QWho sent you with the message? Whose message was it that you were delivering?
AI was commissioned at that time by Reichsmarshal Goering, in Muenster Lager, to attend the review of the Italian division there and to tell Field Marshal Graziani that the men in this division were to be used to command flak guns. After Field Marshal Graziani had not declared himself agreeable to this I was obliged to go to the Fuehrer Headquarters by air. It had been originally arranged that I should go by train and should go from-
QAnswer my question, witness. Just answer the question, please, and you will save us agreat deal of time. Whose message were you carrying to the Fuehrer?
AI brought the message that Graziani was not disposed to using these soldiers of the Italian division as had been suggested.
QAnd before you started for the Fuehrer Headquarters you communicated with Goering about it, didn't you?
ABefore my departure, when I went to the Muenster Lager, that was a few days before I had spoken to him. I had spoken to him when I returned to the Fuehrer Headquarters. At twelve-fifteen I telephoned Hermann Goering in his headquarters and gave him the same message.
QAnd did he instruct you to go to the Fuehrer Headquarters at that time and give the message to the Fuehrer?
AThis trip from Muenster Lager I made on my own initiative because it was important to Adolf Hitler to know of this information before Graziani arrived at the Fuehrer Headquarters, where he was expected at three o'clock on July 20.
QAs I understand you, Goering wanted a peaceful outcome of the negotiations at Munich?
AHe said that to me several times.
QAnd he was highly pleased with the outcome that was achieved there?
AHe was very pleased. I emphasized that before when I said that when he came from the conference room he said spontaneously, "That is peace".
QAnd when you cay thatGoering wanted peace with Poland he also wanted that same kind of a peace, didn't he?
ARegarding peace with Poland I did not speak with him.
QDid he send someone or induce Hitler to take someone to Munich in order to counter-check Ribbentrop?
AI know personally only the following in this matter. Here in imprisonment Captain Wiedemann told me that Hermann Goering had expressed the wish to take von Neurath with him, and Wiedemann told me that Hitler had corresponded to that.
QNow, you were interrogated by the United States about this subject before Wiedemann got here, weren't you?
ABefore?
QBefore Wiedemann was brought here.
AI was not interrogated on this subject.
QWere you interrogated on the 6th day of November 1945, and did you not then say that Goering used very harsh words about Ribbentrop and asked Hitler to take Neurath to Munich with him in order to have a representative present? Did you not say that to the interrogators of the United States?
AAt the moment I can not recall. If that is in my interrogatory then it must be so.
QThis meeting as to which you have -- oh, by the way, after Munich you knew that Goering gave his word of honor to the Czechs that there would be no further aggression against them, do you not?
APlease repeat the question?
QYou know that after Munich, when Goering was pleased with the outcome, he gave his word of honor that there would be no further aggression against the Czechs. Did you know that?
ANo, I didn't know that.
QThis meeting that took place in London, I mean the meeting that took place when the Englishmen were present-
A In Husum, yes.
QWho was the Swedish person who was present?
AHerr Dahlerus was the Swede who was present.
QWho were the English who were present.
AThere were six to eight English economic experts. The names I don't know.
QAnd at that time--by the way, have you fixed the time of that? What was the date?
AI can't say precisely. It was the beginning of August.
QWasn't it August the 7th?
AI can't say.
QWas Mr. Dahlerus there?
AThe question was whether Dahlerus was there? I can't remember one hundred percent; I only knew that I spoke with my lawyer and he said that Dr. Dahlerus was there, but I can not swear one hundred percent that he was there. I assume he was. The defense counsel Dr. Stahmer told me that he was there, that was the reason why I said previously that Hermann Goering and Dahlerus were present at that conference.
QAnd the subject under discussion was the Polish relations with the German Reich?
ANot about Polish questions but relationships between England and Germany. There was no talk of relationships with Poland.
QAnd Goering wanted the English gentlemen to see that England didn't attack Germany?
AHe didn't press it quite that way; he said, as I have already stated, the English gentlemen should, when they return home, work in the same way that he was working for peace and to make their influence felt in important circles.
QNow,wasn't that said in connection with the Polish negotiations that were then going on?
AI can not remember that any mention was made of such negotiations.
QWere you with Hermann Goering when the Polish war broke out?
AWhen the Polish war broke out I was in Berlin.
Q Were you still in your office under Hermann Goering's command?
AYes, I was under Hermann Goering's command.
QWhen did you first begin preparing for a movement of your forces in the direction of Poland?
AI can't make any definitive statement on that subject; that was a matter with which the General Staff was concerned. I know only that in the time before the beginning of the war the General Staff several times visited the High Command of the Luftwaffe, Hermann Goering, and that this matter was discussed. I myself am not oriented with what or how many forces were to be used in the Polish campaign.
QWere you present at the time the conference in which Hermann Goering informed that he, right after Munich, had orders to multiply the air force by five?
AI can not recall any such discussion.
QYou know that the air force was greatly enlarged after Munich?
ANo, I don't know that. There was a plan that the Luftwaffe was augmented, but I can not say at all what the German Luftwaffe, at the beginning of the Polish war, had either in the way of leaders or armament or materiel.
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Justice Jackson, would you like to adjourn now or would you like to go on in order to finish?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:This would be a convenient time; I am sure we can't finish before lunch hour.
THE PRESIDENT:You would like to adjourn now?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT:Very well.
(A recess auras taken until 1400 hours.)
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of The United States of America, the French Re public, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et al, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany, on 8 March 1946, 1400-1700, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.
THE PRESIDENT:We will have no open session tomorrow.
GENERAL RUDENKO:I want to say a few words with respect to the subject of defense. The Defense referred to a document this morning, saying that it did not have the document with regard to Katyn. I want to report right here that on the 13th of February of this year this document, USSR 54, consisting of thirty copies, all in the German language, was given to the Document Room for purposes of the Defense. We did not think that we had to present the document to each attorney for the Defense separately. We considered that if the Document Division received the document, the attorneys for the Defense would receive the copies.
This is all I want to report here.
DR.LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): There must be a misunderstanding about the number of this document. At that time, in open session, the Russian Prosecutor submitted a document under the number, USSR-64. USSR-64 has not been distributed. I have not received it, and upon request at the Information Room of the Defendants' Counsel, upon two requests, I have not received it.
THE PRESIDENT:Well, we will inquire into the matter.
GENARAL KARL VONBODENSCHATZ resumed the stand and testified further as follows:
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:
QPrevious to the Spring of 1943, as I understand you, Hermann Goering was a man of great influence in the councils of the Reich?
ABefore the year 1943 -- or until the year 1943, Hermann Goering always had access to the Fuehrer and his influence was important.
QIn fact, it was the most important in Germany, outside of the Fuehrer himself, was it not?
AWithin the Reich he had great influence, very great influence.
QAir power was his special mission and his special pride, was it not?
AHe was, as an old flier, very proud to be able to build up and lead the Air Force.
QHe had more confidence in air power as a weapon of war than most of the other men of his time, didn't he?
AAt any rate, he was convinced that his air force was very good; but I have to repeat what I said before: At the beginning of the war, in the year 1939, this stage had not been reached by the air force. I repeat that at that time the air force was, as far as leadership and material were concerned, not ready for war.
QBut ever since you first went with Hermann Goering you had been rapidly building up the air force, had you not?
AThe building up of the air force went relatively fast.
QAnd when you first went withGoering -- I have forgotten what year you said that was.
AI came to Hermann Goering in 1933. At that time there was no supreme commander of the air force, just a Reich Commissariat for Aviation. But even at that time the beginning of the building up of the air force -- the first beginnings -- started. However, it was only after 1935 when the freedom of building up the force was declared, that it was speeded up.
Q.And the building up of the air force was very largely in bombers, was it not?
AIt was not bombers in the main; it was mixed -- fighters and bombers both,
QGoering also had charge of the four-year plan?
AHe had received the mission from the Fuehrer to execute the fouryear plan.
QHe also held several other offices, did he not?
AHermann Goering, besides being Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe, was charged with the four-year plan before, at the beginning of the seizure of power.
He was minister for the Interior in Prussia, and Minister President, President of the Reichstag and Reich Forestry Minister.
Q I notice that you use here -- as you have used in your interrogations by the United States -- the expression "seizure of power."
That was the common expression used in your group, was it not, to describe the coming to power of Adolf Hitler?
AIn this sense, No. It cannot be said in this sense. At that time it was completely legal. It was just that the National Socialist was the strongest party, and the strongest party nominated the Reich Chancellor and had the strongest influence. It cannot be understood in such a way, that they assumed power, but they had the most important position among the parties that is completely lega, by election.
QYou want to change the word "seizure," do you?
AYes, I have to change that. It is more an expression which was circulated in the press at that time; it was common usage in the press.
QHermann Goering got along without any open break with Hitler until 1945, didn't he?
AUntil the year 1945 there was no open break. It was only at the end, as I have said before, the arrest.
QThe arrest was the first open break that had occurred between them, is that right?
AYes, the first big break, which could be seen from the outside. But since the year 1943, as I have said before, there was already -- in the attitude of the two men -- an estrangement.
QThat was kept from the German public, was it not?
AThat was not visible from the outside, It was a development which had taken place from the Spring of 1943 to 1945 -- first to a small extent, and then the tension became greater and greater.
QWhen the arrest was made it was made by the SS, was it not?
AI have only heard that, that at Obersalzburg allegedly a unit of SS had arrived and arrested Hermann Goering in his small house and kept him there. As to that, perhaps the witness to be questioned later, Colonel von Brauchitsch, -- who was presented at this address and who was arrested himself -- can give more details.
QYou were not arrested by the SS, were you?
A At that time, since the 20th of July, 1944, when I had been seriously injured, I was in the hospital.
I was close to Berchtesgaden, at Bad Reichenhall, for recuperation.
QWhenever there were conferences which you attended, was it not the custom at the conclusion of Hitler's address to the group, for Goering as the ranking man present, to assure the Fuehrer on behalf of himself and his fellow officers of their support of his plan?
AOf course, I was not present at all conferences. I only was listener at this particular conference. These conferences in which I took part -it happened on and off that the Reichsmarshal at the end made a remark and assured that the will of the Fuehrer would be executed, but at the moment I cannot remember any particularconference of that kind.
Q You can not remember any conference at which he did not do it either, can you?
AYes, it was not always done. Just the contrary. It was not the rule that he did that. In the Reichstag Hermann Goering always made a speech at the end, after a session had ended, and in these speeches he expressed his confidence in Adolf Hitler.
QDid he not do that at every meeting of officers at which the Fuehrer was present?
AI would ask you to repeat the question. I have not quite understood it. I beg you to excuse me, but due to my injury, I would like to say, I have lost fifty per cent of my hearing, and therefore I beg you to excuse me if I ask to repeat.
QQuite all right, sir. Do you know of any conference between Hitler and his High Command at which Goering did not close the meeting as the ranking officer present by making assurances of support to Hitler's plan.
AThere were many conferences--most of the conferences--where nothing was said at the end; when the Fuehrer had finished, that was the end of the meeting.
QIn 1943 when Goering began to lose influence with Hitler, it was a very embarrassing time for Goering, was it not?
AHermann Goering suffered from this fact. He said frequently to me that he would suffer very much from that.
QFrom the fact that the Fuehrer was losing confidence in him? He was suffering from the fact that the Fuehrer was losing confidence in him? was that what was causing his suffering?
AThat may have been part of the reason, but it came to differences of opinion about the Luftwaffe.
QNow, in the spring of 1943, it was apparent to you and apparent to him that the war was lost for Germany, was it not?
AI can not say that. The Reichsmarshal never made a statement to me in 1943 that the war was lost, but that there were great difficulties; that it would become very dangerous, but that the war was finally lost, I can not remember that the Reichsmarshal in the spring of 1943 should have made a statement of that kind to me.
QThe Reichsmarshal had given his assurance to the German people, had he not, that it would not be possible for them to be bombed, as Warsaw, Rotterdam, and other cities were bombed?
AIn this form, as much as I know, he did not give the assurance, He said before the war when our air force was growing, and at the beginning of the war, when there were great successes in Poland and in France and they were very obvious, he said to the German people that the air force would do its job and do everything to prevent, to keep away from the country bombing attacks. There was reason for that, and that the development later was a different one--that could not be seen at that time.
QThen he had given his assurances to the German people, had he not, that the Luftwaffe would be able to keep enemy bombers away from Germany?
AI can not remember that he gave an official assurance to the German people in the form of a directive or of a speech. At times when one spoke about that, the German air force, after the successes in Poland and France, was at the peak. An official proclamation or declaration or statement to the German people--I don't know anything about any such.
QIn all events, it became apparent in the spring of 1943 that any such assurance, if it had been given, was misleading?
AIn the year 1943 the conditions were entirely different, due to the fact that the British and American air force in so large numbers came into the play.
QIt was also true that the air defenses of Germany were proving entirely inadequate to cope with the situation; is that not a fact?
AThe air defense of Germany was very difficult, since the entire defense was not depending only on the air force crews, but it was also a radio, technical war, and in this kind of war, it has to be admitted that the enemy was essentially better off than we were. It was not only a war in the air, but it was also a radio war.
Q It had become apparent that Germany could not cope with it; is that not a fact, by 1943?
AYes, in the year 1943, it was not a hundred per cent clear. There were low and high points. There were efforts made to increase the strength of the fighters, the per centage of the bombers; it was not one hundred per cent obvious that the enemy air force could not be countered successfully. That could be seen only from the middle of 1944.
QThe Fuehrer lost confidence in Goering as the bombing of German cities progressed, did he not?
AYes, indeed, from that moment on when the British air force started with their large attacks on German cities; specifically when the first great British air attack on Cologne took place. From this moment on it was obvious that there were differences of opinion, first of a lighter nature, between the two gentlemen.
QAnd Hitler accused Goering, did he not, of misleading him as to the strength of the air defenses of Germany?
AI do not know that at any time the Fuehrer accused the Reichsmarshal of any such. Discussions between Hitler and the Reichsmarshal were, in spite of all tensions, very moderate. The criticism, allegedly, was getting worse in 1944 and 1945, but I was not present because, since 20 July 1944 I was retired.
QI did not intend to imply that the Fuehrer accused him of an intentional misstatement, but he had misled him or had misunderstood the strength of Germany's air defenses. Was that not generally understood in your circle?
AOf the misleading there could not be any idea. The reports which the air force made to the Fuehrer were always correct. Even the weaknesses were reported to the Fuehrer at all times.
QThat were the efforts that were made by Goering, that you refer to as tremendous efforts, to recapture his influence with the Fuehrer?
AThe Reichsmarshal, whenever there were such conferences, asked through me that he might participate. The Reichsmarshal came more frequently than usual to the Fuehrer's headquarters, and he told me also, "I'll try everything to get into the right relations with the Fuehrer again". He said that personally to me.
QHe was particularly careful after the spring of 1944 not to do anything that would offend the Fuehrer?
AAbout the year 1945 I can not say anything any more because then I was no longer active. I had no contact any more.
QNow, this bombing of German cities had become very very troublesome from the point of view of the German people's criticism of the government, had it not, in 1944?
AThe German people have suffered terribly under these bombing attacks, and I can only say one thing--that Adolf Hitler suffered most from it. If one has seen that, if one has been present when the bombing of a German city was reported to him, he was deeply moved. Likewise the Reichsmarshal, because the terrible details of such bombings were tremendous. I have seen such bombings in Berlin. Whoever has been present will never forget it.
QAnd this was all becoming very embarrassing to Hitler and to the Reichsmarshal, was it not, to explain to the German people why this was going on?
AThat had not to be explained, because the German people felt it. An explanation has not been given. It was only said that all measures would be taken to prevent such things.
QAnd you knew at that time, and the Reichsmarshal knew, that no measures could be taken that would prevent it?
ANo, no, no. I pointed out before that it was a war on the field of broadcast techniques, and there were moments when in the defense we could cross the measures of the enemy if we found a means to hit him.
QWhen you made the announcement to the German people that all means would be taken, you had then no means at your disposal, that you knew of, to use, did you?
AO, yes, indeed.
QThat were they, and why were they not used?
A The reference is to the following means. The most important areas were protected by flak, and there were radio technical means, because the stations would have made it possible to disturb the reports in enemy planes.
Q The movement to satisfy the German people under the bombing attacks was a matter of great concern to the Reichsmarshal, was it not?
AThe Reichsmarshal was very much interested to see that the population would be informed.
QAnd see that the population was satisfied, were they not?
AIt is easy to say "satisfied". He could only assure the German people that he would do anything in his power to stave off these attacks.
QNow, had you seen the Reichmarshal and Hitler when the reports came in of the bombing of Warsaw and of Rotterdam and of Coventry?
AI cannot remember whether I was present when the reports came.
QYou never saw any such reactions on their part on thse bombings at that time?
AI only know that Warsaw was a fortress which was in the hands of the Polish Army, and there were strong forces, artillery. The forts were manned, and two or three times Adolf Hitler announced that the cities should be evacuated by civilians. That was refused. Only the foregin embassies were evacuated. The Polish, Army, which was in the city and defended the city and, that is to say, in a very dense circle of forts, even from the center of the town, heavy artillery was firing outside. The fortress of Warsaw was therefore attacked and also by the Luftwaffe, but only after the ultimatum, that is the request from Hitler, was refused.
QWas Coventry a fortified city?
ACoventry was no fortress. Coventry, however, was a city on which the key industry of the enemy air force was, in which the aeroplane motors were built, a city which, as I know, many factories and many parts of these aeroplanes were manufactured inside the city. The air force at that time, that I know, had the order only to bomb the industrial targets. If the city has lso been hit, then that is only to be explained by the means of navigation at that time,
QYou were interrogated in November of 1945, were you not, by Colonel Williams?
AYes, I was interrogated.
QAnd Colonel Williams asked you about certain fictitious incidents along the German-Polish border late in August '39, did he not?
AYes, he asked me about that.
Q And would you care to tell the Tribunal what you know about the fictitious incidents along the Polish border?
AI do not know anything positive. I was asked by Colonel Williams whether I knew before about the incidents of the Gleiwitz Broadcasting Station. I told him, no, I didn't know about it. It was only that the incidents at the Polish border were very similar to those which happened at the Czech border, and that is just an opinion of mine. It may be they were intended, but a positive evidence according to anything which would have been put in, seen by our side, I did not have.
QDid you not tell him on the 6th of November 1945, as follows:
"I heard about it, but I personally at that time had the feeling that all these provocations that had taken place had originated from our side, from the German side. As I said, I had no real proofs of that, but I always had that feeling. Did you not say that?
AYes, I said that.
QAnd that you had talked with people about this from whom you got that feeling; is that right?
AI cannot remember that very well now. I only know that from the press. The report from the press gave me that suspicion.
QYou were asked, were you not, this question and gave this answer:
A "Q But you are of the opinion that what appeared in the press and these incidents that were reported were not true, but done merely to cause an incident as an excuse for an invasion?"
And did you not make this answer:
"A I had that feeling. I cannot prove it, but I definitely know I had a feeling that the whole thing was being engineered by us."
Did you not make that answer to that question?
AWell, the minutes will show it, such as you have read now. If it is in the minutes, I have said it, but at the moment I cannot remember the words.
QYou do not deny the fact, however?
AAs a matter of opinion, that was a very subjective opinion, very personal opinion.
QWell, it was you opinion?
A Yes, sir.
QNow then, I ask you whether you were not interrogated about the Fuehrer's desire to make war on Poland and whether you did not give this answer:
"Gentlemen, this question is very hard to answer, but I can state under my oath that the Fuehrer actually wanted the war against Poland. I can prove that he actually wanted a war of aggression against Poland by all the surroundings and the remarks that were made around the Fuehrer. I was present during the night when Hitler gave Henderson his conditions that he wanted Danzig, and I concluded from all the conferences that the Fuehrer had with the ambassador--I had the impression that the Fuehrer did not really want the Poles to accept those conditions."
And I ask you if you made those answers to Colonel Williams?
AI can say the following:
I was not present at the conference. If I said that, I didn't express it correctly. I was not at the conference that the Fuehrer had with Henderson, but I was,as the other adjutants,standing in the anti-chambers and only there in the hail one heard how they talked among each other, and one said this, the other said that, and from these talks I gathered that the conditions which Henderson received for the Poles in the evening--that the deadline for the answering of these questions was given for the noon of the next day, and it was so short that you could assume that there was some intention behind it.
QWell, that is the impression that you received from being in the anti-room and talking with the people who were about Hitler that night?
AThere were adjutants, the Reich press chief, and the gentlemen who were waiting in the anti-room without taking part in the conferences.
QI will ask you, in order to make this very clear, one more question about your interrogation on that subject. Were you not asked this question:
"Then we can summarize your testimony this morning by saying that you knew in 1938, several months before Germany attacked Poland, that Hitler fully intended to attack Poland and wage an aggressive war against her; is that right?
And did you not make this answer:
"I can only say that with certainty, from the night when he told Henderson he wanted Danzig and the streets to the Corridor, from that moment I was sure Hitler intended to wage aggressive war."
Where you asked that question and did you make that answer?
AIf it is in the minutes, I have said that.
Q Well, if it were not in the minutes, it would still be your testimony now, wouldn't it?
It is a fact, isn't it?
AMy definition is that it is quite precise to say that from the submission of the request by Adolf Hitler to Henderson and the short time that Henderson was granted, I assume that there was a certain intention. That is the way I would like to formulate it precisely.
QI will ask that you be shown Exhibit L-79, United States Exhibit in evidence, 27. You have seen that before, Mr. Witness?
AYes. A copy of this document has been shown to me by Colonel Williams, and I have told him that personally I cannot remember that I was present; but if it says so, if my name is on the minutes, on the document, then I was there.
QBut your name is on the document, isn't it?
AYes. Then I was there. I cannot remember the content of this conference. I told Colonel Williams presumably what has been spoken about, because Colonel Schmundt has marked it down in writing and I got a copy. Colonel Schmundt is a man who was very exact about his notes, very conscientious about his notes.
QThat is all in his handwriting?
AIt is here, as I see it here.
QAnd it is signed by Colonel Schmundt?
AIt is signed by Lt. Colonel Schmundt. The corrections are not in his handwriting.
QBut the body of the document is in his handwriting?
AI didn't understand.
QThe body of the document is his handwriting?
AYes; that is his own handwriting. I know it, yes, sir, indeed.
QAnd when you were asked about that by Colonel Williams you took time to read it, and then you said, did you not: "I think that the thoughts are right as they are expressed here; these are the thoughts that the Fuehrer usually voiced to us in a small circle"? You made that statement?
AYes, I have said that, yes.
QAnd you said that. "I cannot remember whether these things were expressed on that day. However, it is possible the thoughts that are put down here are the thoughts of Adolf Hitler."
You said that to Colonel Williams, did you not?
AYes, I said that to Colonel Williams.
QI will ask--that is all I care to ask about that.
I now ask to have shown to you the original exhibit, United States Exhibit 798-PS, United States Exhibit 29 in evidence.
ATo my knowledge this was also shown to me by Colonel Williams.
QThat's right. You said, did you not, that you did not recall whether you were present but that the thoughts that were expressed -
A (Interposing) I have said that the thoughts, as far as the thoughts are concerned, are correct.
QThey are correct. That is all about that.
ABut I have to say one more thing. I have tried to talk to Colonel Williams and could not reach him. Probably I have listened to this discussion, this meeting.
QWell, we will take that statement now and excuse you from looking for Colonel Williams.
I ask to have shown to you Exhibit 3474-PS, United States Exhibit in evidence, Number 580. Is that your hand writing?
AIt is my handwriting.
QAnd signed by you?
AYes, sir.
QAnd it is a note of a conference of the 2nd day of December 1936, is it not?
AYes.
QYou prepared this memorandum for your files; is that right?
AI don't know to whom I gave this.
QWell, it says the notes for the files on that discuss ion; is that correct?
AThat is a note for the file, yes.
QGoering was present at that conference; is that correct?
AYes. He may well have conducted that meeting.
Q In fact, the note says he conducted it, doesn't it?
AYes.
QNow, there was also present Milch, Kesselring,and all of the others who are named in the list at the head of the note.
AYes.
QAnd you then recorded that Goering told--oh, by the way, all of those men were men connected with the armed forces of Germany, were they not?
AThose were all men from the Air Force, Luftwaffe, the leading men. General Milch was active in armament. Kesselring, I believe, chief of staff. They were all gentlemen who were in leading positions.
QAll concerned with the Air Force you say. And this meeting was held on the 2nd of December 1936. Are we correct about that?
A yes.
QThen Goering opened the conference by saying "The world press is excited about the landing of 5,000 German volunteers in Spain. Official complaint by Great Britain. She takes up connection with France." Refreshing your recollection, that is what occurred, is it not?
AYes.
QThen Goering said "The general situation is very serious," and that he took over full responsibility, did he not?
AYes. "The conditions are very serious. England is rearming also, and we have to get into a state of readiness."
QNow, he next said, did he not, that "Silence until 1941 is desirable. However, We cannot know whether there will be implications before. We are already in a state of war. It is only that no shot is being fired so far." Did he say that?
AThat is stated in this protocol, in these minutes.
QAnd he also said, did he not, that "Beginning January 1, 1937, all factories for aircraft production shall be run as if mobilization had been ordered."
AWell, that must have been said if it is here in the text.
QWell, it is there in thetext, isn't it?