THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment, Dr. Dix. I have one or two announcements to make. In the first place, the application which has been made on behalf of the defendants for a separate trial of the organizations named under Articles 9 and 10 of the Charter, is denied. the Defendant Bormann, the Tribunal have considered that the application dated February 23, 1946, by Dr. Bergold, counsel for the Defendant Bormann, in which he asks that Bormann's case should be heard last, at the end of the case of all the other defendants, the Tribunal have decided to grant this application.
The Tribunal also ruled that the hearing of Dr. Bergold's applications, on behalf of Bormann, for writnesses and documents, in accordance with Article 24-D, shall not take place at the present time when the Tribunal are hearing the applications of all the other defendants, but at a later date to be fixed within the next three weeks. sit in closed session after the conclusion of the applications on behalf of the four defendants who are being heard today. Tomorrow, the Tribunal will continue the applications on behalf of the next four defendants; and on Thursday, the Tribunal will hear the case on behalf of the Defendant Goering.
Yes, Dr. Dix.
DR. DIX (Counsel for Schacht): Before the recess, I was on the point of telling the Tribunal, under No. 2 of the list of documents, that these extracts from books and addresses are limited to very short citations; that these documents having been made accessible by the prosecution, that should be enough on the question of No. 2.
As far as No. 1 is concerned, extracts from documents already submitted by the prosecution, I hardly need expand on all the examples here. I should like to mention one, however, by way of example; for instance, the report of Ambassador Bullitt to the Secretary of State in Washington, in which the prosecution read the latter, namely, that part which was interesting to it. Regarding this, I should like to reserve the right to read the first part which is concerned with Schacht's peaceful attitude on his political influence on Hitler. It is this part which is interesting to the defense.
I now turn to No. 3, under sub-heading (a), memorandum of Dr. Schacht, of May 3, 1935, to Hitler, regarding the legal protection of the Jews, the distribution of the Gestapo. Here I should like to express the wish to the prosecution that so far as is possible, it should take care of this second document which has not been introduced. It is not Document 1168-PS, but when it was submitted -- I should like to ask that this document be procured, as I heard yesterday that it has not yet been found, but perhaps Colonel Gurfien, who is most certainly at home now, could help us in this matter. This document is immensely important to us because there is here a question in these two documents of an entire memorandum of Schacht's, which has to be submitted and evaluated in its entirety.
Then there is a letter from Dr. Schacht to General Feldmarschall von Blomberg concerning the limitation of armaments. I believe that the relevancy of this document is obvious.
Something should also be said in regard to sub-heading (c). That is a memorandum of Hitler regarding the Four lean Plan of August 1936. In this memorandum, Hitler makes the most strenuous sort of accusations against Schacht, including that of sabotage. This memorandum of Hitler's is of infinitive importance to us. Contrary to what stands in the list, I am not in a position to provide a desirable copy of this memorandum which, under certainly circumstances, could take the place of the submission of the original. What I have is an extract which, as such, is in no way reliable enough to be submitted to the Tribunal in evidence. We want to be certain as to the contents of this memorandum and this we must do; then we must have the original. It was in the Lager Dustbin, in the town of Taunus, and I repeat my request of the prosecution to assist us in the procuring of this original.
Then there is a letter of Dr. Schacht to Goering, of November 1942, his answer to Goering. Goering's statement was that he should be dismissed because of defeatism. More precisely, the consequence of this letter was Schacht's dismissal because of defeatism and, furthermore, as a consequence of this letter, Goering expelled him from the Prussian State Council. Schacht saw this letter the last time in the hands of Herr von Schlabrendorf, who was an assistant to General Donovan, but is no longer here. Where he is now, Schlabrendorf, namely, I don't know. That could also be of assistance to us, and the prosecution could be of help to us.
Under (e), a telegram from Goering to Schacht, January 1943, in which Goering expelled the Defendant Schacht from the Prussian State Council.
in getting our hands on this document. These are various notes, of written soliloquys and letters, and what not, found in Schacht's estate in Guehlen, near Lindow in Mark Brandenburg; it was when the Russians occupied that territory. So far as we have heard, the documents were taken in custody by the Russian troops. I should like the Russian delegation to do its best to provide us with these documents.
The documents under No. 4 are already in our possession. I hardly need list them in detail. They are to be found in our document book and hereafter the prosecution will have an opportunity to take an attitude towards them regarding their relevancy. That is all I have to say regarding the documents I wish to submit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: with the approval of the Tribunal I shall consign the very remarks I have to make to paragraph 3 of Dr. Dix memorandum. With regard to the document for which Dr. Dix request, it is not yet procured. I have asked my colleagues to make inquiries, but at the moment they can find certain of these documents, although a search has been made. For example, No. 2, the note handed to Hitler on the same day is document No. 1168-PS. Mr. Dodd tells me that an exhaustive search was made in the American Delegation two months ago, and they are convinced that that document is not in their possession, and, the same applies to No. 4, by the Soviet Party.
THE PRESIDENT: Who was the interrogator, Judge Gurfein?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Colonel Gurfein is the one that started the American prosecution who would conduct the interrogations at the earlier stage.
THE PRESIDENT: Where is he now?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: New York. That appearance has been brought in mind in the usual interrogations. If the document is used it is very carefully referred to, and the American Delegation informs me that they took that line of search, and had that in mind, and that they have not been able to find it. Similarly, in regard, to No. 4, the Soviet Colleagues told me that they have no trace of the documents there mentioned.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean there is no reference to that document in the interrogation conducted by Judge Gurfein?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, yes. They are unable to find any
THE PRESIDENT: Have you any knowledge of any communication that has been sent to Judge Gurfein?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not sure he had gone when the search of two months ago was made. I am sure that the American Delegation will look into that. What I was going to say in regard to No. E, my Soviet Colleagues inform me that no trace of these documents has been established by the Russian authorities. With regard to those, the prosecution would like some further time and they will make further inquiries, and then they will report to Dr. Dix and to the general delegation if anything can be done. With regard to the other documents, the ones which are referred to by Dr. Dix, on the many extracts, is one which entirely suits the prosecution if it suits the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the defendant Doenitz.
DR. OTTO KRANZBUEHLER: Dr. Kranzbuehler, counsel for the defendant Doenitz. I should like to call the following witnesses: First, is Admiralrichter Kurt Eckhardt. He accounts for it as representative of the judge advocate. He should make testimony regarding the policies that were at the basis of the German U-Boat policy. This testimony is relevant in connection with the document submitted by the prosecution according to which th U-boat war was conducted without regard for International law. Secondly -
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Again it might help Dr. Kranzbuehler and the Tribunal, if I indicated the view of the prosecution to consider that No. 1, Admiral Eckhardt, and No. 2, Rear Admiral Wagner, and No.4 Rear Admiral Godt, should not be subject of objections, they don't make objections to these three. With regard to Commander Hessler, No. 3, it seems to the prosecution that he was rarely accumulative of Rear Admiral Godt, as he ceased to be a U-boat Commander at the end of 1941, before the mss of material orders were issued. That is really the onepoint; as I said, we raise no objections to the other three. With regard to the second portion of the interrogatories, the interrogatories of Mr. Messersmith had been granted. With regard to the next three, Rear Admiral Kreisch, and Captain Rossing, and Commander Suhren, these were granted on 14 February, and a slight error crept into the prosecution's action which was purely mechanical; that the prosecution replied they did not object in principle, and did not wish to file cross interrogatories; they objected to two on the questions to be addressed to Commander Suhren, Nos.
7 and 8. It was indicated the same objection to the same questions should be made with regard to the other two. That it appears on one document as only relating to Commander Suhren, and on general principle there is no objection; with regard to No. 5, that has been done.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, Sir David, have those mistakes been rectified, in reference to 2 and 3?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not quite sure. I want to mention that same objection to narrow the issues of this objection to two of the interrogatories, and in connection to all three sets of interrogatories, I don't think this has been before the Tribunal so far as I know.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And with regard to Captain Eck, that evidence has been taken on the commission, and so there is no objection, and, finally, with regard to Admiral Nimitz, the prosecution do object to that application; that is a new application, and if the Tribunal will look at the grounds, they have, that from the United States the submarines attacked all ships departing from United States, and Allied vessels without warning, and that the United States submarines attacked all Japanese ships without warning, at the latest during that time when it should be surmised that Japanese ships would resist being taken as a prize. And third, that United States submarines did not assist ship-ridden people in "sub" waters where the submarine would be endangering herself by such assistance. The reason which Dr. Kranzbuehler gives is that we have not testimony to prove that the United States Admiralty made the same strategic and legal considerations in carrying out this submarine warfare. In the submission of the prosecution this is irrelevant. It does not follow that even this course had been taken by the United States. That they followed the same legal considerations might have been done as retaliation, and if so, the question whether the United States broke the laws and usages of war is quite irrelevant; as the question before the Tribunal is whether the German High Command read the laws, the admiralty laws, which merely raise the old problem of the evidence where directed to choose the proper argument, which this prosecution has always submitted throughout this trial as irrelevant.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I shall limit my comments to those points to which Sir David has raised objections. I do not consider his testimony to be cumulative. He is to testify first of all, when Order 154, which was submitted by the Prosecution, was no longer in force. This testimony is important because the Prosecution is of the opinion that the Order of September, 1942, did not have to be issued at all, but that it would have been enough to rely for behavior in each such matter on Order 154, the old order. Hessler is to testify that Order 154 was no longer in force at that time. who from 1941 on instructed all U-boat commanders on the orders that were issued, particularly on the orders regarding treatment of shipwrecked persons. testimony of the witness Moehle.
I now go over to Numbers Two, Three and Four: Admiral Kreisch, Captain Roesing, and the Captain of the Fregatte Suhren. questions I have asked in my interrogatory can only then be answered when the answers to these questions are on hand. I do not know just what these objections are. I consequently do not know what reasons are given for them.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the Tribunal got the interrogatories and the objections of the Prosecution to Number Four?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: So far the Tribunal has received from me only the interrogatory.
THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution given us their objection to one question, which I understand was an objection that was made to the interrogatories put to Suhren, which should have been an objection to a particular question on the other two as well.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. It is very short. I will indicate, if Dr. Kranzbuehler will allow me, the two questions were: "Is it known to you that in September 1914 German submarines saved shipwrecked people after torpedoing the British steamer 'Laconia' qnd while doing so were bombed by an Allied plane?"
Number 8: "Do you know whether this incident was the reason for issuing an order by the commanding officer of the submarines, BDU, in which assistance at the risk of endangering your own boat was prohibited and was declared irreconcilable with the laws of sea warfare?"
The objections were -- I will read them out: "Question 7. Objection is entered on the ground that this question is unnecessary and the facts are admitted."
"Question 8: Objection entered. It is not seen how the witness could possibly know the reason for the orders from the defendant Doenitz."
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: May I make a statement regarding this? I believe that the officers named have some knowledge of the reason for the orders that they received from the Commander-in-Chief and can give testimony on that subject. For this reason: In the U-Boat arm it was generally know what was the reason for the order of September 1942, and while the commanders of the submarines in various theaters of war sometimes listened to the telegraphic communications in the course of the "Laconia" incident, such telegraphic communications were made and were listened to. That is all. Nimitz. The Prosecution has an entirely different attitude from that which is the basis of my application. I do not by any means wish to prove or even to assert that the American Admiralty in its U-Boat war against Japan broke international law. On the contrary, I am of the opinion that it acted strictly within the limit of international law. In the sea war of the United States against Japan, it was a question of precisely the same problems that confronted Germany in its sea warfare against England, to wit, the extent and the application of the London Submarine Agreement of 1930. The United States and Japan were also signatories to this agreement. resist, the London Agreement is no longer applicable to such merchant vessels. It is also not applicable in regions that had been declared war zones in which a general warning has been issued to all vessels, and where an individual warning to the individual ship is no longer necessary.
that the American Admiralty in its practical understanding of the London Agreement, behaved in exactly the same way as the German Admiralty, and I should like to regard this as proof that the German behavior in sea warfare was perfectly legal. the submarine would endanger itself by undertaking rescue measures.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kranzbuehler.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I now turn to the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: If you are departing from Admiral Nimitz I should like to ask a question of Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If My Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I understood you to submit that these questions to Admiral Nimitz were entirely irrelevant?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it make any difference to your submission whether the German Navy had attacked merchant ships without warning in the first instance in the beginning of their war against England?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that of course would be a clearer breach of the treaty as at that time there was no question of armament, so faras I am aware, and there was certainly no question that the German submarines thought that they were attacking armed vessels who were reallly ships of war. Then of course one comes to the position which the prosecution developed in evidence that the German Navy, having indulged in thebeginning in that form of submarine warfare, the position changed and armament had to be inserted into the British ships. In my submission it would make a difference even if one takes the argument as Dr. Kranzbuehlerhas put it new, his saying that he is not alleging breaches of the laws and usages of war, but on his prior terms in the London agreement that merchant ships that were armed could be attacked. It really becomes a very difficult matter if one is to construe these treaties by a sort of general investigation of the interpretation by various commanders. Within the point that Your Lordship put to me there is that very clear point which appears in our documents that the arming of merchant ships was the result of the attacks without warning which took place in the first months of the war.
THE PRESIDENT: But would you say that these questions to Admiral Nimitz are irrelevant because the United States came into the war in November 1941 when the war between -- the sea warfare between -- Germany and England had developed, to that stage, when attacks were being made without warning?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, My Lord. That is what I was saying, I am very grateful to Your Lordship for clarifying the argument that I wanted to make.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that clear to you, Dr. Kranzbuehler? The argument which I understood Sir David as putting forward with reference to these interrogatories is that they are truly irrelevant because of the date at which the United States came into the war, a date when the sea war between England and Germany had, for reasons which must be investigated, arrived at the stage that submarines were attacking merchant vessels without warning, and merchant vessels were defending themselves against those attacks.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President. It is however my opinion that the relationship that developed between Germany and England in their sea warfare can not be used as foundation for the measures that were carried on between the United States and Japan in their sea warfare, because in the latter it was an entirely different theatre of war in which German forces did not operate. In my opinion, therefore, the rules of sea warfare toward the East Asian theatre of war were answered perfectly in their own conditions and should not be derived from their conditions in the European theatre of war.
THE COURT: Then the Tribunal will consider those arguments.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How can what any navy did show the proper construction of a law? It may show what a particular admiral thought about it, but how are we interested in knowing what one admiral or another admiral thought about the law? Isn't that for us to decide? How is that any evidence? Isn't that your point, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
MR. BIDDLE: How does that really throw any light on the meaning of a law?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I believe that the principles, according to which sea warfare is conducted, do not originate in any one admiral, but that because of their enormous importance are great measures; that is to say, measures taken by the government. But it is recognized international law that the sources of international law are not only treaties but are also acts of governments. I should like to point out for example that Justice Jackson in his first report to President Truman specifically emphasized the fact that international law is furthered by acts of governments even if the London agreement of 1930 did not from the very beginning have the significance of accepting merchant vessels who had orders to resist; then acts of governments that were taken by all governments in this direction would have been of such a sort to create new international law in this matter. I am subsequently of the opinion that the attitude of the United States, as one of the greatest sea powers, in this matter is definitive in the correct interpretation of the London Agreement, and there it is also of decisive importance in regard to the legality of Germany's behaviour.
MR. BIDDLE: Do you claim that the London Agreement is ambiguous?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
MR. BIDDLE: What words in the London Agreement are ambiguous?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The concept "merchant vessels."
MR. BIDDLE: You haven't got the citation there, have you?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Which is that?
MR. BIDDLE: The phrase in the London Agreement which you claim is ambiguous.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I do not have it here, but I can report it pretty precisely. It is stated that submarines in their behavior toward merchant vessels also are to observe the same rules as surface ships would.
I shall later submit proof that the concept "merchant vessel" even in the conference of Washington in 1922, was called ambiguous, and that also literature on international law after that date has emphasized again and again that this concept is ambiguous.
MR. BIDDLE: Dr. Kranzbuehler, you want Admiral Nimitz to give us his opinion of his construction of the treaty, do you not? Isn't that the purpose of these interrogatories?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, I do not want to hear Admiral Nimitz's opinion, but I should like to hear of the methods employed by the United States in their warfare against Japan.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the arguments you addressed, Dr. Kranzbuehler.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I now turn to the documents. As I have just heard from Sir David, there are no objections on the part of the prosecution. I do not know whether I need further justify my reasons for submitting the individual documents. Do I have to submit such reasons now? the Admiralty and the commanders of submarines, they have already been submitted, and the Prosecution does not object.
Under Number three I ask to be able to use the "British Confidential Fleet Orders" and "Admiralty Merchant Shipping Instructions" of the British Admiralty -
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this matter came up before the Tribunal in closed session on an application from Dr. Kranzbuehler. I haven't heard definitely from the British Admiralty whether they agreed to do this, but I have asked Dr. Kranzbuehler if he will leave this matter over for ten days in the hope that we may be able to meet him. If Dr. Kranzbuehler will not press it in ten days I shall, of course, let him know as soon as I have any definite information.
THE COURT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I am agreed to that. Under number four I announce my intention of submitting a number of declarations and letters I have received from German U-Boat commanders and officers, in part through the agency of the Secretary General. These declarations contain details on the address delivered by the commander-in-chief in Gotenhafen on which the witness Heisig testified, H-e-i-s-i-g; the order concerning instructions regarding U-Boat commanders by the witness Moehle; and the order regarding the behavior towards shipwrecked persons. So far as I know the prosecution has no objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any objection, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, many of these matters may have to be considered when the actual document is put before us. There are no class objections to them.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I should like to point out that I must probably bring further documents later, after I have spoken to Admiral Eckhardt. I may perhaps then once more request the Tribunal to allow me to call this witness, who is very important to the entire defense, and to hear him as soon as possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think the Tribunal would grant that subject, of course, to there being no delay regarding further applications.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 6 March 1946 at 1000 hours).
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of the International
THE PRESIDENT: I desire to announce a slight change in the order of business.
Dr. Stahmer has made a motion in writing, stating that he desired a little more time in the preparation of his documents and for other reasons would be grateful if the case of the defendant Goering did not come on Thursday, as announced. heard may present some difficulties in getting the documents translated in time. As the Tribunal had announced, that they would continue the hearing of the applications for witnesses until they were all completed, they will adhere to this decision. It is anticipated that this will give Dr. Stahmer one day more, but at the conclusion of the hearing of the applications for witnesses, the case of the defendant Goering will come on without delay. tions for delay or postponement on the part of the defendants will be entertained, save in the most exceptional circumstances.
DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for the Defendant Raeder): For the Defendant Raeder, I should like to call as first witness, a witness who can give testimony regarding the Defendant's personal character.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if it would be convenient, I might first indicate the views of the Prosecution and then Dr. Siemers can deal with this point. for oral testimony:
No. 2, the retired Minister, Karl Severing.
No. 5, Vice-Admiral Schulte-Moenting.
No. 6 has been already sought and not objected to by the Prosecution, to be called for the Defendant Doenitz.
And No. 10, Admiral Hermann Boehm. an affidavit as the suitable procedure:
No. 2, Vice-Admiral Lohmann -
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean an affidavit or interrogatories?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In this case I should prefer an affidavit, because it is only a history of past events that is involved.
THE PRESIDENT: Affidavit in which case?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is in the case of Lohmann, No. 2.
Then with regard to No. 4, Grand Admiral Albrecht, his evidence covers the same ground as No. 5. It might be that interrogatories were more convenient, but that would be a matter for my friends.
Then the next number, 7. That is Dr. Suechting, who is an engineer. It is desired to have him speak about the Naval Treaties and questions of construction. The Prosecution suggests an affidavit will be suitable there, because apparently it is desired that he speak on technical matters.
No. 8, Field Marshal von Blomberg, I am told, is ill. And I think that Dr. Siemers has submitted questions and answers already. He ought to be dealt with by interrogatories. Probably it is the easiest thing for the Field Marshal and the most suitable.
THE PRESIDENT: Wasn't that suggested in the case of one of the other defendants?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: von Blomberg, yes. I have a note that Defendants' Counsel have submitted questions.
I wasn't quite sure whether by Dr. Siemers or another. I think it was Dr. Nelte, for Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: I think so. That is No. 8.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then the next one, von Weizsaecker, who was the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. He is requested with regard to the Athenia case. At the moment I can't see the point for which the Defense want this gentleman, but I suggest that if they get an affidavit from Weizsaecker we should know what he can speak about.
Then the other one is No. 14, Colonel Soltmann. It is desired to give the results of the interrogation of certain British prisoners-of-war at Lillehammer. It would appear that the object was merely to give further evidence which would be cumulative to the statements in the German White Book and therefore the Prosecution suggests an affidavit. line between admissibility and affidavits. They are really, in the submission of the Prosecution, not relevant witnesses, but the Tribunal might like to consider the question. These are No. 1, a naval chaplain who really speaks as to the general moral and religious outlook of the Defendant Raeder. That is, in the submission of the Prosecution, really irrelevant; but at the most it would be a matter for an affidavit. The Prosecution's position is that it is really irrelevant but it certainly should not be more than an affidavit, even if a different view was taken.
The other is No. 16, Admiral Schultze. He is to speak with regard to an interview with the late Admiral Darlan, and it is submitted that that is irrelevant; but, granting it any approach to relevance -- which the Presecution has not been able to see -- that it is only a matter for an affidavit.
The Prosecution submits that the following are unnecessary:
Nos. 11 -
THE PRESIDENT: Dealing with No. 16, wouldn't that be more suitably dealt with by interrogatories. I see that the Tribunal granted interrogatories in that case, but I suppose they haven't yet been produced.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Which one?
THE PRESIDENT: No. 16.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, if the Tribunal feelthat it is a matter that should, be explored I agree that interrogatories would be suitable. are:
No. 11, Vice-Admiral Gottlieb Buerkner, because cumulative of Nos. 5 and 10.
No. 12, Lt. Commander Schreiber, because on the 21st of February Dr. Siemers said that he was willing not to call this witness, if No. 5, Schulte-Moenting, was allowed.
No. 13, Hugo Lackorn, who is a Norwegian merchant, who is supposed to speak of Allied plans, without any means of knowledge being stated. This witness was temporarily given up on the 21st of February.
No. 15, Alf Whist, who was Secretary of Commerce in the Quisling Cabinet, as I understand the application. There is no indication why this witness should be competent on the case of the Defendant Raeder.
And No. 16 has been dealt with.
No. 17 is Colonel Goldenberg, who was the interpreter at the meeting between the Defendant Raeder and Darlan. The Defendant Raeder gives evidence and Admiral Schultze answers interrogatories. It will appear that interview was well covered.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: I thank Sir David for taking up the individual points, as a consequence of which I can, as I presume, dispense with further discussion of the points to which he has agreed and confine myself to these on which he has disagreed.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the best course would be for you to go through the ones upon which Sir David has not agreed, which could have been called as oral witnesses, and then perhaps it might be necessary to deal with the ones on which he has agreed. If you will begin in the order in which he took them up -- 2, 4, 7, 8, 9 -- if that is convenient to you.
THE PRESIDENT: In Case Two he suggested an affidavit.
DR. SIEMERS: Number Two is Vice Admiral Lohmann. In this connection I refer to the last page of my brief, on which I have discussed the documents under Roman Numeral III. There I have stated that I suggested to the British Delegation that we come to some agreement regarding the Treaty of Versailles and the Naval Treaty. The British Delegation has given me reason to think that we can reach this understanding and has communicated with the British Admiralty in London on this matter. Vice Admiral Lohmann should then submit only an affidavit, since he would then have to testify on only a few points. I ask, therefore, thathe be approved for the time being, and whether or not I renounce calling him will depend on this understanding with the Prosecution. If this understanding is not reached, then the proof of a considerable number of points would become very difficult, and then I could not renounce Lohmann as a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you say about that, Sir David?
SIRDAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have circulated Dr. Siemers' note and request for agreement to my colleagues, and I have also consulted the Admiralty, and I hope that we may be able to give the information and probably to agree on these matters, but I am waiting to get that confirmed from the Admiralty in Britain, so I think that if we could leave over the question of this witness until I see if I can get an agreement which will satisfy Dr. Siemers on the point -
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then if you cannot make the agreement, probably the witness would have to be called?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I can let Dr. Siemers know whether there is any controversy on the point, whether I am going to challenge what he puts forward. If I am going to challenge it, I should not object to the witness being called.
DR. SIEMERS: Under the circumstances, I shall be satisfied with the submission of an affidavit. I have written to Vice Admiral Lohmann, asking him to answer certain minor questions, and in the matter of the main questions, I shall adhere to the principles just stated by Sir David.