THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Kranzbuehler.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I now turn to the documents.
THE PRESIDENT: If you are departing from Admiral Nimitz I should like to ask a question of Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If My Lordship pleases.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, I understood you to submit that these questions to Admiral Nimitz were entirely irrelevant?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it make any difference to your submission whether the German Navy had attacked merchant ships without warning in the first instance in the beginning of their war against England?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that of course would be a clearer breach of the treaty as at that time there was no question of armament, so faras I am aware, and there was certainly no question that the German submarines thought that they were attacking armed vessels who were reallly ships of war. Then of course one comes to the position which the prosecution developed in evidence that the German Navy, having indulged in thebeginning in that form of submarine warfare, the position changed and armament had to be inserted into the British ships. In my submission it would make a difference even if one takes the argument as Dr. Kranzbuehlerhas put it new, his saying that he is not alleging breaches of the laws and usages of war, but on his prior terms in the London agreement that merchant ships that were armed could be attacked. It really becomes a very difficult matter if one is to construe these treaties by a sort of general investigation of the interpretation by various commanders. Within the point that Your Lordship put to me there is that very clear point which appears in our documents that the arming of merchant ships was the result of the attacks without warning which took place in the first months of the war.
THE PRESIDENT: But would you say that these questions to Admiral Nimitz are irrelevant because the United States came into the war in November 1941 when the war between -- the sea warfare between -- Germany and England had developed, to that stage, when attacks were being made without warning?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is so, My Lord. That is what I was saying, I am very grateful to Your Lordship for clarifying the argument that I wanted to make.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that clear to you, Dr. Kranzbuehler? The argument which I understood Sir David as putting forward with reference to these interrogatories is that they are truly irrelevant because of the date at which the United States came into the war, a date when the sea war between England and Germany had, for reasons which must be investigated, arrived at the stage that submarines were attacking merchant vessels without warning, and merchant vessels were defending themselves against those attacks.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President. It is however my opinion that the relationship that developed between Germany and England in their sea warfare can not be used as foundation for the measures that were carried on between the United States and Japan in their sea warfare, because in the latter it was an entirely different theatre of war in which German forces did not operate. In my opinion, therefore, the rules of sea warfare toward the East Asian theatre of war were answered perfectly in their own conditions and should not be derived from their conditions in the European theatre of war.
THE COURT: Then the Tribunal will consider those arguments.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How can what any navy did show the proper construction of a law? It may show what a particular admiral thought about it, but how are we interested in knowing what one admiral or another admiral thought about the law? Isn't that for us to decide? How is that any evidence? Isn't that your point, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.
MR. BIDDLE: How does that really throw any light on the meaning of a law?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I believe that the principles, according to which sea warfare is conducted, do not originate in any one admiral, but that because of their enormous importance are great measures; that is to say, measures taken by the government. But it is recognized international law that the sources of international law are not only treaties but are also acts of governments. I should like to point out for example that Justice Jackson in his first report to President Truman specifically emphasized the fact that international law is furthered by acts of governments even if the London agreement of 1930 did not from the very beginning have the significance of accepting merchant vessels who had orders to resist; then acts of governments that were taken by all governments in this direction would have been of such a sort to create new international law in this matter. I am subsequently of the opinion that the attitude of the United States, as one of the greatest sea powers, in this matter is definitive in the correct interpretation of the London Agreement, and there it is also of decisive importance in regard to the legality of Germany's behaviour.
MR. BIDDLE: Do you claim that the London Agreement is ambiguous?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
MR. BIDDLE: What words in the London Agreement are ambiguous?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The concept "merchant vessels."
MR. BIDDLE: You haven't got the citation there, have you?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Which is that?
MR. BIDDLE: The phrase in the London Agreement which you claim is ambiguous.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I do not have it here, but I can report it pretty precisely. It is stated that submarines in their behavior toward merchant vessels also are to observe the same rules as surface ships would.
I shall later submit proof that the concept "merchant vessel" even in the conference of Washington in 1922, was called ambiguous, and that also literature on international law after that date has emphasized again and again that this concept is ambiguous.
MR. BIDDLE: Dr. Kranzbuehler, you want Admiral Nimitz to give us his opinion of his construction of the treaty, do you not? Isn't that the purpose of these interrogatories?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, I do not want to hear Admiral Nimitz's opinion, but I should like to hear of the methods employed by the United States in their warfare against Japan.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will consider the arguments you addressed, Dr. Kranzbuehler.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I now turn to the documents. As I have just heard from Sir David, there are no objections on the part of the prosecution. I do not know whether I need further justify my reasons for submitting the individual documents. Do I have to submit such reasons now? the Admiralty and the commanders of submarines, they have already been submitted, and the Prosecution does not object.
Under Number three I ask to be able to use the "British Confidential Fleet Orders" and "Admiralty Merchant Shipping Instructions" of the British Admiralty -
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, this matter came up before the Tribunal in closed session on an application from Dr. Kranzbuehler. I haven't heard definitely from the British Admiralty whether they agreed to do this, but I have asked Dr. Kranzbuehler if he will leave this matter over for ten days in the hope that we may be able to meet him. If Dr. Kranzbuehler will not press it in ten days I shall, of course, let him know as soon as I have any definite information.
THE COURT: Yes.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I am agreed to that. Under number four I announce my intention of submitting a number of declarations and letters I have received from German U-Boat commanders and officers, in part through the agency of the Secretary General. These declarations contain details on the address delivered by the commander-in-chief in Gotenhafen on which the witness Heisig testified, H-e-i-s-i-g; the order concerning instructions regarding U-Boat commanders by the witness Moehle; and the order regarding the behavior towards shipwrecked persons. So far as I know the prosecution has no objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you got any objection, Sir David?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, many of these matters may have to be considered when the actual document is put before us. There are no class objections to them.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I should like to point out that I must probably bring further documents later, after I have spoken to Admiral Eckhardt. I may perhaps then once more request the Tribunal to allow me to call this witness, who is very important to the entire defense, and to hear him as soon as possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think the Tribunal would grant that subject, of course, to there being no delay regarding further applications.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will now adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 6 March 1946 at 1000 hours).
OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT of the International
THE PRESIDENT: I desire to announce a slight change in the order of business.
Dr. Stahmer has made a motion in writing, stating that he desired a little more time in the preparation of his documents and for other reasons would be grateful if the case of the defendant Goering did not come on Thursday, as announced. heard may present some difficulties in getting the documents translated in time. As the Tribunal had announced, that they would continue the hearing of the applications for witnesses until they were all completed, they will adhere to this decision. It is anticipated that this will give Dr. Stahmer one day more, but at the conclusion of the hearing of the applications for witnesses, the case of the defendant Goering will come on without delay. tions for delay or postponement on the part of the defendants will be entertained, save in the most exceptional circumstances.
DR. SIEMERS (Counsel for the Defendant Raeder): For the Defendant Raeder, I should like to call as first witness, a witness who can give testimony regarding the Defendant's personal character.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, if it would be convenient, I might first indicate the views of the Prosecution and then Dr. Siemers can deal with this point. for oral testimony:
No. 2, the retired Minister, Karl Severing.
No. 5, Vice-Admiral Schulte-Moenting.
No. 6 has been already sought and not objected to by the Prosecution, to be called for the Defendant Doenitz.
And No. 10, Admiral Hermann Boehm. an affidavit as the suitable procedure:
No. 2, Vice-Admiral Lohmann -
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean an affidavit or interrogatories?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In this case I should prefer an affidavit, because it is only a history of past events that is involved.
THE PRESIDENT: Affidavit in which case?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is in the case of Lohmann, No. 2.
Then with regard to No. 4, Grand Admiral Albrecht, his evidence covers the same ground as No. 5. It might be that interrogatories were more convenient, but that would be a matter for my friends.
Then the next number, 7. That is Dr. Suechting, who is an engineer. It is desired to have him speak about the Naval Treaties and questions of construction. The Prosecution suggests an affidavit will be suitable there, because apparently it is desired that he speak on technical matters.
No. 8, Field Marshal von Blomberg, I am told, is ill. And I think that Dr. Siemers has submitted questions and answers already. He ought to be dealt with by interrogatories. Probably it is the easiest thing for the Field Marshal and the most suitable.
THE PRESIDENT: Wasn't that suggested in the case of one of the other defendants?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: von Blomberg, yes. I have a note that Defendants' Counsel have submitted questions.
I wasn't quite sure whether by Dr. Siemers or another. I think it was Dr. Nelte, for Keitel.
THE PRESIDENT: I think so. That is No. 8.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then the next one, von Weizsaecker, who was the Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. He is requested with regard to the Athenia case. At the moment I can't see the point for which the Defense want this gentleman, but I suggest that if they get an affidavit from Weizsaecker we should know what he can speak about.
Then the other one is No. 14, Colonel Soltmann. It is desired to give the results of the interrogation of certain British prisoners-of-war at Lillehammer. It would appear that the object was merely to give further evidence which would be cumulative to the statements in the German White Book and therefore the Prosecution suggests an affidavit. line between admissibility and affidavits. They are really, in the submission of the Prosecution, not relevant witnesses, but the Tribunal might like to consider the question. These are No. 1, a naval chaplain who really speaks as to the general moral and religious outlook of the Defendant Raeder. That is, in the submission of the Prosecution, really irrelevant; but at the most it would be a matter for an affidavit. The Prosecution's position is that it is really irrelevant but it certainly should not be more than an affidavit, even if a different view was taken.
The other is No. 16, Admiral Schultze. He is to speak with regard to an interview with the late Admiral Darlan, and it is submitted that that is irrelevant; but, granting it any approach to relevance -- which the Presecution has not been able to see -- that it is only a matter for an affidavit.
The Prosecution submits that the following are unnecessary:
Nos. 11 -
THE PRESIDENT: Dealing with No. 16, wouldn't that be more suitably dealt with by interrogatories. I see that the Tribunal granted interrogatories in that case, but I suppose they haven't yet been produced.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Which one?
THE PRESIDENT: No. 16.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, if the Tribunal feelthat it is a matter that should, be explored I agree that interrogatories would be suitable. are:
No. 11, Vice-Admiral Gottlieb Buerkner, because cumulative of Nos. 5 and 10.
No. 12, Lt. Commander Schreiber, because on the 21st of February Dr. Siemers said that he was willing not to call this witness, if No. 5, Schulte-Moenting, was allowed.
No. 13, Hugo Lackorn, who is a Norwegian merchant, who is supposed to speak of Allied plans, without any means of knowledge being stated. This witness was temporarily given up on the 21st of February.
No. 15, Alf Whist, who was Secretary of Commerce in the Quisling Cabinet, as I understand the application. There is no indication why this witness should be competent on the case of the Defendant Raeder.
And No. 16 has been dealt with.
No. 17 is Colonel Goldenberg, who was the interpreter at the meeting between the Defendant Raeder and Darlan. The Defendant Raeder gives evidence and Admiral Schultze answers interrogatories. It will appear that interview was well covered.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Dr. Siemers?
DR. SIEMERS: I thank Sir David for taking up the individual points, as a consequence of which I can, as I presume, dispense with further discussion of the points to which he has agreed and confine myself to these on which he has disagreed.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the best course would be for you to go through the ones upon which Sir David has not agreed, which could have been called as oral witnesses, and then perhaps it might be necessary to deal with the ones on which he has agreed. If you will begin in the order in which he took them up -- 2, 4, 7, 8, 9 -- if that is convenient to you.
THE PRESIDENT: In Case Two he suggested an affidavit.
DR. SIEMERS: Number Two is Vice Admiral Lohmann. In this connection I refer to the last page of my brief, on which I have discussed the documents under Roman Numeral III. There I have stated that I suggested to the British Delegation that we come to some agreement regarding the Treaty of Versailles and the Naval Treaty. The British Delegation has given me reason to think that we can reach this understanding and has communicated with the British Admiralty in London on this matter. Vice Admiral Lohmann should then submit only an affidavit, since he would then have to testify on only a few points. I ask, therefore, thathe be approved for the time being, and whether or not I renounce calling him will depend on this understanding with the Prosecution. If this understanding is not reached, then the proof of a considerable number of points would become very difficult, and then I could not renounce Lohmann as a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you say about that, Sir David?
SIRDAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have circulated Dr. Siemers' note and request for agreement to my colleagues, and I have also consulted the Admiralty, and I hope that we may be able to give the information and probably to agree on these matters, but I am waiting to get that confirmed from the Admiralty in Britain, so I think that if we could leave over the question of this witness until I see if I can get an agreement which will satisfy Dr. Siemers on the point -
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Then if you cannot make the agreement, probably the witness would have to be called?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I can let Dr. Siemers know whether there is any controversy on the point, whether I am going to challenge what he puts forward. If I am going to challenge it, I should not object to the witness being called.
DR. SIEMERS: Under the circumstances, I shall be satisfied with the submission of an affidavit. I have written to Vice Admiral Lohmann, asking him to answer certain minor questions, and in the matter of the main questions, I shall adhere to the principles just stated by Sir David.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. SIEMERS: Witness Number Four, Grand Admiral Albrecht, was one of the closest collaborators with Grand Admiral Raeder. From 1926 to 1928 he was Raeder's Chief of Staff in Kiel, from 1928 to 1930, Chief of the Navy Personnel Office of the OKM. From then on he was Commanding Admiral in Kiel, and finally Navy Commander East from 1939. was also commander in chief in charge of organization. Consequently, his testimony appears important to me. General Admiral Albrecht has also written to the Tribunal in this connection. familiar with Raeder's main notions. He knows Raeder's train of thought, has known it since 1928. That is to say, from that point on when the accusations against Raeder of the Prosecution begin.
directed against RAeder during a period of 15 years. I cannot refute all the accusations with just one or two witnesses.
The number of points taken up by these various witnesses are so various that we cannot speak of them as cumulative. by the Tribunal and by the Prosecution, particularly Schulte-Moenting, the Tribunal has not yet informed me in this connection where Schulte-Moenting is. I presume that he is in a prisoner of war camp in England, but I do not know whether he is really at my disposal and whether I can get in touch with him in time.
THE PRESIDENT: You were dealing with Grand Admiral Konrad Albrecht, were you not? You are dealing with Number Four?
DR. SIEMERS: Regarding Albrecht, we know that he is in Hamburg. I simply pointed out that it would not be cumulative if both Albrecht and Schulte-Moenting are heard by the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: You see, what Sir David is suggesting was an interrogatory in the case of Admiral Albrecht and an affidavit in the case of Admiral Schulte-Moenting.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will agree to Admiral Schulte-Moenting being called orally.
THE PRESIDENT: I beg your pardon. I was mixing the numbers. Yes, that is right, to call the one and have interrogatories, from the others. Have you any objection to that?
DR. SIEMERS: I request that I be able to call both as witnesses. Schulte-Moenting will testify regarding a later period, Albrecht of the period immediately subsequent to the Versailles Treaty. Their testimony is very different. has not yet informed me whether I can with absolute certainty count on Schulte-Moenting, in other words, whether he has been found, whether it is known where he is.
THE PRESIDENT: Our information is that he is not located, SchulteMoenting.
DR. SIEMERS: I have no information.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure thatis right. Yes, he has been located in a prisoner of war camp in the United Kingdom. At least, I think so. a prisoner of war camp in the United Kingdom.
DR. SIEMERS: I thank you. I had not known that, and under these circumstances I am prepared, in regard to General Admiral Albrecht, to satisfy myself with an affidavit or an interrogatory on the proposition that Schule-Moenting really turns up.
Number Seven, Dr. Suechting. I shall be satisfied with an affidavit in this case to speed up the trial.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: Under the one condition that this matter will be clarified between me and the British Prosecution, as stated first in connection with Admiral Lohmann. I believe that Sir David is agreeable to this.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to know how you suggest that these questions of shipbuilding in connection with the German-English Naval Agreements of 1935 and 1937 are relevant to any charge made here.
DR. SIEMERS: The Defendant Raeder is accused of having broken the Treaty of Versailles and the Naval Agreements. In the violation of such treaties, it is usually a question of shipbuilding. Consequently, I must prove what was permissible according to the Treaty of Versailles and the Naval Agreements and what was actually built, and what basic principles guided the naval policy. As I said, I would be satisfied to submit an affidavit in this case.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the Tribunal will consider the arguments on that.
DR. SIEMERS: No.8, Fieldmarshal von Blomberg. The Prosuection suggests an affidavit or an interrogatory in consideration of von Blomberg's state of health. I am agreeable to this for the sake of simplicity and I suggest an affidavit since I have no very complicated questions to put to him.
No. 9, Ambassador von Weizsaecker. I made the application on Februar 6th. So far I have not received an answer from the Tribunal. In the case of the ship "Athenia", at that time Weizsaecker was State Secretary in the Reich Ministry for Foreign Affairs. At that time, in September 1939, Weizsaecker communited with the American Ambassador on the subject of the Athenia. Weizsaecker spoke with Hitler and with Raeder. He knows the details and must heard on these details. I do not believe that an affidavit would suffice. Let me remark in passing that I do not now know where Weizsaecker is, but aside from that, the accusation against Raeder in the case of the Athenia is of some criminality from an ethical point of view that the evidence here could not be of a restricting factual nature and this moral point must be given considerable contention. particularly and made insulting attacks on the defendant in this matter. In view of the irreproachable life of my client, I feel obliged to clarify this case utterly.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, as far as the application, there is nothing to show beyond the position of the suggested witness that he knew anything about it at all, and under those circumstances would not interrogatories be the most appropriate course? You did not show whether he did know anything about it at all. You say in your application that he was State Secretary in the Reich Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
DR. SIEMERS: Let me point out that in my application I stated that the witness is informed regarding the events connected with the case Athenia.
THE PRESIDENT: You say on the basis of his position as State Secretary that he must know.
DR. SIEMERS: The American Ambassador immediately after the Athenia case got in touch with Weizsaecker in order to clarify that case. Thereupon Weizsaecker spoke with Raeder, after he had already, however, told the American Ambassador that no German submarines had anything to do with that case. The classification of the Athenia case in which a German submarine was involved occurred only later. Previous to that Raeder had not known of it. The return of the U-boat took place on the 27th of September. The sinking took place on the 3rd of September.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you state those facts about the conversations between the American Ambassador and the Ambassador Weizsaecker in a previous application?
DR. SIEMERS: No, but on the 6th of February I did make an application, but also mentioned in general terms as regards the Athenia case. Let me add, Weizsaecker knows also the subsequent occurrences.
He knows very well that the Navy and particularly the defendant Raeder had nothing to do with the article which the propaganda ministry had published in the newspapers. Weizsaecker was just as outraged by this article as the defendant Raeder was, but it precisely this of which the Prosecution accuses Raeder.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will consider what you say.
DR. SIEMERS: Let me add that I made a mistake. I just heard that Weizsaecker is still with the Vatican in Rome; in other words, it is known where he is.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. SIEMERS: No. 14, Colonel Soltmann. So far as I know, Colonel Soltmann is also to be called as a witness by the defendant Jodl. He has already been sent an affidavit or an interrogatory. I am consequently agreed with Sir David that such will suffice in the case of Soltmann, depending on the agreement of defense counsel for Jodl.
THE PRESIDENT: He does not appear to be located yet.
DR. SIEMERS: The witness Soltmann is not located? I have his address.
THE PRESIDENT: Have you?
DR. SIEMERS: I gave it to you in my application. It is Falkenberg near Moosach in Upper Bavaria.
No. 16, General Admiral Schultze. Schultze is in Hamburg. The Prosecuti has accused the defendant Raeder of participating in the National Socialist policy of conquest. This occusation is unfounded. Raeder in Norway, as well as in France, worked industriously to bring about peace; in other words, to carry out no definitive conquest of any country. Raeder was in strong opposition to Hitler andit was only after much urging that Raeder succeeded in speaking to Darlan in Paris regarding peace negotiations. I believe that such a positive attitude in favor of a rapid conclusion of the war is important enough to be testified to by a witness in a trial so important as this one. I cannot understand how Sir David, in view of his accusation, can say that this point is irrelevant. The Prosecution has repeatedly declared that the defendant Raeder was -
THE PRESIDENT: I do not believe that Sir David said it was irrelevant.
He suggested interrogatories.
DR. SIEMERS: I made a rate here that Sir David said that the witness was irrelevant, but he would be agreeable to an affidavit.
THE PRESIDENT. I was wrong.
DR. SIEMERS: I simply wanted to take the position on the question as to whether or not this witness is irrelevant. I believe I have done so.
THE PRESIDENT: You want the witness? You would not agree to an affidavit or an interrogatory? I s that right?
DR. SIEMERS: I ask the Tribunal to call Schultze as a witness here in Nurnberg because he can give testimony on a definitive point in my case, to wit, Raeder's attitude toward the war as a whole, and can do so from firsthand observation rather than from hearsay.
I come now to the witnesses as to whom Sir David had objection.
Witness Number 11, Vice Admirable Buerkner. I asked for him on the 31st of January. So far I have received no answer. I asked to be allowed to speak to the witness, Buerkner, so that I could acquaint myself with the details. This was rejected.
I object to Sir David's objection until I can speak to this witness. I ask, first of all, that he be approved so that I can speak with him. Only then can I take a decisive attitude toward whether I want him as a witness. If it then turns out as Sir David is of the opinion, that his evidence is cumulative, then I am willing to forego him. I presume that Sir David is agreeable to this.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal doesn't quite understand why counsel shouldn't have seen this officer who is in prison in Nurnberg, subject of course to security.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We have no objection to counsel seeing Admiral Buerkner. I think up to now the Prosecution have always taken the view that what Dr. Siemers was wanting to see him about was not relevant. I don't think the Tribunal has ruled on that.
THE PRESIDENT: The view of the Tribunal is that counsel for the Defense ought to be in touch with the witnesses before in order to see whether they are able to give relevant evidence or not. They can't give the evidence or the relevancy of it unless they know what the witness is going to say.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No objection will be made, and Dr. Siemers can make arrangement, as far as the Prosecution is concerned, to see Admiral Buerkner at the earliest date he likes.
DR. SIEMERS: I thank the Tribunal for clarifying this point. This point has made greatly more difficult the work of the Defense Counsel. I have been waiting for more than a month to be able to speak to Buerkner. For four weeks I was not able to speak to Admiral Wagner. There are others to whom I should like to speak who are in the court house prison, but so far in all these cases permission has been refused me. I believe that now the point is clarified.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Siemers.
DR. SIEMERS: There is the poss bility that after speaking with these witnesses I shall not want to call them, particularly since I hear today that Schulte-Moenting can be called, and on the supposition that Boehm, will be approved.
THE PRESIDENT: That who will be approved?
DR. SIEMERS: Boehm, Number 10.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes. That was Sir David's only objection to Number 11, wasn't it, that it was cumulative to 5 and 10?
DR. SIEMERS: Number 12, Schrieber. Sir David pointed out correctly-I agree with Sir David in this--that if actually Schulte-Moenting and the witness Boehm can be called Schrieber is, in point of fact, not necessary.
Number 13, the witness Lackorn in Leipzig. Before the occupation of Norway, Lackorn was on business in Oslo. He has nothing to do with the military. It is purely by accident that he found out in the Hotel Bristol in Oslo that the landing of the English troops was immediately imminent. This point is important for this reason, because here we can find out the attitude of the defendant in the matter of Norway and can judge it only if we know the entire situation in Norway at that time. The entire situation in Norway, however, means the relations between Norway and Germany, England, Sweden, and all the other neighboring countries. It will not do on so important a point simply to declare that it is only a question of a small sector.
I understand that the witness cannot be heard here. Since I expected this attitude on the part of the Prosecution, I have written to this witness for an affidavit and am agreeable if simply an affidavit is submitted here. He does not have to come personally as a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you didn't deal with that aspect of the matter, if there was an affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, my Lord, I am afraid the view of the Prosecution is that the story, which apparently started in the bar of a hotel in Oslo, is not evidence which is really admissible, relevant or of any weight in a matter of this kind.
That is the view we have taken throughout.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, it appears from the application which is before us that you originally made a request for this witness on the 19th of January 1946, which appears to have been in perfectly general terms, and that the Tribunal ordered on the 14th of February that you should furnish supplementary details of the evidence which you wanted to call through this witness. Thereupon, on the 21st of February, you withdrew your application. at all, simply saying that the witness had been in Oslo on business and received information there of the imminent landing of Allied forces in Norway. Well, that is a perfectly general statement, just as general as the original statement. It doesn't seem to comply with the orders of the Tribunal at all.
DR. SIEMERS: On the 21st of February, I withdrew my application in view of the basic point of view that I have told the Court about. I pointed out that in my opinion it cannot be asked of the Defense that they provide each individual detail, after we were consulted for over three months on no single witness called by the Prosecution. Nor did we have the slightest word to say in the conduct of the Prosecution. We were not given any opportunity by the Prosecution to take an attitude on the relevancy of their witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: I have already pointed out on several occasions that the reason why Defendants' counsel have to submit applications for their witnesses is because they are unable to get their witnesses themselves and because they are applying to the Tribunal to get their witnesses for them and their documents for them.