"Any attempt by the Soviet Union in obtaining from Norway a position on the Atlantic Coast would be contrary to the vital interests of the Allies, and would provoke that appropriate reaction."
THE PRESIDENT: You don't need to read the document, do you? I mean you can tell us what the substance of it is. It appears it is an objection as to any further attack upon Finland and would be considered by the Allies to be contrary to their vital interests. That is all.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, this word "vital interests" is a decisive one. I do not wish, as the prosecution seems to think, to bring an objection. I want to show only how, according to International Law, our position was, and at the same time There Grand Admiral Raeder had certain processes of thought regarding Norway, Greece and so forth, at the same time the Allied Agencies had the scene thoughts, and they were basing their thoughts on the same idea, the International Law, which was established by Kellog, and that was the right of self-preservation, and that this right was maintained, and I can show my point only through these documents.
THE PRESIDENT: The point made against you by Sir David was that the document could not have come into the hands of the German authorities until after the fall of France.
DR. SIEMERS: Now, I shall deal with the groups as designated by Sir Dav:
Sir David laid down certain basic expositions and clarifi-
cations. Regarding Document Numbers 28 and 29 he mentioned specifically and pointed out that in one case these were the thoughts of General Gaelin and in the other case thoughts of General Weygand and that these thought processes were not known to the Germans at that time since these documents were not in our hands at that time. The latter point is correct. Processes of thought and the plan to occupy Greece, to destroy Romanian oil wells, those thoughts were known to the Germans, and through their Intelligence the Prosecution had data -- did not present the dada of the German O.K.W. which show these reports. Since I do not have these data I believe it would be well if I have the possibility, to quote the known facts which were known to Germany at the time and to prove the facts that way, since I have not other May of proving these facts that it is so easy for the Prosecution to take from documents which I need for the presentation of my case. And I can understand that, but the Prosecution must also understand the fact that I must insist that those documents which are definite proof for plans should remain at my disposal. Grand Admiral Raeder has been accused that an aggressive war was a criminal war of aggression, and that the planning of the occupation of Greece was to be considered as such. Document Number 29 shows that General Weygand and General Gamelin on the 9th of September 39 concerned themselves with the planning for the occupation of neutral Saloniki. In this is the case I cannot understand how that on the German side German Admiral Raeder would be accused that a year and half later he also concerned himself with such plans. I do believe therefore that these and similar documents should be granted me, for only from them can the military planning and the value of the military planning, or the objectionable side, that is, the criminal side of the planning -- be seen and understood. The stratigic thinking of the defendant can be understood only if one knows approximately what strategic thinking was carried on at the same time by the opposition ; the strategic reasoning of Grand Admiral Raeder isn't in a vacuum, but it depends on those reports andintelligence reports which he received about the strategic planning of the oppostion, of the enemy.
It is a mutual effect and this idea of the muttual effect -- cause and effect -- is necessary for a complete understanding, therefore, in connection with this very essential point of view, to grant me these documents, since as I have already stated the other day that I do not Know just how in these grave accusations regarding Norway I can carry on my defense at all if all of my documents be stricken. I do believe that I Have been understood correctly that I do not assert that we knew these documents. I am saying that Germany knew the contents of these documents, and I believe it is sufficient for me to state that fact.
66, Group A. This Document Number 66 is the expert opinion of Dr. Mosler, an expert at international law, about the aspect of the Norwegian campaign as seen in the light of international law. I would have my doubts about rejecting this official report, for a refusal of this document would force me to set forth the trend of thought detailed point by point, and I believe that for the High Tribunal, for the Prosecution and for me it is much easier if in this connection I may in general bring those -
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a document which is a matter of legal argument. If the Tribunal think it would be of any assistance to have the argument in documentary form, I would willingly withdraw my objection to that. That is on quite a different project than the other one, and I want to help in any way I can As I am before the microphone:
I did mention that there were two other documents that fall into the same group. Number 34 falls into Group 3 and Number 48 into the Group E.
DR. SIEMERS: May it please the High Tribunal, I do not wish to dispute Number 66, I just wanted to ease the situation for everyone. And further documents are 101 to 107 in this group. These are documents. I cannot say that this is a unified group. One document deals with Norway, the other deals with Belgium, the third deals with the Danube. The unity of this group escapes me. As a matter of basic principle those documents have this point in common, that, as I have already stated, a planning was present in the Allied general staff as well as in the German, and all were based on the international law tenet of self-preservation; and in order to be brief at this point I should like to refer to Document 66 particularly, and to save time I ask that the citations, the quotations which I will quote from 66, be the reasons dealing with the right of self-preservation. I am referring to the quotations on Page 3 and Page 4 of this expert report, that the legal evaluation is made very clear herein, and it is set forth very clearly in this expert report that as far as the question of occupation is concerned -- occupation of Norway, that is -- we are not concerned with that, but if the Allies had as a matter of fact landed in Norway, the question was only whether such a plan actually existed -- that we are not concerned with, the fact whether Norway agreed or did not agree.
The danger of a change ofneutrality according to inter national law prescribes the right to use preventative measures or to attack on your own accord; and this basic tenet according to the entire literature which is quoted in this document, has been maintained. And in my speech later on I will refer to this point. specially. Document 107 is not concerned with the Reichs books like the other documents are. 107 is an affidavit by Schreiber. Schreiber was the Naval attache from October 1939 onward and he had this post at Oslo. From the beginning I have said that I needed Schreiber as a witness. In the meantime, I dispensed with Schreiber because even though we tried for weeks, we could not find him. I discussed this matter with Sir David and with Colonel Phillimore. I was advised in this matter that there should be no objection on this formal point since Schreiber suddenly and of his own accord reappeared again.
If, as the prosecution wishes, this piece of evidence is taken from me - -
and by that I mean the affidavit of Scheiber about the Intelligence reports which Grand Admiral Raeder received from Oslo and, beyond that, the documents from which the authenticity of these Intelligence reports may be shown, then I have no means of proof for this entire question at all. Schreiber was at Oslo during the entire period of occupation and he can testify as to the behavior of the Navy; he can testify as to the efforts of Grand Admiral Raeder in connection with the regrettable civil administration. They talked about this and ha can testify on that point. Therefore, I am asking the High Tribunal to grant this affidavit to me or, on the other hand, to grant Schreiber as a witness so he can testify before the Court. This latter course, however, would take up more time. I have tried to limit my evidence to such a decree that I believe in the entire span of fifteen years with which we are dealing in the case of Defendant Raeder such an affidavit should be granted me. already made. The group seems to be rather Heterodox, but I believe they are all documents taken from the White Book. That is, the same trend of thought still applies.
THE PRESIDENT: I think Sir David recognized that there was a certain decree of lack of identity in these groups but he suggested that they all fill into geographical groups, one group the Low Countries, one group Norway, one group Greece, and one group the Caucasus and the Danube, which agrees with "E". That is what he said. Couldn't you deal with them in those geographical groups?
DR. SIEMERS: Very well. I have already briefly mentioned Greece and would like to say briefly in this case that there was a double accusation raised: 'One, that neutral ships had been sunk - that is neutral Greek ships; and a second accusation of the aggressive war against Greece and by that the occupation of all Greece. the Greek merchantmen I would like to say only that in this case the action and demeanor of the Defendant seems justified in that when he received Intelligence reports, which are in accord with the documents which were found a month later in France, the same reports were received by Raeder when he told his point to Hitler.
I would like to prove that these reports which came to him through the Intelligence Service were actual facts, and the same applies to the oil regions where plans existed to destroy Roumanian oil wells; and, furthermore there was a plan to destroy the Caucasian oil wells.
Both of these plans were with the ideal of damaging the enemy, first of all German, and in the second case Russia, because at that time Russia was friendly with Germany. These plans are and this is shown by the document - - in the same form as all other documents presented by the prosecution. These documents as well, in their entirety, are top secrets; they are personal, confidential. They had these labels; just as the prosecution has always said, why did you do everything secretly, that to us seemed suspicious. These documents contain an instance of a strategic planning idea as do the documents presented by the prosecution. That is something which arises from the nature of war and which is not meant to be an accusation on my part, and it should not be construed as an accusation against Grand Admiral Raeder by the prosecution.
Then the group of the Ribbentrop documents follows. I can say only that which I said the other day, and as I glance at it cursorily now, the documents in the Ribbentrop document book are not as complete as they are here. Therefore, I believe it is important to take the documents with their complete content and to investigate them with the point of view of Raeder rather than the point of view of Ribbentrop. That perhaps may have taken place as the High Tribunal suggested the other day. Then I believe, however, it is no objection to be used by the prosecution, to say that these were Ribbentrop documents and in the case of Ribbentrop they were partially admitted and partially rejected, for some which were granted Ribbentrop were refused me.
Then we turn to Group "E" and that is tuque quo (??) I believe I have already said sufficient on that point the other day. I dispute it again and I can not understand why the prosecution will not agree with me on that. I do not with to object. I am not saying tu quoque *---* . I am saying only that there is strategic planning which is carried on in every war and there are tenets in international law which applied to the Allies as well as to us; and these foreign political possibilities of comparison, I beg they be granted me.
for me to define my position and comments in such a brief period of time on about forty documents, and I am asking the High Tribunal to facilitate my work by not refusing these documents to me.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will carefully consider these documents and your arguments.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 17 May 1946, at 1000 hours.)
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal have given careful and prolonged attention to the consideration of the documents offered by Dr. Siemers on behalf of the Defendant Raeder; and they, therefore, do not wish the documents which they propose to admit to be read, because they have already read them all.
Document 74 is denied.
who made that document.
THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle) That is Admiral Boehme.
THE PRESIDENT: Admiral Boehme, yes.
Have I gone too quickly for you, Dr. Siemers? You have the last few?
DR. SIEMERS: Yes, I heard everything.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, yesterday afternoon the Tribunal asked that we ascertain the origins, if possible, of document 1014 PS. Some question was rais about it by Dr. Siemers, It is U. .A. Exhibit No. 30. to submit concerning this document. all concerning this same speech made at Obersalzberg on the 22nd of August, 193 They were offered in evidence by Mr. Alderman of the American staff on the 26th day of November, 1945.
I should like to point out that L-3, to which Dr. Siemers made reference yesterday, was offered only for identification, as the record shows, for the proceedings of that day on the 26th of November, and has received the mark U.S. Exhibit No. 28 for identification only. Mr. Aldermann pointed out, as appears i the record, that he was not offering it in evidence, that it was a paper which came into our hands originally through the services of a newspaperman, and that later on, the documents 798 PS and 1014 PS were found among captured documents.
They referred to the same speech in Obersalzberg. Mr. Aldermann offered those two at that time.
Now Document 789 P.S, U.S.A. 29, and Document 1040 P. S., U.S.A. 30, were both found by the forces of the United States in this fashion:
They had been taken from the O. K. W. Headquarters in Berlin and in the course of various journeys in those days, before they finally arrived at any one place, they were stored at various places by the O. K. W., under the control of General Winters of the German forces, and they were transported in three railway trains to Solfelden in the Austrian Tyrol. Subsequently, General Winters ordered that all documents in his possession be turned over to the Allied forces and they were, and these particular documents, together with other papers were turned over by General Winters and his staff, and on the 21st day of May, 1945, they were removed from Solfelden from under the control of General Winters and taken to the third U.S. Document Center at Munich, and while at Munich they were catalogu ed by Department G-2 of the American Expeditionary Forces with the assistance of Clerks from the O. K. W. and O. K. H., and on the 16th of June, 1945, these documents, with others, were removed by six trucks from the Headquarters of the Third Army at Munich, and were taken to the U.S. Group Control Council No. 32 at Seckenheim, Germany, which was located in the former offices of the I. G. Farben Company, and were placed on the third floor of the building and kept under guard between the 16th of June, 1945 and the 30th of August, 1945. documents was carried out under the supervision of the British Colonel Austin, with personnel of the Supreme Court and the G-2 Document Division of the Intelligence Section, 6889 Berlin Document Section and the British Enemy Document Unit and the British Military Intelligence Research Section, beginning from the 5th day of July,1945, and continued until the 30th of August, 1945. United States Chief Counsel, and Lieutenant Margolis who is here in the court room, and members of his staff, personally picked these documents out of our file 789 P. S. and 1040 P. S. from the captured files, and locked them in the document room where they have been kept under strict security ever since.
Now, that is the history of these documents about which Dr. Siemers raised a question yesterday, a considerable question, and inferred there was something strange about their contents, and I think the statement as given over the signature of Lieutenant Commander Hofer?
clearly establishes the source and where they have been ever since, and I think it is only fair to say that since Dr. Siemers pointed out this language as having been extremely harsh and Which was attributed to Hitler, these documents show they were actually talking about aggressive war, and the reading of the documents by the Tribunal Till show they are in accordance with the purpose for which they wereoffered, which was to show these people were talking aggressive war, and I might say I am not surprised to find my friend is sensitive about the language, but I think the actual proof in the case thus far shows that not only were these things said but they were done.
M. DUBOST: May it please the Court. No doubt it is a mistake in transla-
tion. We understood Document 106 had been rejected the first time.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear the number.
M. DUBOST: We understood 106 had been rejected the first time and admitted a second time in the group 102 to 107.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was my mistake. I did say that the group 102 to 107 were admitted, but I have also said 106 was rejected and it is rejected. It is entirely my mistake. 106 is rejected.
MR. DUBOST: 106 is thrown out and 102 to 107 are also rejected are they?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I will state the exact number: 103, 104, 105 and 107 are admitted.
M. DUBOST: Very good. MR. President, we want to offer further explanations on 102 to 107 during the course of the proceedings.
DR. SIEMERS: MR. President, may I say just one other thing concerning the statement made by MR. Dodd? documents were handled since they were found was absolutely correct, and Mr. Dodd spoke only about that, but what I believe is important is the following: documents, because from that only one can say whether these were documents belong ing to a certain Adjutant. For instance, were they together with the Hossbach papers or together with the Schmundt file. If the documents, for instance, were together with the Schmundt documents it is a probability it was from the Adjutant.
THE PRESIDENT: That all goes to the weight of the document, doesn't it. No doubt, a document which is signed has more weight than a document which is not signed. All of those matters the Tribunal will take into account when considering the documents, but the admissibility of the document depends upon it's being a German document found and captured.
DR. SIEMERS: MR. President, I only want to say this, because I am sorry if the American Delegation misunderstood my motion concerning the document. I am not reproaching the manner in which the document was handled or found, but I am only doubtful among which papers it was, and it came to my attention that Mr. Dodd treated the three documents concerned in quite the same way today as Mr. Alderm on page 188 of the transcript said that none of these documents on account of it's doubtful origin, and apparently that is the three, and therefore, refused that document.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
I believe we can finish with the questions entirely. I ask you to look at the Document C.155. That is G. B. 214. In document book 10, page 24, the document of the British Delegation, page 24. It is your handwriting of the 11 June 1940, and a letter which was sent to 74 Navy officers and which the Prosecution has called a document of justification. The Prosecution wants to deduct from that that already in the summer of 1933 you knew that a war was to be expected. I should like you to speak very briefly. the fall at all, and in view of the small extent of rearmament of Germany was quite natural. I have mentioned that in my speech before the U-boat officers clearly and distinctly that we could not count on it.
Q And what was the cause for that writing, for that letter? be explained by the fact that also these torpedoes were not quite perfectly developed such as it should be at the beginning of a war, would have to be at the beginning of a war. And furthermore, the cause was that the officers, now that the war has broken out, believed, many of them did so, that it would have been more correct if first the submarine forces should have been developed as strongly as possible so that this weapon at least should be ready in case a war should break out at the earliest possible moment; and I objected to that opinion, and with the reason that we did not have to expect such a war. And on Page 3, 8th paragraph, I emphasize again that, as you find it in the second line, the Fuehrer hoped until the end to avoid or postpone the menacing dispute with England until 1944 or 1945. I emphasize here I am speaking of a menacing dispute. The menace of a dispute is something one doesn't at all desire. We were rather afraid of it.
Q There is another key document, that is, 789 P.S., U. S. 23, the very long speech made by Hitler on the 23rd November 39 before the commanders in Chief.
DR. SIEMERS: The document, Mr. President, is in document 10-A on page 261. 261, Book 10-A. Again this is the Hitler speech of which one doesn't know who recorded it, and just as with the other documents, I do not have to speak about that point; signature and date, that is.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
background, a definite thought of Hitler, behind it?
A Yes. There was at that time a severe conflict between Hitler and the Commander in Chief of the Army, and a difference of opinion also with the leading Generals concerning the offensive under way, and the Fuehrer assembled all the various leaders in order to give them his opinion about all these matters. He explained -- and I was present myself -- that up to that time he had always been right in his decisions, and also with that opinion, that if an offensive had to be started in the fall it would be correct; he had been proved correct. Again, he used very harsh words, and in the third paragraph towards the last of the document "I shall destroy everyone who is against me." And that was directed against the generals. weather delayed it. we do not have to go into that now. Then, and in the same connection, we come to the last document, that is, C. 126, which you have also in front of you, G. B. 41 in the document book 10-A on page 92, concerning the preparation of the war against Poland. The Prosecution has submitted their document of the 22nd June 1939 of the High Command of the Armed Forces signed by Keitel because that document contained a time-table for the war against Poland. Did that document or that directive contain or show to you a definite intention, aggressive intention?
A No. A definite intention of aggression not at all. But certain questions had to be cleared up, certain long range questions, such as, for instance, whether our training ships which used to go out and put to sea in summer should put to sea or whether they should await that decision, which should be made in the beginning of August.
And in connection with that order I issued the order pertaining to that document of the 2nd August to the individual higher Navy officer; that is an operative decree; for the use of Atlantic submarines in the Case Weiss; and I may be permitted to read the first lines, because the wording is important "Attached are operational directions for the employment of U-boats which are to tention to carry out "Fall Weiss" remaining uncharged.
Flag Officer of U-boats in handing in his Operation Orders to SLK by 12 August. A decision on the sailing of U-boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August. These directions must, if the Operations are not carried out, be destroyed by the 1 September 1939 at the latest. " cause it was a precautionary measure which had to be taken under all circumstances according to directive for the Case Weiss. him personally, that there would not be a war, particularly a war against England
Q Now, then, on the 3rd September 39 war with England came about.After that -- and if so when -- did you speak then with Hitler about that question? remember the exact hour I was called into the Reichschancellory -- the S.K.N. ha informed me already that the ultimatum had been received from England and Franceand I came into the study of the Fuehrer where a number of persons were assemble I still remember that Deputy of the Fuehrer Hess was present. I could not say who else was there. But I noticed particularly that Hitler was embarassed in speaking to me when he told me that against all of his hopes, now war against England was imminent, since the ultimatum had been received. It was an express embarassm* such as I had never noticed from Hitler. you, Admiral, agreed with National Socialism and sponsored it greatly.
DR. SIEMERS: May I also be permitted to sak the Tribunal to look at Document D.481, which is G.B 215 in Document Book 10, Page 101. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q That deals with the oath of civil servants and the oath of soldiers. The Prosecution with reference to this document has explained that you, Admiral, on the 2nd of August 34 and with special ceremonies, took an oath on Adolf Hitler, and not the nation. In the protocol, that is the transcript 2719, the English transcript 2719, the German transcript 2791, we read:
"The Tribunal will see that Raeder in his oath put the Fuehrer in the place of his country". it is correct that you -- or whether you had any part in changing of the oath from country to Hitler.
A No. I cannot understand that accusation at all. The entire matter was not particularly a ceremony and I cannot understand who could have observed it so that he could make a statement like that. The Commander in Chief, von Blomberg, the three commanders of the branches, and I, in the morning of the 2nd August, were called to Hitler; we were in his study; and Hitler asked us to come to his place without any ceremony, and there we took that oath which he as Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed-Firces read to us.
We repeated that oath. None of us participated in the writting of that oath. Nobody asked us to do so. It would have been quite unusual. The oath referred to the person of Hitler It had never been an oath to the country as far as the words were concerned, but once I took an oath on the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord, one oath on the Weimar Constitution, and the third oath on the person of the Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces -- Hitler. In all three cases I took the oath on my people, my country. That is a matter of course.
Q Admiral, when you were ordered to that meeting on 2 August, did you know before what it was to deal with?
A Well, I should assume so, that through the Adjutant's Office information had been sent to my Adjutant that I should come there and that it would have to do with the taking of the oath; but I could not state with certainty now, I should assume so.
Q It was the morning after the death of Hindenberg?
Q On the day after the Death of Hindenberg?
Q Did you know about the wording of the oath? were informend about the wording before, at the desk there.
DR. SIEMERS: May I say at this moment, Mr. President, that the wording is contained in the document that I have mentioned and it is a Reich Law. The Prosecution asserts that on 30 January, 1937, you became a party member by receiving the Golden Party Emblem. Would you speak briefly about this point which we have discussed in otherrcases before? that this was the highest decoration which he could give at the time. I could not become a party member at all because it had been stated that soldiers could not be members of the party. That was generally known and therefore that assertion cannot be understood.
Q The membership of soldiers was prohibited by the constitution?
A Yes. May I say one more thing about it. It was prohibited both by the Weimar Constitution and also according to the decrees which Hitler had issued. clerical ideology, which was very well known, and how did that work out? Did you have any difficulties with the Party on account of that? best explained by the fact that the Navy had a suitable amount of prestige in the Party, such as this, in Germany, Frictions which occured were always taken care of by higher officers in cooperation with the respective Party officers. if they were more important they came to my attention and I took care of them;