extremely ready about the sudden change of aviation, I had to be ready. I could, therefore, set forth any of the danger of the department which existed. I was liable to the outlying police, and of not any central position, or in the outlining of the position, but I had to increase the instrument of the police. was for security to the State.In order to make that clear I called the State Police the Central State Police, and at the same time looked for outlying places. I took out a number of non-political officials who were expert received, and in the beginning I took fewer from the Party, because I had to stretch my knowledge of the field. the security for the State, and against the enemy of the State position, and also the leader which I selected for that from the Party, to see that he came from the former police, he was already there. At that time it was the Oberregierungsrat and later Ministerialrat Diehls. Likewise, to remain so the other leaders of the Gestapo as officials were not from the Party. Later, of course, stronger members of the Party came into the Gestapo. Their mission was at first to create all assurance of security against any action from the left. I knew and later was proved that the worth of the Communist in Berlin, the Liebknecht House, was strongly fortified, and contained many arms at that time. We exposed junctional connection between the Russian Economic delegation, and the Communist Party, and even with this I did that, and with one action arrested thousands of Communist Kommissars. At least an immediate danger was removed at the moment, but definitely not the danger as such. the network, to expose it, to watch it, and so on, and for that the police force had to be specialized of the official democratic party, certainly not merely as dangerous, because so far as the members were concerned, of course, the definite opponent of our State, or our new State, and a part of the number of their officials were more radical, and at this listing were radical more so, so I also prevented it; so the whole number of former social democratic ministers, oberpresident and higher officials, as I said before, were retired, naturally, and received their pension, and nothing was set against them.
Of course, there were other officials of the Party, of the social democratic party, whom we had to definitely watch carefully. So the secret State Police had charge of this work created by me in Prussia with that mission, because I had nothing to do with the other provinces at that time. The organization of the restof the police is not of such importance here. a peaceful situation, and to remove the most important element there against us, and I decided to do it in such a manner that I in one action wanted to arrest all the Communist Kommissars, so I had a list made for that purpose, and it was clear to me that even with that early most important danger of these kommissars, that there would be several thousand; because it was not only necessary to take them from the Party functionaries, but also the Red Front. The Communist also had affiliated organizations. These arrests were happening for the reasons of security, and necessity for the security of the State or Nation. The purpose was to remove a danger to the State. Only one possibility was developed to take those into custody, that is to say, this guard was created, so if the people at the moment could be charged with inactivity which was against the State, and which was in the way, whether it could be accepted from them, or regardless of that, they would have to be kept from, it, and those taken into custody it would be possible for them.
That was not new. It was not the National Socialist Convention influence, as far back as such measure already were a protective custody, which had been in the Reich at that time apparently against Communist, but also partly against ourselves, the National Socialist. The prison for that was not involved for that, and I want to stress from the very beginning that this was a political act for the protection of the State. be created a camp whore they were protected, and, of course, I could not feel at that time how long the internment of these people would be necessary. I could not say how in the serving, or investigation of this part of Communist, how much the number would be increased. When occupied the Karl Liebknecht house, we found so many arms, material, and preparation for a civil war. That, as I said, that this entire incident could not yet be for long. I have already, naturally, informed that in view of such political tension, high tension, that existed between the two wings of the political parties, that with also the view of fighting, of continuous fighting in the streets, plundering, which took place during the time in political fights, that there would not be an agreeable situation. In view of that possibility, therefore, I had issued directives, or directions, that the guard should be wherever possible with the police force, and only where that was not sufficiently available, then other forces should be used. that this name was not created by us, but that it appeared in the foreign press, and was made acceptable later from that end and made history. At the end of 1933 I have said in a book, which at first appeared in English, and which has already been presented by the Prosecution as in evidence, I have expressed quite frankly - that was at the end of 1933 when I wrote it, and I point out again for the English speaking countries that I have expressed the following sentence quite frankly:
may I quote it? "Of course, in the beginning it took place. Of course, here and there innocent people were subjected. Of course, the people were hit, and there were acts of brutality committed, but taken the measure of everything that happened before, and the greatness of what happened, this German revolution of freedom is believed ready in the most difficult of all revolutions of history so far."
Q Did you supervise or know anything about the treatment of the inmates?
They did happen and they happened everywhere to a smaller or larger extent, but I have alssys stressed that the things should not happen, one, because it was in my interest to regain some of these people far ourselves and re-educate them.
Q Did you do anything about it whenever you heard about instances? of 1934. As I said, at that time there were only two or three, at the most, in Prussia.
Witness Koerner has already mentioned the case of Thaelmann. I would like to speak about it, because it was the most outstanding, because Thaelmann Was the leader of the Communist Party. I could not say today who it was who made the remark to me that Thaelmann had been hit, beaten. to see me in my office, and I questioned him personally. I asked him personally and he told me that especially in the beginning he had been beaten during interrogations. Thereupon, as the witness has said already who was present, I told Thaelmann that I regretted that very much. At the same time I told him, "Dear Thaelmann, if you would have come to power, I probably would not have been beaten, but you probably would have chopped my head off." And he affirmed that in a very friendly manner. should happen in that direction to him or to others, that he should feel free to let me know; that I could not always be there, be present, but it was not my intention that any act of brutality should be committed against him. was not an unimportant one, Thaelmann's wife wrote to me and asked for my intervention. I answered her letter immediately, and also for that I have evidence. inasmuch as that was necessary. been mentioned and which belong in the category of excesses. At first I did not know anything about them, but then I found out about such a camp near Stettin.
It had been established by Gauleiter Karpfenstein from Pomerania. I had this camp closed immediately, which I can prove, and I made sure that those who were responsible for acts of brutality were accused by the prosecution. Karpfenstein was excluded from the Party, expelled from the Party. established. At this time I do not remember what happened. At any rate, it was not authorized by myself, this camp, and I had that dissolved immediately. Heines was one of those close collaborators of Roehm, about whom I will speak later. more, I do not remember the place anymore -- close to Berlin there was another wild concentration camp, of the SA leader Ernst of Berlin, whom I always had under suspicion of acts of brutality. He had established that camp secretly. That also was closed, and Ernst belonged to those nasty figures who were eliminated after the Roehm Putsch. That is a possibility, to question inmates of that time of these camps, 1933 and 1934, whether during that time to any extent things happened such as they happened later. inmates and at what time? lighter cases and those cases of whom one could assume that they had resigned themselves to the situation, I directed that about 5,000 should be released. I repeated that once more in December 1934 with 2,000 inmates.
I stress again that that only refers to Prussia. At that time, as much as I can remember -- I cannot say that precisely -- one camp was dissolved or at least closed temporarily. That fact was mentioned at a time when nobody thought that at any time it would be the subject of an investigation before a tribunal. camps?
A In fact until the beginning of 1934. That is to say until the beginning of 1934 I was in charge and Diehls under me. He reported to me about the Gestapo and also concentration camps. At that time, outside of Prussia, around Prussia, a regrouping of police took place, had taken place, in such a way that Himmler in all other provinces of Germany was in charge of the police with the exception of Prussia only.
That is to say, he took somewhat of an imitation of my measures. He had installed secret state police forces, because the police at that time still was a matter of the provinces. It was Bavaria, Saxon, and so on. desirous of also gaining the leadership of the police in Prussia. I was very satisfied with Diehls at that time, and from my point of view I saw no reason to let any change take place. Shortly after, in the spring of 1934, I had transferred the Prussian Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of the Interior of the Reich, and was no more in that job. Prussian police. At that time I did not expressly oppose it. It was not agreeable to me. I could handle my police myself, but when the Fuehrer asked me for it and said that it would be the correct thing to do, and it would be necessary, would prove to be necessary that the enemy of the State should be fought all throughout the Reich in a uniform way, I transferred the leadership to Hitler, who put Heydrich in charge de jure; but I still kept it, because there was no Reich police at that time established. police, I did not turn over to him, because that police to a large extent, which I will explain later, was organized in Prussia militarily by me in order to be able to use it later for the rearmament. For this reason I could not give him the uniformed police, because they were established, trained, instructed according to military principles by myself and had little to do with real police work, until 1935 when they could be turned over to the Wehrmacht. Police was created. The office was created. Then also de jure, not only formally, legally the police was turned over to the Reichsfuehrer SS,Himmler, or, as he was called, the Chief of the German police.
Q You mentioned before the Roehm Putsch, Roehm Revolt. Who was Roehm, and what were the events?
THE PRESIDENT: (Interposing) I think we had better adjourn. It is 5:00 o'clock now.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 14 March, 1946, at 1000 hours.)
BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Did you call the Party Program to have it compiled?
A No. The Party Program had been compiled and announced when I heard about the movement for the first time, and it was intact.
Q What are the views of this Party Program?
A On the whole positive. It was a matter, of course, that hardly any politician or man with a political mind who agreed with every point of a program of a political party. service?
Q Were they even to be achieved by every means, even illegal?
A Of course, they were to be achieved with every means. The conception "illegal" had better be clarified. If I aim at a revolution, then it is illegal for the State then in existence at the time. If that is achieved then they become the fact and they become legal and lawful. Until 1923, and the date November 9th, I and all of us had the view that we would achieve our aim, even if necessary of a revolution. After the Fuehrer returned from his conference, he decided that in the future we would proceed by legal means with a political fight, and "job up" on the other parties, and the Fuehrer prohibited any illegal action to avoid any setback in the activity of the Party.
Q When and with what aims was the SS created?
A The SS was created while I was absent abroad. I think it was in 1926 or 1927. Its aims, as far as I could judge at the time and remember nowwere to form a special body within the setup of the Party, and to offer protection for the person of the Fuehrer. Originally it was extremely small.
Q Did you at any time belong to the SS? form, neither actively nor passively. incorrect?
Q What did you understand by the word "herrenvolk", master race?
A I myself didn't understand anything of that word. In none of my speeches, in none of my writings, will you find that word. It is my view that if you are a master you don't have to emphasize it.
Q What do you understand by "lebensraum", living space?
A That conception is a very controversial one. I have full understanding, and I am asserting before signatories of the Charter, if such powers control more than three-quarters of the world would like to explain it differently. But for us, where 144 people live in one square kilometer, the words "living space" meant the proper proportion for the nourishment of the people and their living standard, and the finding of these conditions.
Q The conception which always arises again is the word "machtergreifung", accession to power.
A I should like to refer to that as a terminus technicus. We might as well have used another word, but this word expresses, in fact, as clearly as possible What did actually occur. That is to say, we got hold of power.
Q What is your attitude to the leadership principle?
A I stood and I still face it with a positive attitude. You must not make the mistake to think that the political structure in different countries has different origins, different developments. Something which suits one country extremely well would fail completely in another. Germany, through centuries, had a monarchy and always knew the leadership principle. Democracy appeared in Germany at a time when Germany was very badly off and had reached rock-bottom, I explained yesterday which political difficulties were in existence in Germany:
the number of parties, continuous disquiet caused by elections. And, in that connection, a complete alteration of conceptions about authority and responsibility had arisen. The authority was with the masses; responsibility was with the leader. It should have been the opposite. it was important to employ all forces in a positive sense and to use the leadership principle; that is to say, authority at the top, working downwards, and responsibility at the lower level, working upwards. I consider that the only possibility. Naturally, I realize the fact that a principle can lead to the extreme.
May I use a parallel: Take the positive position of the Catholic Church, which is still relying on the leadership principle. And I think I may add to that that Russia, too, could not have survived the great difficulties of this war without the leadership principle. take place in full agreement with Reichspresident von Hindenburg? did take place in agreement with him. And as far as constitutional agreement from him was necessary in paragraph 41, that agreement was obtained.
Q Was the National Socialist Government recognized by foreign governments? remained recognized until the end, unless hostilities caused the diplomatic connections to be severed. rallies in Nurnberg? as being the great event and demonstration of cur movement They were invited and they arrived completely. Not every year, but one I recollect exactly.
Q Until what year? of political opponents?
A Laws were issued which decreed confiscation of the property of people hostile to the state; that is to say, of people we declared to be so.
The property of the Communist Party, with its accessories; the property of the Social Democratic Party, was confiscated. But not--and I want to emphasize that-but not the private property of the members or even leaders of these parties. On the contrary, a number of leading Social Democrats who had been ministers or civil servants were given their full pension. In fact, later on it was increased.
Q How do you explain the attacks against the trade unions? Did you proceed against free workers in that connection?
A First of all, the trade unions: Trade unions in Germany were, in their leading majority, very closely connected with the Social Democratic Party, and increasingly with the influ ence and activities of the communists, and through that with the Communist Party. If not formally, then in fact, there were organs, various active ones at that, of these parties with trade unions.
I am not talking about the masses of the people. I am talking about the group who were leading these trade unions. In addition, there was a smaller Christian trade union as well. these leaders with those parties we regarded as our opponents--they agreed with them to such an extent that they did not fit into our new state in any way. Consequently, the organizations of trade unions were dissolved, and the workers were given the organization of the German Workers Front instead. never take place. To the contrary, I am convinced that only we gave to the German worker real freedom, which consisted, in the first place, of his right to work, which we secured for him, and that his whole position in the state was particularly emphasized. characteristics of a freedom which I probably misunderstand, and we removed them. Freedom on one side and barring workers on the other. That could not tally with the right to work, and it would not agree with the duty to work, which every citizen has as a duty towards his nation. These two elements, which contributed to the number of unemployed, we removed and replaced with an enormous labor program.
Creation of work was another predominant point. Our social program has been adopted by others, though under a different name.
I do not propose to elaborate on their social programs at any length but it was the first time that the workers had the right to paid holidays and that I would only add as an aside.
Considerable recreational facilities were created for the workers. Enormous sums were set aside for workers' settlements. The whole living standard of the worker was raised. At that time the worker had been exhausted and exploited. He hardly had any property of his own because of years of unemployment and he had to sell everything or pawn it and thus, whout going into detail, I would like to say finally, that we havenot destroyed free workers but that we have liberated the worker and have relieved him of his unemploy ment.
Q You talked about the Roehm revolt yesterday. Who was Roehm and what was that revolt? that is to say, he was responsible to the Fuehrer, who was Supreme Commander of the SA as far as the matters of the SA were concerned and led it in theFuehrer's name. lile his predecessor Pfeffer, a more revolutionary way to be adopted whereas the Fuehrer, as I said earlier, desired legal developments, the final victory of which could be expected. to take into his hands the Reich Army Ministry. The Fuehrer refused that pointblank since he did not wish a political leader for the armed forces in any way or wished any political influences to be brought to bearon them. The differences between the armed forces and the Roehm group do not distinctly refer to a difference between the armed forces and the SA, that did not exist. It was merely a question of having these leaders in common and I refer to the SA leadership which did at that time actually exist. He desired to remove the majority of the generals and higher officers who had been members of the German Army all the time. It was his view that these officers did not offer a guarantee for the new state, since, as he expressed it, their backbone had been broken in the course of the years and since they were no longer capable of being active elements of the new National Socialist State.
this connection. the Reehm-minded people were (directed in a different direction and towards a revolutionary trend. They were opposed to what they called reaction. They desired to adopt a more leftish attitude. They were increasingly opposed to the church and very strongly opposed to the Jews. Altogether, however, and I only refer to the clique consisting of certain persons, they wished to carry out a revolutionary act; that Roehm placed all his people in leading positions in the SA and that the decent elements were removed and that the decent SA, without its knowledge, was misled, is a well known fact.
If perpetrations occurred during that time then they always occurred in connection with the same persons, that is to say, firstly originating from the Berlin SA leader Ernst, secondly the Breslau leader Heines, and the Munich man Stettin.
and told me that he heard that an action against the Fuehrer and his suite was being planned so that the Third Reich could expeditiously be replaced by the final Fourth Reich, an expression which these people used. I myself was urged and asked not only to place guards of a police regiment outside my house but to have a guard of honor of the SA as well. I had agreed and later on I heard from the commander of that troop just what the purpose of that guard of honor had been, namely that after a certain date they were to arrest me.
I knew Roehm very well. I had him brought to me. I put the things which I had heard openly to him. I reminded him of our mutual fight and I asked him to have extreme faith in the Fuehrer. He raised roughly the same arguments which I have just stated. But he assured me that, of course, he was not thinking of doing anything against the Fuehrer. Shortly afterward I received further news to the effect that he had close connections with those circles who also were strongly opposed to us and that was, first of all the group around the former Chancellor Schleicher, There was the group around the party member who had been excluded, and ex-member of the German Parliment, Strasser. There were the people who had been members of the former trade unions and had extended very far to the political left. I felt it my duty to consult the Fuehrer on the subject. I was astonished when he told me that he too knew about these things and that he considered them to be a threat. He said that he wished however, to await further developments and observe them carefully. described it here and I can leave it out. I was given the order in northern Germany to proceed immediately against those men of the group Roehm. Some of them were ordered to be arrested. As far as Ernst is concerned, the SA leader of Pomerania and two or three others, the Fuehrer ordered in the course of that day that they were to be executed. He himself went to Bavaria where the last meeting of a number of Roehm leaders was taking place at the time and arrested personally Roehm and these people at Wiessee.
At that time this whole matter presented a real threat since some SA units who had been deceived and given wrong orders had been armed.
At one spot only there was a very short fight and some SA leaders were shot. I deputized the arrest to the police which in Prussia then was under Himmler's and Heydrich's lead. When the headquarters of the SA leader Ernst, in Berlin, were occupied we found in the cellars of that headquarters more machine pistols then the whole Prussian Order Police had in their possession. observed at Wiessee, who should be shot and the order for Ernst, Heidebrecht and some of the other of Roehm's followers was issued. There was no order to shoot the other people who were ordered to be arrested, In the course of the arrest of the former Reich Chancellor Schleicher the killing of himself and his wife did occur. An investigation into this event took place and it was found that when Schleicher was arrested, according to the statements of two witnesses, he reached for a pistol to kill himself, possibly, whereupon these two men raised their pistols and Mrs. Schleicher threw herself upon one of them to hold him and he maintained that at that moment his revolver went off.
We deeply regretted that event.
had been shot as well, even some people who had nothing at all do with that Roehm revolt.
The Fuehrer came to Berlin that same evening. After I heard that later during that night, I visited him at lunchtime of the following day. I asked him to issue an order immediately that any further execution was prohibited by him, the Fuehrer, although two further people who were strongly involved and who had been ordered to be executed by the Fuehrer were still alive. These people were, in fact, left alive. I asked him to do that because I was worried that the whole matter would assume larger proportions, as, in fact, it had done to some extent, and I told the Fuehrer that under no circumstances should there be any further bloodshed. in my presence, and it was communicated to all departments concerned. The action was then announced in the Reichstag, and through the Reichstag and the Reichspresident recognized as an action in an emergency, and approved of. But of course, at the same time, it was regretted that, as in all such incidents, there had been a certain amount of perpetrations.
The number of victims has often been exaggerated. As for as I can remember exactly today, 72 or 76 people were concerned, and the majority of them were executed in Sourthern Germany. attitude of the Party and the State toward the churches?
A Certainly. But as my final remark on the Roehm Putsch, I should like to emphasize that I assumed full responsibility for the actions taken against those people by order of the Fuehrer, which I had passed on -- and I am referring to Ernst, Heidebrecht, and several others -- and that even today I am of the opinion that I acted correctly. That was confirmed by the Reichspresident, but no such confirmation was necessary to convince me that here was a danger to the State with which I had to deal.
On the attitude towards the churches. the Fuehrer is attitude was a generous one, at least at the beginning, absolutely generour. I would not like to say that it was positive in the sense that he himself was a convinced follower of any confession, but it was generous and positive in the sense that he recognized the necessity of churches.
Although he himself was a Catholic, he wished that there should be a stronger position for the Protestant church in Germany, since two-thirds of Germany was Protestant.
The Protestant church, however, was divided into county churches; various small differences were made, and that was the reason why they fought against each other and had a war for 30 years, but as far as we were concerned, it did not appear quite so decisive and important. They called themselves Reformed Union, Lutheran -- I cannot say myself just how many of them there were. highest clergyman of the Prussian Church, but I did not concern myself with these matters a great deal. he wanted to realize it by appointing a Reichsbishop so that there should be a high Protestant leader with the high Catholic leaders in the Reich. To begin with, he left the choice to the Protestant churches, but they would not agree. Finally, they produced one man and that was the only nan who didn't suit us. The man who became Reichsbishop hap had the Fuehrer's confidence to a larger degree than all the other bishops in the Reich. cluded through Herr von Papen. Shortly after that agreement was concluded by Herr von Papen, I visited the Pope myself, I had numerous connections with the higher Catholic clergy because of my Catholic mother, and in that manner I could enter both. I am a Protestant. all represented it and I represented it - and that was that politics should be removed from the churches. I didn't consider it right -- and that I would like to say quite openly -- that one day the priest in the church would humbly concern himself with the sould of his sheep and that the Following day, in Parliament, he would make a move or less belligerent speech. concentrate on their sphere of influence, and refrain from getting involved in political matters.