Considering the superiority of the British fleet, which can't even be expressed in figures, and considering the domination of the strategy of the seas by England, such a war appeared to us to be absolutely hopeless. The only means by which Britian, considering her general superiority, could have been damaged, was by submarine warfare; but even the submarine weapon as such was by no means being given preferential treatment or accelerated treatment. It was merely dealt with considering the general picture of our fleet. to sea, of which -- as far as I can remember -- only fifty percent could have been used in the Atlantic. That is in comparison with the far-reaching naval means at the disposal of Great Britain, practically nothing at all. As a comparison I should like to cite the fact that both the British and the French Navy, different at the same time, have more than 100 submarines each.
Q. Captain Doenitz -- as he was at the time -- did he as the head of the submarines have anything to do with the planning of the war?
A. Captain Doenitz at that time was a subordinate commander, a subordinate front commander, under the command of the Chief of the Fleet, and he had the task of developing the young submarine commanders, train them and lead them in practice based on his experience of warfare.
Q. Did he in turn have any suggestions to make recording the plans of the war ?
A. No, these preparations and this planning, in particular for the Case White -- were exclusively the task of the Supreme Command of the Navy.
Q. Did Doenitz at any previous time hear about the intentions for preparations of the war?
A. No.
Q. Did he have any orders to carry out his orders -
A. I am afraid I didn't understand the last part of your question.
Q. Did Admiral Doenitz hear of the military intentions of the Navy Command Staff at an earlier time that it was necessary for the carrying out of the order; which he had been given?
A No, he received his information by means of the orders which he was given by the Naval Command Staff.
submarine warfare? Did the Naval Command Staff draw any conclusions from the record of that agreement for their preparation for a war, in particular, a merchant navy war?
A Yes. The orders still existing from the last war/were reconsidered and they were coordinated with the protocol of London. For that purpose a committee was formed in which sat representatives from the Supreme Command of the Navy, the Foreign Office, the Reich Ministry of Justice, and scientific experts. before the war or was it communicated to them just when it was published just before the war? for the navy and it was available for the purpose of training officers. During the autumn maneuvers of the fleet in 1938 a number of exercises were arranged for the purpose of instructing the officer corps in this new regulation and make them acquainted with it. I, myself, at that time -
THE PRESIDENT: Where are the new prize regulations you are referring to?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: We are talking about the regulations published on the 26th of August, 1939, and which are contained in my document book. They are on page 137, in the third volume of my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I beg your pardon: the date is not the 26th, but the 28th of August, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has said that the exercises were carried out?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. May I continue?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q We were talking about 1938. Which conceptions did the Naval Command Staff nave after the beginning of the war, regarding the development of the naval war, the war at sea against Britain?
where, at the end of the first World War, she had stopped. That meant that there would he a blockade against Germany, a control of neutral countries as far as their merchandise was concerned, introduction of a system of control, the arming of merchant navy vessels, and the disintegration of certain concentration territories.
shown to you. It is Doenitz document No. 55. It can be found on page 139, in volume 3 of the document book. You will see from that that, to begin with, submarines, like other arms, had orders to adhere to this prize ordinance. And then, at the end of it, you will find an order which I propose to read to you. This is on page 140, a prepared order for the war against armed merchant ships of the enemy.
"First, troop and merchant navy vessels of the enemy are armed. Resistance must be expected. Submarines and merchant ships shall only be stopped if own vessels can't be endangered. Clearly recognizable whips can be let pass. If necessary, use of guns by merchant ships when stopping them." whether it was improvised at the last moment? we were issuing because there wasn't time to prepare them thoroughly,
Q Did this order become operative at all?
Q Why not? strictly adhere to the London agreement until we had clear-out evidence of the British merchant navy being used for military purposes. We recognized the power of the enemy propaganda from the last war and we did not under any circumstances want to give them cause once more to speak about us in the worse possible way. clear to the Naval Command Staff? few weeks of the war. We had a large number of reports about artillery fights which had occurred between U-boats and enemy merchant navy ships which werearmed. At least one or probably several boats were lost by us. One British steamer was, around about that tiie, praised public ly by the British Admiralty for its successes in combating submarines.
Q The Tribunal already has knowledge of the order of the 4th of October, allowing attacks against all armed merchant navy ships of the enemy, and also the order of October the 17th, allowing attacks on all enemy merchant navy ships with certain exceptions.
Were these orders the result of experiences made by the Naval Command Staff regarding enemy merchant navy ships?
A Yes. exclusively.
Q. These orders are containing certain exceptions regarding passenger ships. They weren't even to be attacked when they were members of an enemy convoy. To what are these exceptions due ?
A They were due to an order from the Fuehrer. At the beginning of the war he had stated that Germany did not have any intention of waging war against women and children. He wished, for that reason, that during the war at sea, too, any incidents should be avoided during which women and children might lose their lives. Consequently, even the stopping of any passenger ships was prohibited. The military necessities of naval warfare made it very difficult to adhere to this order, particularly, where passenger ships were travelling in enemy convoys. Later on, and step by step, this order was reduced and, when there was no longer any peaceful passenger traffic at all, after we knew that enemy passenger ships were particularly privileged; that is to say, particularly strongly armed, and where passenger ships, as long as they were still travelling, were more and more used as auxiliary cruisers and troop transport ships.
Q. The orders of the German Naval Command regarding the fights against armed enemy ships, were they made known to the British Admiralty?
A. The announcement of war measures of that type was not know on either side during the war and it didn't take place for that reason. But, in October, the German press left no doubt whatsoever that every armed enemy merchant ship would be sunk by us. Later on it was equally well known that the entire enemy merchant navy was regarded by us as being under military direction and in military use. British Admiralty and the neutral governments. Apart from that, and I think this was in October, Admiral Raeder gave an interview to the press which had a similar train.
Q. A memorandum was created in the middle of October, a memorandum of the Naval Command Staff, dealing with the possibilities to intensify the war against merchant shipping. I am point to have this memorandum shown to you. Its number is GB-224. Please, after locking at this memorandum, will you tell me what its purposes were and what the memorandum contains.
Mr. President, some extracts can be found on pace 199, in volume 4 of the document book.
A. The situation to which this memorandum was due was this: With the beginning of the war on the 3rd of September, 1939, Britain had begun a total hunger blockade against Germany. Naturally, that was not directed only against the fighting men, but against all non-fighting members, including women, children, and aged people in Germany. It meant that Britain would block all food rations and all luxury goods and clothing, just as all raw materials would be declared to be contraband; and there a strict control of shipping would, be introduced which would cut the neutral countries off from Germany, in practice at least, as far as it would have to go through waters controlled by Great Britain. Apart from that, England exercised a growing political pressure upon the European neighbors of Germany, trying to have them stop any exchange of merchandise with Germany. That intention of the total hunger blockade had been expressed by the chief of the British Government, Prime Minister Chamberlain, during the speech before the House of Commons at the end of September.
This was emphatically confirmed by him. He described Germany as a beleaguered fort; and he added that it wasn't customary that beleaguered forts should have any type of freedom. That expression of the beleaguered fort was taken up by the French press. October -- according to this memorandum it was on the 12th of October -- that in this war Britain would utilize her entire strength for the destruction of Germany. From this we drew the conclusion, also after the experiences of the last World War, that England would soon hit German exports under some pretext or other.
something which had no doubt been prepared for a long time during peace, we now had to try and catch up. We, of course, had not prepared the war against Great Britain. and we examined the possibilities at our disposal by which we might cut off Britain's supplies, That was the aim and purpose of that memorandum. regarding means for countering the British measures with corresponding German measures, doesn't it? according to which the Naval Command Staff would remain within the limits of International Law as laid down in Geneva, but that measures would even have to be introduced to which the existing International Law could be applied. Did this mean that International Law was to be disregarded by the Naval Command Staff, or what is its meaning? discussed at great length at that time. I should like to point out that on page 2 of the memorandum, in the first paragraph, the thought is being expressed that the orders regarding decent warfare must be applied to all measures of the war at sea. That would prevent any outrages right from the beginning. We did think, however, that the modern technical developments would create conditions for naval warfare which would certainly necessitate further development of the laws of naval warfare.
Q Which technical developments do you mean?
A In the first place, I am thinking of two points: conditions; even at the beginning of the war, that an opponent who could not be seen could be found and fought against. even though they do create new laws at sea. Did any such measures really arise?
A No --at any rate, not at once. In the meantime, I think on the 4th of November, the United States of North America declared the so-called American fighting zone, and the specific reason given for it was that in that zone actual battles, actual belligerent actions, would make the sea dangerous for American shipping. By this announcement some of the considerations of that memorandum were put out of date, and in practice we remained within the limits of such measures as had been employed by both parties during the First World War. zones? submarines were permitted to attack without warning in certain territories at sea. The date is beginning with January 1940. The attack was to be carried out, if possible, on sight, and if possible the ficticious story should be kept up that there were mines.
ware affected by it? I shall have a map handed to you for that purpose. I am submitting it to the Tribunal as Exhibit Doenitz 93.
A In the middle of the map you will find the British Isles. The large sea which is visible on the edge shows the mentioned battle zone, the battles zone I have mentioned, declared by the united States. The shaded parts of the sea near the British coast are these parts which were ordered to be German submarine operational zones. In accordance with the time when they were introduced, they were given letters from A to F.
Q Can you tell us up to which depth these German operational zones went?
Q Does this depth allow favorable use of mines? any difficulty.
Q In these operational zones, certain dates have been entered. Will you please explain how it happened that on these dates particularly, and in that sequence, these territories were made operational zones? a bunching up of enemy traffic and where there was a concentration of the enemy defense, and of course, in consideration of the forces which we were using against it. In other words, wherever there were central points of fighting. British mined zones, those which had been declared to be on the British East Coast, and apart from that, the Channel. You can see, therefore, zone a is the territory of Scotland. There is the date January 6, the same -- no, I beg your pardon. In the Bristol Channel there is the date January 12, and eventually, at the southern end of this forbidden zone, there is the date of January 24. Later on, considering the actual development of the fight, further territories around the British Isles and off the French Coast were declared to be similar.
Q Up to what date did this development continue?
Q Had neutrals been warned against entering these zones?
signify?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is, Mr. President, the declaration I have BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:and the declaration of August?
difference in practice. This fact had been stated by Prime Minister Churchill in the House of Commons at the time.
However, the difference which did exist focussing point of all belligerent action.
battle zone?
A It was nearly exactly the same as the USA battle zone. There were
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, I am submitting another map, Doenitz No. 92.
THE PRESIDENT: I think perhaps that would be a good time to break off (a recess was taken.)
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Now, Mr. President, as Doenitz No. 94, I wish to submit a chart of the German blockade, dated the 17th of August. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: the limitations of the German blockade region and the first U.S. fighting zone?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had already told us that. You told us that the blockade zone was the same as the American zone, didn't you?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I believed that we had not been understood quite correctly before the recess. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: opponents as far as this region was concerned? Was there any practice that they followed? identical with ours. In the regions controlled by us in the Baltic, in the Eastern, North Sea, and the Skagerrak and later on in the Norwegian and French waters, the opponents used ever possible means and used them without warning, without having notified us in advance just which means of combat our ships we to be sunk by -- U-boat, surface vessel, aircraft or whatever it might have been; and in those regions, the same thing applied to neutrals and especially in the later years. the First Lord of the British Admiralty. You will find this on page 208 of the document book; volume 4. This statement is dated the 8th of May 1940, and I have ascertained, Mr. President, that regrettably it was put down wrongly in the British book; therefore, I would like to quote from the origin "In order to make this work as effective as possible, the usual restrictions which we have imposed on the actions of submarine were relaxed.
As I told the House, all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk as opportunity served." I should like to submit this as Exhibit Doenitz 102.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the difference that you were making in the copy we have before us -- "... all ships were to be sunk by day and German ships by night ..." Is that it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. The last sentence, Mr. President should be corrected to read "ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk."
THE PRESIDENT: I see, I said ot wrong -- "and all ships by night." Yes, very well. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER : statement and this practice so far as the German ships were concerned? in this area were to be sunk without warning. ships? area by night are to be -
THE PRESIDENT: Surely the document speaks for itself. We don't need to have it interpreted by a witness who isn't a lawyer.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Very well. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: onward, according to German experiences, did this practice obtain in Skagerrak? 1940, but I believe I recall that even on the 7th of April, the practice was adhered to in accordance to this.
8th of April, had it already been declared as such? April, 1940, as far as this area is concerned. dealing with the British warned off zones and this shall have No. Doenitz 92. Please explain this chart briefly to the Tribunal and explain its significance.
applying to European waters on the basis of German materials as received.
Of significance the following areas may be characterized: First of all, in the German Bay, which on 4-9-1939 -- that is, on the second day of the war -- was declared as such. Then the danger zone already mentioned briefly, the Skagerrak. South Norway, which was declared on the 12th of April 1940. Then the danger zone in the Baltic, on the 14th of April 1940; and adjacent to that the other danger zones as declared in the year 1940. zones were declared as mine danger zones, with the one exception of the area of the Channel and of the Bay of Biscay, of the 17-8-1940. This was called a general danger zone. British sea or air forces, or did German traffic still take place? place. The Baltic Sea in its entire expanses to the West, about 400 sea miles of length, was declared a danger zone, and, in fact, during the entire war it was controlled and dominated by us. In this area there was an extensive traffic. The entire ore traffic from Sweden -
Q Was this just Germany or also neutral ships? as well participated in this traffic, for instance, Finland. A similar situation applied in the Skagerrak where, besides the German supply trains, foodstuffs for the Norwegian population was transported. Of course during this time German and neutral ships were lost.
A Yes. Personnel losses took place as well. zones were declared, were these German merchantmen armed -- that is, at the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940? From that period of time on a rather slight arming took place and anti-aircraft was inaugurated, and especially in regions which were very dangerous.
state ships, which dealt with the supply of German cruisers and auxiliary cruisers in the Atlantic, and were performing their mission there. which is found in the British document book on page 29. This document deals with an application by the commander of the U-boats that ships were to be sunk without warning in the Channel. Can you tell me just whose reasons we are dealing with, these reasons that are set forth in this document? concerned with a document of a U-boat expert in the Naval Warfare Staff.
Q And who was that? obtained, and were they approved by the Naval Warfare Command, or just how was the situation in dealing with them? expert, ideas which were in no way commensurate with the situation. The situated was as follows: British Expeditionary Corps left England for France. The transports ran on the whole during the night and were blacked out. At this time simultaneously there existed the order that French ships were neither to be stopped nor to be attacked. It is entirely clear that at night a blacked-out French ship cannot be differentiated from a blacked-out English ship, just as at night a merchantman can only with difficulty be differentiated or told apart from a war ship. These orders, therefore, meant that practically there could be confusion at night, and that German U-boats could not shoot at night, and, therefore, that the troop transport was entirely unhampered.
Then it was adcertained that a German U-boat in a good, favorable position of attack, confronted with an English transport with troops, had let this ship pass, even though they had 20,000 troops, since the possibility of confusion had been present. in this manner no naval war could be carried on. If a blacked-out ship was to be found in a belligerent area and on top of that in an area in which a strong supply and troop transport was going on, it would be suspicious and it could not be expected that the war would be halted at night for this reason. Therefore, we were not concerned with the question that we declared the sinking at sight of a ship and then gave the declaration that we had confused, it, but the situation at hand was that such a blacked-out ship is to be blamed itself if it is confused and, as a result of this confusion, is sunk. when they were sinking a merchant ship without warning, that they should make the notation in their log that they had considered it a battleship and that an order, a verbal order, to this effect was to be given to the commanders of the U-boats. Is this not correct, and was this thought carried out in actual practice? clear orders that at night in the Channel blacked-out ships may be attacked without warning.
A Yes. This clear order was issued, but nothing more.
correct, and if no orders were issued accordingly, how is it that these things may be found in the diary of the SKL, of the Naval Warfare Command? the SKL, the Naval Warfare Command. The war diary itself recorded the daily happenings. This was carried on by a collaborator, and it was signed by me and by the commanderin-chief of the SKL. Here we are concerned with the writing down of an expert which was to be a part of a group if files, and they were considered the basis of the war diary. were taken, and they were to be summarized without this actually having been approved or being put into practice.
A Yes. All of these materials were to be used for later purposes.
after the sinking of the Laconia, and did it approve of the measures taken by the commanders of the U-boats? that took place in the Laconia case. It approved of the measures taken by the commander, but it was not surprised at all at the commander in chief of the U-boats; and the first aerial attack on the U-boat would have stopped the entire rescue work. work was expereslly prohibited? Commander-in-chief for the U-boats. an order for the shooting of shipwrecked people?
A No; no one ever had this idea.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, at this point I should like to put several questions to the witness which have a bearing on the credibility of the witness, Heisig. But I should like to ask in advance whether there are any objections to my putting these questions, since my documents referring to the credibility of this witness Heisig were not ruled admissible.
THE PRESIDENT: Was the object of the questions which you were offering to put to this witness to show that the witness Heisig was not a witness who could be believed upon his oath? Was that your object?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The general object, Your Honor, is to show how the testimony of this witness originated; that is, the testimony which was submitted to the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by "originated"?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is to say, Your Honor, the basis of which influence on the witness this testimony originated.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the exact question you wanted to ask? Youmay state it, and we will let the witness wait until we have seen what the question is.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I should like to ask the witness, What did the witness Heisig report to you about the manner in which his affidavit came about which was submitted to the High Tribunal by the prosecution?
THE PRESIDENT: The question that you put, as I took it down, was, What did the witness Heisig report to you about the way his affidavit came about. Is that the question?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: what are you purporting to prove by getting the reports that Heisig may have made to this witness?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I should like to prove therewith, Mr. President, that Heisig was under a certain influence, and in this direction that he assumed incorrectly that he could help a comrade through his testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: Who applied for Heisig's affidavit?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I did not understand, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Heisig has given an affidavit, has he not?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That was for the prosecution, was it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is right.
THE PRESIDENT; And have you asked to cross examine him?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I did ask him, and I interrogated him about this in cross examination, yes.
THE PRESIDENT : You did?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, I did question him; and I put to him the contradictions which existed between his testimony here and between his affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I have not read the transcript in this point for about ten days. But I did read it then, and my recollection is that it was never suggested to the witness Heisig that he gave his affidavit under pressure, which I gather is the suggestion now. Your Lordship will remember that although we had the affidavit, we called the witness Heisig. He said that what was in his affidavit was true; and then he presented his evidence, giving a detailed account of all the relevant matters.
So we made it perfectly possible for Dr. Kranzbuehler to cross examine him at the time and to show any differences, as Dr. Kranzbuehler just said he purported to do, between the affidavit and his oral evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler has just said, I think, that he did actually cross examine him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: He did cross examine him on that point, on any differences that appeared between his affidavit and his oral testimony. But he was here to be cross examined, and if it is going to be suggested that the affidavit was obtained by improper means, that suggestion ought to have been made at the time, and then it could have been dealt with. Heisig has been away, and therefore no opportunity has been given to us either to investigate the matter or to have the evidence here, which could have been done when Heisig gave his evidence; and we could have been prepared for any contradictory evidence now. there are two distinct lines. If it was a question of whether Heisig's evidene was admissible or whether it had been obtained under pressure, then it would be quite possible to have this trial within a trial as to whether it was admissible or not. Heisig's evidence, then I respectfully, submit it falls within the same objective I made on Saturday to general evidence directed against the credibility of a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is suggested that there was any pressure put by the prosecution upon Heisig. I do not understand that is what you are suggesting, Dr. Kranzbuehler, is it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, not at all. But the picture as drawn was not true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I understood Dr. Kranzbuehler -- if I misunderstood him, so much the better - to say that he wanted to give this evidence as to certain influence. I thought that was the word used.
THE PRESIDENT: I think he meant not influence exerted by the prosecution but exerted by a mistaken notion in the witness's own mind that he was helping a friend.