I took this task, but it was no office, it was of a general nature. In a few words, I had the freedom, insofar as all the parties were concerned from the left to the right, to deal with them, I may say, concerning general proceedings in the Reichstag or as to the taking of political steps in connection therewith.
Of course, there was also present the task of spreading our ideals and the permeation of our ideals in all spheres. circles, I was connected with them and had access to all these circles. In this matter I seemed suitable to the Fuehrer and that the Fuehrer could absolutely depend upon me and he knew that I would muster all my powers to spread our ideals. Then I was President of the Reichstag and in that capacity my task was eased, for now I had the legal authority and was duty bound, I might say, to participate in political events. to suggest to the Reichspresident what the possibilities were for a new government, which coalition would be suitable and to be considered. It so happened that the Reichspresident was always duty bound to receive me in a matter of this kind. There was a close connection between the Reichspresident and myself. I would like to emphasize that this connection had already existed before; that Field Marshal von Hindenburg, if I requested him to, in memory of the first World War from which time he had known me, always received me. Reichschancellor? There was no political office which I held by despite that my position and rank, especially since the end of 1931, since my contact with the Fuehrer was more and more direct and was his special righthand man, and all of these things, developed in a regular, legal way and were increased after the seizure of power. situation to the Tribunal and describe the events that preceded it. The balance amongst the parliamentary parties, even as far back as the end of 1931, had been disturbed. Everything was at odds in Germany and no real, reliable and durable parliamentary majority could be produced, even at the time that the "special decrees government" came in under the cabinet of Bruening, which also worked with the Ermaechtigungsgesetze.
They were also concerned with Article 48 of the Constitution. parliamentary basis. Von Papen at that time tried to operate on a purely parliamentary basis and he tried to call in the strongest parties -- the National Socialists, and asked them to establish a firm basis, together with other parties. There was conversation that Hitler should be Vice-Chancellor in this cabinet. I remember that I told von Papen Hitler could become any number of things but never a "vice" or a second man. Wherever he was participating he would be the leader. It would be completely unbearable that our leader should take a secondary position. At that time he would have played the role and Hitler would then as the deputy or representative of the strongest party cover up but we were against this and refused it. And I say that, notwithstanding the fact that von Papen is in the dock with me, I told him that this plan could not be followed through; that we would not support him; that we would oppose his cabinet in the Reichstag as we would fight every cabinet which would not give us the leading influence in the Chancellory.
I do not know for how many months von Papen ruled. There was a conflict between him and me, he as Chancellor, I as the President of the Reichstag, and I was interested in overthrowing his government. I knew that the Communists were interested in a vote of no confidence which all the other parties would participate in . This vote of no confidence was to be expressed at all costs so that the Reichspresident could see to it that these cabinets could not rule without the proper background. I saw the "red briefcase" and knew what the decision would be but we took votes anyway. Thirty- two votes were for von Papen and about five hundred or so were against him. The cabinet of von Papen resigned. mention the small, fragmentary parties but all men who were at our disposal had already been presented to the people. Towards the end more and more the political figure behind the scene was the then Minister von Schleicher.
At this point there were only two possibilities. Either as a consequence of existing conditions of power the leader of the strongest party, as is customary, would be taken into the workings of the system and have our confidence or the man who was operating behind the scenes would be supported and Mr. von Schleicher himself took over the Chancellorship in connection with this office -- and this is important -- that of Military Minister and we knew, everyone knew, what the aim and purpose was. Von Schleicher did not have the sympathy of von Papen, could not bring a majority to band.
A military dictatorship was planned by von Schleicher. I talked with von Schleicher and told him at that moment it might be possible to produce a parliamentary majority. The various parties could be welded into one in order to produce a majority. I personally saw that this majority would be only temporary because our interests were at odds and I was indifferent in which way our Party could be brought to power, whether through a parliamentary majority or through the calling in by the Reichspresident. Then Mr. von Schleicher knew that he could not remain as Chancellor. There were special Ermaechtigungsgesetze and the Parliament, even before the seizure of power, had been excluded from legislating.
I told Mr. von Schleicher the same fighting words in Parliament, but much stronger than I had given them before in person.
or that, a Reichstag election, and the cabinet of von Papen, after it had been dissolved, renounced some seats in the Reichstag and just had 292.
Now, in January there were further elections. They showed an increase by cur Party and showed that the short crisis had been mastered and that the Party was stronger than ever before. political meeting. It was in the morning when I was called by telephone by the Fuehrer and was directed to come to Berlin immediately by motor I arrived that afternoon, and he told me about the things that I had already known, that the Reichspresident was not satisfied with von Schleicher any longer and saw that political things would have to take a turn, and that the Reichspresident himself wished to bring the strongest party into a seat of responsibility. Before that time, in a very clever way, a wrong impression had been created with the Reichspresident against the Fuehrer himself, and the President was not kindly disposed toward the word Socialism. the home of von Ribbentrop -- I believe von Papen was to be present also; whether Meissner, who was the State Secretary was there, I don't know -the son of Field Marshal wanted to inquire for his father that possibilities there were of having a Chancellorship by Hitler and of bringing in the Party. his father that he would be shipwrecked with von Schleicher, and told him the demands for forming a new government, and heard the intention of the Field Marshal, that he was already prepared to give the Chancellorship to Hitler and to make a party as the chief basis of the new government if Adolf Hitler could bring in the Steel Helmet, for he wanted a clear-cut national basis for the government, and the Steel Helmet, the Stahlhelm was not a parliamentary party out had many followers.
We did not discuss anything else of any importance that evening.
I told the son of Hindenburg that he might tell his father that everything would be carried out as we had discussed it, and the Fuehrer gave me the task of making all agreements with the parties during the next week, and of coming to agreement with the parties and the Reichspresident.
THE PRESIDENT: I believe we will take off now.
(A recess was taken) BY DR. STAHMER: appointment of Hitler as Reichschancellor. Would you continue.
A I had arrived at the last decisive week. The negotiations had become a little more difficult because the Field Marshal, Reichpresident von Hindenburg, who knew the Fuehrer personally only from two conversations, and who, for many years, from many sides, had heard things and thought he had reasons to be suspicious simply because he did not know him, had demanded some rather serious limitations. We, as the strongest party, concerning future measures had to take the responsibility for the people, and these limitations with regard to our strength would mean a weak part in the government. lowest point of its downward development: 8 million unemployed; all programs had failed; no confidence in the parties; a very strong increase in revolutionary tendencies; political insecurity. Measures had to be taken which, if we should come to power, were expected from us fully, and for which we had to stand. Therefore, it was rather difficult, in taking over such a responsibility, to have such political limitations. von Papen should become Vice Chancellor in this Cabinet. Aside from the sympathetic personality of von Papen, he did not bring us anything, because there was no party behind him. The Reichspresident, however, demanded beyond that that Herr von Papen should be present at the reports which the Fuehrer, after being appointed Reichschancellor, had to give the Reichspresident, but from this we departed very quickly.
Secondly, the Reichspresident thought the Foreign Ministry should be independent of all parties, and should be in the hands of Herr von Neurath.
Herr von Neurath also brought nothing in the way of political power for us besides his knowledge and ability. the Reichschancellor in Germany, was the post which was most important, should also be in a personal union with Herr von Papen. That is, Herr von Papen should also held that job. Before the World War, as it is known, for these reasons Reichschancellor and Prussian Prime Minister were always one person.
the Army Minister, should also be an independent person, a soldier; and he himself appointed him, without any influence from our side, in the person of General von Blomberg, who, at that time was at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Herr von Blomberg was neither personally known to the Fuehrer nor myself at that time. Therefore, there were already essential and decisive posts within the Cabinet in the hands of personalities on whose choice we had no influence.
However, that was increased during the week with further demands. It was demanded that the Finance Ministry should be in the hands of Count Schwerin Krosigk, again a man without the background of the political party. As to the Traffic Ministry, or the Ministry of Traffic - Herr von Eltz - here the same thing applied. It was demanded that the leader of the Stahlhelm, Seldte, should be taken into the Cabinet. Certainly the Stahlhelm was a rather large, extensive movement, but not politically, and not represented by a single representative in the Parliament or in the Reichstag. Nationalists, with 36 seats, as the only parliamentary ally, so to speak. Here also quite extraordinary demands were put, which were in no relation to the smallness of that part. seats, and only the following: The Reichs Chancellor, then Dr. Frick; the Minister of the Interior for the Reich in the Cabinet; and myself as the third, first as a member of the Reich Cabinet, as Reich Commissar for Aviation -that is, of a subordinate department, which was part of the Traffic Ministry, but no department otherwise. thereby of the largest land in the Reich, the person who had the most important starting position for this grouping of power within the Reich.
It was an extraordinarily difficult affair. At the last moment there was a danger that the forming of the Cabinet would not succeed. There were two factors. The Fuehrer had made the condition that shortly after the forming of the new Cabinet a new election for the Reichstag should take place, in the correct recognition that the Party would be considerably strengthened thereby and that, if possible, the party would represent an absolute majority and would be in a position to form the parliamentary platform of the Government.
tradicted this, and he was right in recognizing that this party would probably disappear more or less throughout this election. Five minutes before the Cabinet was formed, there was danger that it would fall apart, for these reasons. It was a pure coincidence that at that moment the Reichspresident took the oath of the now ministers, and so the Cabinet was formed.
The second danger appeared from Schleicher's side. Schleicher, on Sunday, in confidence, then offered to the Fuehrer and to myself the following. He wanted to stress that the Reichspresident was not a sure factor for the new government; it would serve the purpose better, although he had been retired the day before, if he would be ready to go with us from that time on, and not on a parliamentary basis of any kind, but on an entirely new platform of a connection between the Reichswehr and the NSDAP, to form a government. it would not be decent. station from Geneva, he received two orders. The first was from Herr von Hammerstein, Chief of the Army, his superior, to come to him immediately. The second was an order from Hindenburg, his commander-in-chief, to come to his house.
Hammerstein with the Potsdam Garrison. and that is the reason why Herr von Blomberg, two hours before the rest of the Cabinet, was already nominated to War Minister, or Reichswehr Minister, in order to prevent any wrong action by the Reichswehr beforehand.
At 11 o'clock on the morning of the 30th, the Cabinet was formed and Hitler nominated Vice Chancellor.
Q Had the Party come to power in a legal way, in your opinion?
A Of course. Certainly the Party had come into power legally because, according to the Constitution, the Party had been called upon by the Reichspresident and, according to the principles, the Party should have been called upon much sooner than that. The Party had come into power only in the way of normal elections, according to the laws of elections which then existed
Q What measures were taken after Hitler's nomination to fortify the power, or to strengthen the power, of the Party? power we were decided to keep that power under all circumstances. We did not want this power for power's sake, but we needed power, and the power of the government, in order to make Germany free and great. We could not leave this to the play of coincidence by way of elections and parliamentary majorities, but this task, which we thought we were capable of, we wanted to carry out. rebuild the political relations of power. That was carried out in such a manner that shortly after the seizure of government power in the Reich and in Prussia, after the taking over, the other Laender would follow automatically. And there, in all these parts, more or less strong National Socialist governments were formed. it was necessary that so-called political officials, according to the Constitution, could be put at our disposal; that is to say, they could be retired at any time.
These officers had to be put into the hands of the strongest party. into power, I want to underline two elements specifically. and president elections took place in Germany. That there were 37 parties with their candidates in one Reichstag election alone, can give you a clear picture. Therefore, it was possible that a strong group formed the so-called government majority, and another group the oppositon, and from entirely different points of view; opposition, for instance, made by Communists and National Socialists together, and by a small arty which had eight representatives all together, which was not in balance, and in two readings of each law. Particularly in Reich law, it has to be proclaimed three times that they were against the government, and before the third decisive proclamation they could be guaranteed sufficient political and material advantages in order to force it through the government.
The second point, which I want to underline again, on the legality of our coming to power, is the following. the United States of America had existed, then the National Socialist German Workers' Party, N.S.D.A.P., at the end of 1939 would have had all seats in the Reichstag, without exception. For in every Wahlkreis, county, at that time, and the latest in the beginning of 1932--and I underline again in each one that the National Socialist Party was the strongest, that is to say, according to the system of election as it is in Great Britain or in the United States--all these weaker parties would have failed to gain any seats and from this time on we would have only National Socialists in a perfectly legal way, according to democratic principles of these two largest democracies, power such as it is in all other countries where change of power of political parties occurred. Besides the Ministers, first of all there were the Oberpresidente of the Province, the Regierungspresidente of the district, the Polizeipresidente, the Landraete, and they were down to the Ministerialdirektor, that is the director of the departments of Ministry, considered political offices, and that was the group of people which was changed whenever there was a change of power, and before that had been negotiated between the parties. It did not go so far as in other countries--all the way down to the letter carrier. The office holders changed, but at least in the most important posts. The first item ended, I asked von Papen to turn over to me the position of Prime Minister in Prussia, since he could not very well hold it, since he had no party standing behind him and since he could not make the necessary changes, but only one of us. And he agreed at once. Then I made these changes in a small part, that is to say, the Oberpresidentes were replaced by National Socialists. I even left generously, for weeks, Social Democrats in these posts.
I replaced the officers in a few important provinces with important Catholic personalities who were much closer to the centre party than ours. But slowly, by and by, throughout the years, of course, it could not have been different. All these positions were put in the hands of National Socialists, particularly the Oberpresidente; because they were almost the same as the political Gau. However, until the end, in some cases Regierungspresidentes were only party National Socialists, some of them only. The same in the case of the Landraetes. Tribunal I want to stress that the Polizeipresidente has at first nothing to do with the Gestapo. The Polizeipresidente was in larger cities the same as the Landraete in the country--some of them at least. These Polizeipresidentes had been selected by the largest parties up to then. I found Social Democrats in these jobs who could not, of course, stay as our opponents up to that date. That would have been absurd. And these Police Presidents, these offices, I put in the hands of National Socialists, in some cases, again, of people who had nothing to do with the party.
I remind you that the most important office of police president in Berlin was put in the hands of the Admiral, von Lebensohn, who was not a member of the Party. And in some jobs I put former SA leaders. myself but to all of us, very important, because that was the prerogative of our further work, stronger influence in the Reich Cabinet was necessary. New National Socialists came into the office of Ministers, and Ministers were created. A number of new basic laws were added. It was clear to everyone -- there was no doubt in the mind of anybody who had any idea of German conditions, either abroad or of course in the country -- that as quickly as possible we wanted to finish off the Communist Party. It was an absolute consequence, a compelling consequence, that the Communist Party should be prohibited. We were convinced that if the Communist Party, which was the strongest after us, had succeeded in coming to power, they would certainly not have tolerated taking into their Cabinet any National Socialists at all. We were absolutely clear that we would have been put away -- and in an entirely different manner. of the Reichstag as a parliament, to eliminate the influence of the Reichstag. And this was done in that manner -- that we had an absolute majority after the new election anyway. In some cases we suggested to the former parties they dissolve themselves, because they had no purpose, and those who would not dissolve themselves were dissolved by us.
I mentioned the Communist Party. I also mean the Social Democrats. German people up to now, not only to form the framework of a Reich, but we wanted to become a United Reich. And for that, the strengthening of the Reichsgedanke, the thinking of the Reich, and the Reich power, above the various individual countries was necessary. If it was difficult for a fervent German patriot before the first World War to get along with a large number of serenissimi and futile principles, that which came in their place later were often worse -- because in the place of one small will there came manifold interests, tied to various parties in the Reich Government.
There was a majority of these places. In Bavaria a different one, in Hessen different again. It was quite impossible to establish a Reich and Reich power and prestige that could have greatness. Mender Parliaments. I began with it in Prussia by doing away with the Laender Parliaments, which I considered entirely superfluous, for the simple reason that the principles of the Reichsgewalt had already been violated. I could not understand why so many different authorities should exist which, with their unnecessary frictions, discussions, arguments, could only prevent constructive work. However, although I wanted to see and wanted to create the Reich strong and united, I have always -- and so has the Fuehrer -- demanded that within the German provinces and gaus cultural life should remain many-sided and based on local traditions; that is to say, all the old centres of culture, like Munich, Dresden, Weimar and so on, should continue in this direction to exist and to be supported. established -which would exclude any danger to the reconstruction, that is, on the basis of paragraph 48, the law which did away with the so-called freedoms. The definitions of these freedoms is open to argument. The law for the protection of people and nations was created, a law which was most urgently needed -- though during the past years much had been prohibited which would have been similar to a national activity, but it had still been permitted to speak about German people, its history, its state symbols and things which were close to the heart of the patriot, to speak about these without any sense, and they were in no way protected against slander.
It is evident that the definitions, like "Gleichschaltung" -coordination -- were created at that time, that many unnecessary things were done, that is evident, because after the coming to power there came into being the entire movement -- a revolution and still not in the sense of revolutions as they had been known, like the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, that is to say, not in the sense of great fighting and bloody changes, tribunals that executed people by the hundreds of thousands; but still with a strong revolutionary aim, in the direction of the oneness of State, Party, National Socialism as the basis of leadership and as the basis for ideas.
detail, but as I have said, and with all these strong political changes, people will always go beyond the limits here and there. Personally I was not interested that every organization should become National Socialist right away, and I can say quite frankly that in the smallest sense, a club, a small organization should absolutely have a National Socialist chairman, but principally in decisive political affairs, more and more our ideas, our philosophy, had to come through. strengthening of the fortifications of the Reich and additional strengthening then of our position, which occurred only after the death of the Reichspresider von Hindeburg, in 1934, was the fact that the Chief of State and the Reich Chancellor became one person. sation with the Fuehrer. Right from the beginning, we discussed whether Hitler should accept the position of the Chief of State and whether I should take the Chancellorship. In consideration of the entire personality of the Fuehrer, it was incredible -- it could not be thought about -- that the Fuehrer could only be Chief of State, so to speak, above the political clouds. He was a definite leader of the political life and thereby of the government, and to put any other person as puppet in that position we considered not within the dignity of the situation. of the United States of America, where also the Chief of State at the same time is the chief of the government and the cabinet, and we united, following the example of the United States, the position of the Chief of State and the Chief of the Government, and he called himself "Fuehrer" -- leader of the German people -- and Reichschancellor of the German Reich. Wehrmacht. That was a matter of course, according to the constitution and also the previous constitution and such as it is also the case in other nations will have to be mentioned later, that is, the power of the police -- those were the basic elements of the strengthening of power, and again I wish to say, first, it is correct that I personally -- and I can only speak for myself -have done everything which was at all within my personal power to strengthen the National Socialist movement, to increase it, and have worked to bring it into power under all circumstances and alone, and secondly, I have done everything in order to assure for the Fuehrer the place as Reichschancellor, where he belonged; thirdly, if I think back, I think I have not failed to do anything in order to strengthen our power to such an extent that coincidences in the political play or violent incidents would not have impaired it; that, furthermore, it could become that factor of power which was to lead the Reich to a great development.
Q Which offices did you hold after the coming to power? there until the end. In the Reich Cabinet, at first I received the post of a Reich Minister and Reich Commissar of Aviation -- not Air Force. me that we had to establish an air force. Interior on 20 April 1933, and on that date also the post of Prime Minister of Prussia. The Reich Commissariat for Aviation in March 1933 became a Reich Ministry of Aviation. State Council, and so on. Minister of Prussia, on one hand, and of the Aviation Ministry on the other hand, and the Ministry of the Interior of Prussia. That I transferred to the Reich Ministry of the Interior because that was also part of the strengthening affair and, first of all, clarification for the definition of Reich governing power that the Prussian Ministries should be in personal union with those of the Reich, because only in this way was it possible that the Reich department received practical information about the political work of the day and of the departments. Only in this connection was that possible.
where you created the Gestapo and the concentration camps? For what reason, for what purpose, were they installed? prerequisite was to create an instrument which at all times and with all nations was the inner political instrument of power; that is to say, the police. There was no Reich police, only provincial police. The most important one was the Prussian. following the various political groups, and the political parties put their people in. I mentioned how the police presidents were appointed and the leading offices in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. It was such that here in some of the outlying offices, our former opponents, who up to then had always worked against us, we still found them in their offices. when the Social Democrat organization was relieved by the government of Herr von Papen. There the strongest opponents had already been removed. of definite political opponents. I could not expect very well that those who until yesterday were ready to use the police in all severity against us, would today show loyalty for the new state.
Also, before our time, there was a political police in Prussia. That was Police Department 1-A, and its task was, first of all, the surveillance of and fight against National Socialists and also, in part, against the Communists. and let it run under the old firm name, but the situation had changed by our coming to power, because at that time, and as I have mentioned before, the Communist Party was extraordinarily strong. It had over six million voters, and in their Red Front organization they had a thoroughly revolutionary instrument of power, and it was quite clear from the Communist power that if we should stay in power for any length of time, they would definitely use that power.
to the political tension, the atmosphere of contrast -- that it could have come torevolutionary acts on the part of the Communists, particularly since, even after we came to power, political murders, political shootings on National Socialists and policemen did not stop from that side but at times even increased.