He of 23 May 1939. He attended the Obersalzburg briefing of 22 August 1939. the mind of Raeder and not that of Hitler. Despite Hitler's desire, as shown by his directive of October 1939, to keep Scandinavia neutral, the Navy examined the advantages of naval bases there as early as October. Admiral Karls originally suggested to Raeder the desirable aspects of bases in Norway. A questionnaire, dated 3 October 1939, which sought comments on the desirability of such bases, was circulated within SKL. On 10 October Raeder discussed the matter with Hitler; his War Diary entry for that day says Hitler intended to give the matter consideration. A few months later Hitler talked to Raeder, Quisling, Keitel and Jodl; OKW began its planning and the Naval War Staff worked with OKW staff officers. Raeder received Keitel's directive for Norway on 27 January 1940 and the subsequent directive of 1 March, signed by Hitler. forestall the British. It is not necessary again to discuss this defense, which the Tribunal have heretofore treated in some detail, concluding that Germany's invasion of Norway and Denmark was aggressive war. In a letter to the Navy, Raeder said: "The operations of the Navy in the occupation of Norway will for all time remain the great contribution of the Navy to this war." postponements, for the attack in the West. In a meeting of 18 March 1941 with Hitler he urged the occupation of all Greece. He claims this was only after the British had landed and Hitler had ordered the attack, and points directive on Yugoslavia.
out the Navy had no interest In Greece. He received Hitler's the invasion of the USSR. In September 1940 he urged on Hitler an aggressive Mediterranean policy as an alternative to an attack on Russia. On 14 November 1940 he urged the war against England "as our main enemy" and that submarine and naval air force construction be continued. He voiced "serious objections against the Russian campaign before the defeat of England," according to notes of the German Naval War Staff. He claims his objections were based on the violation of the Non-Aggression Pact as well as strategy. But once the decision had been made, he gave permission six days before the invasion of the Soviet Union to attack Russian submarines in the Baltic Sea within a specified warning area and defends this action because these submarines were "snooping" on German activities. in the planning and waging of aggressive war.
Raeder is charged with war crimes on the high seas. The "Athenia," an unarmed British passenger liner, was sunk on 3 September 1939, while outward bound to America. The Germans two months later charged that Mr. Churchill deliberately sank the "Athenia" to encourage American hostility to Germany. In fact, it was sunk by the German U-Boat 30. Raeder claims that an inexperienced U-Boat commander sank it in mistake for an armed merchant cruiser, that this was not known until the U-30 returned several weeks after the German denial and that Hitler then directed the Navy and ledge of the propaganda campaign attacking Mr. Churchill.
Foreign Office to continue denying it. Raeder denied knowout unrestricted submarine warfare, including sinking of unarmed merchant ships, of neutrals, non-rescue and machine-gunning of survivors, contrary to the London Protocol of 1936. The Tribunal makes the same finding on Raeder on this charge as it did as to Doenitz, which has already been announced, up until 30 January 1943 when Raeder retired. not apply to naval warfare, was transmitted by the Naval War Staff to the lower naval commanders with, the direction it should be distributed orally by flotilla leaders and section commanders to their subordinates. Two commandos were put to death by the Navy, and not by the SD, at Bordeaux on the 10 December 1942. The comment of the Naval War Staff was that this was "in accordance with the Fuehrer's special order, but is nevertheless something new in international law, since the soldiers were in uniform." Raeder admits he passed the order down through the chain of command, and he did not object to Hitler. Two, and Three.
GENERAL NIKITCHENKO:
Von Schirach is indicted under Counts One and Four. He joined the Nazi Party and the SA in 1925. In 1929 he became the Leader of the National Socialist Students Union. In 1931 he was made Reichs Youth Leader of the Nazi Party with control over all Nazi youth organizations including the Hitler Jugend. In 1935, after the Nazis had obtained control of the Government, von Schirach was made Leader of Youth in the German Reich, originally a position within the Ministry of the Interior, but, after December 1, 1936, an office in the Reich Cabinet. In 1940, von Schirach resigned as head of the Hitler Jugend and Leader of Youth in the German Reich, but retained his position as Reichsleiter with control over Youth Education. In 1940 he was appointed Gauleiter of Vienna, Reichs Governor of Vienna, and Reichs Defense Commissioner for that territory. ing both physical violence and official pressure, either drove out of existence or took over all youth groups which competed with the Hitler Jugend. A Hitler decree of December 1, 1936, incorporated all German youth within the Hitler Jugend. By the time formal conscription was introduced in 1940, 97% of those eligible were already members. Youth "in the spirit of National Socialism" and subjected them to an intensive program of Nazi propaganda. He established the Hitler Jugend as a source of replacements for the Nazi Party formations. In October 1938 he entered Hitler Jugend who met SS standards would be considered as the into an agreement with Himmler under which members of the primary source of replacements for the SS.
military training. Special units were set up whose primary purpose was training specialists for the various branches of the service. On August 11, 1939, he entered into an agreement with Keitel under which the Hitler Jugend agreed to carry out its premilitary activities under standards laid down by the Wehrmacht and the Wehrmacht agreed to train 30,000 Hitler Jugend instructors each year. The Hitler Jugend placed particular emphasis on the military spirit and its training program stressed the importance of return of the colonies, the necessity for Lebensraum and the noble destiny of German youth to die for Hitler. Hitler Jugend, however, it does not appear that von Schirach was involved in the development of Hitler's plan for territorial expansion by means of aggressive war, or that he participate in the planning or preparation of any of the wars of aggression. Vienna. At the same time he was appointed Reichs Governor for Vienna and Reichs Defense Commissioner, originally for Military District 17, including the Gaus of Vienna, Upper Danube and Lower Danube and, after November 17, 1942, for the Gau of Vienna alone. As Reichs Defense Commissioner, he had control of the civilian war economy. As Reichs Governor he was head of the municipal administration of the city of Vienna, and, under the supervision administration of the Reich in Vienna.
of the Minister of the Interior, in charge of the governmental Crimes in Vienna, only with the commission of Crimes against Humanity. As has already been seen, Austria was occupied pursuant to a common plan of aggression. Its occupation is, therefore, a "crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal," as that term is used in Article 6(c) of the Charter. As a result, "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts" and "persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds" in connection with this occupation constitute a Crime against Humanity under that Article. Sauckel decree dated April 6, 1942, making the Gauleiters Sauckel's plenipotentiaries for manpower with authority to supervise the utilization and treatment of manpower within their Gaus. Sauckel's directives provided that the forced laborers were to be fed, sheltered and treated so as to exploit them to the highest possible degree at the lowest possible expense. tation of the Jews had already been begun, and only 60,000 out of Vienna's original 190,000 Jews remained. On October 2, 1940, he attended a conference at Hitler's office and told Frank that he had 50,000 Jews in Vienna which the General Government would have to take over from him. On December 3, 1940, von Schirach received a letter from Lammers stating that after the receipt of the reports made by von Schirach, Hitler had decided to deport the 60,000 Jews still remaining in Vienna to the General Government because of the housing shortage in Vienna. The deportation of the Jews from Vienna On September 15, 1942, von Schirach made a speech in which was then begun and continued until the early fall of 1942.
he defended his action in having driven "tens of thousands upon tens of thousands of Jews into the Ghetto of the East" as "contributing to European culture." addressed to him in his official capacity, were received in von Schirach's office from the office of the Chief of the Security Police and SD which contained a description of the activities of Einsatzgruppen in exterminating Jews. Many of these reports were initialed by one of von Schirach's principal deputies. On June 30, 1944, von Schirach's office also received a letter from Kaltenbrunner informing him that a shipment of 12,000 Jews was on its way to Vienna for essential war work and that all those who were incapable of work would have to be kept in readiness for "special action." originate the policy of deporting Jews from Vienna, participated in this deportation after he had become Gauleiter of Vienna. He knew that the best the Jews could hope for was a miserable existence in the Ghettoes of the East. Bulletins describing the Jewish extermination were in his office. function as Reichsleiter for Youth Education and in this capacity he was informed of the Hitler Jugend's participation in the plan put into effect in the fall of 1944 under which 50,000 young people between the ages of 10 and 20 were evacuated into Germany from areas recaptured by the Soviet forces and used as apprentices in German industry and as auxiliaries in units of the German armed forces. In the summer of 1942, von Schirach telegraphed carried out in retaliation for the assassination of Heydrich which, Bormann urging that a bombing attack on an English cultural town be he claimed, had been planned by the British.
MR. BIDDLE:
Sauckel is indicted under all four counts. Sauckel joined the Nazi Party in 1923, and became Gauleiter of Thuringia in 1927. He was a member of the Thuringian legislature from 1927 to 1933, was appointed Reichsstatthalter for Thuringia in 1932, and. Thuringian Minister of the Interior end Head of the Thuringian State Ministry in May 1933. He became a member of the Reichstag in 1933. He held the formal rank of Obergruppenfuehrer in both the SA and the SS. ficiently connected with the common plan to wage aggressive war or sufficiently involved in the planning or waging of the aggressive wars to allow the Tribunal to convict him on Counts One or Two. for the Utilization of Labor, with authority to put under uniform control "the utilization of all available manpower, including that of workers recruited abroad and of prisoners of war". Sauckel was instructed to operate within the fabric of the Four Year Plan, and on March 27, 1942, Goering issued a decree as Commissioner for the Four Year Plan transferring his manpower sections to Sauckel. On September 30, 1942, Hitler gave Sauckel authority to appoint Commissioners in the various occupied territories, and "to take all necessary measures for the enforcement" of the decree of March 21, 1942. a program for the mobilization of the Labor resources available to the Reich.
exploitation, by force, of the labor resources of the occupied territories.
One of the important parts of this mobilization was the systematic Shortly after Sauckel had taken office, he had the governing authorities in the various occupied territories issue decrees, establishing compulsory labor service in Germany. Under the authority of these decrees Sauckel's Commissioners, backed up by the police authorities of the occupied territories, obtained and sent to Germany the laborers which were necessary to fill the quotas given them by Sauckel. He described so-called "voluntary" recruiting by Janates "a whole batch of male and female agents just as was done in the olden times for shanghaiing". That real voluntary recruiting was the exception rather than the rule is shown by Sauckel's statement on March 1, 1944, that "out of five million foreign workers who arrived in Germany not even 200,000 came voluntarily." Although he now claims that the statement is not true, the circumstances under which it was made, as well as the evidence presented before the Tribunal, leave no doubt that it was substantially accurate. transported to Germany, and what happened to them after they arrived, has already been described. Sauckel argues that he is not responsible for these excesses in the administration of the program. He says that the total number of workers to be obtained was set by the demands from agriculture and from industry; that obtaining the workers was the responsibility of the occupation authorities, transporting them to Germany that of the German railways, and taking care of them in Germany that of the Ministries of Labor and Agriculture, the German Labor Front and the various industries involved. He testifies that insofar as he had any authority he was constantly urging There is no doubt, however, that Sauckel had overall humane treatment.
responsibility for the slave labor program. At the time of the events in question he did not fall to assert control over the fields which he now claims were the sole responsibility of others. His regulations provided that his Commissioners should have authority for obtaining labor, and he was constantly in the field supervising the steps which were being taken. He was aware of ruthless methods being taken to obtain laborers, and vigorously supported them on the ground that they were necessary to fill the quotas.
Sauckel's regulations also provided that he had responsibility for transporting the laborers to Germany, allocating them to employers and taking care of them, and that the other agencies involved in these processes were subordinate to him. He was informed of the bad conditions which existed. It does not appear that he advocated brutality for its own sake, or was an advocate of any program such as Himmler's plan for extermination through work. His attitude was thus expressed in a regulation:
"All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated of expenditure."
The evidence shows that Sauckel wasin charge of a program which involved deportation for slave labor of more than 5,000,000 human beings, many of them under terrible conditions of cruelty and suffering. Counts One and Two. He is guilty under Counts Three and Four.
JODL M. de VABRES:
Jodl is indicted on all four counts. From 1935 to 1938 he was chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command. After a year in command of troops, in August 1939 he returned to become Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Although his immediate superior was defendant Keitel, he reported directly to Hitler on operational matters. In the strict military sense, Jodl was the actual planner of the war and responsible in large measure for the strategy and conduct of operations. to obedience, and not a politician; and that his staff and planning work left him no time for other matters. He said, that when he signed, or initialed orders, memoranda and letters, he did so for Hitler and often in the absence of Keitel. Though he claims that as a soldier he had to obey Hitler, he says that he often tried to obstruct certain measures by delay, which occasionally proved successful as when he resisted Hitler's demand that a directive be issued to lynch allied "terror fliers".
Entries in Jodl's diary on 13 and 14 February 1938 show Hitler instructed both him and Keitel to keep up military pressure against Austria begun at the Schuschnigg conference by simulating military measures, and that these achieved their purpose. When Hitler decided "not to tolerate" Schuschnigg's plebiscite, Jodl brought to the conference the "old draft", the existing staff plan. His diary for 10 March shows Hitler then ordered, the preparation of "Case Otto", mentary instructions on 11 March, and initialed Hitler's order and the directive was initialed by Jodl.
Jodl issued supplefor the invasion on the same date. active, according to the Schmundt Notes. He initialed items 14, 17, 24, 35 and 37 in the Notes. Jodl admits he agreed with OKH that the "incident" to provide German intervention must occur at the latest by 1400 on X-1 Day, the day before the attack, and said it must occur at a fixed time in good flying weather. Jodl conferred with the propaganda experts on "imminent common tasks" such as. German violations of international law, exploitation of them by the enemy and refutations by the Germans, which "task" Jodl considered "particularly important".
After Munich, Jodl wrote:
"Czechoslovakia an a power is out ... The genius the use of force.
The hope remains that the in been converted and will remain that way."
post command and did not become Chief of the Operations Staff in OKW until the end of August, 1939. and Raeder on 12 December 1939; his diary is replete with late entries on his activities in preparing this attack. Jodl explains his comment that Hitler was still looking for an "excuse" to move meant that he was waiting for reliable intelligence on the British plans, and defends the invasion as a necessary move to forestall them. His testimony shows that Belgium, but was doubtful about invading Holland until the from October 1939 Hitler planned to attack the West through middle of November.
On 8 February 1940, Jodl, his deputy Warlimont, and Jeschonnek, the air forces planner, discussed among themselves the "new idea" of attacking Norway, Denmark and Holland, but guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Many of the 17 orders postponing the attack in the West for various reasons including weather conditions, until May 1940, were signed by Jodl. Yugoslavia. The Hitler order of 11 January 1941 to intervene in Albania was initialed by Jodl. On 20 January, four months before the attack, Hitler told a conference of German and Italian generals in Jodl's presence that German troop, concentrations in Roumania were to be used against Greece. Jodl was present on 18 March when Hitler told Raeder all Greece must be occupied before any settlement could be reached. On 27 March when Hitler told the German High Command that the destruction of Yugoslavia should be accomplished with "unmerciful harshness", and the decision was taken to bomb Belgrade without a declaration of war, Jodl was also there. and so attacked first. This preparation began almost a year before the invasion. Jodl told Warlimont as early as 29 July 1940 to prepare the plans since Hitler had decided to attack; and Hitler later told Warlimont he had planned to attack in August 1940 but postponed it for military reasons. He initialed Hitler's directive of 12 November 1940 according to which preparations verbally ordered should be continued and also initialed."Case Barbarossa" on 18 December. On 3 February, 1941, Hitler, Jodl and Keitel discussed reports on "Case Barbarossa" were made.
the invasion, and he was present on 14 June when final day later a supplementary explanation to commanding officers only. The covering memorandum as signed by Jodl. Early drafts of the order were made by Jodl's staff, with his knowledge. Jodl testified he was strongly opposed on moral and legal grounds, but could not refuse to pass it on. He insists he tried to mitigate its harshness in practice by not informing Hitler when it was not carried out. He initialed the OKW memorandum of 25 June 1944 reaffirming the Order after the Normandy landings. directive for "Case Barbarossa". The decision whether they should be killed without trial was to be made by an officer. A draft contains Jodl's handwriting suggesting this should be handled as retaliation, and he testified this was his attempt to get around it. Convention, Jodl argued the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. On 21 February he told Hitler adherence to the Convention would not interfere with the conduct of the war, giving as an example the sinking of a British hospital ship as a reprisal and calling it a mistake. He said he did so because it was the only attitude Hitler would consider, that moral or legal arguments had no effect and argues he thus prevented Hitler from denouncing the Convention.
slave labor program, and he must have concentrated on his strategic planning function.
But in his speech of 7 November 1943 to the Gauleiters he said it was necessary to act "with remorseless vigor and resolution" in Denmark, France and the Low Countries to compel work on the Atlantic Wall. persons in Northern Norway and the burning of their houses so they could not help the Russians. Jodl says he was against this, but Hitler ordered it and it was not fully carried out. A document of the Norwegian Government says such an evacuation did take place in Northern Norway and 30,000 houses were damaged. On 7 October 1941, Jodl signed an order that Hitler would not accept, an offer of, surrender of Leningrad or Moscow, but on the contrary he insisted that they be completely destroyed. He says this was done because the Germans were afraid these cities would be mined by the Russians as was Kiev. No surrender was ever offered.
His defense, in brief, is the doctrine of "superior orders", prohibited by Article 8 of the Charter as a defense. There is nothing in mitigation. Participation in such crimes as these has never been required of any soldier and he cannot now shield himself behind a mythical requirement of soldierly obedience at all costs as his excuse for commission of these crimes.
THE PRESIDENT: VON PAPEN Von Papen is indicted under Counts One and Two.
He was appointed Chancellor of the Reich on June 1, 19.32, and was succeeded by von Schleicher on December 2, 1932. He was made Vice Chancellor in the Hitler Cabinet on January 30, 1933, and on November 13, 1933, Plenipotentiary for the Saar. On July 26, 1934, he was appointed Minister to Vienna, and was recalled on February 4, 1938. On April 29, 1939, he was appointed Ambassador to Turkey. He returned to Germany when Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in August 1944. the Coalition Cabinet and aided in his appointment as Chancellor on January 30, 1933. As Vice Chancellor in that Cabinet he participated in the Nazi consolidation of control in 1933. On June 16, 1934, however, von Papen made a speech at Marburg which contained a denunciation of the Nazi attempts to suppress the free press and the church, of the existence of a reign of terror, and of "150% Nazis" who were mistaking "brutality for vitality." On June 30, 1934, in the wave of violence which accompanied the so-called Roehm Purge, von Papen was taken into custody by the SS, his office force was arrested, and two of his associates, including the man who had helped him work on the Marburg speech, were murdered. Von Papen was released on July 3, 1934. the position of Minister to Austria on July 26, 1934, the day after Dollfuss had been assassinated. His appointment was announced in a the two countries "into normal and friendly channels" and assured letter from Hitler which instructed him to direct relations between him of Hitler's "complete and unlimited confidence."
As Minister to Austria, von Papen was active in trying to strengthen the position of the Nazi Party in Austria for the purpose of bringing about Anschluss. In early 1935 he attended a meeting in Berlin at which the policy was laid down to avoid everything which would give the appearance of German intervention in the internal affairs of Austria. Yet he arranged for 200,000 marks a month to be transmitted to "the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria." On May 17, 1935, he reported to Hitler the results of a conference with Captain Leopold, the Leader of the Austrian Nazis, and urged Hitler to make a statement recognizing the national independence of Austria, and predicting that the result might be to help the formation of a coalition between Schuschnigg's Christian Socialists and the Austrian Nazis against Starhemberg. On July 27, 1935, von Papen reported to Hitler that the union of Austria and Germany could not be brought about by external pressure but only by the strength of the National Socialist Movement. He urged that the Austrian Nazi Party change its character as a centralized Reich German Party and become a rallying point for all National Germans. supported Nazi propaganda activities and submitted detailed reports on the activities of the Nazi Party, and routine reports relating to Austrian military defenses. His Austrian policy resulted in the agreement of July 11, 1936, which nominally restored relations between Germany and Austria to "normal and friendly form", but which had a secret supplement providing for an amnesty for Austrian Nazis, the lifting of censorship appointment of men friendly to the Nazis in the Schuschnigg Cabinet.
on Nazi papers, the resumption of political activities by Nazis and the resignation was not accepted. Thereafter he proceeded to bring continued pressure on the Austrian Government to bring Nazis into the Schuschnigg Cabinet and to get them important positions in the Fatherland Front, Austria's single legal party. On September 1, 1936, von Papen wrote Hitler advising him that anti-Nazis in the Austrian Ministry of Security were holding up the infiltration of the Nazis into the Austrian Government and recommended bringing "slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime". Austria, at the same time that von Fritsch, von Blomberg and von Neurath were removed from their positions. He informed Hitler that he regretted his recall because he had been trying since November 1937 to induce Schuschnigg to hold a conference with Hitler and Schuschnigg had indicated his willingness to do so. Acting under Hitler's instructions, von Papen then returned to Austria and arranged the conference which was held at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938. Von Papen accompanied Schuschnigg to that conference, and at its conclusion advised Schuschnigg to comply with Hitler's demands. On March 10, 1938, Hitler ordered von Papen to return to Berlin. Von Papen was in the Chancellery on March 11 when the occupation of Austria was ordered. No evidence has been offered, showing that von Papen was in favor of the decision to occupy Austria by force, and After the annexation of Austria von Papen retired into private he has testified that he urged Hitler not to take this step.
life and there is no evidence that he took any part in politics. He accepted the position of Ambassador to Turkey in April 1939 but no evidence has been offered concerning his activities in that position implicating him in crimes.
The evidence leaves no doubt that von Papen's primary purpose as Minister to Austria was to undetermine the Schuschnigg regime and strengthen the Austrian Nazis for the purpose of bringing about Anschluss. To carry through this plan he engaged in both intrigue and bullying. But the Charter does not make criminal such offenses against political morality, however bad these may be. Under the Charter von Papen can be held guilty only if he was a party to the planning of aggressive war. There is no showing that he was a party to the plans under which the occupation of Austria was a step in the direction of further aggressive action, or even that he participated in plans to occupy Austria by aggressive war if necessary. But it is not established beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the purpose of his activity, and therefore the Tribunal cannot hold that he was a party to the common plan charged in Count One or participated in the planning of the aggressive wars charged under Count Two. ment, and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal, when the Tribunal presently adjourns.