SEYSS-INQUART MAJOR GENERAL NIKITCHENKO:
Seyss-Inquart is indicted under all Four Counts. Seyss-Inquart, an Austrian attorney, was appointed State Councillor in Austria in May 1937 as a result of German pressure. He had been associated with the Austrian Nazi Party since 1931, but had often had difficulties with that Party and did not actually join the Nazi Party until March 13, 1938. He was appointed Austrian Minister of Security and Interior with control over the police pursuant to one of the conditions which Hitler had imposed on Schuschnigg in the Berchtesgaden conference of February 12, 1938. which preceded the German occupation of Austria, and was made Chancellor of Austria as a result of German greats of invasion. welcoming the German forces and advocating the reunion of Germany and Austria. On March 13, he obtained the passage of a law providing that Austria should become a province of Germany and succeeded Miklas as President of Austria when Miklas resigned rather than sign the law. SeyssInquart's title was changed to Reichs Governor of Austria on March 15, 1938, and on the same day he was given the title of a General in the SS. He was made a Reichs Minister without Portfolio on May 1, 1939. and induced them to declare their independence in a way which fitted in closely with Hitler's offensive against the independence of Czechoslovakia of confiscating Jewish property.
Under his regime Jews were forced to emigrate, were sent to concentration camps and were subject to pogroms.
At the end of his regime he cooperated with the Security Police and SD in the deportation of Jews from Austria to the East. While he was Governor of Austria, political opponents of the Nazis were sent to concentration camps by the Gestapo, mistreated and often killed. tration of South Poland. On October 12, 1939, Seyss-Inquart was made Deputy Governor General of the General Government of Poland under Frank. On May 18, 1940, Seyss-Inquart was appointed Reich Commissioner for occupied Netherlands. In these potions he assumed responsibility for governing territory which had been occupied by aggressive wars and the administration of which was of vit importance in the aggressive war being waged by Germany. Inquart was a supporter of the hard occupation policies which were put in effect. In November 1939, while on an inspection tour through the General Government, Seyss-Inquart stated that Poland was to be so administered as to exploit its economic resources for the benefit of Germany. SeyssInquart also advocated the persecution of Jews and was informed of the beginning of the AB action which involved the murder of many Polish intellectuals. ruthless in applying terrorism to suppress all opposition to the German In collaboration with the local Higher SS and Police Leaders he was occupation, a program which he described as "annihilating" his opponents.
involved in the shooting of hostages for offenses against the occupation authorities and sending to concentration camps all suspected opponents of occupation policies including priests and educators. Many of the Dutch police were forced to participate in these programs by threats of reprisal against their families. Dutch courts were also forced to participate in this program, but when they indicated their reluctance to give sentences of imprisonment because so many prisoners were in fact killed, a greater emphasis was placed on the use of summary police courts. Netherlands without regard for rules of the Hague Convention which he described as obsolete. Instead, a policy was adopted for the maximum utilization of economic potential of the Netherlands, and executed with small regard for its effect on the inhabitants. There was widespread pillage of public and private property which was given color of legality by Seyss-Inquart's regulations, and assisted by manipulations of the financial, institutions of the Netherlands under his control. began sending forced laborers to Germany. Up until 1942, labor service in Germany was theoretically voluntary, but was actually coerced by strong economic and governmental pressure. In 1942 Seyss-Inquart formally decreed compulsory labor service, and utilized the services of the Security Police and SD to prevent evasion of his order. During the occupation over 500,000 people were sent from the Netherlands to the One of Seyss-Inquart's first steps as Reich Commissioner of the Reich as laborers and only a very all proportion were actually volunteers.
Netherlands was to put into effect a series of laws imposing economic discriminations against the Jews. This was followed by decrees requiring their registration, decrees completing them to reside in Ghettos and to wear the star of David, sporadic rests and detention in concentration camps, and finally, at the suggestion of Heydrich, the mass deportation of almost 120,000 of Holland's 1400,000 Jews to Auschwitz and the "final solution." Seyss-Inquart admits showing that they were going to Auschwitz but claims that he heard from people who had been to Auschwitz that the Jews were comparatively well off ere, and that he thought that they were being held there for resettlement after the war. In light of the evidence and on account of his official position it is impossible to believe this claim. crimes committed in the occupation of the Netherlands because they were either ordered from the Reich, committed by the Army, over which he had no control, or by the German Higher SS and Police Leader, who, he claims, reported directly to Himmler. It is true that some of the excesses were the responsibility of the Army, and that the Higher SS and Police Leader, although he was at the disposal of Seyss-Inquart, could always report directly to Himmler. It is also true that in certain cases SeyssInquart opposed the extreme measures used by these other agencies, as when he was largely successful in preventing the Army from carrying out a scorched earth policy, and urged the Higher SS and Police Leaders to reduce the number of hostages to be shot. But the fact remains that War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity which were committed Seyss-Inquart was a knowin and voluntary participant in in the occupation of the Netherlands.
under Counts Two, Three and Four. Seyss-Inquart is not guilty on Count One.
SPEER
MR. BIDDLE:
Speer is indicted under all Four Counts. Speer joined the Nazi Party in 1932. In 1934 he was made Hitler's architect and became a close personal confidant. Shortly thereafter he was made a Department Head in the German Labor Front and the official in Charge of Capital Construction on the staff of the Deputy to the Fuehrer, positions which he held through 1941. On February 15, 1942, after the death of Fritz Todt, Speer was appointed Chief of the Organization Todt and Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions (after September 2, 1943, for Armaments and Mar Production). The positions were supplemented by his appointments in March and April 1942 as General Plenipotentiary for Armaments and as a member of the Central Planning Board, both within the Four Year Plan. Speer was a member of the Reichstag from 1941 until the end of the war.
The Tribunal is of opinion that Speer's activities do not amount to initiating, planning, or preparing wars of aggression, or of conspiring to that end. He became the head of the armament industry well after all of the wars had been commenced and were under way. His activities in charge of German Armament Production were in aid of the war effort in the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war; but the Tribunal is not prepared to find that such activities involve engaging in the common plan to wage aggressive war as charged under Count I or waging aggressive war as charged under Count II.
The evidence introduced against Speer under Counts Three and Four relates entirely to his participation in the slave labor program.
Speer himself had no direct administrative responsibility for this program. Although he had advocated the appointment of a General Plenipotentiary for the Utilization of labor because he wanted one central authority with whom he could deal on labor matters, he did not obtain administrative control over Sauckel. Sauckel was appointed directly by Hitler, under the decree of March 21, 1942, which provided that he should be directly responsible to Goering, as Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan. potentiary for Armaments under the Four Year Plan, Speer had extensive authority over production. His original authority was over construction and production of arms for the OKH. This was progressively expanded to include naval armaments, civilian production and finally, on August 1, 1944, air armament. As the dominant member of the Central Planning Board, which had supreme authority for the scheduling of German production and the allocation and development of raw materials, Speer took the position that the Board had authority to instruct Sauckel to provide laborers for industries under its control and succeeded in sustaining this position over the objection of Sauckel. The practice was developed under which Speer transmitted to Sauckel an estimate of the total number of workers needed, Sauckel obtained the labor and allocated it to the various industries in accordance with instructions supplied by Speer.
in conferences involving the extension of the slave labor program supplied by foreign laborers serving under compulsion.
He participated for the purpose of satisfying his demands. He was present at a conference held during August 10 and August 12, 1942, with Hitler and Sauckel at which it was agreed that Sauckel should bring laborers by force from occupied territories where this was necessary to satisfy the labor needs of the industries under Speer's control. Speer also attended a conference in Hitler's headquarters on January 4, 1944, at which the decision was made that Sauckel should obtain "at least 4 million new workers from occupied territories" in order to satisfy the demands for labor made by Speer, although Sauckel indicated that he could do this only with help from Himmler. foreign laborers were being obtained by force. At a meeting of March 1, 1944, Speer's deputy questioned Sauckel very closely about his failure to live up to the obligation to supply four million workers from occupied territories. In some cases Speer demanded laborers from specific foreign countries. Thus, at the conference August 10-12, 1942, Sauckel was instructed to supply Speer with "a further million Russian laborers for the German armament industry up to and including October 1942." At a meeting of the Central Planning Board on April 22, 1943, Speer discussed plans to obtain Russian laborers for use in the coal mines, and flatly vetoed the suggestion that this labor deficit should be made up by German labor. labor program to place a greater emphasis on utilization of German countries in local production of consumer goods formerly produced in labour in war production in Germany and on the use of labour in occupied Germany.
Speer took steps in this direction by establishing the socalled "blocked industries" in the occupied territories which were used to produce goods to be shipped to Germany. Employees of these industries were immune from deportation to Germany as slave labourers and any worker who had been ordered to go to Germany could avoid deportation if he went to work for a blocked industry. This sytem, although somewhat less inhumane than deportation to Germany, was still illegal. The system of blocked industries played only a small part in the overall slave labour programme knowing the way in which it was actually being administered. In an official sense, he was its principal beneficiary and he constantly urged its extension. labour as Chief of the Organization Todt. The Organization Todt functioned principally in the occupied areas on such projects as the Atlantic Hall and the construction of military highways, and Speer has admitted that he relied on compulsory service to keep it adequately Staffed. He also used concentration camp labour in the industries under his control. He originally arranged to tap this source of labour for use in small out of the way factories; and later, fearful of Himmler's jurisdictional ambitions, attempted to use as few concentration camp workers as possible. industries but contends that he only utilized Soviet prisoners of war in Speer's position was such that he was not directly concerned with industries covered by the Geneva Convention.
the cruelty in the administration of the slave labor program, although he was aware of its existence. For example, at meetings of the Central Planning Board he was informed that his demands for labor were so large as to necessitate violent methods in recruiting. At a meeting of the Central Planning Board on October 30, 1942. Speer voiced his opinion that many slave laborers who claimed to be sick were malingerers and stated: "There is nothing to be said against SS and Police taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into concentration camps." Speer, however, insisted that the slave laborers be given adequate food and working conditions so that they could work efficiently.
In mitigation it must be recognized that Speer's establishment of blocked industries did keep many laborers in their homes and that in the closing stages of the war he was one of the few men who had the courage to tell Hitler that the war was lost and to take steps to prevent the senseless destruction of production facilities, both in occupied territories and in Germany. He carried out his opposition to Hitler's scorched earth program in some of the Western countries and in Germany by deliberately sabotaging it at considerable personal risk. but is guilty under Counts Three and Four.
VON NEURATH M. de VABRES Von Neurath is indicted under all Four Counts.
He is a professional diplomat was served as German Ambassador to Great Britain from 1930 to 1932. On June 2, 1932, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in the von Papen cabinet, a position which he held under the cabinets of von Schleicher and Hitler. Von Neurath resigned as Minister of Foreign Affairs on February 4, 1938, and was made Reich Minister without portfolio, President of the Secret Cabinet Council and a member of the Reich Defense Council. On March 18, 1939, he was appointed Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, and served in this capacity until September 27, 1941. He held the formal rank of Obergruppenfuehrer in the SS. Hitler in connection with the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations on October 14, 1933; the institution of rearmament; the passage on March 16, 1935, of the law for universal military service; and the passage on May 21, 1935, of the secret Reich Defense Law. He was a key figure in the negotiation of the Naval Accord entered into between Germany and England on June 18, 1935. Von Neurath played an important part in Hitler's decision to reoccupy the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, and predicted that the occupation could be carried through without any reprisals from the French. On May 18, 1936, he told the American Ambassador to France that it was the policy of the German Government to do nothing in foreign affairs until "the Rhineland had been digested", and that as soon and the countries of central Europe realized that France as the fortfications in the Rhineland had been constructed could not enter Germany at will, "all those countries will begin to feel very differently about their foreign policies and a new constellation will develop."
November 5, 1937. He has testified that he was so shocked by Hitler's statements that he had a heart attack. Shortly thereafter, he offered to resign, and his resignation was accepted on February 4, 1938, at the same time that von Fritsch and von Blomberg were dismissed. Yet with knowledge of Hitler's aggressive plans he retained a formal relationship with the Nazi regime as Reichs Minister without Portfolio, President of the Secret Cabinet Council and a member of the Reichs Defense Council. He took charge of the Foreign Office at the time of the occupation of Austria, assured the British Ambassador that this had not been caused by a German ultimatum, and informed the Czechoslovakian Minister that Germany intended to abide by its arbitration convention with Czechoslovakia. Von Neurath participated in the last phase of the negotiations preceding the Munich Pact but contends that he entered these discussions only to urge Hitler to make every effort to settle the issues by peaceful means. and Moravia on March 18, 1939. Bohemia and Moravia were occupied by military force. Hachs's consent, obtained as it was by duress, cannot be considered as justifying the occupation. Hitler's decree of March 16, 1939, establishing the Protectorate, stated that this new territory should "belong henceforth to the territory of the German Reich", an assumption that the went on the theory that Bohemia and Moravia retained their Republic of Czechoslovakia no longer existed.
But it also sovereignty subject only to the interests of Germany as expressed by the protectorate. Therefore even if the doctrine of subjugation should be considered, to be applicable to territory occupied by aggressive action, the Tribunal does not believe that this Proclamation amounted to an incorporation which was sufficient to bring the doctrine into effect. The occupation of Bohemia and Moravia must therefore be considered a military occupation covered by the rules of warfare. Although Czechoslovakia was not a party to the Hague Convention of 1907, the rules of land warfare expressed in this Convention are declaratory of existing international law and hence are applicable. istration in Bohemia and Moravia similar to that in effect in Germany. The free press, political parties and trade unions were abolished. All groups which might serve as opposition were outlawed. Czechoslovakian industry was worked into the structure of German war production, and exploited for the German war effort. Nazi anti-Semitic policies and laws were also introduced. Jews were barred from leading positions in Government and business. warning against any acts of sabotage and stating that "the responsibility for all acts of sabotage is attributed not only to individual perpetrators but to the entire Czech population." When the war broke out on September 1, 1939, 8,000 prominent Czechs were arrested by the Security Police in Bohemia and Moravia and put into protective custody. Many of this group died in concentration camps as a result of mistreatment. held a series of demonstrations. As a result, on Hitler's orders, all universities of the demonstration shot by Security Police and SD.
Von were closed, 1200 students imprisoned, and the nine leaders Neurath testified that he was not informed of this action in advance, but it was announced by proclamation over his signature posted on placards throughout the Protectorate, which he claims, however, was done without his authority.
a memorandum which he had prepared dealing with the future of the Protectorate, and a memorandum with his approval prepared by Carl Herman Frank on the same subject. Both dealt with the question of Germanization and proposed that the majority of the Czechs might be assimilated racially into the German nation. Both advocated the elimination of the Czechoslovakian intelligentsia and other groups which might resist Germanization, von Neurath's by expulsion, Frank's by expulsion or "special treatment." the repressive measures was carried out by the Security Police and SD who were under the control of his State Secretary, Carl Herman Frank, who was appointed at the suggestion of Himmler and who, as a Higher SS and Police Leader, reported directly to Himmler. Von Neurath further argues that anti-Semitic measures and those resulting in economic exploitation were put into effect in the Protectorate as the result of policies decided upon in the Reich. However this may be, he served as the chief German official in the protectorate when the administration of this territory played a n important role in the wars of aggression which Germany was waging in the East knowing that War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity were being committed under his authority.
vene with the Security Police and SD for the release of many of the Czechoslovaks who were arrested on September 1, 1939, and for the release of students arrested later in the fall.
On September 23, 1941, he was summoned before Hitler and told that he was being not harsh enough and that Heydrich was being sent to the Protectorate to combat the Czechoslovakian resist groups. Von Neurath attempted to dissuade Hitler from sending Heydrich, but in vain, and when he was not successful offered to resign. When his resignation was not accepted he went on leave, on September 27, 1941, and refused to act as Protector after that date. His resignation was formally accepted in August 1943. all four counts.
Fritzsche is indicted on Counts One, Three and Four. He was best known as a radio commentator, discussing once a week the events of the day on his own program, "Hans Fritzsche Speaks."
He began broadcasting in September 1932; in the same year he was made the head of the Wireless News Service, a Reich Government agency. When on May 1, 1933, this agency was incorporated by the National Socialists into their Reich Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, Fritzsche became a member of the Nazi Party and went to that Ministry. In December 1938 he became head of the Home Press Division of the Ministry; in October 1942 he was promoted to the rank of Ministerial Director. After serving briefly on the Eastern Front in a propaganda company, he was, in November 1942, made head of the Radio Division of the Propaganda Ministry and Plenipotentiary for the Political Organization of the Greater German Radio. the German press of 2,300 daily newspapers. In pursuance of this function he held daily press conferences to deliver the directives of the Propaganda Ministry to these papers. He was, however, subordinate to Dietrich, the Reich Press Chief, who was in turn a subordinate of Goebbels. It was Dietrich who received the directives to the press of Goebbels and other Reich Ministers, and prepared them as instructions, which he then handed to Fritzsche for the press.
From time to time, the "Daily Paroles of the Reich Press Chief", as these instructions were labeled, directed the press to present to the Jewish problem, the problem of living space, or other the people certain themes, such as the leadership principle, standard Nazi ideas.
A vigorous propaganda campaign was carried out before each major act of aggression. While Fritzsche headed the Home Press Division, he instructed the press how the actions or wars against Bohemia and Moravia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union should be dealt with. Fritzsche had no control of the formulation of these propaganda policies. He was merely a conduit to the press of the instructions handed him by Dietrich. In February 1939 and before the absorption of Bohemia and Moravia, for instance, he received Dietrich's order to bring to the attention of the press Slovakia's efforts for independence, and the anti-Germanic policies and politics of the existing Prague Government. This order to Dietrich originated in the Foreign Office. head in November 1942, was one of the twelve divisions of the Propaganda Ministry. In the beginning Dietrich and other heads of divisions exerted influence over the policies to be followed by Radio. Towards the end of the war, however, Fritzsche became the sole authority within the Ministry for radio activities. In this capacity he formulated and issued daily radio "paroles" to all Reich Propaganda Offices, according to the general political policies of the Nazi regime, subject to the directives of the Radio-Political Division of the Foreign Office, and the personal supervision of Goebbels. Ministry, was present at Goebbels' daily staff conferences. Here they were instructed in the news and propaganda policies of the day. After 1943 Fritzsche Goebbels and his State Secretaries were absent.
And even himself occasionally held these conferences, but only when then his only function was to transmit the Goebbels' directives relayed to him by telephone.
This is the summary of Fritzsche's positions and influence in the Third Reich. Fuehrer did he achieve sufficient stature to attend the planning conferences which led to aggressive war; indeed according to his own uncontradicted testimony he never even had a conversation with Hitler. Nor is there any showing that he was informed of the decisions taken at these conferences. His activities cannot be said to be those which fall within the definition of the common plan to wage aggressive war as already set forth in this Judgment. and encouraged the commission of war crimes, by deliberately falsifying news to arouse in the German people those passions which led them to the commission of atrocities under Counts Three and Four. His position as official duties were not sufficiently important, however, to infer that he took part in originating or formulating propaganda campaigns. anti-Semitism on his part. He broadcast, for example, that the war had been caused by Jews and said their fate had turned out "as unpleasant as the Fuehrer predicted." But these speeches did not urge persecution or extermination of Jews. There is no evidence that he was aware of their extermination in the East. The evidence moreover shows that he twice attempted to have publication of the anti-Semtitic "Der Sturmer" suppressed, though unsuccessfully.
news, but it was not proved he knew it to be false. For example, he reported that no German U-Boat was in the vicinity of the "Athenia" when, it was sunk.
This information was untrue; but Fritzsche, having received it from the German Navy, had no reason to believe it was untrue. ments of a propagandistic nature in his broadcasts. But the Tribunal is not prepared to hold that they were intended to incite the German people to commit atrocities on conquered peoples, and he cannot be held to have been a participant in the crimes charged. His aim was rather to a rouse popular sentiment in support of Hitler and the German war effort. this Indictment, and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal when the Tribunal presently adjourns.
Bormann is indicted on Counts One, Three, and Four.
He joined the National Socialist Party in 1925, was a member of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the SA from 1928 to 1930, was in charge of the Aid Fund of the Party, and was Reichsleiter from 1933 to 1945. From 1933 to 1941 he was Chief of Staff in the Office of the Fuehrer's Deputy and, after the flight of Hess to England, became Head of the Party Chancellery on 12 May 1941. On 12 April 1943 he became Secretary to the Fuehrer. He was political and organizational head of the Volkssturm and a General in the SS.
Bormann, in the beginning a minor Nazi,/steadily rose to a position of power and, particularly in the closing days, of great influence over Hitler. He was active in the Party's rise to power and even more so in the consolidation of that power. He devoted much of his time to the persecution of the churches and of the Jews within Germany. Hitler's plans to prepare, initiate or wage aggressive wars. He attended none of the important conferences when Hitler revealed piece by piece these plans for aggression. Nor can knowledge be conclusively inferred from the positions he held. It was only when he became Head of the Party Chancellery in 1941, and later in 1943 secretary to the Fuehrer when he attended many of Hitler's conferences, that his positions gave him the necessary access. Under the view stated elsewhere which the Tribunal has taken of the conspiracy to wage aggressive war, there is not sufficient evidence to bring War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Bormann within the scope of Count One.