DR. LATERNSER (Counsel for the General Staff and the OKW): Mr. President this morning, through a member of the prosecution and through the present announcement of Mr. President, I noted that the witness was called a defendant twice. I believe that that is not correct, because he functioned as a witness and the individual is not indicted but just the group, and I do not believe it quite correct to call him adefendant.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, possibly it was an error to call him an accused person, but he is a member of the General Staff. I rather think that Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe made it clear that he meant only a member of the group, which the Indictment asked the tribunal to declare criminal. That is all that is meant, and I was only pointing out to Dr. Stahmer that the questions which have been asked were not necessarily relevant to the case of the defendant Goering, but might be relevant and relevant alone to the case of the General Staff.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I appreciate the position of the individual general. I just wish to prevent that assumption, even though it is thought that they should be called accused or defendants, I wish to prevent that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. STAHMER: If the High Tribunal agree, I wish to call the former Reichsmarshal, Goering, to the witness stand. as follows:
Q Will you give your name please?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.
(The witness repeated the oath.) BY DR. STAHMER:
Q When were you born and where?
WorldWar, but briefly, please.
A Normal education, first tutored at home; then cadet corps education; then active officer.
Just a few points which are decisive about my later life. The position of my father was the first governor of Southwest Africa. His friends had powerful connections abroad, especially two British statesmen, Rhodes and Chamberlain. Then the strong affection of my father towards Bismarck. connection between Austria and Germany. regiment.
Q In what position did you participate in the first World War? and after October 1914 I was aircraft reconnaissance man. Then in 1915 I was a leader, that is, reconnaissance flight man, on bomber reconnaissance work, and then in the autumn of 1915 I was a fighter pilot. Then I was seriously wounded in aerial combat. After my health was restored I was a leader of a fighter squadron, and after the death of von Richthofen I became the commander of the then very famous Richthofen Squadron.
Q What war decorations did you receive? the Carl Frederic Order, and the Order Pour Le Merite, which was the highest decoration possible. know Hitler.
A I would like to put a hypothesis or condition before I go on. after the defeat in the first World War my squadron was demobilized and the demand to enter the Reichswehr was refused by me because from the beginning I was opposed in every way to the reaction and to the republic; I could not have combined this with my inner convictions; therefore I went abroad to find a position. After a few years I wanted to come back to my own country, and spent quite some time at a hunting lodge in the mountains and studied. In some way I wanted to participate in the fate of my country, but as an officer I could not do it for the reasons above mentioned and would not do it.
These hypotheses or conditions I wanted to establish. I attended the university at Munich and studied history and political science. I lived in the neighborhood of Munich and settled down there with my wife. Then one day, on a Sunday in November or October of 1922, the expedition was started of our military leaders to this protest meeting or announcement at Munich, and to this protest announcement I went as a spectator without actually participating. gave speeches. Toward the one Hitler appeared. I had briefly heard his name before and wanted to hear what he had to say. He declined to speak. It was pure coincidence that I was near. He wanted unity. He did not want to disturb the unity of this announcement, and did not see himself in a position to do so, as he said, these were really mild citizens, and he did not wish to take the word from them and send off protests, protests which had no weight. This made quite an impression on me because I was of the same opinion. could hear Hitler speak, for every Monday evening it was his custom to have meetings. I attended, and there Hitler spoke in connection with the announcement about Versailles, the peace of Versailles, and the refusal of Versailles. would be logical only if there was power which could put weight behind the protest. days following I went to the business office of the NSDAP. At that time I knew nothing of the program of the NSDAP; I knew only that it was a very small party. I had also looked into the other parties and their programs. After, at a national meeting - I had no political convictions, but voted democrat. Then alter I saw whom I had elected I took no more notice of politics; kept myself apart from it.
Finally I saw a man who had a serious and definite aim. I just wanted to speak with him to see if in any way I could assist him. He received me at once, and he was very grateful and considered it a stroke of good fortune that we should meet.
We spoke about the things which were dear to our hearts -- the defeat of our fatherland -- and that we could not be content with the situation.
The chief theme at this conversation was Versailles. I told him that so far as I was concerned everything that I had and was he could have and dispose of me and my person in the most vital and decisive manner. And I wish to oppose the Treaty of Versailles. received a strong impression and which I considered as a condition was the fact that he told me at length it was not possible under the conditions then prevailing; only those things which were considered natural at that time, may it be political, the so-called national party, or those who call themselves nationalists, or the then existing societies or clubs, fighting clubs, the free corps, and so forth, carry weight.
With then alone it was not possible to make a complete change, as long as the mass of the German labor was against these things.
Germany was to be resurrected only if the masses of German labor were behind one, and, carried by the broad masses of the people to resurrect the will to freedom against the shackles of the dictates of Versailles, and that only in a unification of thenational concept and of the putting of a national aim this could be done. Socialism on one side and socialism on the other. These two concepts were to be united, and that nationalism and the citizenry and the socialist masses could be comprehended into one idea, and that there was to be a new unit of bearing of these thoughts. to help him in one point from the beginning, to assist him, and that within the Party, as small as it was, there was a special selection which he had made of such people who were the most convinced followers, and who were to disseminate the ideas without reservation. were, and that in the meetings he could just make his points, since his meetings had to be protested. To protect meetings from rioters end dissenters, he had established the SA, and he was on the lookout for a leader who, according to his concepts, who, during the last war, could have risen-from the last war, which was just a few years behind, sc that the necessary authority could be present. He thought of a nan who had the proper merit would be either a flyer or some other officer, and now it seemed to him a good stroke of fortune that I should be the last commander of the Richthofen Squadron and should be at his disposal. the beginning to take a leading role, since it might appear that I had just entered because of this position. We finally reached an agreement that for one to two months officially I was to remain in the background, and then to take over the leadership, but that from that moment on I was to make my influence felt. I agree to that, and in that way I came to know Hitler.
Q And when was that?
A The end of October or the beginning of November in the year 1922. Either October or the beginning of November, 1922.
Q And when did you officially enter the Party?
A That was about the same date. Just a few days after that I became a registered member.
Q And what tasks did Hitler give you; that is, up until the November Putsch, 1923? the SA. We had to weld the SA into a definite unit, to form discipline, and to weld it into a completely reliable unit which would carry out my orders and the orders of Hitler. Up until that point it had just been a club which had been active but which had lacked discipline and shape. I was concerned right from the beginning to bring into the SA these members of the Party who were young and who were ideally minded enough to give their free time and their personality to these matters, for at that time it was very hard for these brave men, because, after all, we were very small and cur opponents were very powerful, and even in those days these men had to suffer all sorts of things. knew that among labor many members were to be incorporated into the SA. in having cur meetings, which were held in Munich and the upper regions of Bavaria, which was a very small territory, and to have these meetings in peace without disturbance. In most cases we succeeded. Sometimes, perhaps, we had a mass of cur opponents present, and at that time there were still weapons, because of the war which was in the not too far distant past. Critical situations arose, and we had to send for reinforcements to other localities. opposition became stronger and stronger, and we saw that the then Bavarian regime wanted to travel a different path from that of the Reich. The Reich regime was strongly Marxist, but the Bavarian regime was far from that. It was a citizenry party.
Then in Bavaria the regime was suddenly changed. Von Kahr was taken into the government, and this man had all authority for the Bavarian government. There was a conflict with the Reichswehr. The 7th Reichswehr Division, stationed in Bavaria, was freed from an oath of loyalty to the Reich and had to give an oath of loyalty to Kahr.
The same thing applied to the Bavarian police. national societies, which were half military and, of course, were armed. The whole thing was directed against Berlin and, as we expressed it, against the Republic. We could agree up to a certain point.
On a Sunday, the 9th of November, there was a large parade at Munich. The Reichswehr, the police, and the whole Bavarian regime was there. We were too. Suddenly, at this parade we saw that the figure in the foreground was not Mr. von Kahr but the Bavarian Crown Prince, Ruprecht, We were dismayed, and the suspicion arose among us that Bavaria wished to go her separate way, a way which would lead to almost a secession of Bavaria from the Reich regime. But we were intent on having anything but such a step. We wanted a strong Reich, a unified Reich, but we wanted it cleansed of those things and parties which were then ruling it.
We were mistrustful about this parade to Berlin. When this became a certainty, and Mr. von Kahr called this meeting in the Buerger Brau Cellar, it was thelast hour to prevent and frustrate those plans.
Then, the 9th of November, 1923, materialized very shortly. But I personally am concerned, and I never refused to acknowledge this. I was always ready to take part in each revolution, no matter what the origins were, a revolution against the so-called November State, and for this task I had always put my services at disposal. close the first chapter.
Q Then, after that time, did you meet Hitler again?
A Then I went to Austria and was in a hospital. There was a case before the German People's Court regarding the 9th of November, and Hitler was indicted, and all those who had been apprehended. I had been very seriously wounded and had been in upper Bavaria for several days, had been brought to the border, arrested, and then the Bavarian police brought me back. I asked Hitler at that. time, in those days, whether I was to be present at the court proceedings. He urgently asked me not to do that, and I agreed. In this manner the proceedings could not be held behind closed doors, because I had made the statement that if that were done I would make a suitable publication.
Then, after my recuperation, I spent about a year in Italy. In the year 1926 or 1927 there was a general amnesty for an illegal, if I may so say, proceedings which had taken place and for the people who had participated.
This amnesty was granted, and I could return to Germany. conversation at Berlin. I was then not active in the Party, but I wanted to have an independent position once more.
Then I was not in connection with Hitler for months. Before the Reichstag elections of 1928 in May, Hitler had me called in and told me he wanted me to be a representative for the Reichstag and whether I was agreed. He asked me and I said, "Yes."
Q Had you entered the SA?
A No, at that time I had no connection with the SA. In the meantime there had been a change of membership, and the new leader, Mr. von Ffeffer, wanted to keep his position and did not want me to resume a close connection with the SA. the SA?
AAfter 1923 my active work in the SA was completed. After the resumption of power, at a later date, some honorary positions were established. I received the highest rank as an SA honorary member. period of time on was a speaker for the Party. time it was not limited to Bavaria, but had spread to the whole Reich.
Q Was it prohibited after 1923?
Q And was this prohibition rescinded? to Germany. But in any case it had apread over all of Germany and was now essential. units, and I would like to point out that especially active was the Red Front, which was a Communist organization, one of our strongest opponents. There was constant friction, and they tried to create disturbances at our meetings. Then in addition there was the Reichsbanner, the organization of the Social Democrats. There was the Stahlhelm; that was a national organization tending to the right, and then there was the SA, which may be mentioned in the same capacity. heavily and often. Most of the SA people were small people, workers, men who only for idealogical reasons took part and who worked in the evenings, late at night without receiving a cent in payment, who believed in their Fatherland and therefore worked with us.
They were often heavily wounded and some of them were killed. They were persecuted by the Government. They could not be officials; an official could not be in the SA. They were under constant, terrific pressure and I would like to emphasize that I had the highest respect and affection for these men, these SA men, who, not as has been pictured here, were not just decided upon doing something cruel. But they were men who were willing to undergo the greatest difficulties, because of their ideology, and therefore left many of their own things undone to carry through their ideals. until the taking over of power?
A I had no office in the Party. I was never a political leader and that may sound strange. I was a member of the Reichstag, as I have already mentioned, and of course was a speaker, and by that I mean I travelled from city to city and tried to do what I could to spread the Party, to strengthen it, to bring in new members and to bring Communists and Marxists as members into our Party in order to get a broad base amongst the people in the Party. and we had to electioneer and hold many speeches, perhaps three an evening or all through the night--I became a member and our Party was the strongest in the Reichstag and I was elected as President of the Reichstag. With that I took over a political task. Party was on the increase and was growing heavily, the Fuehrer talked to me about the after. He said that he would like to be independent of a Party Office and that he would like an independent deputy who could direct political meetings, and this leader was not to be tied down to any particular office. He asked me whether I was interested in this office, especially since I was living in the capital, that is, Berlin.
I took this task, but it was no office, it was of a general nature. In a few words, I had the freedom, insofar as all the parties were concerned from the left to the right, to deal with them, I may say, concerning general proceedings in the Reichstag or as to the taking of political steps in connection therewith.
Of course, there was also present the task of spreading our ideals and the permeation of our ideals in all spheres. circles, I was connected with them and had access to all these circles. In this matter I seemed suitable to the Fuehrer and that the Fuehrer could absolutely depend upon me and he knew that I would muster all my powers to spread our ideals. Then I was President of the Reichstag and in that capacity my task was eased, for now I had the legal authority and was duty bound, I might say, to participate in political events. to suggest to the Reichspresident what the possibilities were for a new government, which coalition would be suitable and to be considered. It so happened that the Reichspresident was always duty bound to receive me in a matter of this kind. There was a close connection between the Reichspresident and myself. I would like to emphasize that this connection had already existed before; that Field Marshal von Hindenburg, if I requested him to, in memory of the first World War from which time he had known me, always received me. Reichschancellor? There was no political office which I held by despite that my position and rank, especially since the end of 1931, since my contact with the Fuehrer was more and more direct and was his special righthand man, and all of these things, developed in a regular, legal way and were increased after the seizure of power. situation to the Tribunal and describe the events that preceded it. The balance amongst the parliamentary parties, even as far back as the end of 1931, had been disturbed. Everything was at odds in Germany and no real, reliable and durable parliamentary majority could be produced, even at the time that the "special decrees government" came in under the cabinet of Bruening, which also worked with the Ermaechtigungsgesetze.
They were also concerned with Article 48 of the Constitution. parliamentary basis. Von Papen at that time tried to operate on a purely parliamentary basis and he tried to call in the strongest parties -- the National Socialists, and asked them to establish a firm basis, together with other parties. There was conversation that Hitler should be Vice-Chancellor in this cabinet. I remember that I told von Papen Hitler could become any number of things but never a "vice" or a second man. Wherever he was participating he would be the leader. It would be completely unbearable that our leader should take a secondary position. At that time he would have played the role and Hitler would then as the deputy or representative of the strongest party cover up but we were against this and refused it. And I say that, notwithstanding the fact that von Papen is in the dock with me, I told him that this plan could not be followed through; that we would not support him; that we would oppose his cabinet in the Reichstag as we would fight every cabinet which would not give us the leading influence in the Chancellory.
I do not know for how many months von Papen ruled. There was a conflict between him and me, he as Chancellor, I as the President of the Reichstag, and I was interested in overthrowing his government. I knew that the Communists were interested in a vote of no confidence which all the other parties would participate in . This vote of no confidence was to be expressed at all costs so that the Reichspresident could see to it that these cabinets could not rule without the proper background. I saw the "red briefcase" and knew what the decision would be but we took votes anyway. Thirty- two votes were for von Papen and about five hundred or so were against him. The cabinet of von Papen resigned. mention the small, fragmentary parties but all men who were at our disposal had already been presented to the people. Towards the end more and more the political figure behind the scene was the then Minister von Schleicher.
At this point there were only two possibilities. Either as a consequence of existing conditions of power the leader of the strongest party, as is customary, would be taken into the workings of the system and have our confidence or the man who was operating behind the scenes would be supported and Mr. von Schleicher himself took over the Chancellorship in connection with this office -- and this is important -- that of Military Minister and we knew, everyone knew, what the aim and purpose was. Von Schleicher did not have the sympathy of von Papen, could not bring a majority to band.
A military dictatorship was planned by von Schleicher. I talked with von Schleicher and told him at that moment it might be possible to produce a parliamentary majority. The various parties could be welded into one in order to produce a majority. I personally saw that this majority would be only temporary because our interests were at odds and I was indifferent in which way our Party could be brought to power, whether through a parliamentary majority or through the calling in by the Reichspresident. Then Mr. von Schleicher knew that he could not remain as Chancellor. There were special Ermaechtigungsgesetze and the Parliament, even before the seizure of power, had been excluded from legislating.
I told Mr. von Schleicher the same fighting words in Parliament, but much stronger than I had given them before in person.
or that, a Reichstag election, and the cabinet of von Papen, after it had been dissolved, renounced some seats in the Reichstag and just had 292.
Now, in January there were further elections. They showed an increase by cur Party and showed that the short crisis had been mastered and that the Party was stronger than ever before. political meeting. It was in the morning when I was called by telephone by the Fuehrer and was directed to come to Berlin immediately by motor I arrived that afternoon, and he told me about the things that I had already known, that the Reichspresident was not satisfied with von Schleicher any longer and saw that political things would have to take a turn, and that the Reichspresident himself wished to bring the strongest party into a seat of responsibility. Before that time, in a very clever way, a wrong impression had been created with the Reichspresident against the Fuehrer himself, and the President was not kindly disposed toward the word Socialism. the home of von Ribbentrop -- I believe von Papen was to be present also; whether Meissner, who was the State Secretary was there, I don't know -the son of Field Marshal wanted to inquire for his father that possibilities there were of having a Chancellorship by Hitler and of bringing in the Party. his father that he would be shipwrecked with von Schleicher, and told him the demands for forming a new government, and heard the intention of the Field Marshal, that he was already prepared to give the Chancellorship to Hitler and to make a party as the chief basis of the new government if Adolf Hitler could bring in the Steel Helmet, for he wanted a clear-cut national basis for the government, and the Steel Helmet, the Stahlhelm was not a parliamentary party out had many followers.
We did not discuss anything else of any importance that evening.
I told the son of Hindenburg that he might tell his father that everything would be carried out as we had discussed it, and the Fuehrer gave me the task of making all agreements with the parties during the next week, and of coming to agreement with the parties and the Reichspresident.
THE PRESIDENT: I believe we will take off now.
(A recess was taken) BY DR. STAHMER: appointment of Hitler as Reichschancellor. Would you continue.
A I had arrived at the last decisive week. The negotiations had become a little more difficult because the Field Marshal, Reichpresident von Hindenburg, who knew the Fuehrer personally only from two conversations, and who, for many years, from many sides, had heard things and thought he had reasons to be suspicious simply because he did not know him, had demanded some rather serious limitations. We, as the strongest party, concerning future measures had to take the responsibility for the people, and these limitations with regard to our strength would mean a weak part in the government. lowest point of its downward development: 8 million unemployed; all programs had failed; no confidence in the parties; a very strong increase in revolutionary tendencies; political insecurity. Measures had to be taken which, if we should come to power, were expected from us fully, and for which we had to stand. Therefore, it was rather difficult, in taking over such a responsibility, to have such political limitations. von Papen should become Vice Chancellor in this Cabinet. Aside from the sympathetic personality of von Papen, he did not bring us anything, because there was no party behind him. The Reichspresident, however, demanded beyond that that Herr von Papen should be present at the reports which the Fuehrer, after being appointed Reichschancellor, had to give the Reichspresident, but from this we departed very quickly.
Secondly, the Reichspresident thought the Foreign Ministry should be independent of all parties, and should be in the hands of Herr von Neurath.
Herr von Neurath also brought nothing in the way of political power for us besides his knowledge and ability. the Reichschancellor in Germany, was the post which was most important, should also be in a personal union with Herr von Papen. That is, Herr von Papen should also held that job. Before the World War, as it is known, for these reasons Reichschancellor and Prussian Prime Minister were always one person.
the Army Minister, should also be an independent person, a soldier; and he himself appointed him, without any influence from our side, in the person of General von Blomberg, who, at that time was at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Herr von Blomberg was neither personally known to the Fuehrer nor myself at that time. Therefore, there were already essential and decisive posts within the Cabinet in the hands of personalities on whose choice we had no influence.
However, that was increased during the week with further demands. It was demanded that the Finance Ministry should be in the hands of Count Schwerin Krosigk, again a man without the background of the political party. As to the Traffic Ministry, or the Ministry of Traffic - Herr von Eltz - here the same thing applied. It was demanded that the leader of the Stahlhelm, Seldte, should be taken into the Cabinet. Certainly the Stahlhelm was a rather large, extensive movement, but not politically, and not represented by a single representative in the Parliament or in the Reichstag. Nationalists, with 36 seats, as the only parliamentary ally, so to speak. Here also quite extraordinary demands were put, which were in no relation to the smallness of that part. seats, and only the following: The Reichs Chancellor, then Dr. Frick; the Minister of the Interior for the Reich in the Cabinet; and myself as the third, first as a member of the Reich Cabinet, as Reich Commissar for Aviation -that is, of a subordinate department, which was part of the Traffic Ministry, but no department otherwise. thereby of the largest land in the Reich, the person who had the most important starting position for this grouping of power within the Reich.
It was an extraordinarily difficult affair. At the last moment there was a danger that the forming of the Cabinet would not succeed. There were two factors. The Fuehrer had made the condition that shortly after the forming of the new Cabinet a new election for the Reichstag should take place, in the correct recognition that the Party would be considerably strengthened thereby and that, if possible, the party would represent an absolute majority and would be in a position to form the parliamentary platform of the Government.
tradicted this, and he was right in recognizing that this party would probably disappear more or less throughout this election. Five minutes before the Cabinet was formed, there was danger that it would fall apart, for these reasons. It was a pure coincidence that at that moment the Reichspresident took the oath of the now ministers, and so the Cabinet was formed.
The second danger appeared from Schleicher's side. Schleicher, on Sunday, in confidence, then offered to the Fuehrer and to myself the following. He wanted to stress that the Reichspresident was not a sure factor for the new government; it would serve the purpose better, although he had been retired the day before, if he would be ready to go with us from that time on, and not on a parliamentary basis of any kind, but on an entirely new platform of a connection between the Reichswehr and the NSDAP, to form a government. it would not be decent. station from Geneva, he received two orders. The first was from Herr von Hammerstein, Chief of the Army, his superior, to come to him immediately. The second was an order from Hindenburg, his commander-in-chief, to come to his house.
Hammerstein with the Potsdam Garrison. and that is the reason why Herr von Blomberg, two hours before the rest of the Cabinet, was already nominated to War Minister, or Reichswehr Minister, in order to prevent any wrong action by the Reichswehr beforehand.
At 11 o'clock on the morning of the 30th, the Cabinet was formed and Hitler nominated Vice Chancellor.
Q Had the Party come to power in a legal way, in your opinion?
A Of course. Certainly the Party had come into power legally because, according to the Constitution, the Party had been called upon by the Reichspresident and, according to the principles, the Party should have been called upon much sooner than that. The Party had come into power only in the way of normal elections, according to the laws of elections which then existed
Q What measures were taken after Hitler's nomination to fortify the power, or to strengthen the power, of the Party? power we were decided to keep that power under all circumstances. We did not want this power for power's sake, but we needed power, and the power of the government, in order to make Germany free and great. We could not leave this to the play of coincidence by way of elections and parliamentary majorities, but this task, which we thought we were capable of, we wanted to carry out. rebuild the political relations of power. That was carried out in such a manner that shortly after the seizure of government power in the Reich and in Prussia, after the taking over, the other Laender would follow automatically. And there, in all these parts, more or less strong National Socialist governments were formed. it was necessary that so-called political officials, according to the Constitution, could be put at our disposal; that is to say, they could be retired at any time.