The case against Schacht therefore depends on the inference before the war as it was on suspicion of his complicity in the bomb that Schacht did in fact know of the Nazi aggressive plans.
prosecution, and a considerable volume of evidence for the defense. The Tribunal has considered the whole of this evidence with great card, and comes to the conclusion that this necessary inference has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. and directs that he shall he discharged by the Marshal, when the Tribunal presently adjourns.
Doenitz is indicted on Counts One, Two and Three. In 1935 he took M. de VABRES:
DOENITZ command of the first U-Boat flotilla commissioned since 1918, became in 1936 commander of the submarine arm, was made Vice-Admiral in 1940, Admiral in 1942, and on January 30, 1943 Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy. On 1 May 1945 he became the Head of State, succeeding Hitler. does not show be was privy to the conspiracy to wage aggressive wars or that he prepared and initiated such wars. He was a line officer performing strictly tactical duties. He was not present at the important conferences when plans for aggressive wars were announced, and there is no evidence he was informed about the decisions reached there. Doenitz did, however, wage aggressive war within in the meaning of that word as used by the Charter. Submarine warfare which began immediately upon the outbreak of war, was fully coordinated with the other branches of the Wehrmacht. It is clear that his U-Boats, few in number at the time, were fully prepared to wage war. Chief he Was not an "Oberbefehlshaber". But this statement underestimates the importance of Doenitz' position. He was no more Army or division commander, The U-Boat arm was the principal part of the German fleet and Doenitz was its leader. The High Seas fleet made a few minor, if spectacular, raids during the early years of the war but the real damage to the tons of allied and neutral shipping sunk will testify.
Doenitz was enemy was done almost exclusively by his submarines as the millions of solely in charge of this warfare.
The Naval War Command reserved for itself only the decision as to the number of submarines in each area. In the invasion of Norway, for example, Doenitz made recommendations in October 1939 as to submarine bases, which he claims were no more than a staff study, and in March 1940 he made out the operational orders for the supporting U-Boats, as discussed elsewhere in this Judgment. eloquently proved by Raeder's recommendation of Doenitz as his successor and his appointment by Hitler on 30 January 1943 as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Hitler too knew that submarine warfare was the essential part of Germany's naval warfare. Hitler. The evidence was that they conferred on naval problems about 120 times during the course of the war. Doenitz as its Commander-in-Chief urged the Navy to continue its fight. On 1 May 1945 he became the head of State and as such ordered the Wehrmacht to continue its war in the East, until capitulation on 9 May 1945. Doenitz explained that his reason for these orders was to insure that the German civilian population might be evacuated and the Army might make an orderly retreat from the East. active in waging aggressive War.
Doenitz is charged with waging unrestricted submarine war-
fare contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936, to which Germany acceded, and which reaffirmed the rules of submarine warfare laid down in the London Naval Agreement of 1930. the German U-Boat arm began to wage unrestricted submarine warfare noon all merchant ships, whether enemy or neutral, cynically disregarding the Pretocol; and that a calculated effort was made throughout the war to disguise this practice by making hypocritical references to international law and supposed violations by the Allies. within the confines of international law and of the Protocol. He testified that when the war began, the guide to submarine warfare was the German Prize Ordinance taken almost literally from the Protocol, that pursuant to the German view, he ordered submarines to attach all merchant ships in convoy, and all that refused to stop or used their radio Upon sighting a submarine. When his reports indicated that British merchant ships were being used to give information by wireless, were being armed and were attacking submarines on sight, he ordered his submarines on 17 October 1939 to attack all enemy merchant ships without warning on the ground that resistance-was to be expected. Orders already had been issued on 21 September 1939 to attack all ships, including neutrals, sailing at night without lights in the English Channel. warning to neutral shipping that, owing to the frequent engagements taking place in between U-Boats and Allied.
merchant ships which were armed the waiters around the British Isles and the French Coast and had instructions to use those arms as well as to ram UBoats, the safety of neutral ships in those waters could no longer be taken for granted.
On the first of January, 1940, the German U-Boat command, acting on the instructions of Hitler, ordered U-Boats to attack all Greek merchant ships in the zone surrounding the British Isles which was banned by the United States to its own ships and also merchant ships of every nationality in the limited area of the Bristol Channel. Five days hater a further order was given to U-Boats to "make immediately unrestricted use of weapons against all ships" in an area of the North Sea, the limits of which were defined. Finally on the 18th of January, 1940, U-Boats were authorized to sink, without warning, all shies "in those waters near the enemy coasts in which the use of mines can be pretended". Exceptions were to be made in the cases of United States, Italian, Japanese and Soviet Ships. in accordance with its Handbook of instructions of 1938 to the merchant navy, armed its merchant vessels, in many cases convoyed them with armed escort, gave orders to send position reports upon sighting submarines, thus Integrating merchant vessels into the warning network of naval intelligence. On British merchant ships had been ordered to ram U-Boats if possible. is not prepared to hold Doenitz guilty for his conduct of submarine warfare against British armed merchant ships. sinking of neutral merchant vessels which enter those zones presents a different question. This adopted in retaliation by Great Britain.
The Washington con-
practice was employed in the War of 1914-1918 by Germany find ference of 1922, the London Naval Agreement of 1930 and the Protocol of 1936 were entered into with full knowledge that such zones had been employed in the First World War. Yet the Protocol made no exception for operational zones. The order of Doenitz to sink neutral ships without warning when found within these zones was, therefore in the opinion of the Tribunal, a violation of the Protocol. only did not carry out the warning and rescue provisions of the Protocol but that Doenitz deliberately ordered the killing of survivors of shipwrecked vessels, whether enemy or neutral. The prosecution has introduced much evidence surrounding two orders of Doenitz, War Order No. 154, issued in 1939, and the so-called "Laconia" order of 1942. The defense argues that these orders and the evidence supporting them do not show such a policy and introduced much evidence to the contrary. The Tribunal is of the opinion that the evidence does not establish with the certainty required that Doenitz deliberately ordered the killing of shipwrecked survivors. The orders were undoubtedly ambiguous, and deserve the strongest censure. were not carried out and that the defendant ordered that they should not be carried out. The argument of the defense is that the security of the submarine is, as the first rule of the sea, paramount to rescue and that the development of aircraft made rescue impossible. This may be so, but the Protocol is explicit. If the commander cannot rescue, then under its terms he cannot sink a merchant vessel and should allow it to pass harmless before his periscope. These orders, then, prove Doenitz is guilty of a violation of the Protocol.
an order of the British Admiralty announced on the 8 May 1940 according to which all vessels should be sunk at night in the Skagerrak, and the answers to interrogatories by Admiral Nimitz stating that unrestricted submarine warfare was carried on in the Pacific Ocean by the United States from the first day that nation entered the war, the sentence of Doenitz is not assessed on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare.
Doenitz was also charged with responsibility for Hitler's Commando Order of 18 October 1942. Doenitz admitted he received and knew of the order when he was Flag Officer of U-Boats, but disclaimed responsibility. He points out that the order by its express terms excluded men captured in naval warefare, that the Navy had no territorial commands on land, and that submarine commanders would never encounter commandos. Navy, in 1943, the members of an allied motor torpedo boat were captured by German Naval Forces. They were interrogated for intelligence purposes on behalf of the local admiral, and then turned over by his order to the SD and shot. Doenitz said that if they were captured by the Navy their execution was a violation of the commando order, that the execution was not announced in the Wehrmacht communique, and that he was never informed of the incident. He pointed out that the admiral in question was not in his chain of command, but was subordinate to the army general in command of the Norway occupation. But Doenitz permitted the order to remain in full force when he became commander-in-chief, and to that extent he is responsible. "12,000 concentration camp prisoners will be employed in the shipyards as additional labor." At and claims that this was merely a suggestion at the meeting of ships, that he took no steps to get these workers since it whether they ever were procured.
He admits he knew of concentration camps.
A man in his position must necessarily advantages.
The summary of Doenitz' attitude shown in the notes taken by an officer, included the following sentence:
"It would be better to carry out the measures all costs to save face with the outer world."
The prosecution insisted that "the measures" referred to broken at will.
The defense explanation is that Hitler wanted to break the Convention for two reasons:
to take groups to the British and Americans; and also to permit bombing raids.
Doenitz claims that what he meant by "measures" were disciplinary measures against German troops to measures against the Allies; moreover that this was merely Germans.
The Tribunal, however, does not believe this ex-
such measures were ever taken, either against Allies or planation. The Geneva Convention was not, however, denounced by Germany. The defense has introduced several affidavits to prove that British naval prisoners of war in camps under Doenitz' jurisdiction were treated strictly according to the Convention, and the Tribunal takes this fact into consideration, regarding it as a mitigating circumstance. circumstance. of the Indictment, and is guilty on Counts Two and Three.
THE PRESIDENT:
Raeder is indicted on Counts One, Two, and Three. In 1928 he became Chief of Naval Command and in 1935 Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine (OKM); in 1939 Hitler made him Gross-Admiral. He was a member of the Reich Defense Council. On 30 January 1943, Doenitz replaced him at his own request, and he became Admiral Inspector of the Navy, a nominal title. Navy; he accepts full responsibility until retirement in 1943. He admits the Navy violated the Versailles Treaty, insisting it was "a matter of honor for every man" to do so, and alleges that the violtations were for the most part minor, and Germany built less than her allowable strength. These violations, as well as those of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, have already been discussed elsewhere in this Judgment. special preparations for war against Austria. He was one of the five leaders present at the Hoszbach Conference of 5 November 1937. He claims Hitler merely wished by this conference to spur the Army to faster rearmament, insists he believed the questions of Austria and Czechoslovakia would be settled peacefully, as they were, and points to the new naval treaty with England which had just been signed. He received no orders to speed construction of U-Boats, indicating that Hitler was not planning war.
Raeder received directives on "Fall Gruen" and the directives on "Fall Weiss" beginning with that of 3 April 1939; the latter directed the was also one of the few chief leaders present at the meeting Navy to support the Army by intervention from the sea.
He of 23 May 1939. He attended the Obersalzburg briefing of 22 August 1939. the mind of Raeder and not that of Hitler. Despite Hitler's desire, as shown by his directive of October 1939, to keep Scandinavia neutral, the Navy examined the advantages of naval bases there as early as October. Admiral Karls originally suggested to Raeder the desirable aspects of bases in Norway. A questionnaire, dated 3 October 1939, which sought comments on the desirability of such bases, was circulated within SKL. On 10 October Raeder discussed the matter with Hitler; his War Diary entry for that day says Hitler intended to give the matter consideration. A few months later Hitler talked to Raeder, Quisling, Keitel and Jodl; OKW began its planning and the Naval War Staff worked with OKW staff officers. Raeder received Keitel's directive for Norway on 27 January 1940 and the subsequent directive of 1 March, signed by Hitler. forestall the British. It is not necessary again to discuss this defense, which the Tribunal have heretofore treated in some detail, concluding that Germany's invasion of Norway and Denmark was aggressive war. In a letter to the Navy, Raeder said: "The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the great contribution of the Navy to this war." postponements, for the attack in the West. In a meeting of 18 March 1941 with Hitler he urged the occupation of all Greece. He claims this was only after the British had landed and Hitler had ordered the attack, and points directive on Yugoslavia.
out the Navy had no interest In Greece. He received Hitler's the invasion of the USSR. In September 1940 he urged on Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy as an alternative to an attack on Russia. On 14 November 1940 he urged the war against England "as our main enemy" and that submarine and naval air force construction be continued. He voiced "serious objections against the Russian campaign before the defeat of England," according to notes of the German Naval War Staff. He claims his objections were based on the violation of the Non-Aggression Pact as well as strategy. But once the decision had been made, he gave permission six days before the invasion of the Soviet Union to attack Russian submarines in the Baltic Sea within a specified warning area and defends this action because these submarines were "snooping" on German activities. in the planning and waging of aggressive war.
Raeder is charged with war crimes on the high seas. The "Athenia," an unarmed British passenger liner, was sunk on 3 September 1939, while outward bound to America. The Germans two months later charged that Mr. Churchill deliberately sank the "Athenia" to encourage American hostility to Germany. In fact, it was sunk by the German U-Boat 30. Raeder claims that an inexperienced U-Boat commander sank it in mistake for an armed merchant cruiser, that this was not known until the U-30 returned several weeks after the German denial and that Hitler then directed the Navy and ledge of the propaganda campaign attacking Mr. Churchill.
Foreign Office to continue denying it. Raeder denied knowout unrestricted submarine warfare, including sinking of unarmed merchant ships, of neutrals, non-rescue and machine-gunning of survivors, contrary to the London Protocol of 1936. The Tribunal makes the same finding on Raeder on this charge as it did as to Doenitz, which has already been announced, up until 30 January 1943 when Raeder retired. not apply to naval warfare, was transmitted by the Naval War Staff to the lower naval commanders with, the direction it should be distributed orally by flotilla leaders and section commanders to their subordinates. Two commandos were put to death by the Navy, and not by the SD, at Bordeaux on the 10 December 1942. The comment of the Naval War Staff was that this was "in accordance with the Fuehrer's special order, but is nevertheless something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform." Raeder admits he passed the order down through the chain of command, and he did not object to Hitler. Two, and Three.
GENERAL NIKITCHENKO:
Von Schirach is indicted under Counts One and Four. He joined the Nazi Party and the SA in 1925. In 1929 he became the Leader of the National Socialist Students Union. In 1931 he was made Reichs Youth Leader of the Nazi Party with control over all Nazi youth organizations including the Hitler Jugend. In 1935, after the Nazis had obtained control of the Government, von Schirach was made Leader of Youth in the German Reich, originally a position within the Ministry of the Interior, but, after December 1, 1936, an office in the Reich Cabinet. In 1940, von Schirach resigned as head of the Hitler Jugend and Leader of Youth in the German Reich, but retained his position as Reichsleiter with control over Youth Education. In 1940 he was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna, Reichs Governor of Vienna, and Reichs Defense Commissioner for that territory. ing both physical violence and official pressure, either drove out of existence or took over all youth groups which competed with the Hitler Jugend. A Hitler decree of December 1, 1936, incorporated all German youth within the Hitler Jugend. By the time formal conscription was introduced in 1940, 97% of those eligible were already members. Youth "in the spirit of National Socialism" and subjected them to an intensive program of Nazi propaganda. He established the Hitler Jugend as a source of replacements for the Nazi Party formations. In October 1938 he entered Hitler Jugend who met SS standards would be considered as the into an agreement with Himmler under which members of the primary source of replacements for the SS.
military training. Special units were set up whose primary purpose was training specialists for the various branches of the service. On August 11, 1939, he entered into an agreement with Keitel under which the Hitler Jugend agreed to carry out its premilitary activities under standards laid down by the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht agreed to train 30,000 Hitler Jugend instructors each year. The Hitler Jugend placed particular emphasis on the military spirit and its training program stressed the importance of return of the colonies, the necessity for Lebensraum and the noble destiny of German youth to die for Hitler. Hitler Jugend, however, it does not appear that von Schirach was involved in the development of Hitler's plan for territorial expansion by means of aggressive war, or that he participate in the planning or preparation of any of the wars of aggression. Vienna. At the same time he was appointed Reichs Governor for Vienna and Reichs Defense Commissioner, originally for Military District 17, including the Gaus of Vienna, Upper Danube and Lower Danube and, after November 17, 1942, for the Gau of Vienna alone. As Reichs Defense Commissioner, he had control of the civilian war economy. As Reichs Governor he was head of the municipal administration of the city of Vienna, and, under the supervision administration of the Reich in Vienna.
of the Minister of the Interior, in charge of the governmental Crimes in Vienna, only with the commission of Crimes against Humanity. As has already been seen, Austria was occupied pursuant to a common plan of aggression. Its occupation is, therefore, a "crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," as that term is used in Article 6(c) of the Charter. As a result, "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts" and "persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds" in connection with this occupation constitute a Crime against Humanity under that Article. Sauckel decree dated April 6, 1942, making the Gauleiters Sauckel's plenipotentiaries for manpower with authority to supervise the utilization and treatment of manpower within their Gaus. Sauckel's directives provided that the forced laborers were to be fed, sheltered and treated so as to exploit them to the highest possible degree at the lowest possible expense. tation of the Jews had already been begun, and only 60,000 out of Vienna's original 190,000 Jews remained. On October 2, 1940, he attended a conference at Hitler's office and told Frank that he had 50,000 Jews in Vienna which the General Government would have to take over from him. On December 3, 1940, von Schirach received a letter from Lammers stating that after the receipt of the reports made by von Schirach, Hitler had decided to deport the 60,000 Jews still remaining in Vienna to the General Government because of the housing shortage in Vienna. The deportation of the Jews from Vienna On September 15, 1942, von Schirach made a speech in which was then begun and continued until the early fall of 1942.
he defended his action in having driven "tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the Ghetto of the East" as "contributing to European culture." addressed to him in his official capacity, were received in von Schirach's office from the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD which contained a description of the activities of Einsatzgruppen in exterminating Jews. Many of these reports were initialed by one of von Schirach's principal deputies. On June 30, 1944, von Schirach's office also received a letter from Kaltenbrunner informing him that a shipment of 12,000 Jews was on its way to Vienna for essential war work and that all those who were incapable of work would have to be kept in readiness for "special action." originate the policy of deporting Jews from Vienna, participated in this deportation after he had become Gauleiter of Vienna. He knew that the best the Jews could hope for was a miserable existence in the Ghettoes of the East. Bulletins describing the Jewish extermination were in his office. function as Reichsleiter for Youth Education and in this capacity he was informed of the Hitler Jugend's participation in the plan put into effect in the fall of 1944 under which 50,000 young people between the ages of 10 and 20 were evacuated into Germany from areas recaptured by the Soviet forces and used as apprentices in German industry and as auxiliaries in units of the German armed forces. In the summer of 1942, von Schirach telegraphed carried out in retaliation for the assassination of Heydrich which, Bormann urging that a bombing attack on an English cultural town be he claimed, had been planned by the British.
MR. BIDDLE:
Sauckel is indicted under all four counts. Sauckel joined the Nazi Party in 1923, and became Gauleiter of Thuringia in 1927. He was a member of the Thuringian legislature from 1927 to 1933, was appointed Reichsstatthalter for Thuringia in 1932, and. Thuringian Minister of the Interior end Head of the Thuringian State Ministry in May 1933. He became a member of the Reichstag in 1933. He held the formal rank of Obergruppenfuehrer in both the SA and the SS. ficiently connected with the common plan to wage aggressive war or sufficiently involved in the planning or waging of the aggressive wars to allow the Tribunal to convict him on Counts One or Two. for the Utilization of Labor, with authority to put under uniform control "the utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers recruited abroad and of prisoners of war". Sauckel was instructed to operate within the fabric of the Four Year Plan, and on March 27, 1942, Goering issued a decree as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan transferring his manpower sections to Sauckel. On September 30, 1942, Hitler gave Sauckel authority to appoint Commissioners in the various occupied territories, and "to take all necessary measures for the enforcement" of the decree of March 21, 1942. a program for the mobilization of the Labor resources available to the Reich.
exploitation, by force, of the labor resources of the occupied territories.
One of the important parts of this mobilization was the systematic Shortly after Sauckel had taken office, he had the governing authorities in the various occupied territories issue decrees, establishing compulsory labor service in Germany. Under the authority of these decrees Sauckel's Commissioners, backed up by the police authorities of the occupied territories, obtained and sent to Germany the laborers which were necessary to fill the quotas given them by Sauckel. He described so-called "voluntary" recruiting by Janates "a whole batch of male and female agents just as was done in the olden times for shanghaiing". That real voluntary recruiting was the exception rather than the rule is shown by Sauckel's statement on March 1, 1944, that "out of five million foreign workers who arrived in Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily." Although he now claims that the statement is not true, the circumstances under which it was made, as well as the evidence presented before the Tribunal, leave no doubt that it was substantially accurate. transported to Germany, and what happened to them after they arrived, has already been described. Sauckel argues that he is not responsible for these excesses in the administration of the program. He says that the total number of workers to be obtained was set by the demands from agriculture and from industry; that obtaining the workers was the responsibility of the occupation authorities, transporting them to Germany that of the German railways, and taking care of them in Germany that of the Ministries of Labor and Agriculture, the German Labor Front and the various industries involved. He testifies that insofar as he had any authority he was constantly urging There is no doubt, however, that Sauckel had overall humane treatment.