A Yes, it is here contained in the protocol.
QNow, you have testified that Goering had no prior knowledge of the action taken against the Jews on the night of November 9 and 10 of 1938.
AI saw that in the fact that on the next day he came to me and was very worried.
QHe was informed about them the next day?
AThe next day that was in the press, in the newspapers.
QYou said that he complained about the people who instigated them.
AThat I was told by Captain Wiedmann, who was here in prison with me in captivity. He has told me that Hermann Goering, a few days after, came to the Fuehrer with matters of evidence and complained to the Fuehrer.
QWhat did he complain about?
AWiedmann told me--and I did not hear that from Hermann Goering myself--but Wiedmann told me that the people who caused that had been Heydrich and Goebbels, and he complained about them.
QAnd Heydrich and Goebbels were both officials in Hitler's regime, were they not?
ADr. Goebbels was Minister of Propaganda, and Heydrich was Chief of the Gestapo.
QSo immediately following these pogroms, Goering knew and complained to Hitler that they had been incited by the officials of the Nazi regime.
AAbout the details as to what was spoken about I don't know. Captain Wiedmann can say something about that.
QGoering was then at the height of his influence both with the Fuehrer and with the country, wasn't he?
AHe had at that time the greatest influence.
QAnd I understand you to say that he immediately called a meeting of Gauleiters.
AThe meeting of Gauleiters was a few weeks later. I was not present. I heard about it from the former Gauleiter of Styria, Dr. Ueberreitor, who is in captivity here together with me. This Gauleiter Ueberreiter took part in that meeting.
Q How long did he wait before he called the meeting?
ADr. Ueberreiter told me that it was a few weeks after.
QWell, did you know about his holding a meeting on the 12th of November 1938 at his offices in the Reich Ministry for Air?
AI cannot remember that.
QAnd do you remember that he had present at that meeting Heydrich and Goebbels and many others? Is that the meeting to which you refer?
AWell, in this case it would be necessary to ask Dr. Ueberreiter who was at that meeting. He told me, Ueberreiter, that besides the Gauleiters there were other people present.
QAnd it was the custom of Goering to keep minutes of the meetings that he conducted?
AHermann Goering always had stenographers present, and the stenographers took minutes of such meetings.
QAnd you want us to understand that Goering was shocked and offended by what had happened to the Jews on the night of the 9th and 10th of November 1938?
AIt was not as he wanted it, because he said it would be a great injustice. It would be unreasonable economically, and it would harm our prestige in foreign countries. Dr. Ueberreiter told me in that sense Goering had spoken to the Gauleiters.
QWas it known to you that on November 12, two days after those pogroms, Goering promulgated the order fining all of the Jews a billion Reichsmarks, confiscated their insurance, and passed a new decree excluding them from economic life? Did you know about that?
A I have heard about the formulating of the regulation. I had nothing to do with that; I was only the military adjutant.
QThese decrees were promulgated two days after this pogrom that you say he complained about, is that right?
AThe precise date I do not know.
JUSTICE JACKSON:That is all.
MR. GRIFFITH JONES:May it please the Tribunal, I have only one matter which I want to make clear. BY MR. GRIFFITH JONES:
QYou have referred to a meeting which took place in SchleswigHolstein in July or August of 1939, at which Goering met a number of Englishmen, and you described those Englishmen, the first time you mentioned them, as members of the government, and the second time you mentioned them I think you referred to them as economic specialists?
AAccording to my knowledge at the present, they were English economic leaders; no members of the government.
QI am obliged to you. Would it be correct to say they were leading industrial and business gentlemen with no connection with the government whatsoever?
AI don't know to what degree these gentlemen were influential. At any rate, Hermann Goering said at the end the gentlemen should use their influence with important people in England to further the peace.
QDo you know that that conference between Goering and those gentlemen took place at the instigation of Dahlerus?
ADahlerus is alleged to have brought about this connection, but I was brought to that thought in a discussion with Doctor Stahmer, who told me about that thing before. Doctor Stahmer told me that he knew Mr. Dahlerus had asked these gentlemen to come to Germany. Only after this information I assumed that Dahlerus asked these people to come.
QDo you know that it was the object of Mr. Dahlerus that leading German and English personalities should meet, in order that they should understand one another's points of view?
AMr. Dahlerus was later again in Berlin after that meeting, and on that occasion, in conversations with him, I gained the impression that he was greatly interested that between Germany and England a peace should be conserved, and that he, Reichsmarshal Goering, tried to establish this connection with important British circles.
QOne last question to you. Do you know that in arranging that meeting and throughout the course of the negotiations thereafter Dahlerus stressed the British point of view to Goering and in particular tried to impress Goering with the fact that the English were losing their patience with the policy of aggression being pursued by the German Government?
AI cannot remember this thought which you mention now. I cannot remember that I have spoken to Dahlerus about that.
THE PRESIDENT:Any other questions to ask?
Dr. Stahmer, do you want to examine?
DR. STAHMER:I have only one more question.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. STAHMER:
QIn the minutes of 2 December 1936, which were shown to you before and which you have before you, there is one paragraph which has not been read entirely. In my opinion it is very important for the interpretation and for the sense and meaning of that meeting.
It says there, "General conditions are very serious. Russia wants war. England rearms strongly. Therefore, order from today highest readiness, No consideration for financial difficulties. Colonel General assumes full responsibility."
Is this "Order highest readiness from today on" only because Russia, as it says here, wants war and England rearms strongly? Was that the motive?
AWhat?
QWas the motive for that "Order highest readiness from today on" the general situation being serious? At any rate, there was no intention of attack but defense?
APlease repeat.
QThere was no intention of attack but only a measure of defense, in my opinion.
AThere was not connected with that the intention of attack but the thought of defense.
QIf it says here "Colonel General assumes full responsibility", that could be understood to refer to the fact that no consideration should be taken of financial difficulties?
AThat refers to financial difficulties, because the Reichsmarshal had frequent controversies with the Reich Finance Ministry, because the Luftwaffe had too high expenses.
DR. STAHMER:Thank you. I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT:The witness may retire.
------------------
DR. STAHMER: As next witness I should like to call General Fieldmarshall Erhard Milch.
ERHARD MILCH, took the stand and testified as follows: BY THE PRESIDENT:
QWhat is your name?
AErhard Milch.
QRepeat this oath after me:
I swear by God the Almighty and Omniscient that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothings.
(The witness repeated the oath.)
You may sit down if you wish.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. STAHMER:
QWitness, have you taken part in the First World War?
AYes.
QIn what position?
AI was First Officer in the artillery and at the end captain of the flyers.
QAfter the end of the First World War when did you leave the army?
AIn the spring of 1920.
QWhat were your activities after you left the army?
AI went to civil aviation.
QWhen did you re-enter into the Wehrmacht?
A 1933.
QIn the air force?
AYes.
QWhat position did you have when the Second World War began?
AI was Colonel General and General Inspector of the Airforce.
QWhen did the military rebuilding of the Airforce start?
A 1935.
QTo what extent?
AA defensive airforce was built up.
QCan you give us more details about that?
A In the year 1933 Germany had left the League of Nations, and therefore also the Disarmament Conference.
Consequently, the question of whether disarmament should continue had been attempted by Hitler in discussions with other nations, and when this did not work out Germany re-armed. Consequently, Germany counted on the fact that it would have to have military force in the air also, and for that an airforce had to be created which would be sufficient for the defense of Germany, That manifested itself first in the establishment of fighters and then artillery.
Likewise, the organization of the German Airforce was organized defensively, consisting of four Luftkreise, which should be imagined by a cross over Germany. There was northwest, northeast, southwest, and southeast. The strength of the Airforce, such as it was organized, was not planned for an aggressive war or a large war as such. Besides fighter planes there were also bombers, but these bomber formations were always called the air defense. That is to say, if possible they should avoid that any of the neighbors of Germany start a war against Germany.
Q Which were the relations, how were the relations of the German Air Force to the air forces of a foreign country after 1935?
AIn the first years after 1935, Germany had no air force; one could not call it that. The first units, the first largest schools that were established -- and also during these years, the industry was established; before, the rearmament industry had been very small. I happen to know that the number of workers in the entire airforce industry, at the time of the seizure of power by the National Socialists, was about 3,000 to 3,500 men -- constructors, technicians and administrative personnel.
The first contacts with foreign countries in the field of aviation were started in 1937 and at that time, in January 1937, an English Commission under Air Vice Marshal Courtney with three other officers. He was the chief of the intelligence service of the British Air Force, and they came to Germany. I was with that Commission, myself, during these days and was guiding them, caring for their requests concerning what they wanted to see, that is to say, they were the first units which we had established -- first our training unit, in which all new models were tried out. Furthermore, we showed them industries, schools, and what were the gentlemen wanted to know. At the end of our conferences, the English Vice Marshal suggested an exchange of plans from German and English sides. I got the agreement from my commanding officer, as I received it at that time, at the time we submitted to the British side the plans for '37, '38 and I believe '39, and we received from the English side also the figures in question. We agreed that also in the future, that if changes in plans should occur or new units should be established, that again an exchange of the material should take place, and that was the beginning of further contacts In May of the same year, 1937, I was, with several other gentlemen, as representative of my commander in chief, I was invited to Belgium to a visit of the Belgium Air Force; then in July -
QHow was this visit in Belgium; can you tell me some more about that?
AIt was a very cordial reception. I made the acquaintance of the War Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Prime Minister, and also His Majesty the King and the officers of the air force who, of course, were there also. There was a very friendly conference in which the Belgians assured them of their feelings of friendship for Germany.
QWas there also an exchange of material?
A No, not that, but we have shown to the Belgians even later in Germany, what we had, when the Chief of the Air Force, General De Vivier, returned the visit, made his return visit.
Then there was a large international meeting in the summer in July 1937, at the air meeting in Zuerich. At this meeting we have shown our unit models and fighters, bombers and Stukas and also our newest models of motors and anything that would be considered interesting from an international point of view. There was a large French, Italian, Czech, Belgium Delegation besides the Germans, and on the basis of the material which we displayed to the British Officer's Commission, wanted to take part in the English thing, I went to the French, the British, and to the other nations, and we have displayed and shown the material in a friendly way. There was for instance, the Messerschmidt fighter 109 with all improvements, which was flown until the end of the war, with varied improvements; the newest Dornier bomber type, the newest Stuka, Daimler, by Junker, likewise motors, Benz 661, and Junker.
THE PRESIDENT:I don't think that this amount of detail is of any interest to the Tribunal. BY DR. STAHMER:
QWill you speak more explicitly.
AThen in October 1937, there was an invitation to France from the French Government, also to visit the French Air Force. The visit was in a very friendly manner. A short time after, there was a visit to England, a return visit for the visit of Marshal Courtney. Here, also factories, organizations, schools were shown, also industry; the Shadow (?) industry, and industry which created peacetime goods in order to be able, when the war started, to start creating war materials. There was also visits with Sweden, and I think that concludes it.
QDid you take part in the Fuehrer meeting on the 23 May 1933?
AYes.
QIn what function?
AI was called on the morning of that day suddenly because the Reichsmarshal was not there.
QDo the remember the details of this meeting?
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Stahmer, did we get the date rightly? The date we got was the 23 May 1933.
DR. STAHMER: 1939.
BY DR. STAHMER:
Q 1939; that was the meeting which you have mentioned.
AOn 23 May 1939.
QDo you remember the course of this conversation?
AThe Fuehrer made a long speech before the three commanders in chief, army, navy, and air force, and the chiefs of staff. There were several other persons present. The main contents were, that Hitler declared he had decided to solve the question of the Corridor across the Corrido in one way or another and in connection with that, he discussed the possibility of conflicts which could start as a consequence in the West. It was mainly a speech, not a discussion or a conversation.
QWas anything else discussed or presented; do you remember other details?
AYes, there was just the question whether the West -- probably he was thinking that France would keep quiet -- whether the West would do something about it.
QWas there any question of the attack on Poland?
AYes, as much as I remember, only the question of solving the Corridor problem; but, of course, I have understood it to mean that it had to be solved at any rate. First, of course, one would think of negotiations but if these negotiations would not lead to a solution, then a military solution would be the only one.
QWere there any more discussions about it?
ANo, it was ordered that any discussion of the participants was forbidden; it was forbidden for me to inform the Reichsmarshal who was not there. It was declared that he would do that himself, that Hitler declared that he would give him the information himself. I remember that at that time also the same order was issued or was mentioned, which is known as "Fuehrer Order No. 1 and had to be displayed in every office, that nobody had to say anything any sooner than it was necessary, and that one had to say only as much as the other was supposed to know.
QThen you did not inform the Reichsmarshal about this discussion?
A No, that had been forbidden,
QWhen did he find out about it?
AI don't know.
QWhat was the attitude of the then Marshal Goering to the war?
AI have always been under the impression that already at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland, he was worried that Hitler's policies would lead to war. In my opinion, he was against the war.
Q When did you find out for the first time that Hitler planned something against Russia?
AAs much as I can understand and as much as I can remember, that was in the spring of 1941. May I look in my notebook? On the 13th of January, the Reichsmarshal told me that Hitler expected an attack from the Russian side against Germany; then at first, I did not hear anything further about it. The Reichsmarshal did not mention anything, did not say what his opinion was, his attitude was. At any rate, in the following weeks and months, I did not hear any more about it. Then,however, at that time, I was not very much in Berlin, not at all at the headquarters but I was at the various stations. When I returned -- and I do not remember whether it was in March or April -- one of my subordinates had the impression of surprise; he reported to me and he asked me the question whether we needed winter clothing in the war against Russia. I was very much surprised about that question because I had not been previously informed, I could only say that if there should come a war against Russia, then, of course, we need clothing for more than one winter, and I told him what I would think of winter clothing.
QDid you speak a second time to Fieldmarshal Goering about the war?
AYes.
QWhen was that?
AOn the 22 May. I returned from one of my trips for the first time after sometime and I came into contact with the commander in chief again. That was in Feldstein, where Goering was at that time. There we discussed the question and I told him that, in my opinion, it is a great historical task for him to avoid war since this war could only end with the absolute annihilation of Germany. I reminded him that we should not start a two-front war on our own and the Reichsmarshal told me that he also had submitted all these arguments but that it was quite impossible to dissuade Hitler from this war, from the idea of this war. My offer that I would try to speak to Hitler against war once more was rejected by the Reichsmarshal as absolutely hopeless. One could not do anything. From these words, I can speak clearly and it can clearly be seen that he was against this war and that under no circumstances he wanted that war, but that also for him in his position, there was no possibility at all to dissuade Hitler from his plans.
Q Could it be construed from his words also that he had told Hitler about his objections?
AYes, that was quite clear for me that he also spoke about the twofront war.
QThat he had presented that to Hitler also?
AHe told me, but it was hopeless. I would like to say some more about the 23rdof May, about that conversation. After this conversation -- and based on the fact that the German Air Force hardly had any reserves and bombers, even bombs -- I made the suggestion that bombs should be manufactured. Hitler had, up to that time, considered it unnecessary and superfluous. In that question, there was a shortage of iron and after this conversation, I was under the impression that there would be conflict, and I had pointed out to him that the air force with its bomber fleet, that the air force with its fleet of bombers was not ready for action. The suggestion was rejected by Hitler again after the 23rd of May. He would say If and when we would need bombs, when he pointed out to me that the manufacture of bombs would take several months, he declared that there would be plenty of time for that later. From that I drew the conclusion -- and you knew I could not talk to anybody about it -- that Hitler's words on the 23rd of May were not meant as seriously as they had sounded to me.
QWhen was this last conversation concerning the refusal to manufacture bombs?
AThat was--I have done that once after May, after the May conversation, because I knew about the conditions. I have again later during the summer; the latter part of the summer, I have pointed it out again but it was rejected again. The order to manufacture bombs was given by Hitler, although we had pointed that deficiency out before, that order was given on the 12th October 1939. Hitler said, if I remember correctly, as far as I remember, "My attempts after the campaign against Poland to come to peace with the West have failed. The war continues. Mow we can and must manufacture bombs."
QDid Hitler tell you or express to you that it was his serious desire to remain and to live in peace with the West?
AYes. I was very short when we mentioned the visits. When I came back from France, I was with Hitler two hours on the Obersalzberg, to report to him about the visit to France.
Likewise, after the visit in England; about fourteen days, two weeks later, I also had to make a report of several hours to Hitler.
He was very much interested and after the second report, that is to say, after the English visit, he declared "My policies are such and such; my actions will be such and such, but you can be assured, you can rest assured that I will always go with England. I have the tendency to go with England at all times." This conversation took place on the 2nd of November.
QWhat year?
AThe year 1937, the 2nd of November.
QYou talked about two conversations?
AYes, the first was the report about the visit in France and the second about the visit in England. Hitler, who did not know foreign countries, was very interested to hear something from a soldier about the country and the arms and so forth.
QWhat were the relations between Reichsmarshal Goering and Himmler?
AIt was not always very clear to me. I had the impression that there was a rivalry on the side of Himmler. The relation was always very correct and very friendly but how they really stood, I could not say.
QIn May of 1942, there was an exchange of correspondence between you and the SS Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff?
AYes, sir.
QAbout medical experiments on inmates of the Camp of Dachau? Could you tell us anything about that?
AI have been interrogated about that question here in Nurnberg and my memory -- and I do not remember it any more. According to my memory, Wolff was adjutant to Himmler at that time; there was a letter from Wolff to me and the answer which I had given -- these letters were presented to me -- the question was about experiments, cooling; these letters were addressed to me only because he did not know Himmler, since he was of the Luftwaffe. The letters were sent to the Sanitaetsinspektion. It was not under my orders. The Sanitaetsinspektion has written in answer and presented it to me. I modified it a little and sent it out. I have not read a report which Himmler had sent. He also offered a system. I have not seen that. The Inspector, whom I asked what it was all about, told me that the air force was quite informed about both problems and that is the experiments about altitude chambers and they had been made by our own young doctors who volunteered for that.
Likewise, the under-cooling could not bring us any results for the air force. We were both clear about it. We saw it clearly that we did not want to have anything to do with that. I asked what it was all about, these experiments, and he told me that criminals were submitted to these experiments. I asked in which way. He said in the same way as our young doctors and we must submit ourselves to these experiments. Then we sent him a letter which was very polite -- and you could not write any different to these people -- but we do not want to have anything to do with that thing. In this letter from Himmler, I had been asked to report to the Reichsmarshal about that question also.
I had an impression that the SS wanted to play up before Hitler as to these experiments, and I told the Reichsmarshal during another report to other questions, that I remembered that thing briefly, because I could expect that one day he would be told about it by Himmler, one day, and then he would not do anything about that whole complex.
The Reichsmarshal asked me when I told him such and such experiments were made, what does it mean, and I replied with the answer which I had received from the medical inspector. I told him we did not want to hare anything to do with it, and he absolutely rejected it. He said he was exactly of the same opinion, and I should be very careful, that I should not treat these people badly, meaning the inspector. What it was all about, what was the experiment there about I do not know, neither do I know what had been done to these people; it is not clear to me.
QDid the Reichsmarshal know?
ANo, certainly not.
QDid Dr. Rascher leave you sooner or later, and go to the SS?
AI could not say. I do not know Dr. Rascher, and that question of leaving our ranks and going to the SS, I had nothing to do with it. Dr. Rascher was not under me, nor the chief inspector, nor was the personnel office.
QDo you know whether the Reichsmarshal Goering had ordered troops under his command, which said that the sabotage groups should be annihilated, or that carrier-flyers should be captured, and should be turned over to the SD for trial?
ANo, I do not know anything about that.
QDid you ever hear about it?
ANo.
Q what was the attitude of the Reichsmarshal as to the flyers who were captured, generally?
AI used to sneak to the Reichsmarshal -
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:I think we have been very liberal. I think we have been very literal in allowing all kinds of statements here, but it does seem to me this passes anything that is reasonable as to evidence. This witness has indicated that he has no knowledge of the subject; did not know of orders which are in evidence, and he assumes to state the attitude of the Reichsmarshal.
I have no objection to his making any statement as to any facts from which this Tribunal may be informed on the attitude of the Reichsmarshal, but I think that for one witness to state the state of mind of another person without any facts whatever passes the bounds of what he can possibly go into here as to evidence. It does not help to solve the problem and I respectively object to the question and answer as not constituting credible and relevant evidence on any subject before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Stahmer, I think you should confine yourself to any facts and observations of the defendant Goering, as the witness just said that he never heard of any action against the enemy flyers at all. I don't think that you can give evidence as to the attitude of Goering about it.
DR. STAHMER:Mr. President, I should like to formulate my question as follows:
QDid the Reichsmarshal Goering speak to you, Mr. Witness, as to how enemy flyers should be treated?
ANo, he did not speak to me about that.
QI have one more question. Did he speak to you about the fact that opposed any cruelty in the treating of the enemy; did he speak about the fact that he opposed in principle any cruelty against enemies?
AI was going to say that he said to me once before the war, that, in remembering the first World War.
QWhat did he say about it?
AThe fact they had been shot down they are our comrades, he said that.
DR. STAHMER:I have no more questions to put to the witness. I place him at the disposal of the defense or the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT:Do any of you wish to ask this witness any questions? BY DR. HANS LATERNSER: Mr. President, Dr. Laternser, counsel for the General Staff and OKW.
QMr. Witness, as you know the prosecution has considered, or has declared to a certain circle of people, that is, the leaders, as criminal.
You probably know that circle?
AYes.
QWithin the German Wehrmacht, was there ever such a grouping of offices; was that ever in existence even?
AI did not understand the question.
QHad there ever been such a grouping of these same offices which now has been grouped in order to form that group; had they ever existed even before in the German Wehrmacht?
AI believe that as long as they were in the army, there was higher leaders who were grouped by their supreme commander.
QWere the men in the offices -- in the positions who were occupied to develop military questions, or problems under orders of Hitler, or, did they on their own initiative develop the plans to present them to Hitler to have him educated?
AThe military leaders have only acted upon the order of their superior, that is, the general air force on the orders of the supreme commander of the airforce, who got his orders from the supreme commander of the Wehrmacht, that was Hitler, and before him, Hindenburg.
QDo you know anything as to the fact that this group of the General Staff and the OKW, as they are called now, if they ever had met collectively?
ABefore they attacked in Poland only that part which was put into action there, those army leaders and navy commanders, were called by Hitler; they were called by Hitler, only that part which was to go into action in the West in the Spring, and the same was done before the attack in Russia.
QWere you personally present at such discussions?
APartly, yes.
QCan you tell me how these conversations took place, especially, I should like to have one point clarified, that is, whether the higher military leaders had such conversations, or had an opportunity to make any suggestions, or counter suggestions?
AI remember one discussion before the campaign which took place over in Obersalzberg, and on the Wehrmacht, and a commander of the Army. Hitler sat before the desk, and the Generals sat in chairs next to each other, and he made a speech concerning the reasons of political precedent as he usually put it, and of his intentions. In this discussion any suggestions in the discussion on the side of the Generals was impossible. Whether there was any other conversations in their discussion about this, I could not say. I only knew of the speech of Hitler's. Then before the attack on Russia, there was another method used. He sat around the large table, and one after another of the leaders of the Army groups of the Army had to state their intents and methods of executing their orders, which they had received, and had to show it on a map, so that Hitler afterwards could declare his agreement, or say that he negatives it, or, in a case of differences he would suggest stronger, or less stronger action, and those were likely remarks.
QDid these discussions have more a character of a briefing?
AYes, definitely, they were briefings, briefings.
QCan you tell me whether any member of the so-called group of the General Staff, and of the OKW, were there any members who made any suggestion to deviate from the International Law?
AI don't know anything a bout that.
QDo you know anything about as to whether members of this alleged group had frequently been in touch with office of the high party members?
AIn my opinion, no. I would like to say that for the majority of these Generals, it is clear that the supreme commanders of th Army centers, or of the chief of the OKW, had frequent conferences with the office, but the general commander of the high Fleet unit, or the Army had no opportunity to.
QBetween the members of those alleged groups, whether they were now Navy or Airforce, had there been discussions among those?
AIt is dependant upon co-operation. That is to say, the Army of the Fleet. Of course, there had been conferences, but the relations were as if with the neighboring units it was issued, and then with the next one there was none.
QSuch conversation took place with regard to the solving of the entire task?
AYes, only for that purpose.