DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Now, Mr. President, as Doenitz No. 94, I wish to submit a chart of the German blockade, dated the 17th of August. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: the limitations of the German blockade region and the first U.S. fighting zone?
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you had already told us that. You told us that the blockade zone was the same as the American zone, didn't you?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Mr. President, I believed that we had not been understood quite correctly before the recess. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: opponents as far as this region was concerned? Was there any practice that they followed? identical with ours. In the regions controlled by us in the Baltic, in the Eastern, North Sea, and the Skagerrak and later on in the Norwegian and French waters, the opponents used ever possible means and used them without warning, without having notified us in advance just which means of combat our ships we to be sunk by -- U-boat, surface vessel, aircraft or whatever it might have been; and in those regions, the same thing applied to neutrals and especially in the later years. the First Lord of the British Admiralty. You will find this on page 208 of the document book; volume 4. This statement is dated the 8th of May 1940, and I have ascertained, Mr. President, that regrettably it was put down wrongly in the British book; therefore, I would like to quote from the origin "In order to make this work as effective as possible, the usual restrictions which we have imposed on the actions of submarine were relaxed.
As I told the House, all German ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk as opportunity served." I should like to submit this as Exhibit Doenitz 102.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the difference that you were making in the copy we have before us -- "... all ships were to be sunk by day and German ships by night ..." Is that it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes. The last sentence, Mr. President should be corrected to read "ships by day and all ships by night were to be sunk."
THE PRESIDENT: I see, I said ot wrong -- "and all ships by night." Yes, very well. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER : statement and this practice so far as the German ships were concerned? in this area were to be sunk without warning. ships? area by night are to be -
THE PRESIDENT: Surely the document speaks for itself. We don't need to have it interpreted by a witness who isn't a lawyer.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Very well. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: onward, according to German experiences, did this practice obtain in Skagerrak? 1940, but I believe I recall that even on the 7th of April, the practice was adhered to in accordance to this.
8th of April, had it already been declared as such? April, 1940, as far as this area is concerned. dealing with the British warned off zones and this shall have No. Doenitz 92. Please explain this chart briefly to the Tribunal and explain its significance.
applying to European waters on the basis of German materials as received.
Of significance the following areas may be characterized: First of all, in the German Bay, which on 4-9-1939 -- that is, on the second day of the war -- was declared as such. Then the danger zone already mentioned briefly, the Skagerrak. South Norway, which was declared on the 12th of April 1940. Then the danger zone in the Baltic, on the 14th of April 1940; and adjacent to that the other danger zones as declared in the year 1940. zones were declared as mine danger zones, with the one exception of the area of the Channel and of the Bay of Biscay, of the 17-8-1940. This was called a general danger zone. British sea or air forces, or did German traffic still take place? place. The Baltic Sea in its entire expanses to the West, about 400 sea miles of length, was declared a danger zone, and, in fact, during the entire war it was controlled and dominated by us. In this area there was an extensive traffic. The entire ore traffic from Sweden -
Q Was this just Germany or also neutral ships? as well participated in this traffic, for instance, Finland. A similar situation applied in the Skagerrak where, besides the German supply trains, foodstuffs for the Norwegian population was transported. Of course during this time German and neutral ships were lost.
A Yes. Personnel losses took place as well. zones were declared, were these German merchantmen armed -- that is, at the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940? From that period of time on a rather slight arming took place and anti-aircraft was inaugurated, and especially in regions which were very dangerous.
state ships, which dealt with the supply of German cruisers and auxiliary cruisers in the Atlantic, and were performing their mission there. which is found in the British document book on page 29. This document deals with an application by the commander of the U-boats that ships were to be sunk without warning in the Channel. Can you tell me just whose reasons we are dealing with, these reasons that are set forth in this document? concerned with a document of a U-boat expert in the Naval Warfare Staff.
Q And who was that? obtained, and were they approved by the Naval Warfare Command, or just how was the situation in dealing with them? expert, ideas which were in no way commensurate with the situation. The situated was as follows: British Expeditionary Corps left England for France. The transports ran on the whole during the night and were blacked out. At this time simultaneously there existed the order that French ships were neither to be stopped nor to be attacked. It is entirely clear that at night a blacked-out French ship cannot be differentiated from a blacked-out English ship, just as at night a merchantman can only with difficulty be differentiated or told apart from a war ship. These orders, therefore, meant that practically there could be confusion at night, and that German U-boats could not shoot at night, and, therefore, that the troop transport was entirely unhampered.
Then it was adcertained that a German U-boat in a good, favorable position of attack, confronted with an English transport with troops, had let this ship pass, even though they had 20,000 troops, since the possibility of confusion had been present. in this manner no naval war could be carried on. If a blacked-out ship was to be found in a belligerent area and on top of that in an area in which a strong supply and troop transport was going on, it would be suspicious and it could not be expected that the war would be halted at night for this reason. Therefore, we were not concerned with the question that we declared the sinking at sight of a ship and then gave the declaration that we had confused, it, but the situation at hand was that such a blacked-out ship is to be blamed itself if it is confused and, as a result of this confusion, is sunk. when they were sinking a merchant ship without warning, that they should make the notation in their log that they had considered it a battleship and that an order, a verbal order, to this effect was to be given to the commanders of the U-boats. Is this not correct, and was this thought carried out in actual practice? clear orders that at night in the Channel blacked-out ships may be attacked without warning.
A Yes. This clear order was issued, but nothing more.
correct, and if no orders were issued accordingly, how is it that these things may be found in the diary of the SKL, of the Naval Warfare Command? the SKL, the Naval Warfare Command. The war diary itself recorded the daily happenings. This was carried on by a collaborator, and it was signed by me and by the commanderin-chief of the SKL. Here we are concerned with the writing down of an expert which was to be a part of a group if files, and they were considered the basis of the war diary. were taken, and they were to be summarized without this actually having been approved or being put into practice.
A Yes. All of these materials were to be used for later purposes.
after the sinking of the Laconia, and did it approve of the measures taken by the commanders of the U-boats? that took place in the Laconia case. It approved of the measures taken by the commander, but it was not surprised at all at the commander in chief of the U-boats; and the first aerial attack on the U-boat would have stopped the entire rescue work. work was expereslly prohibited? Commander-in-chief for the U-boats. an order for the shooting of shipwrecked people?
A No; no one ever had this idea.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Mr. President, at this point I should like to put several questions to the witness which have a bearing on the credibility of the witness, Heisig. But I should like to ask in advance whether there are any objections to my putting these questions, since my documents referring to the credibility of this witness Heisig were not ruled admissible.
THE PRESIDENT: Was the object of the questions which you were offering to put to this witness to show that the witness Heisig was not a witness who could be believed upon his oath? Was that your object?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: The general object, Your Honor, is to show how the testimony of this witness originated; that is, the testimony which was submitted to the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by "originated"?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is to say, Your Honor, the basis of which influence on the witness this testimony originated.
THE PRESIDENT: What is the exact question you wanted to ask? Youmay state it, and we will let the witness wait until we have seen what the question is.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I should like to ask the witness, What did the witness Heisig report to you about the manner in which his affidavit came about which was submitted to the High Tribunal by the prosecution?
THE PRESIDENT: The question that you put, as I took it down, was, What did the witness Heisig report to you about the way his affidavit came about. Is that the question?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: what are you purporting to prove by getting the reports that Heisig may have made to this witness?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I should like to prove therewith, Mr. President, that Heisig was under a certain influence, and in this direction that he assumed incorrectly that he could help a comrade through his testimony.
THE PRESIDENT: Who applied for Heisig's affidavit?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I did not understand, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Heisig has given an affidavit, has he not?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: That was for the prosecution, was it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: That is right.
THE PRESIDENT; And have you asked to cross examine him?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I did ask him, and I interrogated him about this in cross examination, yes.
THE PRESIDENT : You did?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Yes, I did question him; and I put to him the contradictions which existed between his testimony here and between his affidavit.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: My Lord, I have not read the transcript in this point for about ten days. But I did read it then, and my recollection is that it was never suggested to the witness Heisig that he gave his affidavit under pressure, which I gather is the suggestion now. Your Lordship will remember that although we had the affidavit, we called the witness Heisig. He said that what was in his affidavit was true; and then he presented his evidence, giving a detailed account of all the relevant matters.
So we made it perfectly possible for Dr. Kranzbuehler to cross examine him at the time and to show any differences, as Dr. Kranzbuehler just said he purported to do, between the affidavit and his oral evidence.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler has just said, I think, that he did actually cross examine him.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: He did cross examine him on that point, on any differences that appeared between his affidavit and his oral testimony. But he was here to be cross examined, and if it is going to be suggested that the affidavit was obtained by improper means, that suggestion ought to have been made at the time, and then it could have been dealt with. Heisig has been away, and therefore no opportunity has been given to us either to investigate the matter or to have the evidence here, which could have been done when Heisig gave his evidence; and we could have been prepared for any contradictory evidence now. there are two distinct lines. If it was a question of whether Heisig's evidene was admissible or whether it had been obtained under pressure, then it would be quite possible to have this trial within a trial as to whether it was admissible or not. Heisig's evidence, then I respectfully, submit it falls within the same objective I made on Saturday to general evidence directed against the credibility of a witness.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think it is suggested that there was any pressure put by the prosecution upon Heisig. I do not understand that is what you are suggesting, Dr. Kranzbuehler, is it?
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: No, not at all. But the picture as drawn was not true.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I understood Dr. Kranzbuehler -- if I misunderstood him, so much the better - to say that he wanted to give this evidence as to certain influence. I thought that was the word used.
THE PRESIDENT: I think he meant not influence exerted by the prosecution but exerted by a mistaken notion in the witness's own mind that he was helping a friend.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL FYFE: I see. Then, My Lord, that merely goes to credibility and it does then fall within my general objection; that is if we are going to have evidence as directed on credibility, we can go on ad infinitum.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbuehler, the Tribunal will allow this question to be put in this particular instance, but they make no general rule as to the admissibility of such questions.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Thank you very much Mr. President. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: with the witness. affidavit rested A he told me the following personally:
At the interrogation he had been told that Oberleutnant Hoffman or Kapitaenleutnant Eck had testified that at that time he had listened to the speech by Doenitz at Erlhaven in the autumn of 1942, and that he had considered this as a demand for the killing of survivor of shipwrecks Heisig had been told "If you confirm this testimony of Hoffmann, then you will save not only Eck and Hoffmann, but two others who would have been sentenced as well. You will save then from death, and you will prevent judicial proceeding against the Captain from being instituted. against Grand Admiral Doenitz is of such tremendous weight that his life has been played away anyway." sion of the speech by the Grand Admiral, he had been in a stress of spiritual conflict. He had been at Luebeck, and there he had seen the terrific consequence of an air attack. He had lived through this attack and he had seen the consequences-- well, perhaps he had not lived through it, but he had seen the terrific consequences. He was for revenge against those total measures, and he considered it possible that these happenings might have been influenced by Doenitz' speech.
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
THE PRESIDENT: If the prosecution desire to do so, they can, of course, recall Heisig for the purpose of investigating this further.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If your Lordship pleases, Heisig is no longer here; that is the difficulty when this is done in this order. However, we can on consider the matter, My Lord, and we are grateful to the Tribunal for the permission.
THE PRESIDENT: Is Heisig not in custody? Is that what you mean?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, he is no longer in custody,
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: He is studying medicine at Munich, Your Honor, he can be very easily reached.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER: and what were your tasks in that capacity? the following: Doenitz counted on a much more critical situation in the war. He believed that one day he night be forced to separate himself from the Navy and its command, and that he night have to be at the Fuehrer headquarters for a longer period of time in order to stay abreast of the development of the entire war situation, or that there night be a transfer of the Naval Command -- that is, a change from Berlin-because of the continued heavy air attacks. For this purpose the Grand Admiral wanted on alder and experienced naval officer in his immediate vicinity, an officer who was well versed in the problem of sea warfare and who knew about the entire problem of naval war.
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, of the SKL and the other officers and departments, commanders-in-chief, for the duration of the separation of the Grand Admiral from the High Command.
Q. Did you accompany the Grand Admiral regularly on his visits to the headquarters?
A. Yes; from the period of time mentioned I was present regularly.
Q. Now I shall submit to you a list of these visits, which has been submitted by the prosecution as GB-207. This may be found in the document book of the prosecution on page 56. are correct.
A. The dates are correct, but, mostly at the end, the list does not seem to be complete. There are some gaps. Pertaining to the period from the 10th of April until the 21st of April, 1945 -- at that time the Grand Admiral participated for the last time at the briefing sessions in the Fuehrer's headquarters. Beyond that, it seems to me that the list of the people present is incomplete. I do not know with just what view or with just what idea in mind this list was compiled.
Q. Look at the list of people given. Has Admiral Doenitz present and was he with these people constantly on these dates mentioned, or does this mean only that these persons were at the Fuehrer headquarters together with him? Can you still recall these points?
A. Yes. If these people participated in the military briefings, then Doenitz at least saw them. Of course, people in high positions were frequently at the Fuehrer headquarters who did not participate in the briefing sessions, and these people the Grand Admiral did not see during these visits.
Q. For what reason did Admiral Doenitz -
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, upon this point, if the witness is saying that any one of these minutes is incorrect, I should be very grateful if he would specify it, because we can get the original German minutes here and and confirm the affidavit.
Mr Lord, the witness has said that he thinks these are incorrect. They are summaries of the minutes, and if he wants to say that any one is wrong. I shall he very glad to pet the minutes and compare it.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: I believe the witness said only that additional people participated in these discussions and that, at the end, some of the conferences are lacking. However, I do not know just what he has to say. Perhaps the prosecution will deal with that matter in cross examination.
THE PRESIDENT: But Sir David wants him to specify which are the ones, if he can. He wanted him to specify, if he could.
DR. KRANZBUEHLER: Very well. BY DR. KRANZBUEHLER:
Q. Admiral, can you tell me more exactly, as to any one of these dates, whether these present are correctly names, or whether there were other people present, or whether Doenitz was not present?
A. I can only tell you exactly that this list is incorrect because it did not ever occur that not either Field Marshal Keitel or Colonel-General Jodl were present at the headquarters. For example, on 4/3/45, neither one of these men is mentioned, nor on 6/3 or 8/3. Therefore, I conclude that this list cannot be complete. In other wpots, however, the name of Jodl is seen; for example, on the 18th of March, 1945.
and was present in the Fuehrer headquarters on all of these days. Can you confirm that point? am of the opinion that the list is correct in that connection, for the frequency of the visits of the Grand Admiral corresponds with the things set down in this list, and spot checks show me that the dates are correct. headquarters? What were his reasons? frequent toward the end of the war, was the intention to keep abreast of the development of the general war situation so that he, Doenitz, could carry on the leadership of the Navy and the Navy war in accordance with the general situation; and among that, mostly, or frequently, points were to be regarded or to be discussed which the Grand Admiral out of his own authority could not decide for himself but because of their importance he wanted to report on then personally for points which he wanted to discuss with the representatives of the OKW and of the General Staff, and wished to discuss them personally. Admiral to the Fuehrer?
A The matter was as follows: Most of the problems for the Fuehrer took place when the general Naval matter was discussed. This matter was taken care of then. he was at the headquarters?
Q And what is the chief session? day and lasted several hours. This I am referring to as the chief session; but beyond, this and perhaps for months sometimes in just an exceptional case there was an evening session at whichthe Grand Admiral participated only when it was to be expected that certain measures were to be discussed which applied to his Navy and were especially Important for him. And that is what I meant.
put to the Fuehrer, were taken care of at the main briefing. Were there personal reports? very seldom. Personal discussions with the OKW and the other military departments at the headquarters, that was something which took place daily. so-called Lagebesprechungen, the briefing session. The prosecution seems to consider this briefing session as sort of a fourth Cabinet at which, for instand Ribbentrop would report about foreign policies, Speer about questions of production. Himmler about security questions. Is this a correct picture? who participated regularly and who came in just once in a while? following: The permanent participants from the OKW, Fieldmarshal Keitel, Colonel General Jodl, General Buhle, Captain At Sea Assmann, Buechs, and a few ethers. Then the Chief of the General Staff of the Army with one or two aides generally; also the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force -the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force with one or two aides. General Bodenschatz, until the 20th of July, 1944; Vice Admiral Foss, who was the permanent Deputy of the Grand/Admiral; Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein, Colonel Deputy Hewel; Sonnleitner, permanent Deputy of the Foreign Ministry; Reich Press Chief, Dr. Dietrich. Frequently the following participated: Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe; quite frequently Himmler; in addition to those there was a varying participation on the part of special officers from the General Staff of the Army and from those who were just present first, Commanders in Chief of the Army and of the Air Force. increasing measure Reichsminister Speer, in his capacity as Armament Minister, and in other very seldom cases the Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop.
And they were there as listeners.
Q Who reported at these briefing sessions and what was reported on? situation, the war situation, and to tell him through the General Staff of the Army about the Eastern situation through the OKW, about the situation on all other theaters of war, and concerning all three branches of the Wehrmacht. The situation report took place as follows: situation; then Colonel General Jodl reported on the situation in all other theaters of war on land. Then Captain Assmann of the OKW reported on the situation on the sea; then the last, Major Buechs from the OKW, reported on the air situation; and in between frequently conversations took place which dealt with military specific problems, sometimes for aircraft, aerial problems. And when the aerial problems were dealt with the situation was cleared up, the meeting was concluded, we left the room. And I saw frequently the Ambassador Hewel had a batch of reports from the Foreign Office, brought them to Hitler, reported on them without the rest of us knowing just what did take place. consultation, or who gave the orders? and frequently decided on a military basis by the Fuehrer, that is, that no further preparations for decision were called for. present? at these briefing sessions and I cannot remember that he participated or uttered any statement during the entire session. He was there for his own information and participated at this situation report.
Q How about Minister Speer, What was he doing there? seldom had a word during the discussion. I know that questions of armament were discussed between Hitler and Speer but they were dealt with in special discussions and conversations.
But there may be some exceptions to this in this case. discussing questions of security, or what was his mission?
A No. During the military briefing session security problems were net mentioned at all. Himmler and his deputy appeared, they appeared very frequently, in connection with the Waffen SS, and Fegelein had to give permanent reports about the deployment of the SS divisions. At this time the SS divisions in my opinion played an especially large part, for, ostensibly, they were a part of the strategic part of the Army and therefore had to be dealt with.
Q I have a record which was given by you. It has the number GB 209 and it says in the third paragraph -- I will read one sentence to you -- in the document of the Prosecution, GB 209, Mr. President -- it is not found in any document book and I am just reading one sentence. It says there the Deputy of the Reichsfuehrer SS at the Fuehrer headquarters SS Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein brought about the question of the Reichsfuehrer when the Panzer -- that is, when the tanks, could be counted on.
Is that a typical mission of SS Fegelein?
A Yes. That was the kind of questions which were dealt with as a matter of course at every one of these sessions. did he speak or report?
A I cannot remember one single utterance on Kaltenbrunner's part during one of these military briefing sessions.
Q What role did Admiral Doenitz play at these session discussions? reported by the deputy from the OKW, Assmann, but the Grand Admiral used the occasion of the naval war problems in connection with the individual theaters of war; or at the end, he reported on those questions and discussed these questions which he had wanted to present. As far as question of the war by air or by land was concerned, it had no connection with the naval war. The Grand Admiral was neither asked nor did he give any opinion. In his statements he strictly confined himself to the sphere of the war Navy, and very energetically objected if someone else during the situation discussion tried to interfere in his sphere of influence.
