On the second page, page 38, the first paragraph:
"In accordance with this order, I immediately gave the organs 'Abwehrstelle,' 'Koenigsberg,' 'Cracow,' 'Breslau,' 'Vienna,' 'Danzig,' and 'Poznan,' the task of intensifying the counter intelligence work."
the five documents, I read:
"In March 1941 I received from Canaris the following directives "a) Preparation of all links of 'Abwehr III' (Counter Intelligence, Department III) for carrying out active counter "b) Spreading false information via their foreign intelligence "c) Counter intelligence measures to keep secret the prepara the transfer of troops to the east be kept secret."
in connection with the preparation and execution of Plan Barbarossa:
the second and third paragraphs. Pickenbrock states:
"In March 1941 I was present at a conversation between Canaris and the head of the Diversion and Sabotage Department, 'Abwehr II,' "I, personally, as head of 'Abwehr I,' beginning in February East Department, Colonel Kinzel.
These conversations dealt with the more precise definition of various tasks assigned to 'Abwehr,' with preparation of the attack on the Soviet Union.
I now skip one The field offices of the "Abwehrstelle," which were working against Russia, were given the task of intensifying the dispatch of agents to the USSR.
A similar task - the intensification of espionage work against Russia - was given to all intelligence organs existing in the armies and army groups. For the more successful direction of all these "Abwehr" organs, a special intelligence staff was created in May 1941 under the code name of "Wally I." pointed to direct operation "Wally I." Later, when following our example, "Abwehr 2" and "Abwehr 3" had also established staffs "Wally 2" and "Wally 3", this organ became known as a whole staff "Wally", and directed the entire intelligence, counter-intelligence, and diversionary work against the USER. At the head of staff "Wally" was Colonel Schmalschlaeger.
I now pass on to the last paragraph of Lahousen's statement; that is page 36 in the book of documents. From numerous reports given by Colonel Lahousen and Canaris, at which I was also present, I know that a great amount of preparatory work for the war with the Soviet Union carried out by this department. In the period of February to May 1941 many conferences of the leaders of "Abwehr 2" took place at the quarters of Jodl's deputy, General Warlimont. They were held in a cavalry school, in the small town of Krampnitz. One particular question settled at these conferences, in accordance with the needs of the war with Russia, was that of increasing the special task units "Brandenburg 800, and of distributing contingents of these units amongst the individual army groups."
That was in Pickenbrock's testimony which just was read, and are his references to a special task with which Lahousen's department was entrusted, and to special task units known under the Code name of "Brandenburg 800." the German Army, Erwin Stoltze, who was Lahousen's deputy in the second department of the German Military Intelligence and Counter-intelligence Service at the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces. to the Tribunal Stoltze's testimony of the 25th of December, 1945, which was given to Col.
Vorasniko of the Red Army, and is No. USSR 231, and beg that it may be accepted as evidence.
I will read extracts from this evidence which are underlined with red pencil. I commence the quotation on page 48 of the book of documents, which starts with the evidence as follows: "I received instructions from Lahousen to organize and to lead a special group under Code name 'A', which had to engage in the preparation of diversionary acts, and in the work of disintegration of the Soviet rear in connection with the intended attack on USSR". it and for my guidance, Lahousen gave me an order which came from the Operational Staff of the Armed Forces and was signed by Field Marshall Keitel and General Jodl - or General Warlimont on Keitel's instructions, I do not quite remember, and which contained basic directives for the conduct of subversive activities in the territory of the USSR after Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. The order in question was for the first time marked with the code name "Barbarossa."
I am leaving the two lines, and I am reading further. It was pointed out in the order that for the purpose of delivering a lightening blow against the Soviet Union, "Abwehr 2", in conducting subversive work against Russia, must use its agents for kindling national antagonism among the peoples of the Soviet Union. is on the second page of the propaganda or questionnaire, and the Tribunal will note the following places in the document. "In carrying out the abovementioned instructions of Keitel and Jodl, I contacted Ukrainian Nationalists, who were in the German Intelligence Service, and other members of the Nationalist Fascist groups, whom I roped in to carry out the tasks as set out above.
"In particular, instructions were given by me personally to the leaders of the Ukrainian Nationalists, the German Agents Myelnik (code name 'Consul I') and Bandara to organize, immediately upon Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, and to provoke demonstrations in the Ukraine in order to disrupt the immediate rear of the Soviet armies, and also to convince international public opinion of alleged disintegration of the Soviet rear.
We also prepared special diversionist groups for subversive activi-
ties in the Baltic Soviet Republics." documents, beginning with the testimony of Stoltze, and reading:
"Apart from this, a special military unit was trained for subversive activities on Soviet territory, a special duty training regiment 'Brandenburg 800' under the immediate command of the head of 'Abwehr 2', Lahausen. Among the objects of this special unit, created in 1940, was the seizure of operationally important points, such as bridges, tunnels, and defense installations, and hold them till the arrival of the advance units of the German Army." war, the personnel of the regiments, formed mainly of Germans from beyond the frontiers, made wide use of the adversary's army uniforms, equipment and arms, in order to camouflage their operations.
"During the course of preparations for Germany's attack on the USSR, the command of the 'brandenburg 800' regiment also collected supplies of Red Army uniforms, equipment and arms, and organized separate detachments of Germans acquainted with the Russian language." of evidence of Stoltze, Bentivegni and Pickenbrock disclosed the working methods of the German Intelligence Service in the preparation and execution of "Plan Barbarossa". I shall no longer occupy the attention of the Tribunal on these questions. But, before I continue further my presentation, I should like to point out that the intelligence work in Germany was also the subject of activities of the defendant Kaltenbrunner's department. I shall limit myself to submitting one document which is characteristic of how the Hitlerites, by using their connections, created difficulties in Iran, through which, as is known, the routes passed for the delivery to the USSR of motor vehicles and of the most varied war materials. USSR No. 178, was taken by us from the German Foreign Office Archives, which were captured by the advancing units of the Red Army. This is defendant Kaltenbrunner's letter to the defendant Ribbentrop. The letter is typed on the letterhead of the Chief of the Security Police and SD.
In the document book which is in front of you this document is on page 42. I quote extracts from this letter, which are underlined:
"28 July 1943 "We have made direct contact with Iran and have received infor the Iranian Parliamentary elections."
And a few lines further is stated:
"In order to have a decisive influence on the elections, bribes "For Teheran - 400,000 Tumans and for the rest of Iran at least "It should be noted that nationally oriented Iranian circles expect Germany's intervention.
"I beg you to inform me whether it is possible to get one million Tumans from the Foreign Office.
This money can be sent with fuehrer."
which interested the Reich Foreign Minister. episode. and of the Reich Fuehrer SS strengthened and developed more and more. As a result, a very curious document appeared, which can be entitled an agreement between Himmler and Ribbentrop on the organization of intelligence work. I submit this document as USSR No. 120, and request the Tribunal to accept it as documentary evidence.
The text of this document ison the pages numbered 53 and 55 in the book of documents which are in front of you.
The text of this agreement will be read by me. I read the marked parts:
"By the order dated the 12th of February, 1944, the Fuehrer has entrusted the Reich Fuehrer SS with the creation of a unified German Secret Intelligence Service. The Secret Intelligence Service has as its purpose, so far as foreign countries are concerned, to get information in the political, military, economic and technical spheres for the Reich. In addition, the Fuehrer has established that the direction of the Intelligence Service, in so far as foreign countries are concerned, must be conducted in agreement with the Foreign Minister. In this connection, the following agreement between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Reichsfuehrer SS was arrived at:
"1. The Secret Intelligence Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS represents an important instrument for obtaining information in the sphere of foreign politics, and this instrument is placed at the disposal of the Foreign Minister. The first condition for this is close, comradely and loyal cooperation between the Foreign Office and the headquarters of the Reich Security Service. The collection of information on foreign politics by the Diplomatic Service is not affected by this.
"2. The Foreign Office places at the disposal of the Headquarters of the Reich Security Services the information on the situation in the field of foreign politics necessary for the conduct of the Intelligence Service and the directive regarding German foreign policy. It hands over to the Headquarters of the Reich Security Service its intelligence and other tasks in the sphere of foreign policy, which are to be performed by the organs of the Secret Intelligence Service.
"3. Intelligence material in the field of foreign politics, obtained by the Secret intelligence Service, is placed--"
THE PRESIDENT: Will you give a sufficient summary of this document with which you are dealing. To say that it is a document signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop and it shows that there was a unification of the German Secret Intelligence Service and the details of that unification are not really a matter which very much concerns this Tribunal, and, therefore, as we are directed by the Charter to be as expeditious as possible, it is not necessary to read all the details of this unification.
MAJOR GENERAL ZORYA: I shall summarize this document, but I must say that this agreement, signed by Himmler and Ribbentrop, created such a situation at the time that it was difficult to distinguish the conditions of Fascist Germany, where it begun, the activity of Ribbentrop and Kaltenbrunner. If the Tribunal will allow, I shall carry on with the presentation of the next document. This document I read just now, I mean the counter espionnage abroad that I mentioned, that under the name of German diplomatic representatives in countries which were in ordinary diplomatic relations with Germany, the Gestapo actually worked in these countries. paragraph, No. 3.
III Germany's Satellites.
When the plan "Barbarossa" was read at Court, in my opinion, only one part of the whole plan received comparatively little attention.
I have in mind part 2 of the "Barbarossa" version (No. 446-PS) bearing the name of "Presumed allies and their tasks". the Tribunal's attention.
In the first place, allow me to remind you of the contents of this part:
Document No. 446-PS, page 14 of the Document book. The document is already presented to the Tribunal. I am reading now the second count:
"1. On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Rumania and Finland in the war against Soviet Russia.
"The Supreme Command of the German Army will, at the appropriate time, settle and lay down in what way the armed forces of the two countries will be subordinated to the German command on their entry into the war.
"2. Rumania's task will be to tie up, incooperation with the group of the armed forces advancing there, the enemy forces facing her, and, for the rest, to maintain the auxiliary services in the rear area.
"3. Finland will have to cover the advance of the German Northern landing group (units of the XXI groups) due to arrive from Norway, and then operate together with it. In addition, it will be up to Finland to liquidate the Russian Forces in Hango.
"4. It is possible to count upon the Swedish Railways and Coals being available for the movements of the German Northern group not later than the beginning of the operation." attention was drawn to the sentence which begins this section:
"On the flanks of our operation, we can count upon the active participation of Rumania & Finland in the war against Soviet Russia." the fact that on the 18 December 1941 (the date of the "Barbarossa" document) Rumania and Finland were already following in the wake of the Hitlerite conspirators' predatory policies. cution and which mentions Germany's presumed allies in her aggression against the USSR.
This is the document bearing the number C-39 and entitled "Provisional Plan Barbarossa". It is, as defendant Keitel pointed out in his covering letter, a calendar plan of the preparations for Plan Barbarossa after the 1st June 1941. This plan was confirmed by Hitler.
In part 2 of this document entitled "Negotiations with Friendly Powers", we read:
"a) A request has been, sent to Bulgaria not to reduce to any large extent the units stationed for security reasons, on the Turkish frontier.
"b) The Rumanians have begun, at the instigation of the Commander-in-Chief of the German troops in Rumania, a partial, camouflaged mobilisation in order to be able to close their frontiers against a presumed attack by the Russians.
"c) Hungarian territory will be used for the advance of the Southern Army Group only in so far as it would be expedient for introducing German units to link up the Hungarian and Rumanian forces. Until the middle of June, however, no representations on this subject will be made to Hungary.
"d) Two German divisions have entered the Eastern part of Slovakia, the next ones will be landed in the area of Prossy.
"e) Preliminary negotiations with the Finnish General staff take place as from the 25th May." to the fact that this has shown us the preliminary preparation of aggression on the Roumanian front, having indicated that the measures for organizing the Roumanian army, according to the plan of the German Army, were kept in 1940 with Roumania when the special mission was directed to Roumania. The Fascist leaders, their written agreement was not formulated. It was not always convenient for them. Defendant Ribbentrop, which took place on 12 February 1942. This document was taken from some personal archives of Marshal Antonescu, which was taken by the advancing Red army. This document is placed under page 59, and 62 in your book of documents.
In connection with Ribbentrop's speech in Budapest on Transylvania, Antonescu makes the following entry: The last paragraph of page 2 of the Russian text of the document. Page 60 in the book of documents.
"Without hesitation, I stressed the point that, as early as the beginning of September, when I took over the government of the country, supported only by Monsieur Michael Antonescu, I declared, without asking the opinion of my people, that we must follow a policy of adherence to the Axis powers; I said that this was the only example in the history of nations when two persons dare to make an open declaration and to call upon their people to follow a policy which no doubt could appear only infamous".it to receive wide publicity.
Mr. President, I intend to read two long documents which will take considerable time.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 12 February, 1946, at 1000 hours).
Military Tribunal, in the matter of: The
THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to recall the witness who was being called yesterday, Fieldmarshall Paulus, are you not, for the defendants' counsel to have the opportunity of questioning him? Will you do that now.
DR. NELTE (Counsel for defendant Keitel): Yes, if it is convenient to the Tribunal, the witness can come up.
(FIELDMARSHALL PAULUS resumed the stand.)
THE PRESIDENT: Fieldmarshall Paulus, I want to remind you that you should pause after the question has been asked you before you answer it in order that the translation shall get through. Do you follow what I mean?
THE WITNESS: I have understood. BY DR. NELTE:
Q I would like to ask Several questions. On the 3rd of September, 1940, you came as General Quartermaster I to the High Command of the Army; is that correct?
Q Who was at that time the High Command of the Army? in-Chief of the Army was Fieldmarshall von Brauchitsch. because I did not put this question for any other reason than just to explain the situation to the people who are assembled here. It is known to us but maybe not to the Tribunal. Who was at that time the Chief of Staff of the Army?
Q Were you asGeneral Quartermaster No. I the representative of the Chief of Staff?
told me to do so and, besides, I had various tasks with which he charged me. have later known as "plan Barbarossa"? in an affidavit which has been presented by the prosecution about the treatment of military plans--he has made a statement. With the permission of the Tribunal, I would like to ask you to tell me whether this statement by Fieldmarshall von Brauchitsch is also your opinion.
"If Hitler had decided to use milita ry pressure for his political aims or military means of power, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, if he had anything to do with it, first received orally a sort of orientation or a definite order."
Is that your opinion also?
A I could not say. I have no knowledge of that.
Q Col. Gen. Halder, who was your immediate superior, has said about the handling of such military operational things in an affidavit, which also has been submitted by the prosecution, the following: of the Wehrmacht and the parts of the Wehrmacht which were immediately under him, that is army, navy, and air force.
Is that your opinion likewise? stand exactly what you meant.
Q It is about the question: Who were the military persons who were responsible to Hitler in large planning? And in respect to that, von Brauchitsch said what you have just said and Halder said the following: which were directly the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, that is to say, the Army, the Navy, and the Luftwaffe.
Is that so?
A I have witnessed it myself. We received the orders about military measures by the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. Such was the Directive No. 21. I thought the people responsible were, first, the superior Military advisors of Hitler.
Q If you have seen Directive No. 21, then you must also know who signed it. Who was that? by Keitel and Jodl initialed it; that is to say, as much as I can remember.
Q But, at any rate, signed by Hitler as all directives; is that correct? other people in his name. the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht, that is to say, Hitler? opinion, that the General Staff of the Army with its large machinery was to work out ideas which Hitler conceived, work them out in detail? Don't you believe that?
A That is correct. They had to execute the orders which were given them by the Commander-in-Chief. was given these orders. There was in all planning, as I can see from your statement also, in the execution of such plans there was a close collaboration between Hitler as Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht and the General Staff of the Army; is that correct? are charged to carry out the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. you found on the 3rd of September, 1940, that you have developed that, and that then, after a certain measure of completeness was reached, it was presented to the Commander-in-Chief personally or through Col. Gen. Halder?
Staff or by the-
Q That is, it had to be accepted by Hitler or refused? already in the fall of 1940 understood that Hitler wanted to attack the Soviet Union. was the theoretical preparation for an attack.
Q But at that time already you thought that it was Hitler's intention, didn't you? the theoretical preparation, a practical-
THE PRESIDENT: You must go slower. been received by the Abwehr that the Intelligence which would prove that there were any intentions by the Soviet Union to attack. about these things?
A Yes, very frequently. They had serious doubts about it, but there wasn't any news, in fact, about any preparations for war on the side of the Soviet Union; at least I didn't know anything about that. Soviet Union?
THE PRESIDENT: The witness must speak slower. signs which did not exclude the conclusion that an attack was prepared. ditions for attack was considered not only by myself but also by other people, other informed people, as the first step for the preparations for an attack, that is to say, an aggressive attack on the Soviet Union.
or the High Command of the Army made any protests to Hitler about it? der of the Army has made any protests.
Q Have you, yourself, protested to Col. Gen. Holder or von Brauchitsch? Have you spoken about your personal doubts? as a witness for the events with which the defendants are accused. I ask the Tribunal, therefore, to relieve me of the responsibility of answering these questions which are directed against myself.
Q Fieldmarshall Paulus, you don't seem to know that you also belong to the circle of the accused because you belonged to the organization of the High Command which is indicted here as criminal. events which have led to the indictment, I have asked to be relieved of the responsibility of answering these questions which concern myself.
DR. NELTE: I ask the Tribunal to decide.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal considers that you must answer the questions that have been put to you up to date.
THE WITNESS: Then may I ask for a repetition of the questions,please?
Q. I have asked you, Fieldmarshall, whether, since you realized that there were serious doubts, you have talked to your chief, Halder or von Brauchitsch, about these things?
A. I cannot remember having talked to the Supreme Commander of the Army about it, but with the Chief of the General Staff Col. Gen. Halder.
Q. Was he of the same opinion?
A. Yes, he was of the same opinion, that is to say, of the opinion of great concern for such a plan.
Q. For military or moral reasons?
A. For several reasons, both military and moral.
Q. It is certain then that you and the Chief of Staff von Halder realized these facts which would have stamped the war against Russia as a criminal attack and just the same that you have done nothing about it? In your statement you have said that later you became Commander-in-Chief of the Sixth Army; is that right?
A. Yes
Q. With knowledge of all these facts you have accepted the command of an army which was to push against Stalingrad. Did you have any serious doubts to be made a tool of that attack which in your opinion was a criminal one?
A. As the situation at that time presented itself for the soldier in connection also with the extraordinary propaganda which was put into play, I had at that time, as so many, believed that I had to do my duty toward my fatherland.
Q. But you knew about the facts which were against that opinion?
A. The facts which became clear to me afterwards, due to my experiences as Commander of the Sixth Army which found the climax at Stalingrad, well, the facts I didn't know at that time. Also, about that criminal attack, that knowledge came later, when I thought about all the details because before I could only see part of it.
Q. Then I have to consider your expression "criminal attack" or any other expressions for the war mongers -- I have to consider that as something that you found out later?
A. Yes.
Q. And I may say then that in spite of your having serious doubts and knowledge about the facts which marked the war against Russia as a criminal action of aggression, that in spite of your knowledge you have considered it your duty to take the command of the Sixth Army and to hold Stalingrad until the last moment?
A. I have just explained that at that time, when I took over the command of the Sixth Army, I did not see the extent of the crime which was considered in the beginning and execution of this war; that I did not see the entire extent of it and could not see it as my experiences as Commander of the Sixth Army have shown me later.
Q. You speak of the extent, but the fact is that you knew the causes. Maybe you were one of the few that knew them. You have not mentioned that.
A. I knew the introduction as a war of agrression. At that time, and, as it was the attitude of the Officers' Corps, I found it in the fact that the policy of the Reich was based on power politics and it was nothing unusual.
Q. So you agreed to these ideologies?
A. No, not the tendency which was to be seen later, but I did not exclude that also the fate of the country was based upon power politics. It was a mistake that at that time in the Twentieth Century only the democracies and the realization of the nationality principle were the important factors.
Q. Would you grant, also, the others ggod faith who were not so near to the sources, that they just wanted the best for their fatherland?
A. Yes, I do. BY DR. SAUTER (Counsel for defendants von Schirach and Funk):
Q. Yesterday you mentioned that you consider as the guilty ones the Hitler Government; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. In your written deposition of the 8th of January, '46, as it says here, in a prison camp, there is nothing about that; at least, I have not found anything about it.
A. This letter has nothing to do with it. What is a letter to the Soviet Government, in which I explained several questions which have come up at the Sixth Army in Russia and several of my own experiences were mentioned here.
Q. In this letter of the 8th of January, '46, you said explicitly:
"Today, where the crimes of Hitler and his helpers are judged, I found myself obliged to tell you everything which I have known and which may serve as proof for the guilt of the crimes in the Nurnbert trials and to present all that to the Soviet Government."
THE PRESIDENT: If you are cross-examining this witness on this letter, you must put the letter in evidence, the whole letter,
DR. SAUTER: That is the statement which the witness has given.
THE PRESIDENT: If you are cross-examining him on the letter and put the letter to him, you must put the letter in evidence. You have a copy of the letter?
DR. SAUTER: Yes. It is the statement which the Soviet prosecutor yesterday put up to the witness and in regard to which the witness made the statement that he considers it correct and he will repeat it.
THE PRESIDENT: I wasn't sure whether it was actually put in or nor or whether it was withdrawn upon the promise to produce the witness. Is the letter actually in?
DR. SAUTER: But the witness has said, after the prosecutor asked him, that he will repeat that statement. In fact, he has repeated it.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Willey, has the letter been put in?
MR. WILLEY: It has not been put in.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, you can go on cross-examining about it, but the document has to be put in. That is all.
DR. SAUTER: Yes.
Q. Now I would like to know, witness, what do you mean by "Hitler Government"? Do you mean the Reich Cabinet, or what exactly do you mean?
A. I mean everyone who is responsible.
Q. I would like you to answer the question more precisely.
A. In my statements yesterday I have only explained, what I have seen myself, what I have experienced myself. About the individual personalities of the government I had no intention to make any statements because that would not be within my knowledge.
Q. But you spoke about the Hitler Government, didn't you?
A. I just mean the fact of the Hitler Government.
Q. That means, first, the Reich Cabinet, doesn't it?
A. Yes, inasmuch as it is responsible for the directives given by the government.
Q. For this reason I would like to know the following: the Reich Cabinet and the defendant, von Schirach is also counted as one member of the Reich Cabinet by the prosecution. Do you know anything about the fact whether the defendant Funk and the defendant von Schirach as, for instance you, have known anything about these plans of Hitler?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you know whether during the war, since you were at the OKW, there were any meetings of the Cabinet?
A. I don't know that either.
Q. Do you know that Hitler in the interest of secrecy of his warlike plans has even ordered that conversations between himself and his military advisors, the members of the Reich Cabinet, not be present?
A. I don't know about that.
Q. Didn't it come to your knowledge by Jodl or from Keitel that Hitler even prohibited that many members of the Reich Cabinet should be present at such military conferences?
A. I don't know anything about that at all.
Q. Another question: After Stalingrad was encircled and the situation had become hopeless, there were several telegrams of devotion to Hitler from Stalingrad; do you know anything about that?