According to a declaration under date of the 16th of February 1942, coming from the Minister for Economics of the Reich, the aim was to continue to weaken the black market, according to various indications, in a legal form, and according to a directing idea, that one must take into account various elements to assure the acquisitions of the Reich.
This organization had its offices at Brussels. The purchases were assured by a certain number of specialized offices, the list of which is given at Page 5 of the aforementioned report. These organizations received their orders from the R.O.G.E.S., Rohstoff Handelsgesellschaft, which we mentioned when we began stating the case for the economic plundering of occidental Europe.
The role of the R.O.G.E.S. was very important in the organization of the black market. This role had four purposes. First of all, the directive of purchasing, once the authorization had been given for them by the central office of Brussels, was communicated by the R.O.G.E.S. to the purchasing offices according to their speciality. done through the R.O.G.E.S., who saw to it that they were distributed in Germany.
The R.O.G.E.S. financed the operations, and it was the R.O.G.E.S., lastly, which was entrusted with paying the difference between the rate of purchase, which was usually very high, because it was of course a black market price, and the official cost on the interior market of Germany, which was the definite rate of selling. The difference was covered through a false taxation which was fed by the account, expense of occupation, and on which the Minister of Finance for the Reich put sums to the disposal of the R.O.G.E.S. through the channel of the Minister of Economics. particulars on the functioning of the central office. It is interesting to note that the central office of Brussels was created by an ordinance of the military head in Belgium, dated the 3rd of November 1942, and he had the mission of creating for the North of France a branch at Lille. At the same time, the Brussels office was authorized to give money to its branch in Lille.
report of the Lille office. This report, made out the 20th of Kay, 1943, gives a whole series of interesting particulars on the functioning of this organization.
THE PRESIDENT: It is 5:00 o'clock now. Perhaps, M. Delpech, I think it would be the wish of the Tribunal if it were possible for you to omit any parts of this document which are on precisely the same principles with those which have already been submitted to us in connection with the other countries. If you could, I think that would be for the convenience of the Tribunal. Of course, if there are any essential differences in the treatment of Belgium then no doubt you would draw our attention to them.
M. DELPECH: Certainly, your Honor.
(Whereupon at 1700 hours the hearing of the Tribunal adjourned) Military Tribunal, in the matter of:
The
M. MOUNIER: The representative of the French Prosecution is here. He will appear.
M. HENRI DELPECH: Mr. President, your Honors: I had the honor yesterday to begin to explain before the Tribunal the methods of economic spoilation of Belgium by the Germans in the course of their occupation of the country. Coming back to what was said in the course of the general considerations on economic pillage and on the behavior of the Germans in Norway and Denmark and in Holland, I have been able to show that in all places the will to economic domination of National Socialism had manifested itself. Therefore, in response, at once, to the wish expressed yesterday by the Tribunal, and to fulfill the mission entrusted to the French Prosecution by the Belgian Government to plead its case before your high jurisdiction, I shall limit myself to the main outlines of the evolution, and I shall allow myself to refer for the details of the German seizure of Belgium productivity to the text of the report submitted to the Tribunal and to the numerous documents which are quoted therein. of the black market in Belgium, its organization by the occupation troops, and their final decision to suppress this black market. One may, in this regard, conclude, as has already been indicated in the course of the general observations, that in spite of their claims it was not in order to avoid inflation in Belgium that the German authorities led a campaign against the black market. proclaimed their anxiety to spare the Belgian economy and the Belgian population the very serious consequences of the threatening inflation. In reality, the German authorities intervened against the black market in order to avoid that the extension of the latter, which grew increasingly large in scope, should in the end absorb all the available merchandise and completely strangle the official market.
In a word, the survival of the official market with its lower prices was, in the end, much more profitable for the army of occupation, chapter, the acquisitions which were regular in appearance. These acquisitions had only one aim, namely the subjection of Belgian productive power. Applying their program of domination of the countries of Western Europe as it had been established even before 1939 the Germans, from the moment they entered Belgium in May 1940, took all the measures which seemed to them appropriate in order to assure the subjection of Belgian productive machinery.
No sector of the Belgian economy was to be spared. If the pillaging seems more striking in the industrial and economic domain, this is only the consequence of the very marked industrial character of the Belgian economy. The sectors of agriculture and of transportation were not to escape the German hold.
I propose to discuss first the levies in kind in industry. The Belgian industry was the first to be attacked. Thus, the military commander in Belgium, in agreement with the various offices of the Reich for raw materials, in agreement with the Four-Year Plan Office and the Ministry for Economics, established a whole program whose effect was to win over almost the entire Belgian productivity to their bellicose ends. On the 13th of December 1940, already it could make known to the higher authorities a series of plans established for iron, coal, textiles, and copper. Lt. Col. Helder, entitled, "Change in Economic Orientation." It points out that from 14 September 1940 the armament service of the army was sending to its subordinate formations the following instructions. They are to be found in Document 163, I read the last paragraph of page 41 of the German text:
"I attack the greatest importance to the fact that the factories in the occupied territories, Holland, Belgium, and France, should be, as much as possible, put to the contribution of the armament manufacturing of the German forces and to increase the war potential.
The Danish establishments are also to be included to a greater and greater extent for deliveries. Moreover, the disposition exercised under the ordinance of the Marshal of the Reich, as well as the ordinance concerning the economy of raw materials in the occupied territories, is strictly to be observed." direct the whole productive force and all the distribution facilities of Belgium towards the German war effort.
The decree of 27 May 1940 Vobel No. 2, submitted under No. 146, created merchandising services whose aim was - and I quote from the third paragraph - "to direct the production and to organize a just repartition and a rational utilization by assuring, as far as possible, the labor class is always in conformity with the orders given by the army group in the form of a general order transmitted to the enterprises where those controlled products are utilized and whore they are the object of commercial enterprises." merchandising services, and in particular they were given the right:
(a) to oblige enterprises to sell produce to given purchasers:
(b) to forbid the utilization of certain raw materials; and of merchandise. merchandising services with an independent and juridical personality of their own. Thus, 11 merchandising services were created, taking in the whole of the economy; thus, the coal sector, whose direction was confided to the Belgian Office of Coal. This is embodied in Document 165, which gives the proof of this allegation. texts published by the Belgian authorities in Brussels, The latter took, in particular, a decree dated 3 September 1940 as their basis, by virtue of which Belgian organizations resumed the functions of the offices which the Germans abandoned to them.
These offices were to have varying functions. Although stemming from the Belgian Minister of Economy, they were closely controlled by the services of the German military command. the appointment of Kommissars of Exploitation, under the ordinance of 29 April 1941, submitted under No 166. Article 2 of this text defines the powers of the Kommissars:
"The Kommissar of Exploitation has the duty of assuring the launching or the functioning of the enterprise which is confided to him, the methodical carrying out of orders as well as the adoption of all measures appropriate to the augmentation of the production of the enterprise." 6 August 1942, establishing the principle of the possibility of forbidding certain manufacturers, or the use of certain raw materials. This ordinance is to be found in the document book under No. 167. A service of merchandising offices was soon organized by the appointment to each of these of a German Kommissar, chosen by the Empire Office Reichsstelle, who was competent. From the last months of 1943, the Ruestungsobmann Office of the Armament Ministry, under Speer's Ministry, assumed the habit of handling its orders directly, without having recourse to the channel of the merchandising services, but even before this date measures had been taken to prevent any initiative that was not in accord with the German war aims. is proper to quote the ordinance of 30 March 1942, subjecting all setting up or extension of commercial enterprises to the previous authorization of the military commander. the Chief of the General Staff, Reder, specifies that for the single period of January to March 1943, out of 2,000 enterprises working in iron, 400 were closed down as "working irrationally" or unnecessarily, that is, unnecessarily for the war aims."
preoccupation to rationalize production than by the malicious desire to obtain cheaply a certain amount of tooling and machines of great value. In this sense, it is appropriate to point out the setting up of an Office of Machine Compensation. its 11th part, pages 56 and the following, is particularly significant in this regard. Here is an extract from this report, the last paragraph of page 56 in the French translation.
THE PRESIDENT: That passage you read about the Defendant Raeder, was that from Document 169 or 170?
M. DELPECH: Mr. President, I spoke yesterday of the Chief of the Administration Section, Reder. He was sention chief in Brussels. He has no connection with the defendant here.
Document 171, second paragraph of the French text. The paragraph has to do with the Office of Machine Compensations:
"The proof is established by a rapid glance at the compensation operations which have been considered and those which have been carried out. Five hundred sixty-seven requests have been taken into consideration for a total value of 4.6 million Reichsmarks." first paragraph, page 56 in the German text. Convention of 1907, Articles 52 and 53, the formula of the Hague Convention which provides for requisition only for the benefit of, and the needs of the occupying power, applied to the circumstances of the year 1907, that is, to a time when war actions were limited to well defined regions and where, in practice, the military force alone had to support the war activities. In view of the limitations in space of war, it was normal that the Hague Convention providing for requisitions solely for the needs of the occupying power should be entirely sufficient to the needs of the conduct of the operations.
But modem warfare requires at the same time as the maintenance of the conventions of the Hague, their adaptation to the new conduct of war; as much as on the one hand this modern type of warfare, becoming transformed into total warfare, no longer recognizes any limitations in space; and since on the other hand it has become a war of economy as much as a war of peoples. has been made on the basis of the ordinance of the military commander of 6 August 1942. It may be considered that it was to the end of making known to the Belgian population the necessary rational interpretation of the Hague conventions. not been informed in the school of national socialism. It may in any case justify the pillage of industry and the subjection of Belgian production. These few considerations show how subtle and varied were the procedures utilized by the Germans to reach their aims on the economic plane. In the same sense as the preceding developments on clearing operations and the utilization of occupation costs, they make it possible to indicate in detail the methods utilized to bring about massive wholesale levies in the Belgian economy. possible to determine the scope of economic pillage with a certain exactness. On the other hand, in numerous industrial sectors the computations cannot yet be established. It has not been possible to establish these computations. It is true that a considerable part of the industrial losses correspond to the clearing operations, notably for the stock requisitions. It will therefore be necessary to limit ourselves to the directive to the maintenance of the policy practised by the Germans. It behoves us to examine briefly the manner in which the economic despoliation manifests itself in three sectors: in industry, agriculture, and transportation.
The industrial sector first of all. The statistics of the clearing operations in the first place furnish indication on the total charges suffered by the various industrial groups or departments. On that side, document ECH-19, Report of the Military Administration in Belgium, to which I will refer again and again, gives the following details. Briefly summarized:
stock on which they were to operate considerable levies, notably for textiles and non-ferrous metals. I shall limit myself to speak briefly about textiles and non-ferrous metals. The example of the textile industry is particularly revealing. industry was the second industry in Belgium in importance after that of metallurg. Under the pretext of avoiding the exhaustion of very important stock which still then existed, an ordinance of 27 July 1940 forbade the textile industry to work to more than thirty percent of its 1938 capacity. Only for the period May to December 1940 requisitions were not inferior to one billion Belgian francs. They notably affected nearly half of the wool stock existing in the country on May 10, 1940, and nearly one-third of the stock of raw cotton. factories constituted for the Germans an excellent excuse for removing, on the pretext of rental contracts, the unused machines and tools. When it was not requisitioned it got a low price. book under No. 174, determined the manner in which factories should be closed in execution of the right recognized by the occupation authorities. The rights to dissolve certain business groups, business and industrial groups, and to order their liquidation. The pretext given was that of the concentration of enterprises. In the month of January 1944, sixty-five percent of the textile industries' factories had been stopped. I shall not go into the details of this operation, and I shall pass to page fifty-eight of the report. particularly edifying figures in regard to production. In a total production of the wool industry of 72,000 tons for the period May 1940 to the end of June 1944, a production representing a value of 397 million Reichsmarks. The breakdown of the deliveries between the German and Belgian markets is the following:
figures. policy of direction of the textile market. It is still the same report of the Military Administration which furnishes details, pointing out that in 1938 the needs in textile products amounted in Belgium to a monthly average of twelve kilos. The respective figures for the occupation years are the following:
1940 to 1941 - 2.1 kilos per inhabitant.
1941 to 1942 - l.4 1942 to 1943 - l.4 1943 to 1944 - 0.7 within these two figures:
twelve kilos in 1938; 0.7 kilos in 1944. cations on the pillage of textile production. Obligatory handing over to Germany during the occupation. The breakdown is as follows: percentage was still taken over by the Germans by the fact of its purchases on the Belgian market; purchase of finished or manufactured products. The counter-value of these forced deliveries can generally be found in the clearing statistics, unless they correspond to occupation costs, which have been misrepresented.
I shall now turn to the industry of the non-ferrous metals. Belgium was in 1939 the largest producer in Europe of non-ferrous metals; particularly of copper, lead, zinc, and of -Document 173, will furnish the evidence for the Tribunal. On the 18th of February 1941, in connection with the Four Years Plans Service, the Reich office for metals and the Supreme Command of the Army elaborated a metal plan which provided for One, Belgian consumption;Two, the carrying out of German orders; undertook a certain number of campaigns of recuperation which were called special actions, according to a method which they applied in all the territories of Western Europe.
I shall not go into the details of these actions. I shall mention the campaign of recuperation of metals. The printing campaign, the lead campaign, the copper campaign. According to the information *---* given by the Belgian Government, Document 146, page sixtyfive of the report.
According to the information given by the Belgian Government in other realms, but without admitting it, the Germans pursued a policy intended to eliminate or to restrict Belgian competition, so that in case of a German victory the Belgians under consideration would have had to limit themselves to the Belgian market, which would then have remained wide open to German business. This attempt at suppression of competition was manifested notably in certain sectors of the founds industry, in the textile industries, the workshops of machine construction, secret factories, and construction of railroads, narrow-gauge railroads, the leather industry, and especially the shoe-manufacturing industry, in which the system of destroyed factories was systematically forbidden. But in addition, in the textile industry, as well as in numerous sectors, especially in metal manufacturing, the economic weakening cannot be measured only by the size of the obligatory furnishings, but as in relation to the policy practiced by the occupant. very considerable losses as a result of directives imposed in view of financing at a better figure the war needs.
I shall pass over the question of prices of coal. The control of the coal industry was assured by the establishment of an administrative chief in matters of coal, and by centralization of all sales outlets into the hands of a single organ, a single seller under Belgian direction but provided with a German commissar. This is the Belgian office or bureau of coal, a wholesale seller in the place of a sole purchaser, Rheinisches Westphaelische Kohlensyndikat, which gave orders for deliveries to be made to the Reich from Alsace-Lorraine to Luxembourg. According to the same German report, in spite of the rise in the price of coals agreed to on the 20th of August 1940, 1st January 1941, and 1st January 1943, the coal industry showed in the course of the occupation years considerable losses. price of coal, the price per ton was higher than that of the German interior market. The German commissar of mining industry forced the Belgian industry to pay the difference on the exchange for exportation to the Reich by means of compensating premiums.
The financial losses are indicated by the figures indicated in Documents 176 and 178. The report of the Military Administrati* gives in its eleventh part details of the metal industry, which suffered as greatly as had the coal industry under the occupation; the Thomas plant especially. The losses come about from the increase in the cost price as in numerous drops in the price granted to certain elements that enter into the manufacturing, and the obligation to export at higher prices. the losses under this heading may be evaluated at three billion Belgian francs. Still according to the same report, out of a total production of 1,400,000 tons, 1,300,000 tons of various products were exported to Germany without including the metal delivered to the Belgian factories working exclusively for Germany. Another aspect of this, according to information furnished by the Belgian Government, the Germans removed on the whole and transported to Germany material of very great value. The total of the industrial spoliation is estimated by the Belgian Government to a sum of two billion Belgian francs at the 1940 rate. These removals constitute a real loss of substance, and according to the fragmentary indications given to the Tribunal this figure of two billion francs is the figure which I ask the Tribunal to make note of. extent of the levies made in industry. It is even more difficult to evaluate in the agricultural sector, of which I shall make a brief development. Page seventy-one. authorities made an effort to obtain a supplement of food levies in Belgium intended to supplant the feeding of the Reich and other territories occupied by the German authorities. After having utilized direct methods of levy, the Germans had recourse to the service of unscrupulous intermediaries in charge of purchasing at any price on the secret markets. The black market in this domain took on such extension that the occupying authorities became concerned and on several occasions, particularly in the course of 1943, had to intervene.
to the woods and forests, which occupy an important place in Belgium. The damage resulting from abnormal cutting in the forests brought about an excess in deforestation reaching a figure of 2,000,000 tons. The injury to capital caused by these premature cuttings can be evaluated at one hundred Belgian francs per ton. The military operations, properly speaking, caused damage to an extent of one hundred million Belgian francs. According to the memorandum of the Belgian Government, the total of the damage caused in the forest realm reaches a figure of 475 million Belgian francs. Taking account of the damage for abnormal cutting in the forest and for the establishment of airfields, the Belgian Government estimates at approximately one billion Belgian francs the losses undergone by all agriculture during the occupation. It must be noted in this domain that these are net losses in capital, constituting a real exhaustion of substance of inevitable reduction and a consumption or an eating up of the nation patrimony. the question of transport. The conduct of war led the Germans to utilize to the fullest the railroad network and the canal and river system of Belgium. The result was that the railroads and river fleet are included in the sectors of Belgian economy which suffered most from the occupation and the hostilities which took place on Belgian soil. operations, and a traffic of merchandise, -- coal, minerals, woods, food products, without forgetting the considerable quantities of construction material demanded by the fortification of the coast of the North Sea.
Railroads. The report of the Belgian Government brings out that the damage undergone by the railroads is expressed at once by losses in capital and by losses in revenue. Losses in capital first of all concerning principally requisitions and removals to which the Germans proceeded in a wholesale fashion on the moment of their entry into Belgium. Thus in particular they immediately made drains on the stock of locomotives on the pretext of recuperating German locomotives given to Belgium after the war of 1914-1918 on the pretext of recuperation.
In addition to seizures of locomotives, the National Society of Railroads became the subject of numerous requisitions of material, sometimes under the form of rental.
Those requisitions are estimated at four and a half billion Belgian francs of the value of 1940.
Now we come to losses in revenue. Revenue losses come principally from the free transportation service demanded by the Wehrmacht. They likewise are due to the policy of prices imposed by the occupying power. These levies of these exceptional costs could be borne by the interested societies only by making large drains on the treasury.
Regarding automobiles, I shall say almost nothing. The losses amount to about three billion Belgain francs, out of which individuals have been reimbursed only to the extent of about one billion.
We come now to river transport. The carrying out of the plan of economic spoliation of Belgium presented the occupying power with grave transportation problems, which I have already called attention to. In this domain the military administration imposed upon the Belgian boat industry very heavy charges. According to the report of the Belgian Government, the losses undergone by the Belgian River Fleets presents itself under three aspects: requisitions and removals by the Germans; partial or total damage through acts of war, abnormal deterioration of material. These three kinds of losses reach a figure of half a billion francs, of which only one hundred million are represented in the clearing exchange. to two billion francs for the figure of 1940, notably by reason of requisitions and removals of public or private port material. Fishing boats were requisitioned or disappeared without leaving any trace. Others were damaged or underwent losses through requisitions or renting contracts or military maneuvers. to mention briefly the question of removal of industrial material, (page 82). professional reorganization of the military administration had as its result, the closing of very numerous enterprises, making it possible for the Germans, as a result, to seize a great number of machines under the pretext that they had become unnecessary.
There are no industrial branches which were not despoiled in this way, The metal industry seems to be one of those that suffered most.
it seems particularly opportune to briefly draw its attention to the very technique which was used in the organization of levies, whose details were decided upon even before the entry of the German troops into the territories of Western Europe; an organization that put into play, put into use military formations; an organization emanating from the Economic Bureau of the General Staff of the Army, particularly of the defendant Keitel, Chief of the OKW. pillaging detachments, is proved by various German documents. Under the name of Economic Detachments, "Wirtschaftstruppen", or Special Commandos, these pillaging crews carried out wicked and illegal activities in all the countries of Western Europe. The secret instructions for the Economic Detachment J, stationed at Anvers are found in the file under Number 183. They constitute a very important document, an irrefutable document of the intentions of the Germans to permit pillaging and they prove, too, the contempt of the National Socialist leaders for the rules of international law. These instructions are dated in the last days of May, 1940. I should like to read a few fragments of these instructions to the Tribunal (Document 183, page 1).
"The economic detachments are set up by the Economic Arrangement Office of the High Command of the Wehrmacht. They are placed at the disposal of the High Command of the Army to exercise their activity in the countries to be occupied."
"Their mission. is to detect rapidly and completely, in their sector, the products most necessary to the war, lacking products or products in limited quantity, raw materials, products that have been worked on, mineral oils, as well as materials most useful to the war production for the different aims and needs of national defense and to note exactly their quantities.
"For machines their requisitions will be carried out by the marking of all goods lacking or limited and will be assured by marking and surveillance by guards.
"The economic detachments have, moreover, the mission of preparing the evacuation of goods lacking limited quantity, mineral oils as well as the most important machines and to execute this order of theArmed Forces, these missions are the exclusive responsibility of the economic detachments.
"The economic detachments must begin their activity in the newly occupied territories as soon as the' battle situation allows."
Machines and raw materials were thus found and identified. New organisms entered into play for their removal and setting up in Germany. on the setting up of the personnel elements of Deplacement J in Anvers. The eight officers are all reserve officers, engineers, wholesale dealers, directors of mines, importers of raw materials, engineering consultants. Their names and their professions are mentioned in the document. These men are, therefore, all specialists in commerce and industry. The choice of these technicians cannot be attributed to mere chance. instructions found under date of May 10, 1940, coming from General Hannecke, Document 184, once the machines or the stocks have been identified, the offices are given their work, the R.O.G.E.S. on one hand, and the Office of Compensation of Machines, which I called attention to in regard to the economic pillage of Holland and Belgium. that the very composition of the economic detachments emanates from the High Command. Quoting from page 6:
"The economic detachments, to which reference is made in paragraph one, are composed by the combination of specialists chosen from industrial fields. Specialists found in occupied territories would seek for and assure the conversion of stocks of raw materials which are important at the present time and of special machines for the manufacture of munitions and of war materials."
THE PRESIDENT: Is that quotation set out in your dossier?
M. DELPECH: The quotation is on page 84, viz.
THE PRESIDENT: Would this be a convenient time to take off?
(Whereupon at 1120 hours a recess was taken until 1130 hours) of the Tribunal, for the removal of machinery and the re-distribution, either to factories working in the country in behalf of Germany or factories in Germany, the direction of the operations was insured by the Bureau of Machine Compensation.
Such bureaux were created in all the occupied territories of Western Europe in the last months of the year 1942, upon the order of the Minister for Armaments, upon the order of the defendant Speer and the Department of the Four Year Plan, especially upon the order of the defendant Goering. created upon the decision of the Executive Chief of the Economic Section in Brussels under date of February 18, 1943. Its activity has already been pointed out to the Tribunal in relation to the despoiling of industries working on non-ferrous metals. Its activity did not stop there. It is found in all branches of industry. Document 185 can give you the figures on each activity. This activity continued the very last days of the occupation. The levies of machinery and industries was not limited to industry. Documents under Nos. 183 and 184 show the extent of the levies, and I shall conclude with the levies of industrial material. billetting and transport. imposed the expenses of the billetting of their troops upon Belgium. Having done this, the occupation authorities justified themselves by a rather liberal interpretation of Article 52 of the Hague Convention, according to the provisions of which the occupying power may require levies in kind and in services. The report is contained in Document 186. Article 49 gives the right of requiring the occupying country to defray the expenses. Belgium had to endure expenses as great as 5,900,000,000 francs for billetting expenses, equipment, supplies of furniture. The payments Belgian treasury relative to the billetting of troops is estimated in the report of the Belgian General Military Service at 5,423,000,000 francs. It is evident that under the pretext of billetting expenses, other expenses were entered to the detrimer of the Belgian economy, notably - as in other occupied countries -- the purchase of furniture which was to be sent to Germany.
Secondly, Transportation and Communication. To insure transportation, the Belgian treasury had to advance a total sum of 8,000,000,000 francs and, as already pointed out to the Tribunal, the seizure by the occupation authorities even extended to the river craft, and the plan for transportation of occupation troops which needed rail transport. According to the Hague Convention, Article 53, the occupying army has the right to seize the means of transportation provided that they give them back and that they pay indemnities. The army does not possess the right to force the occupied country to pay for the means of transportation at its disposal.
Third Point, Labour. The deportation of labour to Germany and compulsory labour in Germany has already been presented to the Tribunal. It seems then unnecessary to stress this point. At the most, we should recall certain unfavorable results -- unfavorable to the Belgian economy. The measures concerning the deportation of labor have occasioned a disorganization and an economic impoverishment without precedent. Secondly, the departure of workers and especially specialists insufficiently replaced by unskilled people -women and adolescents -- brought about a diminution of production. At the same time an increase in cost price which contributed to increase the problem of the financial equilibrium of industrial enterprises. Third remark: the levy of labor was the cause of political and social discontent by reason of the dispersion of families and inequities which appeared in the requisition of workers. Fourth and last remark; the workers were required to furnish levies in domains which were not necessarily their own, with a consequent loss of professional aptitudes. Personnel were divided and reclassified. The closing of the small workshops brought more or less evident modifications in the structure of certain branches of production. The loss thus occasioned is not that which is measured in monetary terms and need not be submitted to your jurisdiction. page 93. From 1940 on according to their general policy in all the occupied countries of Western Europe, the Germans were concerned with acquiring investments in Belgian financial enterprises in foreign countries.