responsibility for the slave labor program. At the time of the events in question he did not fall to assert control over the fields which he now claims were the sole responsibility of others. His regulations provided that his Commissioners should have authority for obtaining labor, and he was constantly in the field supervising the steps which were being taken. He was aware of ruthless methods being taken to obtain laborers, and vigorously supported them on the ground that they were necessary to fill the quotas.
Sauckel's regulations also provided that he had responsibility for transporting the laborers to Germany, allocating them to employers and taking care of them, and that the other agencies involved in these processes were subordinate to him. He was informed of the bad conditions which existed. It does not appear that he advocated brutality for its own sake, or was an advocate of any program such as Himmler's plan for extermination through work. His attitude was thus expressed in a regulation:
"All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated of expenditure."
The evidence shows that Sauckel wasin charge of a program which involved deportation for slave labor of more than 5,000,000 human beings, many of them under terrible conditions of cruelty and suffering. Counts One and Two. He is guilty under Counts Three and Four.
JODL M. de VABRES:
Jodl is indicted on all four counts. From 1935 to 1938 he was chief of the National Defense Section in the High Command. After a year in command of troops, in August 1939 he returned to become Chief of the Operations Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Although his immediate superior was defendant Keitel, he reported directly to Hitler on operational matters. In the strict military sense, Jodl was the actual planner of the war and responsible in large measure for the strategy and conduct of operations. to obedience, and not a politician; and that his staff and planning work left him no time for other matters. He said, that when he signed, or initialed orders, memoranda and letters, he did so for Hitler and often in the absence of Keitel. Though he claims that as a soldier he had to obey Hitler, he says that he often tried to obstruct certain measures by delay, which occasionally proved successful as when he resisted Hitler's demand that a directive be issued to lynch allied "terror fliers".
Entries in Jodl's diary on 13 and 14 February 1938 show Hitler instructed both him and Keitel to keep up military pressure against Austria begun at the Schuschnigg conference by simulating military measures, and that these achieved their purpose. When Hitler decided "not to tolerate" Schuschnigg's plebiscite, Jodl brought to the conference the "old draft", the existing staff plan. His diary for 10 March shows Hitler then ordered, the preparation of "Case Otto", mentary instructions on 11 March, and initialed Hitler's order and the directive was initialed by Jodl.
Jodl issued supplefor the invasion on the same date. active, according to the Schmundt Notes. He initialed items 14, 17, 24, 35 and 37 in the Notes. Jodl admits he agreed with OKH that the "incident" to provide German intervention must occur at the latest by 1400 on X-1 Day, the day before the attack, and said it must occur at a fixed time in good flying weather. Jodl conferred with the propaganda experts on "imminent common tasks" such as. German violations of international law, exploitation of them by the enemy and refutations by the Germans, which "task" Jodl considered "particularly important".
After Munich, Jodl wrote:
"Czechoslovakia an a power is out ... The genius the use of force.
The hope remains that the in been converted and will remain that way."
post command and did not become Chief of the Operations Staff in OKW until the end of August, 1939. and Raeder on 12 December 1939; his diary is replete with late entries on his activities in preparing this attack. Jodl explains his comment that Hitler was still looking for an "excuse" to move meant that he was waiting for reliable intelligence on the British plans, and defends the invasion as a necessary move to forestall them. His testimony shows that Belgium, but was doubtful about invading Holland until the from October 1939 Hitler planned to attack the West through middle of November.
On 8 February 1940, Jodl, his deputy Warlimont, and Jeschonnek, the air forces planner, discussed among themselves the "new idea" of attacking Norway, Denmark and Holland, but guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium. Many of the 17 orders postponing the attack in the West for various reasons including weather conditions, until May 1940, were signed by Jodl. Yugoslavia. The Hitler order of 11 January 1941 to intervene in Albania was initialed by Jodl. On 20 January, four months before the attack, Hitler told a conference of German and Italian generals in Jodl's presence that German troop, concentrations in Roumania were to be used against Greece. Jodl was present on 18 March when Hitler told Raeder all Greece must be occupied before any settlement could be reached. On 27 March when Hitler told the German High Command that the destruction of Yugoslavia should be accomplished with "unmerciful harshness", and the decision was taken to bomb Belgrade without a declaration of war, Jodl was also there. and so attacked first. This preparation began almost a year before the invasion. Jodl told Warlimont as early as 29 July 1940 to prepare the plans since Hitler had decided to attack; and Hitler later told Warlimont he had planned to attack in August 1940 but postponed it for military reasons. He initialed Hitler's directive of 12 November 1940 according to which preparations verbally ordered should be continued and also initialed."Case Barbarossa" on 18 December. On 3 February, 1941, Hitler, Jodl and Keitel discussed reports on "Case Barbarossa" were made.
the invasion, and he was present on 14 June when final day later a supplementary explanation to commanding officers only. The covering memorandum as signed by Jodl. Early drafts of the order were made by Jodl's staff, with his knowledge. Jodl testified he was strongly opposed on moral and legal grounds, but could not refuse to pass it on. He insists he tried to mitigate its harshness in practice by not informing Hitler when it was not carried out. He initialed the OKW memorandum of 25 June 1944 reaffirming the Order after the Normandy landings. directive for "Case Barbarossa". The decision whether they should be killed without trial was to be made by an officer. A draft contains Jodl's handwriting suggesting this should be handled as retaliation, and he testified this was his attempt to get around it. Convention, Jodl argued the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. On 21 February he told Hitler adherence to the Convention would not interfere with the conduct of the war, giving as an example the sinking of a British hospital ship as a reprisal and calling it a mistake. He said he did so because it was the only attitude Hitler would consider, that moral or legal arguments had no effect and argues he thus prevented Hitler from denouncing the Convention.
slave labor program, and he must have concentrated on his strategic planning function.
But in his speech of 7 November 1943 to the Gauleiters he said it was necessary to act "with remorseless vigor and resolution" in Denmark, France and the Low Countries to compel work on the Atlantic Wall. persons in Northern Norway and the burning of their houses so they could not help the Russians. Jodl says he was against this, but Hitler ordered it and it was not fully carried out. A document of the Norwegian Government says such an evacuation did take place in Northern Norway and 30,000 houses were damaged. On 7 October 1941, Jodl signed an order that Hitler would not accept, an offer of, surrender of Leningrad or Moscow, but on the contrary he insisted that they be completely destroyed. He says this was done because the Germans were afraid these cities would be mined by the Russians as was Kiev. No surrender was ever offered.
His defense, in brief, is the doctrine of "superior orders", prohibited by Article 8 of the Charter as a defense. There is nothing in mitigation. Participation in such crimes as these has never been required of any soldier and he cannot now shield himself behind a mythical requirement of soldierly obedience at all costs as his excuse for commission of these crimes.
THE PRESIDENT: VON PAPEN Von Papen is indicted under Counts One and Two.
He was appointed Chancellor of the Reich on June 1, 19.32, and was succeeded by von Schleicher on December 2, 1932. He was made Vice Chancellor in the Hitler Cabinet on January 30, 1933, and on November 13, 1933, Plenipotentiary for the Saar. On July 26, 1934, he was appointed Minister to Vienna, and was recalled on February 4, 1938. On April 29, 1939, he was appointed Ambassador to Turkey. He returned to Germany when Turkey broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in August 1944. the Coalition Cabinet and aided in his appointment as Chancellor on January 30, 1933. As Vice Chancellor in that Cabinet he participated in the Nazi consolidation of control in 1933. On June 16, 1934, however, von Papen made a speech at Marburg which contained a denunciation of the Nazi attempts to suppress the free press and the church, of the existence of a reign of terror, and of "150% Nazis" who were mistaking "brutality for vitality." On June 30, 1934, in the wave of violence which accompanied the so-called Roehm Purge, von Papen was taken into custody by the SS, his office force was arrested, and two of his associates, including the man who had helped him work on the Marburg speech, were murdered. Von Papen was released on July 3, 1934. the position of Minister to Austria on July 26, 1934, the day after Dollfuss had been assassinated. His appointment was announced in a the two countries "into normal and friendly channels" and assured letter from Hitler which instructed him to direct relations between him of Hitler's "complete and unlimited confidence."
As Minister to Austria, von Papen was active in trying to strengthen the position of the Nazi Party in Austria for the purpose of bringing about Anschluss. In early 1935 he attended a meeting in Berlin at which the policy was laid down to avoid everything which would give the appearance of German intervention in the internal affairs of Austria. Yet he arranged for 200,000 marks a month to be transmitted to "the persecuted National Socialist sufferers in Austria." On May 17, 1935, he reported to Hitler the results of a conference with Captain Leopold, the Leader of the Austrian Nazis, and urged Hitler to make a statement recognizing the national independence of Austria, and predicting that the result might be to help the formation of a coalition between Schuschnigg's Christian Socialists and the Austrian Nazis against Starhemberg. On July 27, 1935, von Papen reported to Hitler that the union of Austria and Germany could not be brought about by external pressure but only by the strength of the National Socialist Movement. He urged that the Austrian Nazi Party change its character as a centralized Reich German Party and become a rallying point for all National Germans. supported Nazi propaganda activities and submitted detailed reports on the activities of the Nazi Party, and routine reports relating to Austrian military defenses. His Austrian policy resulted in the agreement of July 11, 1936, which nominally restored relations between Germany and Austria to "normal and friendly form", but which had a secret supplement providing for an amnesty for Austrian Nazis, the lifting of censorship appointment of men friendly to the Nazis in the Schuschnigg Cabinet.
on Nazi papers, the resumption of political activities by Nazis and the resignation was not accepted. Thereafter he proceeded to bring continued pressure on the Austrian Government to bring Nazis into the Schuschnigg Cabinet and to get them important positions in the Fatherland Front, Austria's single legal party. On September 1, 1936, von Papen wrote Hitler advising him that anti-Nazis in the Austrian Ministry of Security were holding up the infiltration of the Nazis into the Austrian Government and recommended bringing "slowly intensified pressure directed at changing the regime". Austria, at the same time that von Fritsch, von Blomberg and von Neurath were removed from their positions. He informed Hitler that he regretted his recall because he had been trying since November 1937 to induce Schuschnigg to hold a conference with Hitler and Schuschnigg had indicated his willingness to do so. Acting under Hitler's instructions, von Papen then returned to Austria and arranged the conference which was held at Berchtesgaden on February 12, 1938. Von Papen accompanied Schuschnigg to that conference, and at its conclusion advised Schuschnigg to comply with Hitler's demands. On March 10, 1938, Hitler ordered von Papen to return to Berlin. Von Papen was in the Chancellery on March 11 when the occupation of Austria was ordered. No evidence has been offered, showing that von Papen was in favor of the decision to occupy Austria by force, and After the annexation of Austria von Papen retired into private he has testified that he urged Hitler not to take this step.
life and there is no evidence that he took any part in politics. He accepted the position of Ambassador to Turkey in April 1939 but no evidence has been offered concerning his activities in that position implicating him in crimes.
The evidence leaves no doubt that von Papen's primary purpose as Minister to Austria was to undetermine the Schuschnigg regime and strengthen the Austrian Nazis for the purpose of bringing about Anschluss. To carry through this plan he engaged in both intrigue and bullying. But the Charter does not make criminal such offenses against political morality, however bad these may be. Under the Charter von Papen can be held guilty only if he was a party to the planning of aggressive war. There is no showing that he was a party to the plans under which the occupation of Austria was a step in the direction of further aggressive action, or even that he participated in plans to occupy Austria by aggressive war if necessary. But it is not established beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the purpose of his activity, and therefore the Tribunal cannot hold that he was a party to the common plan charged in Count One or participated in the planning of the aggressive wars charged under Count Two. ment, and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal, when the Tribunal presently adjourns.
SEYSS-INQUART MAJOR GENERAL NIKITCHENKO:
Seyss-Inquart is indicted under all Four Counts. Seyss-Inquart, an Austrian attorney, was appointed State Councillor in Austria in May 1937 as a result of German pressure. He had been associated with the Austrian Nazi Party since 1931, but had often had difficulties with that Party and did not actually join the Nazi Party until March 13, 1938. He was appointed Austrian Minister of Security and Interior with control over the police pursuant to one of the conditions which Hitler had imposed on Schuschnigg in the Berchtesgaden conference of February 12, 1938. which preceded the German occupation of Austria, and was made Chancellor of Austria as a result of German greats of invasion. welcoming the German forces and advocating the reunion of Germany and Austria. On March 13, he obtained the passage of a law providing that Austria should become a province of Germany and succeeded Miklas as President of Austria when Miklas resigned rather than sign the law. SeyssInquart's title was changed to Reichs Governor of Austria on March 15, 1938, and on the same day he was given the title of a General in the SS. He was made a Reichs Minister without Portfolio on May 1, 1939. and induced them to declare their independence in a way which fitted in closely with Hitler's offensive against the independence of Czechoslovakia of confiscating Jewish property.
Under his regime Jews were forced to emigrate, were sent to concentration camps and were subject to pogroms.
At the end of his regime he cooperated with the Security Police and SD in the deportation of Jews from Austria to the East. While he was Governor of Austria, political opponents of the Nazis were sent to concentration camps by the Gestapo, mistreated and often killed. tration of South Poland. On October 12, 1939, Seyss-Inquart was made Deputy Governor General of the General Government of Poland under Frank. On May 18, 1940, Seyss-Inquart was appointed Reich Commissioner for occupied Netherlands. In these potions he assumed responsibility for governing territory which had been occupied by aggressive wars and the administration of which was of vit importance in the aggressive war being waged by Germany. Inquart was a supporter of the hard occupation policies which were put in effect. In November 1939, while on an inspection tour through the General Government, Seyss-Inquart stated that Poland was to be so administered as to exploit its economic resources for the benefit of Germany. SeyssInquart also advocated the persecution of Jews and was informed of the beginning of the AB action which involved the murder of many Polish intellectuals. ruthless in applying terrorism to suppress all opposition to the German In collaboration with the local Higher SS and Police Leaders he was occupation, a program which he described as "annihilating" his opponents.
involved in the shooting of hostages for offenses against the occupation authorities and sending to concentration camps all suspected opponents of occupation policies including priests and educators. Many of the Dutch police were forced to participate in these programs by threats of reprisal against their families. Dutch courts were also forced to participate in this program, but when they indicated their reluctance to give sentences of imprisonment because so many prisoners were in fact killed, a greater emphasis was placed on the use of summary police courts. Netherlands without regard for rules of the Hague Convention which he described as obsolete. Instead, a policy was adopted for the maximum utilization of economic potential of the Netherlands, and executed with small regard for its effect on the inhabitants. There was widespread pillage of public and private property which was given color of legality by Seyss-Inquart's regulations, and assisted by manipulations of the financial, institutions of the Netherlands under his control. began sending forced laborers to Germany. Up until 1942, labor service in Germany was theoretically voluntary, but was actually coerced by strong economic and governmental pressure. In 1942 Seyss-Inquart formally decreed compulsory labor service, and utilized the services of the Security Police and SD to prevent evasion of his order. During the occupation over 500,000 people were sent from the Netherlands to the One of Seyss-Inquart's first steps as Reich Commissioner of the Reich as laborers and only a very all proportion were actually volunteers.
Netherlands was to put into effect a series of laws imposing economic discriminations against the Jews. This was followed by decrees requiring their registration, decrees completing them to reside in Ghettos and to wear the star of David, sporadic rests and detention in concentration camps, and finally, at the suggestion of Heydrich, the mass deportation of almost 120,000 of Holland's 1400,000 Jews to Auschwitz and the "final solution." Seyss-Inquart admits showing that they were going to Auschwitz but claims that he heard from people who had been to Auschwitz that the Jews were comparatively well off ere, and that he thought that they were being held there for resettlement after the war. In light of the evidence and on account of his official position it is impossible to believe this claim. crimes committed in the occupation of the Netherlands because they were either ordered from the Reich, committed by the Army, over which he had no control, or by the German Higher SS and Police Leader, who, he claims, reported directly to Himmler. It is true that some of the excesses were the responsibility of the Army, and that the Higher SS and Police Leader, although he was at the disposal of Seyss-Inquart, could always report directly to Himmler. It is also true that in certain cases SeyssInquart opposed the extreme measures used by these other agencies, as when he was largely successful in preventing the Army from carrying out a scorched earth policy, and urged the Higher SS and Police Leaders to reduce the number of hostages to be shot. But the fact remains that War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity which were committed Seyss-Inquart was a knowin and voluntary participant in in the occupation of the Netherlands.
under Counts Two, Three and Four. Seyss-Inquart is not guilty on Count One.
SPEER
MR. BIDDLE:
Speer is indicted under all Four Counts. Speer joined the Nazi Party in 1932. In 1934 he was made Hitler's architect and became a close personal confidant. Shortly thereafter he was made a Department Head in the German Labor Front and the official in Charge of Capital Construction on the staff of the Deputy to the Fuehrer, positions which he held through 1941. On February 15, 1942, after the death of Fritz Todt, Speer was appointed Chief of the Organization Todt and Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions (after September 2, 1943, for Armaments and Mar Production). The positions were supplemented by his appointments in March and April 1942 as General Plenipotentiary for Armaments and as a member of the Central Planning Board, both within the Four Year Plan. Speer was a member of the Reichstag from 1941 until the end of the war.
The Tribunal is of opinion that Speer's activities do not amount to initiating, planning, or preparing wars of aggression, or of conspiring to that end. He became the head of the armament industry well after all of the wars had been commenced and were under way. His activities in charge of German Armament Production were in aid of the war effort in the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war; but the Tribunal is not prepared to find that such activities involve engaging in the common plan to wage aggressive war as charged under Count I or waging aggressive war as charged under Count II.
The evidence introduced against Speer under Counts Three and Four relates entirely to his participation in the slave labor program.
Speer himself had no direct administrative responsibility for this program. Although he had advocated the appointment of a General Plenipotentiary for the Utilization of labor because he wanted one central authority with whom he could deal on labor matters, he did not obtain administrative control over Sauckel. Sauckel was appointed directly by Hitler, under the decree of March 21, 1942, which provided that he should be directly responsible to Goering, as Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan. potentiary for Armaments under the Four Year Plan, Speer had extensive authority over production. His original authority was over construction and production of arms for the OKH. This was progressively expanded to include naval armaments, civilian production and finally, on August 1, 1944, air armament. As the dominant member of the Central Planning Board, which had supreme authority for the scheduling of German production and the allocation and development of raw materials, Speer took the position that the Board had authority to instruct Sauckel to provide laborers for industries under its control and succeeded in sustaining this position over the objection of Sauckel. The practice was developed under which Speer transmitted to Sauckel an estimate of the total number of workers needed, Sauckel obtained the labor and allocated it to the various industries in accordance with instructions supplied by Speer.
in conferences involving the extension of the slave labor program supplied by foreign laborers serving under compulsion.
He participated for the purpose of satisfying his demands. He was present at a conference held during August 10 and August 12, 1942, with Hitler and Sauckel at which it was agreed that Sauckel should bring laborers by force from occupied territories where this was necessary to satisfy the labor needs of the industries under Speer's control. Speer also attended a conference in Hitler's headquarters on January 4, 1944, at which the decision was made that Sauckel should obtain "at least 4 million new workers from occupied territories" in order to satisfy the demands for labor made by Speer, although Sauckel indicated that he could do this only with help from Himmler. foreign laborers were being obtained by force. At a meeting of March 1, 1944, Speer's deputy questioned Sauckel very closely about his failure to live up to the obligation to supply four million workers from occupied territories. In some cases Speer demanded laborers from specific foreign countries. Thus, at the conference August 10-12, 1942, Sauckel was instructed to supply Speer with "a further million Russian laborers for the German armament industry up to and including October 1942." At a meeting of the Central Planning Board on April 22, 1943, Speer discussed plans to obtain Russian laborers for use in the coal mines, and flatly vetoed the suggestion that this labor deficit should be made up by German labor. labor program to place a greater emphasis on utilization of German countries in local production of consumer goods formerly produced in labour in war production in Germany and on the use of labour in occupied Germany.
Speer took steps in this direction by establishing the socalled "blocked industries" in the occupied territories which were used to produce goods to be shipped to Germany. Employees of these industries were immune from deportation to Germany as slave labourers and any worker who had been ordered to go to Germany could avoid deportation if he went to work for a blocked industry. This sytem, although somewhat less inhumane than deportation to Germany, was still illegal. The system of blocked industries played only a small part in the overall slave labour programme knowing the way in which it was actually being administered. In an official sense, he was its principal beneficiary and he constantly urged its extension. labour as Chief of the Organization Todt. The Organization Todt functioned principally in the occupied areas on such projects as the Atlantic Hall and the construction of military highways, and Speer has admitted that he relied on compulsory service to keep it adequately Staffed. He also used concentration camp labour in the industries under his control. He originally arranged to tap this source of labour for use in small out of the way factories; and later, fearful of Himmler's jurisdictional ambitions, attempted to use as few concentration camp workers as possible. industries but contends that he only utilized Soviet prisoners of war in Speer's position was such that he was not directly concerned with industries covered by the Geneva Convention.
the cruelty in the administration of the slave labor program, although he was aware of its existence. For example, at meetings of the Central Planning Board he was informed that his demands for labor were so large as to necessitate violent methods in recruiting. At a meeting of the Central Planning Board on October 30, 1942. Speer voiced his opinion that many slave laborers who claimed to be sick were malingerers and stated: "There is nothing to be said against SS and Police taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into concentration camps." Speer, however, insisted that the slave laborers be given adequate food and working conditions so that they could work efficiently.
In mitigation it must be recognized that Speer's establishment of blocked industries did keep many laborers in their homes and that in the closing stages of the war he was one of the few men who had the courage to tell Hitler that the war was lost and to take steps to prevent the senseless destruction of production facilities, both in occupied territories and in Germany. He carried out his opposition to Hitler's scorched earth program in some of the Western countries and in Germany by deliberately sabotaging it at considerable personal risk. but is guilty under Counts Three and Four.