A No, that had been forbidden,
QWhen did he find out about it?
AI don't know.
QWhat was the attitude of the then Marshal Goering to the war?
AI have always been under the impression that already at the time of the occupation of the Rhineland, he was worried that Hitler's policies would lead to war. In my opinion, he was against the war.
Q When did you find out for the first time that Hitler planned something against Russia?
AAs much as I can understand and as much as I can remember, that was in the spring of 1941. May I look in my notebook? On the 13th of January, the Reichsmarshal told me that Hitler expected an attack from the Russian side against Germany; then at first, I did not hear anything further about it. The Reichsmarshal did not mention anything, did not say what his opinion was, his attitude was. At any rate, in the following weeks and months, I did not hear any more about it. Then,however, at that time, I was not very much in Berlin, not at all at the headquarters but I was at the various stations. When I returned -- and I do not remember whether it was in March or April -- one of my subordinates had the impression of surprise; he reported to me and he asked me the question whether we needed winter clothing in the war against Russia. I was very much surprised about that question because I had not been previously informed, I could only say that if there should come a war against Russia, then, of course, we need clothing for more than one winter, and I told him what I would think of winter clothing.
QDid you speak a second time to Fieldmarshal Goering about the war?
AYes.
QWhen was that?
AOn the 22 May. I returned from one of my trips for the first time after sometime and I came into contact with the commander in chief again. That was in Feldstein, where Goering was at that time. There we discussed the question and I told him that, in my opinion, it is a great historical task for him to avoid war since this war could only end with the absolute annihilation of Germany. I reminded him that we should not start a two-front war on our own and the Reichsmarshal told me that he also had submitted all these arguments but that it was quite impossible to dissuade Hitler from this war, from the idea of this war. My offer that I would try to speak to Hitler against war once more was rejected by the Reichsmarshal as absolutely hopeless. One could not do anything. From these words, I can speak clearly and it can clearly be seen that he was against this war and that under no circumstances he wanted that war, but that also for him in his position, there was no possibility at all to dissuade Hitler from his plans.
Q Could it be construed from his words also that he had told Hitler about his objections?
AYes, that was quite clear for me that he also spoke about the twofront war.
QThat he had presented that to Hitler also?
AHe told me, but it was hopeless. I would like to say some more about the 23rdof May, about that conversation. After this conversation -- and based on the fact that the German Air Force hardly had any reserves and bombers, even bombs -- I made the suggestion that bombs should be manufactured. Hitler had, up to that time, considered it unnecessary and superfluous. In that question, there was a shortage of iron and after this conversation, I was under the impression that there would be conflict, and I had pointed out to him that the air force with its bomber fleet, that the air force with its fleet of bombers was not ready for action. The suggestion was rejected by Hitler again after the 23rd of May. He would say If and when we would need bombs, when he pointed out to me that the manufacture of bombs would take several months, he declared that there would be plenty of time for that later. From that I drew the conclusion -- and you knew I could not talk to anybody about it -- that Hitler's words on the 23rd of May were not meant as seriously as they had sounded to me.
QWhen was this last conversation concerning the refusal to manufacture bombs?
AThat was--I have done that once after May, after the May conversation, because I knew about the conditions. I have again later during the summer; the latter part of the summer, I have pointed it out again but it was rejected again. The order to manufacture bombs was given by Hitler, although we had pointed that deficiency out before, that order was given on the 12th October 1939. Hitler said, if I remember correctly, as far as I remember, "My attempts after the campaign against Poland to come to peace with the West have failed. The war continues. Mow we can and must manufacture bombs."
QDid Hitler tell you or express to you that it was his serious desire to remain and to live in peace with the West?
AYes. I was very short when we mentioned the visits. When I came back from France, I was with Hitler two hours on the Obersalzberg, to report to him about the visit to France.
Likewise, after the visit in England; about fourteen days, two weeks later, I also had to make a report of several hours to Hitler.
He was very much interested and after the second report, that is to say, after the English visit, he declared "My policies are such and such; my actions will be such and such, but you can be assured, you can rest assured that I will always go with England. I have the tendency to go with England at all times." This conversation took place on the 2nd of November.
QWhat year?
AThe year 1937, the 2nd of November.
QYou talked about two conversations?
AYes, the first was the report about the visit in France and the second about the visit in England. Hitler, who did not know foreign countries, was very interested to hear something from a soldier about the country and the arms and so forth.
QWhat were the relations between Reichsmarshal Goering and Himmler?
AIt was not always very clear to me. I had the impression that there was a rivalry on the side of Himmler. The relation was always very correct and very friendly but how they really stood, I could not say.
QIn May of 1942, there was an exchange of correspondence between you and the SS Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff?
AYes, sir.
QAbout medical experiments on inmates of the Camp of Dachau? Could you tell us anything about that?
AI have been interrogated about that question here in Nurnberg and my memory -- and I do not remember it any more. According to my memory, Wolff was adjutant to Himmler at that time; there was a letter from Wolff to me and the answer which I had given -- these letters were presented to me -- the question was about experiments, cooling; these letters were addressed to me only because he did not know Himmler, since he was of the Luftwaffe. The letters were sent to the Sanitaetsinspektion. It was not under my orders. The Sanitaetsinspektion has written in answer and presented it to me. I modified it a little and sent it out. I have not read a report which Himmler had sent. He also offered a system. I have not seen that. The Inspector, whom I asked what it was all about, told me that the air force was quite informed about both problems and that is the experiments about altitude chambers and they had been made by our own young doctors who volunteered for that.
Likewise, the under-cooling could not bring us any results for the air force. We were both clear about it. We saw it clearly that we did not want to have anything to do with that. I asked what it was all about, these experiments, and he told me that criminals were submitted to these experiments. I asked in which way. He said in the same way as our young doctors and we must submit ourselves to these experiments. Then we sent him a letter which was very polite -- and you could not write any different to these people -- but we do not want to have anything to do with that thing. In this letter from Himmler, I had been asked to report to the Reichsmarshal about that question also.
I had an impression that the SS wanted to play up before Hitler as to these experiments, and I told the Reichsmarshal during another report to other questions, that I remembered that thing briefly, because I could expect that one day he would be told about it by Himmler, one day, and then he would not do anything about that whole complex.
The Reichsmarshal asked me when I told him such and such experiments were made, what does it mean, and I replied with the answer which I had received from the medical inspector. I told him we did not want to hare anything to do with it, and he absolutely rejected it. He said he was exactly of the same opinion, and I should be very careful, that I should not treat these people badly, meaning the inspector. What it was all about, what was the experiment there about I do not know, neither do I know what had been done to these people; it is not clear to me.
QDid the Reichsmarshal know?
ANo, certainly not.
QDid Dr. Rascher leave you sooner or later, and go to the SS?
AI could not say. I do not know Dr. Rascher, and that question of leaving our ranks and going to the SS, I had nothing to do with it. Dr. Rascher was not under me, nor the chief inspector, nor was the personnel office.
QDo you know whether the Reichsmarshal Goering had ordered troops under his command, which said that the sabotage groups should be annihilated, or that carrier-flyers should be captured, and should be turned over to the SD for trial?
ANo, I do not know anything about that.
QDid you ever hear about it?
ANo.
Q what was the attitude of the Reichsmarshal as to the flyers who were captured, generally?
AI used to sneak to the Reichsmarshal -
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:I think we have been very liberal. I think we have been very literal in allowing all kinds of statements here, but it does seem to me this passes anything that is reasonable as to evidence. This witness has indicated that he has no knowledge of the subject; did not know of orders which are in evidence, and he assumes to state the attitude of the Reichsmarshal.
I have no objection to his making any statement as to any facts from which this Tribunal may be informed on the attitude of the Reichsmarshal, but I think that for one witness to state the state of mind of another person without any facts whatever passes the bounds of what he can possibly go into here as to evidence. It does not help to solve the problem and I respectively object to the question and answer as not constituting credible and relevant evidence on any subject before the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Stahmer, I think you should confine yourself to any facts and observations of the defendant Goering, as the witness just said that he never heard of any action against the enemy flyers at all. I don't think that you can give evidence as to the attitude of Goering about it.
DR. STAHMER:Mr. President, I should like to formulate my question as follows:
QDid the Reichsmarshal Goering speak to you, Mr. Witness, as to how enemy flyers should be treated?
ANo, he did not speak to me about that.
QI have one more question. Did he speak to you about the fact that opposed any cruelty in the treating of the enemy; did he speak about the fact that he opposed in principle any cruelty against enemies?
AI was going to say that he said to me once before the war, that, in remembering the first World War.
QWhat did he say about it?
AThe fact they had been shot down they are our comrades, he said that.
DR. STAHMER:I have no more questions to put to the witness. I place him at the disposal of the defense or the prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT:Do any of you wish to ask this witness any questions? BY DR. HANS LATERNSER: Mr. President, Dr. Laternser, counsel for the General Staff and OKW.
QMr. Witness, as you know the prosecution has considered, or has declared to a certain circle of people, that is, the leaders, as criminal.
You probably know that circle?
AYes.
QWithin the German Wehrmacht, was there ever such a grouping of offices; was that ever in existence even?
AI did not understand the question.
QHad there ever been such a grouping of these same offices which now has been grouped in order to form that group; had they ever existed even before in the German Wehrmacht?
AI believe that as long as they were in the army, there was higher leaders who were grouped by their supreme commander.
QWere the men in the offices -- in the positions who were occupied to develop military questions, or problems under orders of Hitler, or, did they on their own initiative develop the plans to present them to Hitler to have him educated?
AThe military leaders have only acted upon the order of their superior, that is, the general air force on the orders of the supreme commander of the airforce, who got his orders from the supreme commander of the Wehrmacht, that was Hitler, and before him, Hindenburg.
QDo you know anything as to the fact that this group of the General Staff and the OKW, as they are called now, if they ever had met collectively?
ABefore they attacked in Poland only that part which was put into action there, those army leaders and navy commanders, were called by Hitler; they were called by Hitler, only that part which was to go into action in the West in the Spring, and the same was done before the attack in Russia.
QWere you personally present at such discussions?
APartly, yes.
QCan you tell me how these conversations took place, especially, I should like to have one point clarified, that is, whether the higher military leaders had such conversations, or had an opportunity to make any suggestions, or counter suggestions?
AI remember one discussion before the campaign which took place over in Obersalzberg, and on the Wehrmacht, and a commander of the Army. Hitler sat before the desk, and the Generals sat in chairs next to each other, and he made a speech concerning the reasons of political precedent as he usually put it, and of his intentions. In this discussion any suggestions in the discussion on the side of the Generals was impossible. Whether there was any other conversations in their discussion about this, I could not say. I only knew of the speech of Hitler's. Then before the attack on Russia, there was another method used. He sat around the large table, and one after another of the leaders of the Army groups of the Army had to state their intents and methods of executing their orders, which they had received, and had to show it on a map, so that Hitler afterwards could declare his agreement, or say that he negatives it, or, in a case of differences he would suggest stronger, or less stronger action, and those were likely remarks.
QDid these discussions have more a character of a briefing?
AYes, definitely, they were briefings, briefings.
QCan you tell me whether any member of the so-called group of the General Staff, and of the OKW, were there any members who made any suggestion to deviate from the International Law?
AI don't know anything a bout that.
QDo you know anything about as to whether members of this alleged group had frequently been in touch with office of the high party members?
AIn my opinion, no. I would like to say that for the majority of these Generals, it is clear that the supreme commanders of th Army centers, or of the chief of the OKW, had frequent conferences with the office, but the general commander of the high Fleet unit, or the Army had no opportunity to.
QBetween the members of those alleged groups, whether they were now Navy or Airforce, had there been discussions among those?
AIt is dependant upon co-operation. That is to say, the Army of the Fleet. Of course, there had been conferences, but the relations were as if with the neighboring units it was issued, and then with the next one there was none.
QSuch conversation took place with regard to the solving of the entire task?
AYes, only for that purpose.
Q Within the Air Force, it is so that this group, this circle com-
prises the officers who had the position of chief of staff of the Air Force or commander-in-chief of the Air Force or of an air fleet during a certain time. I have a list here of those generals who belonged on the part of the Air Force to that group, and I should like to ask you concerning a few of them as to which rank and position these generals had had when the war started What was the rank of General Korten?
AI cannot be very sure about that; either colonel or lieutenant colonel, in my recollection.
QDo you know what position he had?
AI believe he was chief of staff at the Air Fleet Munich
QThen, in October 1944 there was a General Kreipe, chief of staff of the Air Force. What was he when the war started?
AI presume major or lieutenant colonel.
QDo you know what position he had?
ANo, I could not say that at this moment. It may be that he was chief of staff of an air corps of the Air Force.
QAnd what rank would he have had as chief of a unit of that kind?
ABetween major and colonel; that depends.
QGeneral Koller was chief of staff for a short time of the Air Force. What was he when the war started?
AI believe lieutenant colonel.
QThen I have only a few more names. Do you know which rank and position Colonel-General Dessloch had at the beginning of the war?
AI do not remember that; it may be major or general or colonelgeneral.
QAnd General Pflugbeil?
AThe same thing.
QGeneral Seidel?
ASeidel, I believe, was already major general at the beginning of the war.
QAnd which position did he have at that time?
AHe was general quartermaster in the general staff.
QWhich rank did that position have compared -
A Well, it was about the commander of an army corps. As general quartermaster, you mean?
QYes. I still have a few questions concerning the Air Force and the highest military leaders. From your statement we could conclude that in 1939 the Air Force was not ready for war. To this point, could you possibly give me the reasons for this unpreparedness of the Air Force for war?
AIn the few years from 1935--I have mentioned before the seizure of power--until 1939, it would have been impossible for any country to build up an Air Force which would have been big enough for the tasks which presented themselves after 1939, That is impossible. And it is neither possible to establish the units nor the schools and furnish the teaching staffs, nor is it possible to build the planes themselves which are necessary, and to develop the models and to build them. It is neither possible in that short period to train personnel with respect to the high technical standards which are necessary. Likewise, it is impossible in such a short time to develop the ground crews and to put them at the disposition of the Air Force and the industry.
THE PRESIDENT:A little slower please, witness. He says that it is impossible. That is sufficient. It should not be necessary to go into this detail on this subject.
DR. LATERNSER:I have only a few more questions.
QDid the Air Force expect resistance when it marched into Austria?
ANo. We knew definitely there would be no resistance. We didn't even take any arms with us.
QHow was the reception there?
ASo friendly it couldn't be friendlier in our own country.
QYou, as field marshal, were you informed or had you been informed previously that a declaration of war to the United States was to be made?
ANo.
QIn this trial there are serious accusations against German soldiers and their leaders on account of cruelties committed. Isn't it so that every soldier was instructed and informed about international law and the regulations?
AYes. Each soldier had a so-called "Soldbuch", and on the first page there were all these regulations.
QCan you give me examples for that?
The points which were on this page?
AYes. For instance, that no soldier, no prisoner, should be shot; that no looting should be permitted. I have my book here. I can read it. Treatment of prisoners of war; Red Cross; the village should not be touched; the threat of punishment if these regulations should not be heeded.
QIf it was known that the soldiers had committed cruelties against the civilians, was it so, as far as you know, that the commanders used all severe punishment against the soldiers?
AI know of some cases and knew some cases There that was done, as far as the death penalty.
QBut it was the endeavor of the commanders that under all circumstances discipline of troops had to be maintained?
AYes. I can give a particular example. A general of the Air Force had taken jewelry which belonged to a foreigner. He was convicted and executed. I think it was in 1943 or 1944.
QWitness, in the critical days of 1939 you were in close relations to Goering. Have you heard through him about a large, extensive plan for a large war?
ANo.
QIn your opinion, did other leaders of the army hear more or did they have to hear more?
ANo. All measures which were taken came like the occupation of the Rhineland came, very suddenly, sometimes after preparation of hours only. That applies to Austria; that applies to Czechoslovakia; and that applies to Prague. The only time that anything had been told us before was the affair with Poland, where we had a discussion on the 23rd of May.
QIn all other cases, for high military leaders, therefore, it was a surprise?
AYes, a complete surprise.
QThen I have one more question: How was it about the possibility of resignation for high military lenders during the war?
AThat has been told several times, and I have experienced it, that one could not submit an application to resign.
It was said if anyone of us had to leave we would be told to do so.
In an authoritarian state the citizen and the subordinate had no right to go by himself, neither a soldier nor a civilian.
DR. LATERNSER:I have no more questions.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will adjourn until Monday morning.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 11 March 1946 at 1000 hours.)
Official transcript of the International Military Tribunal in the matter of the United States of America, the French Re public, the United Kingdom of Great Bri tain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Hermann Wilhelm Goering et all, Defendants, sitting at Nurnberg, Germany on 11 March 1946, 1000 - 1245, Lord Justice Lawrence presiding.
THE PRESIDENT :Dr. Laternser, had you finished your examination?
DR.LATERNSER (Counsel for the OKW and General Staff): I have only a few more questions to ask the witness.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY DR. LATERNSER:
QWitness, I should like to return very briefly to the question of the preparation for war of the Luftwaffe in the year 1939, to what extent they were not prepared for war. In this connection I should like to ask whether the collaboration of the Luftwaffe with the OKW, Army and Navy did not exist in 1939?
AIn 1939 the Luftwaffe was in my conviction not prepared for a large scale war nor were the others. They had reached no agreements with the other parts of the armed forces. I know nothing of any such preparations.
QIf these agreements with the other parts of the armed forces had been existent, then you would have known of them?
AI should like to assume since I was involved in these questions at that time that that is so.
QWas the collaboration between the most important parts of the air force pretty close in the year 1937?
AThere was the General Staff of the technical department and the personnel office. They all worked more or less separately, each for itself.
QYou just mentioned the General Staff. What do you understand by the German General Staff of the Luftwaffe?
AGeneral Staff means in German, assistant to the leadership, that is, higher officers with special training who advised the commanders of the groups and assisted them.
QOf what did the Luftwaffe of the General Staff consist?
A First the Chief of the General Staff of the armed forces and upwards, who was at the disposal of the General Staff, also those officers who, as outside General Staff officers, were at the disposal of the Navy and the individual squadrons.
QWhat were the conditions for promotions?
AThey were not ordered but were simply discussed shortly before the outbreak of the war. We wanted to set up a larger air force at the time that should be completed six to eight years hence.
QWhen would this limit have been reached? When would it have been finished?
AAbout the year 1944-1946.
THE PRESIDENT:Not only is there some technical fault, we are getting two translations at once, but both the witness and the counsel are going too fast.
QIn the year 1939 was there an organization of day and night raiders?
ANo, it did not at that time exist.
QWas there an organization for bombing warfare?
ANot in that sense in which it would have been necessary for a war of aggression.
QTo what extent were at that time air field organizations ready?
AThrough the air fields there were thousand-meter long runways. These runways sufficed for fighters but not for loaded bombers.
Q What was the Intelligence situation?
AThe leadership network was not present. It had to be improvised later during the war.
QHow was the Aircraft Observation Service?
AThat also was not organized.
On the question of the bombers, I might add that it is significant that originally in the first years large bomber types, four-motor bombers, which were designed for use at night--steps in that direction were undertaken. These bombers, however, I believe in the year 1937 were abandoned, although they were technically in order. It was believed that the expenditures involved in building such large bombers could be spared since no one was counting on a war at that time. This was at the time when Fieldmarshal Milch was Chief of the General Staff. This was submitted to the Reichsmarshal for decision, and he decided that these large bombers should be eliminated from the armaments program.
QAt which time was this?
AJust a moment; I will look it up. On the 29th of April 1937, the Reichsmarshal on the commission of the General Staff stopped the production of these large bombers. In this way it came about that in 1939 bombers designed for night bombing were not available, bombers which might have been compared with the English type, such as Lancaster bombers.
QWhat was the personnel of the Air Force?
AThere was at that time a rather small Luftwaffe and just enough personnel reserve. In this personnel reserve there were great difficulties. The question of the timing depended upon the personnel. It would have been possible to build airplanes quicker, but it would not have been possible to expand the development of the personnel.
As I said before, the great weight had to be laid on the question of when the program would be finished. It would have had a purpose to build up the personnel. Half trained people are less use than none.
THE PRESIDENT:Dr. Laternser, I don't want to interrupt your cross examination, but we have been sitting here for nearly 20 minutes now, and all I have got from it is that the Luftwaffe wasn't ready for war in 1939.
It seems to me too much time is being taken up with detail. BY DR. LATERNSER:
QI have simply one more question in this matter. Were there reserves of aluminum and magnesium available, or were there other possibilities of acquiring these materials?
ANot to the necessary extent.
QThen one last question. Witness, during your testimony on Friday, you mentioned Basic Order Number 1. You also gave us the content of this order. Now, in regard to this order I have this question. Was this order strictly observed or not?
AYes, extraordinarily strict.
DR. LATERNSER:I have no further questions to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT:Do any ofthe other defendants' counsel wish to ask the witness any questions?
DR.FLAECHSNER (Counsel for Speer): I'd like to ask the witness a few questions. BY DR. FLAECHSNER:
QWitness, do you remember from what time on Hitler furthered the building of factories to build bombers?
ASo far as I can recall, from the moment of the heavy English attacks in the year 1943 on.
QDo you remember a conference on the Obersalzberg in the beginning of April, 1944, and do you remember what was said then regarding the difficulties in construction, what was told Hitler about these matters and what Hitler ordered?
AYes. At that time the Fuehrer had, I believe, asked for factories, six of them, 100,000 square meters in floor space each, and protected from air raids. Speer also at a subsequent time -- in April he was not there; he was sick--but later Speer raised objections to this. He considered the extent of this construction work was much too large and also much too belated. Later he pressed through the order that all buildings that weren't usable in July 1944, that those that could not be put into practical use should from that time on be abandoned.
Q As regards the worker question, in this discussion at the Obersalzberg, did the Fuehrer point out where we could find the working force to build these factories that he wanted?
AYes. I believe I recall that on the objection of one of the people there, he would take care of the working forces to build those factories.
QYou said, Mr. Witness, that Speer was against this construction. How did things develop from then on? Speer was not present then?
ANo, he was not there.
QCan you tell us briefly just what took place?
ADuring his sickness applications reached the Fuehrer from other sides that this construction should be separated from Speer's function. Difficulties arose, since theoretically this construction was under Speer's command and could not be withdrawn from his purview altogether. He had himself no further influence.
Then the construction department of the O.T. was associated directly with the Fuehrer, and Speer was subsequently eliminated. One was speaking at that time a great deal of large scale construction, that there was no working force available for such construction.
QDid Hitler direct a written order to Herr Dorsch regarding Speer's connection with this?
AAs far as I can recall, such a written order did exist and also was sent to Speer. I recall rather vaguely that Speer once showed me such an order.
QOnelast question on this matter. According to that, then, Herr Dorsch took over the responsibility for these construction works that wereimmediately ordered by the Fuehrer.
AYes.
QCan you tell me whether this planning was justified, from the point of view of the available German working forces available and the possibilities of signing up this work? Was there any such decision?
AThe Central Planning was only there for the distribution of raw material and also to bring a certain order into all questions of transportation, independent of the shortage of the war materials.
On the question of the availability of working forces it had nocommand authority.
Also, the distribution of workers was influenced in part by the Central Planning Board, since the armaments industry could see what was necessary in each regard. But great difficulties arose so that practically this work had to be abandoned by the Central Planning Committee.
QSo decisions were not reached. We have heard affidavits stating that there were workers problems in the Central Planning.
AThe armaments offices that werehere concerned had a great interest in this. There were other questions also, the question of accommodations, as well as other matters.
QOne last question on this point. Was the General Plenipotentiary for Labor for the Arbeitseinsatz in any way definitive in the entire planning of the distribution of the working forces?
ANo.
QWere there in the years 1943 or 1944 available work reserves? When did Speer demand these reserve work forces, or did he?
AYes; Speer was very anxious that the available German work reserves should be included in the whole economic structure, if possible female workers, women from professions, who, other than their household duties had nothing to do.