to be transferred from Lublin to the district of Kirov and then to reduce them in numbers. The Prosecution themselves have stated that this is a remark made by the writer.
Actually, this was not an official report of a meeting. The settlement area of a group of German nationals was concerned, and the employment of Jews in that area, could hardly bring suspicion from me, that Jews were to been exterminated in that district. I knew, however, that the fairly large Jewish population of Lublin was to be taken out of the town by the Governor. Any specific intention regarding the word "decimating", which might have meant exterminating, never occurred to me. The Governor of Radom reported to me that criminals had been shot and it is true that he had told me that. I was under the impression that that had been done through the means of the police courts-martial which still existed at the time. But several sources are mentioned -- or rather, there are several passages in that same report where I point out that German courts had to be introduced and that no sentenc were to be pronounced or carried out without proper court procedure. I think that quite probably I must have said the same thing at the time I was at Radom only it isn't contained in that report. salt, or wanting to monopolize them. In the economic chaos we found in Pola that was quite natural. we had to come to a natural economic system, for the agricultural population who had to be supplied with certain products so that they in turn could supply food to the Polish town populations. In that connection I want to point out that I urged the re-establishing of the Polish self-administration under the old departmental heads from the old Polish time and that I pressed for 9,000,000 of zloty to be placed at the disposal of that scheme, just as I wanted vehicles, motor-cars set aside. I also wanted compulsory work to be replaced by normal employment as soon as possible.
Q The so-called "AB Action" plays a considerable part in the Polish question. It is an abbreviation for "extraordinary pacification action". Since that might still have happened at the time you were active there, I wan to ask you if you know anything about it? Poland, with the beginning of the Norwegian campaign and increased through the campaign in the West.
The resistance movement in Poland became extremely active. The Security Police demanded severe measures. Buehler's objection, which he has talked about when he was here as a witness, was in fact raised. But I also understood the Governor General's words to mean exactly the same as Buehler wanted them to be understood. But Buehler was perfectly entitled to point out what these facts were, because the police might have considered these words to mean much greater powers than the Governor General intended to give them.
Dr. Frank always opposed the sentences passed by these police courtsmartial and he appointed an investigating committee, of which I was the chairman as long as I was in, and sometimes we cancelled as much as 50 per cent of the sentences imposed.
Q How long were you actually the deputy when Dr. Frank was prevented from acting? you introduce any measures which were in the interests of the Polish population I intervened with Secretary of State Backe myself, and, for instance, on one occasion I obtained six thousand tons of grain for the large cities.
I approached Reichsmarshal Goering and the Fuehrer and I intervened on behalf of the Town of Lodz, which was to be left inside the Government General. The same applies to the cool district, West of Krakew. that is the question of your activities in the Netherlands.
My first question is this; How did you happen to become Reich Commissioner for the Netherlands?
Q And where were you at the time?
A I was on a duty journey in the Government General, and Dr. Lammers called me to the headquarters.
Q So you didn't apply for this job, did you?
A No, I didn't think of it. At that time I had asked the Fuehrer for permission to be called to the armed forces.
Q But weren't you incapacitated because of a wound in the last war? nominated you? prosecution, the number being 997-PS, which gives a fair picture of them. framework, had to look after the interests of the Reich. Apart from that I had a political task, which was, under the maintenance of Dutch independence, to try and achieve it so that the Netherlands would change their pro-British attitude and become pre-German, and to create a particularly close economic collaboration.
I want to draw your attention to paragraph 3 of this document. There I point to the difficulties connected with those two tasks and the difficulties connected with coordinating them. I was pointing out that one could not coordinate the two so easily.
on the part of the Dutch, and the question of forming a political will and political attitude would be subject to having such freedom not limited; and I said that the final outcome for the Dutch would be to have them make a decision of their own. particularly political will.
Q Was this order of the Fuehrer ever changed or altered later on?
Q How did you carry out that task from the political point of view? Did you ask the existing parties in Holland to cooperate? parties to remain, and I gave them the possibility to remain active, as far as that was in the interest of the occupying forces. I particularly promoted the National Socialist Party. speeches you often represented the facts differently from the functions you carried out.
I refer to PS-3430, USA 708. It is stated there that you tried to force National Socialism upon the Dutch. This is document 76, at page 197 of my document book. which I proclaimed in my speeches, was not carried out in practice, or could be carried out. However, it may be possible that the Dutch had the impression that I was trying to force National Socialism upon them because, after all, I had only admitted NationalSocialist parties, whereas I had to prohibit the others.
Dutchman, and I never demanded from any member of the population that they should become National Socialists; I never forced any of then to become members of the Party, nor did I ever make that a condition for exercising the general rights and privileges which every Dutchman was entitled to.
Incidentally, I particularly referred to that in my speech. I said: "I shall always act as a National Socialist. But that does not mean that I shall force National Socialism on to even one single person. National Socialism is a matter of inner conviction. There are two groups of organizations. One is the group of political organizations in connection with which I attach importance to the demand that each and every member be led to National Socialism. These are absolutely voluntary organizations. Then there are the vocational organizations, in connection with which it is immaterial which outlook the individual might have, as long as he fulfills his task in his profession."
Q Why and when did you dissolve the political parties in Holland? of the Eastern campaign. At that time all the political parties, with their exception of the National Socialists, adopted an active hostile attitude otwards the occupation forces. In the interests of the occupation forces, that could no longer be tolerated. half I permitted those parties to continue their work. which parties, after all, weren't any less hostile to the National Socialists than National Socialism today is with regard todemocratic parties. privileged it? concerned; it is incorrect as far as the state sector was concerned. alleged as an accusation against me. That was an advisory body with a National Socialist attitude, attached to my administration. It was not al lowed to exercise any influence on the Dutch administration, because any such attempts were always, really, stopped by me.
Q Didn't you, nevertheless, bring individual members of the NSDAP, certainly, into state positions? to find officials on whom I could rely. They were not under orders from the Party, however; on the contrary, in most cases there developed a certain difference between these people and the heads of the Party. government in the Netherlands, as had been done in Norway, for instance. That was so particularly because certain Dutch gentlemen, such as General Secretary Van Damm, President Van Lohen of the Supreme Court, and the President of the Cultural Committee, Professor Schreide, urged me to realize the incorrectness of such measures. about an exploitation policy. Is that true?
in fact, occur. I observed it, and I stated the fact publicly. I regretted this occurrence, but I could not stop it. The German occupation forces had to introduce anumber of measures which meant a certain pressure on the Dutch people, and it discredited our Netherlands friends. that you had coordinated all cultural institutions with the Reich?
A Generally speaking, that accusation is partly correct. With the prohibition of political parties, most of the organizations of trade or profession became impossible, since right down to the chessplayers' club, everybody in the Netherlands organized. It was in the interests of the occupation forces that I had to create new organizations of supervision. Maybe it was lack of imagination, but somehow these organizations were very similar to their original predecessors in the Reich. But I only created these organizations to carry out supervision, and never did I ask them to cooperate politically. I not only made the carrying on of a profession go along these lines; I did not even introduce compulsory membership fees.
I admit that we made two mistakes, or errors of judgment: First of all, we had the mistaken impression that our rule applying to the occupation forces was the right, and at least the better, one; and secondly, that in an occupied country, an independent political will can develop. There our policy failed.
Q Whatinstitutions did you introduce, in consequence? and one for agriculture. Then there was a workers' front, but that was a voluntary organization. Members could leave it without any disadvantageous conseqences, if they wanted to. that you attempted Germanization. What do you have to say about that?
A First of all, I have to explain something clearly. In the English, you say "Germany", and in the Russian you say "Germanski." Both mean "German" (Deutsch). And when we spoke of "Germanization", then we did not mean "making them into Germans"; we meant a political and cultural collecting of a so-called German group, giving them equal rights. That we did act in that manner is something I stated in a speech, Document 103:
"Why do the Germans interfere with everything in the Netherlands?"
THE PRESIDENT: What page is that on?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is U.S.A. 708, which has been presented as a book.
THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number?
DR. STEINBAUER: Its PS number or is 3430. It has been made U.S.A. Exhibit 708. It is a book entitled "Four Years of the Netherlands", and it contains a collection of speeches made by the witness, each one of which has been used by the prosecution. The witness is now replying.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: "There are moments of tension where there is no longer any dividing line between something which is important to the war effort and in the interests of the military, and something which is private and a matter for the civilians." utilized for, or against, the occupation forces, and that,therefore, I had to exercise control over them. BY DR. STEINBAUER: administration in the interests of the party? It had a different sphere of activities which, with reference to the policies of the Dutch National Socialist party supported that in every respect. It did not have any particular interest or return, and that is the important point.
Q Now, let us turn to the administration proper. Which organizations were there in the Netherlands? the armed forces' commander. Then the police had an independent sector. The commander of the armed forces had the right to intervene, and beginning with July, 1944, some of the executive powers were transferred to him. SS and police leader, who, at Himmler's suggestion, was always appointed by the Fuehrer without my being asked. The police reserved to themselves the right to investigate; that is to say, if I gave then a task, they would investigate whether the task could he coordinated with their instructions which Himmler gave directly to the Higher SS and police leader.
plenipotentiary for labor and the armament ministry. Rosenberg, and then there is Speer?
A Yes, there was the armament minister, Speer. Then there were certain rather smaller individual tasks which were being carried out. orders on behalf of Reich departments?
A No; I was not an ordinary official. I was responsible to the Reich in the civilian sector. Perhaps in the first months, departments in Berlin might have worked better by by-passing me. But I then centralized the administration in such a way under my supervision that nothing occurred in the civilian sector which I had not previously agreed to. That was especially recognized by the Fuehrer on one occasion. I want to say that you must not draw any corresponding conclusions with reference to other occupied territories. I am perfectly convinced that in the Eastern territories and in the government in general, the same centralization did not exist.
Q What possibilities did you have to establish an administration? from the loading departments in the Reich. I investigated the demand, together with my officials in consultation with the departments of the Netherlands, We would then submit counter-proposals, which we thought could be expected from the Dutch. And if the Reich still demanded more, then we made efforts not to exceed the possible. Until 1043, all requests were being carried out by the Dutch authorities themselves. I did not allow my departments to submit such demands until after that time, because then the demands became so enormous that I could no longer expect the Dutch authorities to make them.
Q I come back to the question of police for a moment. As you said, it came directly under Himmler?
A The possibilites I had were two: One, considering that the Queen of the Netherlands and the government had gone to London, would have enabled me to nominate a new Dutch government, as had been done in Norway; or, I had to conduct the administration of the country myself. I decided on the second solution. in existence? How did you organize it? the butch police were under my orders; but it was a matter of course that the supervision of the Dutch police was transferred to the Higher SS and Police Leader by me. In his capacity as my General Commissioner for the security system, the Dutch police were divided into either three or four sectors. I think that it can be explained with the interests of the occupational powers that we then coordinated it from thepoint of view of organization.
Q What was the Land Guard of Home Guard? Socialists. In 1943 there were serious cases of terror against National Socialists, and there were very cruel murders. The danger of counterterror existed, of which we heard. In fact, there were several such cases. Consequently, I organized this land Guard, which had the order to act as auxiliary police, with corresponding discipline, and which controlled the pier during the hours of darkness, guarded railways, and carried but such tasks as those. The result was that these acts of terror did almost entirely cease, and until the middle of '44, no further difficulties of that type occurred.
Q Mr. Witness, we now come to a most important chapter.
A May I just for a moment refer to the Document 101? This document has been held against me by the prosecution-
THE PRESIDENT: Is 101 the right designation?
DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the speeches which the Defendant is quoting have been sent down by me to be multigraphed. Although they are already before the Tribunal, unfortunately the translation department did not quite catch up and therefore it is not yetavailable, but I hope to have them by the morning.
THE PRESIDENT: Hasn't it got a PS number of any other designation?
DR. STEINBAUER: It is almost the same bock, USA 708. The prosecution has only quoted individual sentences there.
THE PRESIDENT: I see.
THE WITNESS: The prosecution has quoted Page 167. On the 1st of August '43, I delivered a speech announcing special measures which would bring difficulties and restrictions to the Dutch, and the prosecution believes that shootings which took place later are connected therewith. That is an error. The restrictions which I am mentioning in that speech were merely orders prohibiting Dutch people to leave their own provinces, so that terrorists from the Northwest could not go to the East. As this happened during the time of the holidays, this meant something awful to the Dutch.
Q Now I come to the next question. Did you change the existing organization of the lower courts? Legislation in the Netherlands had a very high standard. Only on two occasions did I introduce supplementation. The Dutch judges showed little understanding for the economic situation. For instance, on the one occasion a group of black market butchers, which had killed large numbers of cattle and introduced them into the black market, were fined two hundred guilders; so I introduced special economic judges, Lutchmen, who had more understanding of these economic necessities. But apart from that, the legal situation was left untouched. Of course, we also introduced our German courts, as every occupational force does. staying in the Netherlands, and then we had the police courts; is that right? occupation forces were dealt with by these courts. thousand executions.
A That is perfectly untrue. If I count everything which the German courts, Police courts, and military courts had pronounced in the way of death sentences which wereactually carried out, and if I add to that the cases where there were clashed with the executive powers on theoccasions where Dutchmen lost their lives, then in accordance to the documents from the Higher SS and Police Leader giving those figures until themiddle of 1944, it amounts to less than eight hundred cases during four years, which means less than a bombing attack on the town of Njemegen.
The shootings came afterwards. a special repreive department?
Q In this connection, I want to refer to Document No. 75 in my Document Book, which is on Page 190. This is an affidavit from the Court Councilor, Rudolf Fritsch, Judge in the Court of Appeals in Berlin, who was the reprieve expert for the Reich Commissioner. I want to quote from this document and I refer to the second paragraph on Page 3:
"In performing his right of clemency the Reich Commissioner proceeded from the principle that this was one of the most distinguished rights of the head of A state and that it was especially suitable for creating a good and close relationship between the Germans and the Dutch. Therefore, in the beginning he himself made the decision in all cases on the basis of case reports submitted to him and a clemency proposal of the clemency division. After about two to three months he delegated internally the exercise of the right of clemency to the chief of the clemency division with the following exceptions: 1) cancellations of proceedings, 2) decisions in case ofdeath sentences; (3) decision in fundamental questions, 4) decision in individual cases, etc. was executed where the clemency question was not examined officially even if a petition for clemency had not been made."
Then I come to page 5, the last paragraph:
"Since the cooperation with the Dutch authorities proved that they could be trusted, the Reich Commissioner gradually delegated in the main the right of clemency to the Dutch minister of justice. From the great amount of mail which came in and which did not concern clemency natters only, I repeatedly saw that police actions had been staged by the Gestapo by which the regular administration of justice was eliminated or was to be eliminated. In such cases I collected material and used it to take action in order to place the persons involved before regular courts for judgment of their cases. Indeed, I succeeded with such action. This was proof to me that the Reich Commissioner was an opponent of the Gestapo's wild police methods and an adherent to the regular administration of justice." the question regarding finance.
A Yes, but the Fuehrer's order excluding courts is of importance.
Q Which order was that?
A That is the decisive order. After the strike at Amsterdam, I had proposed court martial procedure. That isn't an invention of recent times; it is the summary court procedure in the case of special emergencies, such as legislation of every country contains.
Courts martial had special conditions. First of all, a regular judge had to be a member. Secondly, defendants' counsel were foreseen, who could be Dutch. Thirdly, evidence had to be collected in the proper manner, and if the question of guilt was not clearly proved, then the case had to go before the ordinary courts. occasion of the general strike in May 1943. The numerous shootings later on cannot be traced back to these courts martial. They had been provided for the case of a special emergency if Dutch territory once more became operationa known from an order from the OKW. I refer to PS-1155 -- no, I beg your pardon I don't think I am right. It is PS-835.
civilians in occupied territories who were guilty of sabotage or terror actions were to be handed over to the Security Police. The Higher SS and Police Leader and I objected to that order, since we realized what damaging effects it would have in The Netherlands, since the Dutch would only be pressed into illegal organizations through the appearance of such an order. period of over six stocks. This caused a severe reprimand by Himmler, and from that moment the Dutch who had been arrested for sabotage or illegal activities had to be judged under his own jurisdiction, and in certain cases, were shot. That is the cause of numerous shootings, but I do not believe that there were 4,000. be most exact when carrying out that order, and there were no reports to me about individual cases. I had the impression that there were perhaps 600 to 700.
A That is correct. It certainly didn't come under my influence, nor was I competent for it. But if, at that time, I gave the Security Police orders that they should pursue some illegal organization in some place or other, then I had to realize that one or the other Dutchman who would be found out to be a leader of such a movement would be shot by the police without the court or I being able to investigate the case. But then I couldn't fore* the privileges with which I could safeguard the security of the occupational powers merely because of that Fuehrer order.
Q I now come to the chapter of finance. A document has been presente here where a certain Mr. Tripp announces his resignation. Who was he? the currency bank. He was the General Secretary for Finance. I think if you list the most outstanding bending experts of the world, then you will also have to mention Mr. Tripp. He has great personality and he is one of those men who are today described as Dutch genius.
Q He was also General Secretary for Finance, wasn't he?