They referred to the same speech in Obersalzberg. Mr. Aldermann offered those two at that time.
Now Document 789 P.S, U.S.A. 29, and Document 1040 P. S., U.S.A. 30, were both found by the forces of the United States in this fashion:
They had been taken from the O. K. W. Headquarters in Berlin and in the course of various journeys in those days, before they finally arrived at any one place, they were stored at various places by the O. K. W., under the control of General Winters of the German forces, and they were transported in three railway trains to Solfelden in the Austrian Tyrol. Subsequently, General Winters ordered that all documents in his possession be turned over to the Allied forces and they were, and these particular documents, together with other papers were turned over by General Winters and his staff, and on the 21st day of May, 1945, they were removed from Solfelden from under the control of General Winters and taken to the third U.S. Document Center at Munich, and while at Munich they were catalogu ed by Department G-2 of the American Expeditionary Forces with the assistance of Clerks from the O. K. W. and O. K. H., and on the 16th of June, 1945, these documents, with others, were removed by six trucks from the Headquarters of the Third Army at Munich, and were taken to the U.S. Group Control Council No. 32 at Seckenheim, Germany, which was located in the former offices of the I. G. Farben Company, and were placed on the third floor of the building and kept under guard between the 16th of June, 1945 and the 30th of August, 1945. documents was carried out under the supervision of the British Colonel Austin, with personnel of the Supreme Court and the G-2 Document Division of the Intelligence Section, 6889 Berlin Document Section and the British Enemy Document Unit and the British Military Intelligence Research Section, beginning from the 5th day of July,1945, and continued until the 30th of August, 1945. United States Chief Counsel, and Lieutenant Margolis who is here in the court room, and members of his staff, personally picked these documents out of our file 789 P. S. and 1040 P. S. from the captured files, and locked them in the document room where they have been kept under strict security ever since.
Now, that is the history of these documents about which Dr. Siemers raised a question yesterday, a considerable question, and inferred there was something strange about their contents, and I think the statement as given over the signature of Lieutenant Commander Hofer?
clearly establishes the source and where they have been ever since, and I think it is only fair to say that since Dr. Siemers pointed out this language as having been extremely harsh and Which was attributed to Hitler, these documents show they were actually talking about aggressive war, and the reading of the documents by the Tribunal Till show they are in accordance with the purpose for which they wereoffered, which was to show these people were talking aggressive war, and I might say I am not surprised to find my friend is sensitive about the language, but I think the actual proof in the case thus far shows that not only were these things said but they were done.
M. DUBOST: May it please the Court. No doubt it is a mistake in transla-
tion. We understood Document 106 had been rejected the first time.
THE PRESIDENT: I did not hear the number.
M. DUBOST: We understood 106 had been rejected the first time and admitted a second time in the group 102 to 107.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid it was my mistake. I did say that the group 102 to 107 were admitted, but I have also said 106 was rejected and it is rejected. It is entirely my mistake. 106 is rejected.
MR. DUBOST: 106 is thrown out and 102 to 107 are also rejected are they?
THE PRESIDENT: No, I will state the exact number: 103, 104, 105 and 107 are admitted.
M. DUBOST: Very good. MR. President, we want to offer further explanations on 102 to 107 during the course of the proceedings.
DR. SIEMERS: MR. President, may I say just one other thing concerning the statement made by MR. Dodd? documents were handled since they were found was absolutely correct, and Mr. Dodd spoke only about that, but what I believe is important is the following: documents, because from that only one can say whether these were documents belong ing to a certain Adjutant. For instance, were they together with the Hossbach papers or together with the Schmundt file. If the documents, for instance, were together with the Schmundt documents it is a probability it was from the Adjutant.
THE PRESIDENT: That all goes to the weight of the document, doesn't it. No doubt, a document which is signed has more weight than a document which is not signed. All of those matters the Tribunal will take into account when considering the documents, but the admissibility of the document depends upon it's being a German document found and captured.
DR. SIEMERS: MR. President, I only want to say this, because I am sorry if the American Delegation misunderstood my motion concerning the document. I am not reproaching the manner in which the document was handled or found, but I am only doubtful among which papers it was, and it came to my attention that Mr. Dodd treated the three documents concerned in quite the same way today as Mr. Alderm on page 188 of the transcript said that none of these documents on account of it's doubtful origin, and apparently that is the three, and therefore, refused that document.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
I believe we can finish with the questions entirely. I ask you to look at the Document C.155. That is G. B. 214. In document book 10, page 24, the document of the British Delegation, page 24. It is your handwriting of the 11 June 1940, and a letter which was sent to 74 Navy officers and which the Prosecution has called a document of justification. The Prosecution wants to deduct from that that already in the summer of 1933 you knew that a war was to be expected. I should like you to speak very briefly. the fall at all, and in view of the small extent of rearmament of Germany was quite natural. I have mentioned that in my speech before the U-boat officers clearly and distinctly that we could not count on it.
Q And what was the cause for that writing, for that letter? be explained by the fact that also these torpedoes were not quite perfectly developed such as it should be at the beginning of a war, would have to be at the beginning of a war. And furthermore, the cause was that the officers, now that the war has broken out, believed, many of them did so, that it would have been more correct if first the submarine forces should have been developed as strongly as possible so that this weapon at least should be ready in case a war should break out at the earliest possible moment; and I objected to that opinion, and with the reason that we did not have to expect such a war. And on Page 3, 8th paragraph, I emphasize again that, as you find it in the second line, the Fuehrer hoped until the end to avoid or postpone the menacing dispute with England until 1944 or 1945. I emphasize here I am speaking of a menacing dispute. The menace of a dispute is something one doesn't at all desire. We were rather afraid of it.
Q There is another key document, that is, 789 P.S., U. S. 23, the very long speech made by Hitler on the 23rd November 39 before the commanders in Chief.
DR. SIEMERS: The document, Mr. President, is in document 10-A on page 261. 261, Book 10-A. Again this is the Hitler speech of which one doesn't know who recorded it, and just as with the other documents, I do not have to speak about that point; signature and date, that is.
BY DR. SIEMERS:
background, a definite thought of Hitler, behind it?
A Yes. There was at that time a severe conflict between Hitler and the Commander in Chief of the Army, and a difference of opinion also with the leading Generals concerning the offensive under way, and the Fuehrer assembled all the various leaders in order to give them his opinion about all these matters. He explained -- and I was present myself -- that up to that time he had always been right in his decisions, and also with that opinion, that if an offensive had to be started in the fall it would be correct; he had been proved correct. Again, he used very harsh words, and in the third paragraph towards the last of the document "I shall destroy everyone who is against me." And that was directed against the generals. weather delayed it. we do not have to go into that now. Then, and in the same connection, we come to the last document, that is, C. 126, which you have also in front of you, G. B. 41 in the document book 10-A on page 92, concerning the preparation of the war against Poland. The Prosecution has submitted their document of the 22nd June 1939 of the High Command of the Armed Forces signed by Keitel because that document contained a time-table for the war against Poland. Did that document or that directive contain or show to you a definite intention, aggressive intention?
A No. A definite intention of aggression not at all. But certain questions had to be cleared up, certain long range questions, such as, for instance, whether our training ships which used to go out and put to sea in summer should put to sea or whether they should await that decision, which should be made in the beginning of August.
And in connection with that order I issued the order pertaining to that document of the 2nd August to the individual higher Navy officer; that is an operative decree; for the use of Atlantic submarines in the Case Weiss; and I may be permitted to read the first lines, because the wording is important "Attached are operational directions for the employment of U-boats which are to tention to carry out "Fall Weiss" remaining uncharged.
Flag Officer of U-boats in handing in his Operation Orders to SLK by 12 August. A decision on the sailing of U-boats for the Atlantic will probably be made at the middle of August. These directions must, if the Operations are not carried out, be destroyed by the 1 September 1939 at the latest. " cause it was a precautionary measure which had to be taken under all circumstances according to directive for the Case Weiss. him personally, that there would not be a war, particularly a war against England
Q Now, then, on the 3rd September 39 war with England came about.After that -- and if so when -- did you speak then with Hitler about that question? remember the exact hour I was called into the Reichschancellory -- the S.K.N. ha informed me already that the ultimatum had been received from England and Franceand I came into the study of the Fuehrer where a number of persons were assemble I still remember that Deputy of the Fuehrer Hess was present. I could not say who else was there. But I noticed particularly that Hitler was embarassed in speaking to me when he told me that against all of his hopes, now war against England was imminent, since the ultimatum had been received. It was an express embarassm* such as I had never noticed from Hitler. you, Admiral, agreed with National Socialism and sponsored it greatly.
DR. SIEMERS: May I also be permitted to sak the Tribunal to look at Document D.481, which is G.B 215 in Document Book 10, Page 101. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q That deals with the oath of civil servants and the oath of soldiers. The Prosecution with reference to this document has explained that you, Admiral, on the 2nd of August 34 and with special ceremonies, took an oath on Adolf Hitler, and not the nation. In the protocol, that is the transcript 2719, the English transcript 2719, the German transcript 2791, we read:
"The Tribunal will see that Raeder in his oath put the Fuehrer in the place of his country". it is correct that you -- or whether you had any part in changing of the oath from country to Hitler.
A No. I cannot understand that accusation at all. The entire matter was not particularly a ceremony and I cannot understand who could have observed it so that he could make a statement like that. The Commander in Chief, von Blomberg, the three commanders of the branches, and I, in the morning of the 2nd August, were called to Hitler; we were in his study; and Hitler asked us to come to his place without any ceremony, and there we took that oath which he as Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed-Firces read to us.
We repeated that oath. None of us participated in the writting of that oath. Nobody asked us to do so. It would have been quite unusual. The oath referred to the person of Hitler It had never been an oath to the country as far as the words were concerned, but once I took an oath on the Kaiser as Supreme War Lord, one oath on the Weimar Constitution, and the third oath on the person of the Chief of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces -- Hitler. In all three cases I took the oath on my people, my country. That is a matter of course.
Q Admiral, when you were ordered to that meeting on 2 August, did you know before what it was to deal with?
A Well, I should assume so, that through the Adjutant's Office information had been sent to my Adjutant that I should come there and that it would have to do with the taking of the oath; but I could not state with certainty now, I should assume so.
Q It was the morning after the death of Hindenberg?
Q On the day after the Death of Hindenberg?
Q Did you know about the wording of the oath? were informend about the wording before, at the desk there.
DR. SIEMERS: May I say at this moment, Mr. President, that the wording is contained in the document that I have mentioned and it is a Reich Law. The Prosecution asserts that on 30 January, 1937, you became a party member by receiving the Golden Party Emblem. Would you speak briefly about this point which we have discussed in otherrcases before? that this was the highest decoration which he could give at the time. I could not become a party member at all because it had been stated that soldiers could not be members of the party. That was generally known and therefore that assertion cannot be understood.
Q The membership of soldiers was prohibited by the constitution?
A Yes. May I say one more thing about it. It was prohibited both by the Weimar Constitution and also according to the decrees which Hitler had issued. clerical ideology, which was very well known, and how did that work out? Did you have any difficulties with the Party on account of that? best explained by the fact that the Navy had a suitable amount of prestige in the Party, such as this, in Germany, Frictions which occured were always taken care of by higher officers in cooperation with the respective Party officers. if they were more important they came to my attention and I took care of them;
if they only dealt with matters of principle I passed them on to the O.K.W.
Since I never let anything slip through in case it had been started by the Party the entire relation soon worked out very well and I could prevent all sorts of friction, so that soon none of them occured. In that respect, We were at an advantage in the Navy because there were no territorial questions. We were concerned with the sea and only in the coastal cities, port cities where practically everything was concerned with the Navy. I had difficulties, and that is essential, through the personality of Heydrich, whom I had to remove from the Navy in 1929 after an Honor Court had sentenced him for bad treatment of a young girl. That he held against me for a long time and he has tried several times, on various occasions, to denounce me with the leadership of the Party, and even the Fuehrer; but I could always counteract these attacks so there were no consequences for my relations in general. This attitude of Heydrich inflicted itself also on Himmler, so that here also, from time to time, I had to write a rather strong worded letter; but just the strong wording of these letters, in most cases, served as a remedy. I should not like to waste any more time by mentioning details, such as the one with the SD, but a direct attack on account of my position to the Church did not occur. There was only the statement made by Goebbels which I found out about through my co-defendent, Hans Fritsche, that I was disfavored with the Party on account of my attitude to the church; but as I have said, they did not make me feel it in any disagreeable way. Navy does not need any more explanation here by me. I will submit the affidavit without reading it. It was made by Navy Chaplain Ronneberger, who described it, and that will clarify great deal. In that connection, However, may I put one question: To Hitler, did you also emphasize that a clerical attitude was necessary of the soldiers of the Navy? the end without hesitation.
DR. SIEMERS: In this connection, I want to submit Raeder Exhibit No. 121. It is in my document book Raeder No. 60, page 523. I should not like to bother the Tribunal by questioning about the disputes in clerical matters between the Party and the Navy and their contrasting views. I believe that by this document it is made clear enough that a relation between church and National Socialism was not possible.
In this field Bormann is the most outstanding figure, and of the expose which I have submitted I should like to read only the first paragraph "National Socialistic and Cristian concepts are incompatible. Cristian churches are built on the ignorance of men and make it their business to preserve the ignorance of as extensive part of the population as possible, as only in this way can the Cristian churches maintain their power. In contract to this, National Socialism rests on scientific foundations."
The second paragraph, the last sentence: "If therefore in the future our young people do not learn anything more about this Cristianity, the teachings of which are far below our own, then Cristianity will disappear of itself."
And, on the second page: "Just as the harmful influence of astrologers, soothsayers and other swindlers must be eliminated and suppressed by the State, so the possibilities for influence by the Church must also be entirely removed. Only when this has happened, will the State Leadership have full influence over the individual citizen. Only then will people and Reich be assured stability for all time." I believe this is enough to show the contrast between the Party and the Defendant in these matters. BY DR. SIEMERS: ed to the Secret Cabinet Council and the Defense Council. Will you please answer quite briefly, because these questions have been discussed so widely that I assume that nobody in this court will hear anything new about these things. Were you a member of the Reich Government?
Q According to Document 2098 PS. which is GB 206, Document Book 10, Page 39, a decree of the Fuehrer of 25 February, 1938, according to that decree you were given the same rank as a Reich minister, such as the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army?
THE PRESIDENT: Is it 10 or 10-A?
DR. SIEMERS: 10.
THE PRESIDENT: 39 is a translation of C-170.
DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon. I just hear from Sir David that it is 89.
in rank to the Reich Ministers. The Prosecution asserts that therefore you were a member of the Cabinet and were permitted to participate in the meetings and did participate, is that correct?
A No. I was not a Reich Minister, but only equivalent in rank, and the reason that I believe until Keitel was made equal in rank with the Reich Minister because in the execution of the activities of the War Ministry he had very much to do with than and had to be on the same level with them in order to negotiate. And since Brauchitsch and myself were senior in rank to Colonel General Keitel we also received the same rank. I was not a member of the Cabinet at all. But it says in that directive that on the order of the Fuehrer I could participate in a Cabinet meeting. The intention probably was that when technical matters had to be explained I could come to the Cabinet; but it never occured, since after that time there were no Cabinet meetings. "Following my orders he shall participate in the meetings of the Reich Cabinet." that such as Hitler told me himself, that Secret Cabinet Council had only been formed in order to create some position for the Foreign Minister, von Neurath, who was leaving, and in order to retain the impression abroad and at home that von Neurath also will be consulted in foreign policy; but that Secret Cabinet Council never met.
Q The Prosecution has accused you that on the 12th of March, 1939. you gave a speech and that during that speech you mentioned the ruthless challenge of Bolshevism and International Jewry.
(Addressing the Tribunal) May I state, if it please the Court, that unfortunately that speech has been quoted by the Prosecution only in an excerpt which was selected under a certain point of view, and I believe that it would be well to know the entire speech. Of course, I shall not read it. But I should like to submit it as Raeder Exhibit No. 46. In the document book, in my document book, No 30, page 228. On page 235 there is the sentence against which the Prosecution has objected -
THE WITNESS: May I in doing so quote a few short sentences which will characterize the entire speech?
Q I have no doubt that the Tribunal will permit that. I only ask you to use only a few significant sentences, such as the Prosecution nave done.
Q Excuse me. That is on page 235, the sane page on which the quotation of the Prosecution is set out.
A Shortly before the quotation of the Prosecution we read line 6:
" He has returned self-confidence and confidence in their own ability to the German people and thereby enabled them to retake, out of their own strength, their divine right refused to them during the time of their weakness and, beyond that, to approach with courage the tremendous present problems and to work on their solution.
Thus the German people and the Fuehrer have done more for the peace of Europe and of the world than some of our neighbors are able to recognizetoday." the fight against Bolshevism and international Jewry which has been quoted by the Prosecution, and I should like testate briefly in connection with that, after the experience during the years 1917 to 1919 Communism and international Jewry had undermined the resistance, had destroyed the resistance of the German people in a considerable measure and had gained an unpropertionately large influence in German affairs, and as far as the nation and state were concerned and as far as economy and justice were concerned. According to that, in my opinion one could not be surprised that the National Socialist Government tried -- wanted to see that this large and fateful influence should be loosened and finally removed. If now the ilational Socialist Government in pursuing this course took rather severe steps which led to the Nurnberg Laws, the exaggerations of which I regretted, of course, I still could not in the course of the speech whichI held upon orders of the State Government before the public, I could not express any opinions which were principally different on that occasion. As much, of course, as I could find it compatible with my conscience. I also had to think about the fact that such a speech had to fit into a certain frame. That, however, was only one short sentence, whereas other points were considerably more in the foreground. In that connection I ask for permission to read two more short sentences:
"And this is the reason for the demand for equal rights and equal respect with all other people s which alone can guarantee peaceful living together of the nations with each other in this world."
Then the last sentence, on page 235:
"The Fuehrer within the framework of the German community of people has assigned our tasks to us soldiers as protectors of our homeland and our peaceful national reconstruction, as educators of the young men fit for military service who pass through our hands as one body."
spoke about the fact that we should not only have to give technical education to these young people but also educate them in the sense of National Socialist ideology, that we had to march shoulder to shoulder with the Party. foreign body in the State, so that in a monarchic state there could not be a republican Armed forces or in a democratic State a monarchistic Armed Forces. And thus our Armed Forces had to be coordinated into the National Socialist State, to the extent that it would be necessary to create a real people's community, gemeinschaft, and therefore it was a task of the commanders of the Wehrmacht, of the Armed Forces, to educate their branches of the Forces in such a way that the good National Socialist ideals of National Socialism should be understood and appreciated and that they should live accordingly and act accordingly, just in the same way as I did it as Supreme Commander of the Navy. In this manner it was possible to coordinate theArmed Forces correctly, to keep all exaggerations from it, but at the same time to assure the forming of a people's community within the State.
And then on the bottom of page 236:
"This nation needs a new, true peace -- of justice and honor; a peace without hatred. The world also needs such a peace, because a weak Germany could not obtain such a peace, a strong one won it for herself. It is a proud task of the German Wehrmacht, Armed Forces, to secure this peace to the German nation against everybody." bottom of the page:
"But the soldier over there whom we respect as the chivalrous representative of his country may accept a soldier's word: What Germany needs and wants is peace:" The construction work of Germany requires a long -- full -- years of quiet development.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out to the High Tribunal that in the English translation, on page 236, as far as I remember, one sentence was underlined. That is: "Thus, Wehrmacht and Party become one indivisible entity." The Prosecution has submitted that. Other than that, nothing is underlined. In reality, in the original, many other passages are underlined, particularly those sentences which Admiral Raeder has just read which deal with peace. BY DR. SIEMERS: the political acitivities of National Socialism. Therefore, I am compelled to ask you briefly concerning your participation in actions in those countries where one would certainly be surprised to hear of any participation by the navy. annexation of Austria? It did not take part in any way.
Q Did you make any preparations?
A No. In the case of Austria, no preparations were needed. The case of Austria was mentioned in Document C-157, but that dealt only with the directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces for war.
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that that is US 69, in the document book of the British Delegation, 10-A. The Prosecution stressed this document. in every state for every year, according to the political situation, of those cases which in the course of the year may arise and for which, of course, certain preparation have to be made. For the navy, however, that document had no consequences as far as Austria was concerned.
THE PRESIDENT: I am not sure that we have the reference, to that right. It came through, I thought, C-157, US 69, 10-A, and then I did not get the page.
DR. SIEMERS: Page 117.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that C-157 or 175?
DR. SIEMERS: C-175. BY DR. SIEMERS: ions for various eventualities?
A Yes; that is, cases mentioned here, for instance, th Rot and the special case, Case Gruen. All these had to be dealt with, without their having to have any consequences.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that connection I wanted to submit various documents, Raeder exhibits, from which it can be seen that the same type of preparations, being necessary for strategic reasons, were also undertaken by the Allies--only to show the necessity. At this moment I should like to forego that because I can not determine so quickly which one of these documents are approved and which ones are admitted and which ones have been rejected. May I do that in the end, in order that no misunderstanding may occur now by my stating the wrong figures? DR. SIEMERS: cerning the Sudetenland? May I ask you to look at the document of the Prosecution 388-PS.
DR. SIEMERS: It is US 126--No, excuse me--US-26. It can be found in the document book of the British Delegation, 10-A, page 147. It is a draft for a new directive Gruen of 20 May 1938.
A Yes, I have the directive right here. It is of 20 May 1938 for the Navy.
"The Navy participates by the use of the Danube flotilla in the operations of the army. That flotilla is put under the command of the Supreme Commander of the Army. As regards the conduct of naval warfare, at first only those measures are to be taken which appear to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other states. These measures must be confined to the absolutely necessary and have to be carried out independently."
of October made the special measures unnecessary, so the Danube flotilla, which we had taken over from Austria, was put under the command of the army.
Q That was the size of the Danube flotilla?
for the occupation of the remainder of Czechoslovakia, asit is said in document C-136, US 104, document book of the British delegation, page 101. It is of 21 October 1938, and the Prosecution points out that, according to that, in October you had already been informed about Czechoslovakia; that is, in March, as it really happened -- that it was supposed to be occupied. Will youplease tell us something about that? it is drafted shows that that again is for eventualities. Point One is the securing of the border on the frontiers of Germany and protection against surprise air attacks. and occupation of the Memel land. contains as its first sentence:
"It must be possible to smash at any time the remainder of Czechoslovakia if her policy should become hostile toward Germany." therefore, it was not sure at all. occupation of the Memel Land where it says:
"The political situation, particularly complications between Poland and Lithuania, may make it appear desirable that the German armed forces should occupy the Memel Land."
DR. SIEMERS: May I point out that, according to my document, this part that the witness has just read is missing in the English translation, so that you do not look for it and not find it. BY DR. SIEMERS:
Q So here again this is an eventuality?
Q On 3 September 1939, at the beginning of the war, the "Athenia" was sunk. From the military point of view, that case has already been clarified by Dr. Kranzbuehler, but I should like to hear your position and explanation of the incident as commander in chief of the navy and with special consideration for the fact that the Prosecution, especially in this case, has raised a very severe and insulting accusation, the accusation that you purposely and in violation of the rules, made England and Churchill responsible for the sinking of the "Athenia", although you knew perfectly well that the "Athenia" had been sunk by a German U-boat.