These officers had to be put into the hands of the strongest party. into power, I want to underline two elements specifically. and president elections took place in Germany. That there were 37 parties with their candidates in one Reichstag election alone, can give you a clear picture. Therefore, it was possible that a strong group formed the so-called government majority, and another group the oppositon, and from entirely different points of view; opposition, for instance, made by Communists and National Socialists together, and by a small arty which had eight representatives all together, which was not in balance, and in two readings of each law. Particularly in Reich law, it has to be proclaimed three times that they were against the government, and before the third decisive proclamation they could be guaranteed sufficient political and material advantages in order to force it through the government.
The second point, which I want to underline again, on the legality of our coming to power, is the following. the United States of America had existed, then the National Socialist German Workers' Party, N.S.D.A.P., at the end of 1939 would have had all seats in the Reichstag, without exception. For in every Wahlkreis, county, at that time, and the latest in the beginning of 1932--and I underline again in each one that the National Socialist Party was the strongest, that is to say, according to the system of election as it is in Great Britain or in the United States--all these weaker parties would have failed to gain any seats and from this time on we would have only National Socialists in a perfectly legal way, according to democratic principles of these two largest democracies, power such as it is in all other countries where change of power of political parties occurred. Besides the Ministers, first of all there were the Oberpresidente of the Province, the Regierungspresidente of the district, the Polizeipresidente, the Landraete, and they were down to the Ministerialdirektor, that is the director of the departments of Ministry, considered political offices, and that was the group of people which was changed whenever there was a change of power, and before that had been negotiated between the parties. It did not go so far as in other countries--all the way down to the letter carrier. The office holders changed, but at least in the most important posts. The first item ended, I asked von Papen to turn over to me the position of Prime Minister in Prussia, since he could not very well hold it, since he had no party standing behind him and since he could not make the necessary changes, but only one of us. And he agreed at once. Then I made these changes in a small part, that is to say, the Oberpresidentes were replaced by National Socialists. I even left generously, for weeks, Social Democrats in these posts.
I replaced the officers in a few important provinces with important Catholic personalities who were much closer to the centre party than ours. But slowly, by and by, throughout the years, of course, it could not have been different. All these positions were put in the hands of National Socialists, particularly the Oberpresidente; because they were almost the same as the political Gau. However, until the end, in some cases Regierungspresidentes were only party National Socialists, some of them only. The same in the case of the Landraetes. Tribunal I want to stress that the Polizeipresidente has at first nothing to do with the Gestapo. The Polizeipresidente was in larger cities the same as the Landraete in the country--some of them at least. These Polizeipresidentes had been selected by the largest parties up to then. I found Social Democrats in these jobs who could not, of course, stay as our opponents up to that date. That would have been absurd. And these Police Presidents, these offices, I put in the hands of National Socialists, in some cases, again, of people who had nothing to do with the party.
I remind you that the most important office of police president in Berlin was put in the hands of the Admiral, von Lebensohn, who was not a member of the Party. And in some jobs I put former SA leaders. myself but to all of us, very important, because that was the prerogative of our further work, stronger influence in the Reich Cabinet was necessary. New National Socialists came into the office of Ministers, and Ministers were created. A number of new basic laws were added. It was clear to everyone -- there was no doubt in the mind of anybody who had any idea of German conditions, either abroad or of course in the country -- that as quickly as possible we wanted to finish off the Communist Party. It was an absolute consequence, a compelling consequence, that the Communist Party should be prohibited. We were convinced that if the Communist Party, which was the strongest after us, had succeeded in coming to power, they would certainly not have tolerated taking into their Cabinet any National Socialists at all. We were absolutely clear that we would have been put away -- and in an entirely different manner. of the Reichstag as a parliament, to eliminate the influence of the Reichstag. And this was done in that manner -- that we had an absolute majority after the new election anyway. In some cases we suggested to the former parties they dissolve themselves, because they had no purpose, and those who would not dissolve themselves were dissolved by us.
I mentioned the Communist Party. I also mean the Social Democrats. German people up to now, not only to form the framework of a Reich, but we wanted to become a United Reich. And for that, the strengthening of the Reichsgedanke, the thinking of the Reich, and the Reich power, above the various individual countries was necessary. If it was difficult for a fervent German patriot before the first World War to get along with a large number of serenissimi and futile principles, that which came in their place later were often worse -- because in the place of one small will there came manifold interests, tied to various parties in the Reich Government.
There was a majority of these places. In Bavaria a different one, in Hessen different again. It was quite impossible to establish a Reich and Reich power and prestige that could have greatness. Mender Parliaments. I began with it in Prussia by doing away with the Laender Parliaments, which I considered entirely superfluous, for the simple reason that the principles of the Reichsgewalt had already been violated. I could not understand why so many different authorities should exist which, with their unnecessary frictions, discussions, arguments, could only prevent constructive work. However, although I wanted to see and wanted to create the Reich strong and united, I have always -- and so has the Fuehrer -- demanded that within the German provinces and gaus cultural life should remain many-sided and based on local traditions; that is to say, all the old centres of culture, like Munich, Dresden, Weimar and so on, should continue in this direction to exist and to be supported. established -which would exclude any danger to the reconstruction, that is, on the basis of paragraph 48, the law which did away with the so-called freedoms. The definitions of these freedoms is open to argument. The law for the protection of people and nations was created, a law which was most urgently needed -- though during the past years much had been prohibited which would have been similar to a national activity, but it had still been permitted to speak about German people, its history, its state symbols and things which were close to the heart of the patriot, to speak about these without any sense, and they were in no way protected against slander.
It is evident that the definitions, like "Gleichschaltung" -coordination -- were created at that time, that many unnecessary things were done, that is evident, because after the coming to power there came into being the entire movement -- a revolution and still not in the sense of revolutions as they had been known, like the French Revolution, the Bolshevik Revolution, that is to say, not in the sense of great fighting and bloody changes, tribunals that executed people by the hundreds of thousands; but still with a strong revolutionary aim, in the direction of the oneness of State, Party, National Socialism as the basis of leadership and as the basis for ideas.
detail, but as I have said, and with all these strong political changes, people will always go beyond the limits here and there. Personally I was not interested that every organization should become National Socialist right away, and I can say quite frankly that in the smallest sense, a club, a small organization should absolutely have a National Socialist chairman, but principally in decisive political affairs, more and more our ideas, our philosophy, had to come through. strengthening of the fortifications of the Reich and additional strengthening then of our position, which occurred only after the death of the Reichspresider von Hindeburg, in 1934, was the fact that the Chief of State and the Reich Chancellor became one person. sation with the Fuehrer. Right from the beginning, we discussed whether Hitler should accept the position of the Chief of State and whether I should take the Chancellorship. In consideration of the entire personality of the Fuehrer, it was incredible -- it could not be thought about -- that the Fuehrer could only be Chief of State, so to speak, above the political clouds. He was a definite leader of the political life and thereby of the government, and to put any other person as puppet in that position we considered not within the dignity of the situation. of the United States of America, where also the Chief of State at the same time is the chief of the government and the cabinet, and we united, following the example of the United States, the position of the Chief of State and the Chief of the Government, and he called himself "Fuehrer" -- leader of the German people -- and Reichschancellor of the German Reich. Wehrmacht. That was a matter of course, according to the constitution and also the previous constitution and such as it is also the case in other nations will have to be mentioned later, that is, the power of the police -- those were the basic elements of the strengthening of power, and again I wish to say, first, it is correct that I personally -- and I can only speak for myself -have done everything which was at all within my personal power to strengthen the National Socialist movement, to increase it, and have worked to bring it into power under all circumstances and alone, and secondly, I have done everything in order to assure for the Fuehrer the place as Reichschancellor, where he belonged; thirdly, if I think back, I think I have not failed to do anything in order to strengthen our power to such an extent that coincidences in the political play or violent incidents would not have impaired it; that, furthermore, it could become that factor of power which was to lead the Reich to a great development.
Q Which offices did you hold after the coming to power? there until the end. In the Reich Cabinet, at first I received the post of a Reich Minister and Reich Commissar of Aviation -- not Air Force. me that we had to establish an air force. Interior on 20 April 1933, and on that date also the post of Prime Minister of Prussia. The Reich Commissariat for Aviation in March 1933 became a Reich Ministry of Aviation. State Council, and so on. Minister of Prussia, on one hand, and of the Aviation Ministry on the other hand, and the Ministry of the Interior of Prussia. That I transferred to the Reich Ministry of the Interior because that was also part of the strengthening affair and, first of all, clarification for the definition of Reich governing power that the Prussian Ministries should be in personal union with those of the Reich, because only in this way was it possible that the Reich department received practical information about the political work of the day and of the departments. Only in this connection was that possible.
where you created the Gestapo and the concentration camps? For what reason, for what purpose, were they installed? prerequisite was to create an instrument which at all times and with all nations was the inner political instrument of power; that is to say, the police. There was no Reich police, only provincial police. The most important one was the Prussian. following the various political groups, and the political parties put their people in. I mentioned how the police presidents were appointed and the leading offices in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. It was such that here in some of the outlying offices, our former opponents, who up to then had always worked against us, we still found them in their offices. when the Social Democrat organization was relieved by the government of Herr von Papen. There the strongest opponents had already been removed. of definite political opponents. I could not expect very well that those who until yesterday were ready to use the police in all severity against us, would today show loyalty for the new state.
Also, before our time, there was a political police in Prussia. That was Police Department 1-A, and its task was, first of all, the surveillance of and fight against National Socialists and also, in part, against the Communists. and let it run under the old firm name, but the situation had changed by our coming to power, because at that time, and as I have mentioned before, the Communist Party was extraordinarily strong. It had over six million voters, and in their Red Front organization they had a thoroughly revolutionary instrument of power, and it was quite clear from the Communist power that if we should stay in power for any length of time, they would definitely use that power.
to the political tension, the atmosphere of contrast -- that it could have come torevolutionary acts on the part of the Communists, particularly since, even after we came to power, political murders, political shootings on National Socialists and policemen did not stop from that side but at times even increased.
extremely ready about the sudden change of aviation, I had to be ready. I could, therefore, set forth any of the danger of the department which existed. I was liable to the outlying police, and of not any central position, or in the outlining of the position, but I had to increase the instrument of the police. was for security to the State.In order to make that clear I called the State Police the Central State Police, and at the same time looked for outlying places. I took out a number of non-political officials who were expert received, and in the beginning I took fewer from the Party, because I had to stretch my knowledge of the field. the security for the State, and against the enemy of the State position, and also the leader which I selected for that from the Party, to see that he came from the former police, he was already there. At that time it was the Oberregierungsrat and later Ministerialrat Diehls. Likewise, to remain so the other leaders of the Gestapo as officials were not from the Party. Later, of course, stronger members of the Party came into the Gestapo. Their mission was at first to create all assurance of security against any action from the left. I knew and later was proved that the worth of the Communist in Berlin, the Liebknecht House, was strongly fortified, and contained many arms at that time. We exposed junctional connection between the Russian Economic delegation, and the Communist Party, and even with this I did that, and with one action arrested thousands of Communist Kommissars. At least an immediate danger was removed at the moment, but definitely not the danger as such. the network, to expose it, to watch it, and so on, and for that the police force had to be specialized of the official democratic party, certainly not merely as dangerous, because so far as the members were concerned, of course, the definite opponent of our State, or our new State, and a part of the number of their officials were more radical, and at this listing were radical more so, so I also prevented it; so the whole number of former social democratic ministers, oberpresident and higher officials, as I said before, were retired, naturally, and received their pension, and nothing was set against them.
Of course, there were other officials of the Party, of the social democratic party, whom we had to definitely watch carefully. So the secret State Police had charge of this work created by me in Prussia with that mission, because I had nothing to do with the other provinces at that time. The organization of the restof the police is not of such importance here. a peaceful situation, and to remove the most important element there against us, and I decided to do it in such a manner that I in one action wanted to arrest all the Communist Kommissars, so I had a list made for that purpose, and it was clear to me that even with that early most important danger of these kommissars, that there would be several thousand; because it was not only necessary to take them from the Party functionaries, but also the Red Front. The Communist also had affiliated organizations. These arrests were happening for the reasons of security, and necessity for the security of the State or Nation. The purpose was to remove a danger to the State. Only one possibility was developed to take those into custody, that is to say, this guard was created, so if the people at the moment could be charged with inactivity which was against the State, and which was in the way, whether it could be accepted from them, or regardless of that, they would have to be kept from, it, and those taken into custody it would be possible for them.
That was not new. It was not the National Socialist Convention influence, as far back as such measure already were a protective custody, which had been in the Reich at that time apparently against Communist, but also partly against ourselves, the National Socialist. The prison for that was not involved for that, and I want to stress from the very beginning that this was a political act for the protection of the State. be created a camp whore they were protected, and, of course, I could not feel at that time how long the internment of these people would be necessary. I could not say how in the serving, or investigation of this part of Communist, how much the number would be increased. When occupied the Karl Liebknecht house, we found so many arms, material, and preparation for a civil war. That, as I said, that this entire incident could not yet be for long. I have already, naturally, informed that in view of such political tension, high tension, that existed between the two wings of the political parties, that with also the view of fighting, of continuous fighting in the streets, plundering, which took place during the time in political fights, that there would not be an agreeable situation. In view of that possibility, therefore, I had issued directives, or directions, that the guard should be wherever possible with the police force, and only where that was not sufficiently available, then other forces should be used. that this name was not created by us, but that it appeared in the foreign press, and was made acceptable later from that end and made history. At the end of 1933 I have said in a book, which at first appeared in English, and which has already been presented by the Prosecution as in evidence, I have expressed quite frankly - that was at the end of 1933 when I wrote it, and I point out again for the English speaking countries that I have expressed the following sentence quite frankly:
may I quote it? "Of course, in the beginning it took place. Of course, here and there innocent people were subjected. Of course, the people were hit, and there were acts of brutality committed, but taken the measure of everything that happened before, and the greatness of what happened, this German revolution of freedom is believed ready in the most difficult of all revolutions of history so far."
Q Did you supervise or know anything about the treatment of the inmates?
They did happen and they happened everywhere to a smaller or larger extent, but I have alssys stressed that the things should not happen, one, because it was in my interest to regain some of these people far ourselves and re-educate them.
Q Did you do anything about it whenever you heard about instances? of 1934. As I said, at that time there were only two or three, at the most, in Prussia.
Witness Koerner has already mentioned the case of Thaelmann. I would like to speak about it, because it was the most outstanding, because Thaelmann Was the leader of the Communist Party. I could not say today who it was who made the remark to me that Thaelmann had been hit, beaten. to see me in my office, and I questioned him personally. I asked him personally and he told me that especially in the beginning he had been beaten during interrogations. Thereupon, as the witness has said already who was present, I told Thaelmann that I regretted that very much. At the same time I told him, "Dear Thaelmann, if you would have come to power, I probably would not have been beaten, but you probably would have chopped my head off." And he affirmed that in a very friendly manner. should happen in that direction to him or to others, that he should feel free to let me know; that I could not always be there, be present, but it was not my intention that any act of brutality should be committed against him. was not an unimportant one, Thaelmann's wife wrote to me and asked for my intervention. I answered her letter immediately, and also for that I have evidence. inasmuch as that was necessary. been mentioned and which belong in the category of excesses. At first I did not know anything about them, but then I found out about such a camp near Stettin.
It had been established by Gauleiter Karpfenstein from Pomerania. I had this camp closed immediately, which I can prove, and I made sure that those who were responsible for acts of brutality were accused by the prosecution. Karpfenstein was excluded from the Party, expelled from the Party. established. At this time I do not remember what happened. At any rate, it was not authorized by myself, this camp, and I had that dissolved immediately. Heines was one of those close collaborators of Roehm, about whom I will speak later. more, I do not remember the place anymore -- close to Berlin there was another wild concentration camp, of the SA leader Ernst of Berlin, whom I always had under suspicion of acts of brutality. He had established that camp secretly. That also was closed, and Ernst belonged to those nasty figures who were eliminated after the Roehm Putsch. That is a possibility, to question inmates of that time of these camps, 1933 and 1934, whether during that time to any extent things happened such as they happened later. inmates and at what time? lighter cases and those cases of whom one could assume that they had resigned themselves to the situation, I directed that about 5,000 should be released. I repeated that once more in December 1934 with 2,000 inmates.
I stress again that that only refers to Prussia. At that time, as much as I can remember -- I cannot say that precisely -- one camp was dissolved or at least closed temporarily. That fact was mentioned at a time when nobody thought that at any time it would be the subject of an investigation before a tribunal. camps?
A In fact until the beginning of 1934. That is to say until the beginning of 1934 I was in charge and Diehls under me. He reported to me about the Gestapo and also concentration camps. At that time, outside of Prussia, around Prussia, a regrouping of police took place, had taken place, in such a way that Himmler in all other provinces of Germany was in charge of the police with the exception of Prussia only.
That is to say, he took somewhat of an imitation of my measures. He had installed secret state police forces, because the police at that time still was a matter of the provinces. It was Bavaria, Saxon, and so on. desirous of also gaining the leadership of the police in Prussia. I was very satisfied with Diehls at that time, and from my point of view I saw no reason to let any change take place. Shortly after, in the spring of 1934, I had transferred the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of the Interior of the Reich, and was no more in that job. Prussian police. At that time I did not expressly oppose it. It was not agreeable to me. I could handle my police myself, but when the Fuehrer asked me for it and said that it would be the correct thing to do, and it would be necessary, would prove to be necessary that the enemy of the State should be fought all throughout the Reich in a uniform way, I transferred the leadership to Hitler, who put Heydrich in charge de jure; but I still kept it, because there was no Reich police at that time established. police, I did not turn over to him, because that police to a large extent, which I will explain later, was organized in Prussia militarily by me in order to be able to use it later for the rearmament. For this reason I could not give him the uniformed police, because they were established, trained, instructed according to military principles by myself and had little to do with real police work, until 1935 when they could be turned over to the Wehrmacht. Police was created. The office was created. Then also de jure, not only formally, legally the police was turned over to the Reichsfuehrer SS,Himmler, or, as he was called, the Chief of the German police.
Q You mentioned before the Roehm Putsch, Roehm Revolt. Who was Roehm, and what were the events?
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) I think we had better adjourn. It is 5:00 o'clock now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 14 March, 1946, at 1000 hours.)
BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Did you call the Party Program to have it compiled?
A No. The Party Program had been compiled and announced when I heard about the movement for the first time, and it was intact.
Q What are the views of this Party Program?
A On the whole positive. It was a matter, of course, that hardly any politician or man with a political mind who agreed with every point of a program of a political party. service?
Q Were they even to be achieved by every means, even illegal?
A Of course, they were to be achieved with every means. The conception "illegal" had better be clarified. If I aim at a revolution, then it is illegal for the State then in existence at the time. If that is achieved then they become the fact and they become legal and lawful. Until 1923, and the date November 9th, I and all of us had the view that we would achieve our aim, even if necessary of a revolution. After the Fuehrer returned from his conference, he decided that in the future we would proceed by legal means with a political fight, and "job up" on the other parties, and the Fuehrer prohibited any illegal action to avoid any setback in the activity of the Party.
Q When and with what aims was the SS created?
A The SS was created while I was absent abroad. I think it was in 1926 or 1927. Its aims, as far as I could judge at the time and remember nowwere to form a special body within the setup of the Party, and to offer protection for the person of the Fuehrer. Originally it was extremely small.
Q Did you at any time belong to the SS? form, neither actively nor passively. incorrect?
Q What did you understand by the word "herrenvolk", master race?
A I myself didn't understand anything of that word. In none of my speeches, in none of my writings, will you find that word. It is my view that if you are a master you don't have to emphasize it.
Q What do you understand by "lebensraum", living space?
A That conception is a very controversial one. I have full understanding, and I am asserting before signatories of the Charter, if such powers control more than three-quarters of the world would like to explain it differently. But for us, where 144 people live in one square kilometer, the words "living space" meant the proper proportion for the nourishment of the people and their living standard, and the finding of these conditions.
Q The conception which always arises again is the word "machtergreifung", accession to power.
A I should like to refer to that as a terminus technicus. We might as well have used another word, but this word expresses, in fact, as clearly as possible What did actually occur. That is to say, we got hold of power.
Q What is your attitude to the leadership principle?
A I stood and I still face it with a positive attitude. You must not make the mistake to think that the political structure in different countries has different origins, different developments. Something which suits one country extremely well would fail completely in another. Germany, through centuries, had a monarchy and always knew the leadership principle. Democracy appeared in Germany at a time when Germany was very badly off and had reached rock-bottom, I explained yesterday which political difficulties were in existence in Germany: