furnishing any compensating consideration all they desired in a country which had products of any kind, and inhabitants did not have the possibility of denying the invader their property. of the means of payment. These three methods were the creation of an issuing bank; the imposition of attributive war and a pretext of the maintenance of the troops of occupation; the functioning of a system of clearing was some profit. These measures will be treated in three parts, which I will hereafter develop.
Section 1: Creation of an issuing bank. As soon as they arrived in Belgium the Germans created an office for supervising banks, entrusted at the same time with the control of the National Belgian Bank, the creation which was ordered on the 14th of June 1940.
V.O.B.E.L. No. 2, which I submit under the number 141. At this time the direction of the National Belgian Bank was outside of the occupied territories. On the other hand, the total sum of notes on hand would be insufficient to insure a normal circulation, as a great number of Belgians had fled the invasion, taking with them an important quantity of paper money. At least these are the reasons that the Germans invoked to create an issuing bank by order of the 29th of June, 1940.
V.O.B.E.L. No. 4 and 5, which I submit under number 142. By virtue of this last order the new issuing bank had a capital of 150,000,000 Belgian francs, 20% of which had been issued in cash, and a new issuing bank received the monopoly for issuing paper money in Belgian francs. As a matter of fact, the National Bank of Belgium did no more have the right of issuing money. The cover of the issuing bank was not in gold but by, first of all, credits 2. The circular was represented by the credits on the Thirdly:
the third element was a decisive falling in German and of the Reichskreditkasse.
The German Kommissar, who had been the issuing bank.
The decree of the 26th of June, 1940, was published, in V.O.B.E.L., No. 3, page 88, and is submitted under this bank and the new issuing bank.
The director of the National Bank of Belgium was appointed director of the issuing bank.
The issuing bank proceeded to issue a great number of notes.
On the 29,800,000,000 Belgian francs.
On the 29th of December, 1943, it an increase of 236%.National Belgian Bank.
Besides its role of issuing institute, the new bank had the following attributes:
the operations relating occupation, the clearing.
The National Belgian Bank lost its right and finances.
This report was discovered by the U.S. Army and we shall refer to the document many times.
It is No. DH-5, and is submitted to the 'Tribunal under the number 144.
a loss of 3,567,000,000 francs. This number is given by Wetter in Government.
The issuing bank had in hand at the moment of liberation the Reichskreditkasse.
That is to say, the total loss came to 656,000,000 francs.
This number is given in a report of the Belgian No. 146.
Let us now treat the expenses of occupation. Article 49 of the occupation or for the administration of the territory.
The occupant but this must not exceed a strictly limited sum.
On the other hand, the words "needs of the army of occupation" do not mean the expenses for armament and equipment, but solely billeting expenses; expenses
THE PRESIDENT: Don't you think you might omit further references colleague?
M. DELPECH: Consequently the Germans exacted a monthly indemnity of 1,000,000,000 up to August 1941.
At that date the indemnity was increased to 1,500,000,000 per month.
By the end of French francs.
This number cannot be contested by the Defense, occupation was 64, 181,000,000.
This is deposed under No. 147.
with the needs of the occupying army. This is notably manifest in the report of Wetter, in a passage that I depose under No. 148.
On page 245 of this report it is said that on the 17th of January 1941 the general who was commanding officer in Belgium had requested the superior command of the Army that -- rather, the indemnity did not have to cover only the expenses of occupation.
This point of view was not accepted by the High Command, who, by decree of the 21st of October 1941 specified that the indemnity of occupation was to be used not only for the needs of the occupying army, but also those of the operating armies. says -- and I will quote an excerpt which will be found in the book of documents under No. 149, the second paragraph:
"The increase of expenses of the Wehrmacht made it clear that it would be impossible to meet these expenses with these sums. The administration demanded an expiration of account of all occupation expenses in detracting from this account all expenses which were foreign to the occupation itself. This concerns important expenses which the military services went into for buying horses, motor cars, equipment, things which were destined for other countries, and which were put down to the account of occupation expenses.
"By decision of the administrative chief, dated the 11th of June 1941, the financing of the expenses other than those for the occupation were passed on to the clearing. In carrying out of this decision the military command demanded, from the month of June, 1941, a monthly report on all expenses other than those destined to the occupation, but which were paid under account of expenses of occupation and transfers to the clearing. That is, important sums were recuperated and were to the benefit of the expenses of occupation." already exacted, by order of the 17th of December 1940, No. 150, that all expenses of billeting of their troops should be put to the charge of Belgium. Owing to this, this country had to meet expenses totaling 5,900,000,000 francs, which went for the billeting of the German troops, expenses for the establishment, furniture, and so forth. the end of June, 1944, the Belgian payments relating to the billeting of troops totaled 423 million francs.
called indemnity of occupation, was not sufficient for Germany. Her leaders created a system of clearing which enabled them to procure means of payment totalling 62,200,000,000 Belgian francs. 7th of August and 7th of December, 1940, Number 151, 152 and 153 of the Book of Documents, the Germans decided: would be paid into an account called the "Deutche Verrechnungskasse", which was opened in the bocks of the National Belgian Bank in Brussels. This was in belgas in spite of the advice concerning currency as of 17 June, 1940, and to which I made allusion inn connection with the blocking of the means of payment in Belgium. carrying out of the clearing would be entrusted from there on no longer to the National Belgian Bank but to the issuing bank of Brussels, which as I have already had the honor of saying, had been created by the occupant and was under his absolute control. would pay their Belgian creditors by means of the open account at the Belgian bank at the following rate of exchange, one hundred belgas equal forty marks, that is to say one mark for 12.50 Belgian francs. with a view to favoring the operations in this country and even were extended to certain neutral countries by divers similar decisions, which were published in the V.O.B.E.L. The mission of the issuing bank at Brussels consisted, therefore, in receiving payments from all persons or organizations established in Belgium and to whom foreign countries owed something. In other words, every time that an exporter delivered goods to the importer of another country and members of the clearing, it was the issuing bank which paid his bill and which wrote down in his book an equivalent amount as on the "Deutsche Reichskasse" in Berlin.
In case of imports, the opposite operation took place. In fact, under the German leadership, this system functioned to the detriment of the Belgians collectively, which at the moment of the liberation was creditor in the clearing of 62,665,000,000 francs.
It was the National Belgian Bank which had been forced to make advances to the issuing bank so as to counter-balance the account of the "Deutsche Reichskasse." the clearing had no commercial character but were purely military or political expenses. The following information comes from the Belgian government. The clearing operations could be resumed in the following manner, and I draw my conclusions from this document, under Number 156. In the opposite of the movement, 93 per cent corresponded to the compensating Franco-German operation; for goods 93 per cent, for services, 91 per cent. vices or the capital, one comes to the two following tables: the ensemble of the movements, clearings of Belgium with foreign countries, total on the second of September, 1944, the sum of 61,636,000,000 Belgian francs, of which 57,298,000,000 were for operations with Germany, four billion only with France, one billion with the Netherlands and 929,000,000 with other countries. manifest. This was due, in greater part, to requisitions of property and services, which Germany did for her own benefit. metals and things wrought in metal, machines, textile products, ninetenths of which were seized by the Reich, who made themselves, therefore, guilty of spoliation. the occupation were particularly intense, they concerned the forced realization of the participation of Belgian capital in foreign countries as well as the enforced cession to German groups of Belgian assets blocked in Germany. No effective compensation was given in exchange; the transfer pertaining to services belonging primarily to the payments made for the use of the Belgian labor in foreign countries.
The creditors' balance of these services on the second of September, 1944 is as follows, in millions of Belgian francs: Ensemble of the clearing concerned services -- 20,116,000,000, that is to say for paying labor, 73 per cent of the total: for Germany alone, 18,272,000,000, that is to say, 72 per cent of the total amount: for France only 1,600,000 Belgian francs, of which -- well, that is to say a very small part. work in Germany or in the occupied territories. The occupant forced Belgium to the following: She forced her to liquidate, in clearing, all the transferred sums and to send Belgian notes to the ReichsbankDirektorium in Berlin for the paying of the workers in national currency.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you think it is necessary to go into these clearing operations again? In each case of the various countries which have been dealt with the same clearing operations have taken place, havy they not? Then perhaps it is really unnecessary to do it over again for Belgium.
M. DELBECH: Very well, I will continue without insisting on this. come out of the aforesaid reports can only strengthen the conclusions of our statement.
means of payment, I think we may signify that by an order under date of the 22 July 1940, the Germans had fixed the rate of the Belgian franc to 8 Reich pfennig, that is to say, 12.50 francs per one mark, and in the aforementioned report, Hitler writes in connection with this, page 37 and 38, a passage which I ask the Tribunal to allow me to read that this passage is in the Document Book, Number 158:
"The maintenance of the facto of the pre-war parity was of political importance because numerous people would hare had the impression that a strong devaluation or a new modification was a maneuver of plundering. be made. The occupants had no need in Belgium of decreeing, with the view of favoring their undertaking of economic plundering, that the Belgian franc should have a lesser value. As a matter of fact, contrary to that which had passed in France, they had at the moment they entered Belgium instituted new currency of which they had the control. Government 221.730 Kilos of gold of value in 1939 of 9,500,000,000 francs, but as France had restituted this gold to Belgium, this question shall be treated when we discuss the economic plundering of France. army. A few numbers, notes of the Reichskreditkasse, 3,567,000,000; to various notes and accounts in the books of the Reichskreditkasse; 656.000.000; tribute of war under the pretext of indemnity of occupation, 67.000.000, to which we must also add the credit of balance of the clearing; 62.656.000.000. That is to say, a total sum of 133,888,000,000 Belgian francs, the Germans therefore seized as a minimum for over 130,000,000,000 Belgian francs, which they used for purchases of regular appearances, for the paying of requisitions, and to make secret purchases on the black market. These pretended purchases and requisitions will be treated in the following chapters.
Chapter 2, secret purchases, black market. As in all of the other occupied territories, the Germans organized a black market in Belgium as early as October 1941, according to a secret report on the black market, called "Final Report of the Office of the Supervisor of the Military Commander in Belgium and in the North of France, concerning the legal abolishment of the black market in Belgium and in the North of France." of May 1943, Document Number 159 of the book of documents. The reasons given by the Germans for this organization of the black market total three.
First reason: To abolish the competition on the black market between the various German buyers. In the second place, to use as well as they could the Belgian resources for their war effort. Thirdly, to do away with the pressure exercised on the general standard of prices and to avoid all danger of inflation which would end up by endangering the German currency. actual administration and organization was set up by the Germans for the carrying out of this policy. centralized in its books all the operations. The direction of the purchases was assured by a central organization, the name of which changed in the course of the years and which had a certain number of organizations subordinate to it, notably a whole series of purchasing offices. military command in Belgium of the 20th of February 1942. It was created the 13th of the following March, and as soon as it was created it received directives which came from the delegate of the defendant Goering, Marshal of the State. This delegate was Lt. Col. Veltjens, of which we spoke this morning. legalization and of direction of the black market, such as had been decided upon and foreseen following conferences between the General Intendant, the military command of Belgium on the one hand, and the command of the Inspector for Armaments on the other hand.
According to a declaration under date of the 16th of February 1942, coming from the Minister for Economics of the Reich, the aim was to continue to weaken the black market, according to various indications, in a legal form, and according to a directing idea, that one must take into account various elements to assure the acquisitions of the Reich.
This organization had its offices at Brussels. The purchases were assured by a certain number of specialized offices, the list of which is given at Page 5 of the aforementioned report. These organizations received their orders from the R.O.G.E.S., Rohstoff Handelsgesellschaft, which we mentioned when we began stating the case for the economic plundering of occidental Europe.
The role of the R.O.G.E.S. was very important in the organization of the black market. This role had four purposes. First of all, the directive of purchasing, once the authorization had been given for them by the central office of Brussels, was communicated by the R.O.G.E.S. to the purchasing offices according to their speciality. done through the R.O.G.E.S., who saw to it that they were distributed in Germany.
The R.O.G.E.S. financed the operations, and it was the R.O.G.E.S., lastly, which was entrusted with paying the difference between the rate of purchase, which was usually very high, because it was of course a black market price, and the official cost on the interior market of Germany, which was the definite rate of selling. The difference was covered through a false taxation which was fed by the account, expense of occupation, and on which the Minister of Finance for the Reich put sums to the disposal of the R.O.G.E.S. through the channel of the Minister of Economics. particulars on the functioning of the central office. It is interesting to note that the central office of Brussels was created by an ordinance of the military head in Belgium, dated the 3rd of November 1942, and he had the mission of creating for the North of France a branch at Lille. At the same time, the Brussels office was authorized to give money to its branch in Lille.
report of the Lille office. This report, made out the 20th of Kay, 1943, gives a whole series of interesting particulars on the functioning of this organization.
THE PRESIDENT: It is 5:00 o'clock now. Perhaps, M. Delpech, I think it would be the wish of the Tribunal if it were possible for you to omit any parts of this document which are on precisely the same principles with those which have already been submitted to us in connection with the other countries. If you could, I think that would be for the convenience of the Tribunal. Of course, if there are any essential differences in the treatment of Belgium then no doubt you would draw our attention to them.
M. DELPECH: Certainly, your Honor.
(Whereupon at 1700 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned) Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The
M. MOUNIER: The representative of the French Prosecution is here. He will appear.
M. HENRI DELPECH: Mr. President, your Honors: I had the honor yesterday to begin to explain before the Tribunal the methods of economic spoilation of Belgium by the Germans in the course of their occupation of the country. Coming back to what was said in the course of the general considerations on economic pillage and on the behavior of the Germans in Norway and Denmark and in Holland, I have been able to show that in all places the will to economic domination of National Socialism had manifested itself. Therefore, in response, at once, to the wish expressed yesterday by the Tribunal, and to fulfill the mission entrusted to the French Prosecution by the Belgian Government to plead its case before your high jurisdiction, I shall limit myself to the main outlines of the evolution, and I shall allow myself to refer for the details of the German seizure of Belgium productivity to the text of the report submitted to the Tribunal and to the numerous documents which are quoted therein. of the black market in Belgium, its organization by the occupation troops, and their final decision to suppress this black market. One may, in this regard, conclude, as has already been indicated in the course of the general observations, that in spite of their claims it was not in order to avoid inflation in Belgium that the German authorities led a campaign against the black market. proclaimed their anxiety to spare the Belgian economy and the Belgian population the very serious consequences of the threatening inflation. In reality, the German authorities intervened against the black market in order to avoid that the extension of the latter, which grew increasingly large in scope, should in the end absorb all the available merchandise and completely strangle the official market.
In a word, the survival of the official market with its lower prices was, in the end, much more profitable for the army of occupation, chapter, the acquisitions which were regular in appearance. These acquisitions had only one aim, namely the subjection of Belgian productive power. Applying their program of domination of the countries of Western Europe as it had been established even before 1939 the Germans, from the moment they entered Belgium in May 1940, took all the measures which seemed to them appropriate in order to assure the subjection of Belgian productive machinery.
No sector of the Belgian economy was to be spared. If the pillaging seems more striking in the industrial and economic domain, this is only the consequence of the very marked industrial character of the Belgian economy. The sectors of agriculture and of transportation were not to escape the German hold.
I propose to discuss first the levies in kind in industry. The Belgian industry was the first to be attacked. Thus, the military commander in Belgium, in agreement with the various offices of the Reich for raw materials, in agreement with the Four-Year Plan Office and the Ministry for Economics, established a whole program whose effect was to win over almost the entire Belgian productivity to their bellicose ends. On the 13th of December 1940, already it could make known to the higher authorities a series of plans established for iron, coal, textiles, and copper. Lt. Col. Helder, entitled, "Change in Economic Orientation." It points out that from 14 September 1940 the armament service of the army was sending to its subordinate formations the following instructions. They are to be found in Document 163, I read the last paragraph of page 41 of the German text:
"I attack the greatest importance to the fact that the factories in the occupied territories, Holland, Belgium, and France, should be, as much as possible, put to the contribution of the armament manufacturing of the German forces and to increase the war potential.
The Danish establishments are also to be included to a greater and greater extent for deliveries. Moreover, the disposition exercised under the ordinance of the Marshal of the Reich, as well as the ordinance concerning the economy of raw materials in the occupied territories, is strictly to be observed." direct the whole productive force and all the distribution facilities of Belgium towards the German war effort.
The decree of 27 May 1940 Vobel No. 2, submitted under No. 146, created merchandising services whose aim was - and I quote from the third paragraph - "to direct the production and to organize a just repartition and a rational utilization by assuring, as far as possible, the labor class is always in conformity with the orders given by the army group in the form of a general order transmitted to the enterprises where those controlled products are utilized and whore they are the object of commercial enterprises." merchandising services, and in particular they were given the right:
(a) to oblige enterprises to sell produce to given purchasers:
(b) to forbid the utilization of certain raw materials; and of merchandise. merchandising services with an independent and juridical personality of their own. Thus, 11 merchandising services were created, taking in the whole of the economy; thus, the coal sector, whose direction was confided to the Belgian Office of Coal. This is embodied in Document 165, which gives the proof of this allegation. texts published by the Belgian authorities in Brussels, The latter took, in particular, a decree dated 3 September 1940 as their basis, by virtue of which Belgian organizations resumed the functions of the offices which the Germans abandoned to them.
These offices were to have varying functions. Although stemming from the Belgian Minister of Economy, they were closely controlled by the services of the German military command. the appointment of Kommissars of Exploitation, under the ordinance of 29 April 1941, submitted under No 166. Article 2 of this text defines the powers of the Kommissars:
"The Kommissar of Exploitation has the duty of assuring the launching or the functioning of the enterprise which is confided to him, the methodical carrying out of orders as well as the adoption of all measures appropriate to the augmentation of the production of the enterprise." 6 August 1942, establishing the principle of the possibility of forbidding certain manufacturers, or the use of certain raw materials. This ordinance is to be found in the document book under No. 167. A service of merchandising offices was soon organized by the appointment to each of these of a German Kommissar, chosen by the Empire Office Reichsstelle, who was competent. From the last months of 1943, the Ruestungsobmann Office of the Armament Ministry, under Speer's Ministry, assumed the habit of handling its orders directly, without having recourse to the channel of the merchandising services, but even before this date measures had been taken to prevent any initiative that was not in accord with the German war aims. is proper to quote the ordinance of 30 March 1942, subjecting all setting up or extension of commercial enterprises to the previous authorization of the military commander. the Chief of the General Staff, Reder, specifies that for the single period of January to March 1943, out of 2,000 enterprises working in iron, 400 were closed down as "working irrationally" or unnecessarily, that is, unnecessarily for the war aims."
preoccupation to rationalize production than by the malicious desire to obtain cheaply a certain amount of tooling and machines of great value. In this sense, it is appropriate to point out the setting up of an Office of Machine Compensation. its 11th part, pages 56 and the following, is particularly significant in this regard. Here is an extract from this report, the last paragraph of page 56 in the French translation.
THE PRESIDENT: That passage you read about the Defendant Raeder, was that from Document 169 or 170?
M. DELPECH: Mr. President, I spoke yesterday of the Chief of the Administration Section, Reder. He was sention chief in Brussels. He has no connection with the defendant here.
Document 171, second paragraph of the French text. The paragraph has to do with the Office of Machine Compensations:
"The proof is established by a rapid glance at the compensation operations which have been considered and those which have been carried out. Five hundred sixty-seven requests have been taken into consideration for a total value of 4.6 million Reichsmarks." first paragraph, page 56 in the German text. Convention of 1907, Articles 52 and 53, the formula of the Hague Convention which provides for requisition only for the benefit of, and the needs of the occupying power, applied to the circumstances of the year 1907, that is, to a time when war actions were limited to well defined regions and where, in practice, the military force alone had to support the war activities. In view of the limitations in space of war, it was normal that the Hague Convention providing for requisitions solely for the needs of the occupying power should be entirely sufficient to the needs of the conduct of the operations.
But modem warfare requires at the same time as the maintenance of the conventions of the Hague, their adaptation to the new conduct of war; as much as on the one hand this modern type of warfare, becoming transformed into total warfare, no longer recognizes any limitations in space; and since on the other hand it has become a war of economy as much as a war of peoples. has been made on the basis of the ordinance of the military commander of 6 August 1942. It may be considered that it was to the end of making known to the Belgian population the necessary rational interpretation of the Hague conventions. not been informed in the school of national socialism. It may in any case justify the pillage of industry and the subjection of Belgian production. These few considerations show how subtle and varied were the procedures utilized by the Germans to reach their aims on the economic plane. In the same sense as the preceding developments on clearing operations and the utilization of occupation costs, they make it possible to indicate in detail the methods utilized to bring about massive wholesale levies in the Belgian economy. possible to determine the scope of economic pillage with a certain exactness. On the other hand, in numerous industrial sectors the computations cannot yet be established. It has not been possible to establish these computations. It is true that a considerable part of the industrial losses correspond to the clearing operations, notably for the stock requisitions. It will therefore be necessary to limit ourselves to the directive to the maintenance of the policy practised by the Germans. It behoves us to examine briefly the manner in which the economic despoliation manifests itself in three sectors: in industry, agriculture, and transportation.
The industrial sector first of all. The statistics of the clearing operations in the first place furnish indication on the total charges suffered by the various industrial groups or departments. On that side, document ECH-19, Report of the Military Administration in Belgium, to which I will refer again and again, gives the following details. Briefly summarized:
stock on which they were to operate considerable levies, notably for textiles and non-ferrous metals. I shall limit myself to speak briefly about textiles and non-ferrous metals. The example of the textile industry is particularly revealing. industry was the second industry in Belgium in importance after that of metallurg. Under the pretext of avoiding the exhaustion of very important stock which still then existed, an ordinance of 27 July 1940 forbade the textile industry to work to more than thirty percent of its 1938 capacity. Only for the period May to December 1940 requisitions were not inferior to one billion Belgian francs. They notably affected nearly half of the wool stock existing in the country on May 10, 1940, and nearly one-third of the stock of raw cotton. factories constituted for the Germans an excellent excuse for removing, on the pretext of rental contracts, the unused machines and tools. When it was not requisitioned it got a low price. book under No. 174, determined the manner in which factories should be closed in execution of the right recognized by the occupation authorities. The rights to dissolve certain business groups, business and industrial groups, and to order their liquidation. The pretext given was that of the concentration of enterprises. In the month of January 1944, sixty-five percent of the textile industries' factories had been stopped. I shall not go into the details of this operation, and I shall pass to page fifty-eight of the report. particularly edifying figures in regard to production. In a total production of the wool industry of 72,000 tons for the period May 1940 to the end of June 1944, a production representing a value of 397 million Reichsmarks. The breakdown of the deliveries between the German and Belgian markets is the following:
figures. policy of direction of the textile market. It is still the same report of the Military Administration which furnishes details, pointing out that in 1938 the needs in textile products amounted in Belgium to a monthly average of twelve kilos. The respective figures for the occupation years are the following:
1940 to 1941 - 2.1 kilos per inhabitant.
1941 to 1942 - l.4 1942 to 1943 - l.4 1943 to 1944 - 0.7 within these two figures:
twelve kilos in 1938; 0.7 kilos in 1944. cations on the pillage of textile production. Obligatory handing over to Germany during the occupation. The breakdown is as follows: percentage was still taken over by the Germans by the fact of its purchases on the Belgian market; purchase of finished or manufactured products. The counter-value of these forced deliveries can generally be found in the clearing statistics, unless they correspond to occupation costs, which have been misrepresented.
I shall now turn to the industry of the non-ferrous metals. Belgium was in 1939 the largest producer in Europe of non-ferrous metals; particularly of copper, lead, zinc, and of -Document 173, will furnish the evidence for the Tribunal. On the 18th of February 1941, in connection with the Four Years Plans Service, the Reich office for metals and the Supreme Command of the Army elaborated a metal plan which provided for One, Belgian consumption;Two, the carrying out of German orders; undertook a certain number of campaigns of recuperation which were called special actions, according to a method which they applied in all the territories of Western Europe.