distribute raw materials. We met every three months in order to establish the contingents for the forthcoming quarter year. The Four Year Plan, together with the Ministry of Economy, took care of that, and later the Central Planning Board. met every three months?
A Yes, about. Only in very rare cases it was called again, especially if there were urgent problems to be solved. I remember one case where agriculture did not get enough nitrogen and therewas danger that if the quota of nitrogen was too small, agricultural production would suffer. We then asked for a discussion, which took place in the Central Planning Board. Board at a meeting at which you were present that out of all the labor that came to Germany--only 200,000 came voluntarily--out of the millions who came only 200.000 came voluntarily? questions? taken into consideration, and the institutions which got the raw materials demanded also the workers which they needed, and the figures were given to us and were forwarded to the Plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz Front.
Q What about prisoners of war? the Central Plan ning Board only got general figures of workers. For instance, a branch of an industry was short so-and-so many thousand workers, and that was put with the demands for raw materials.
Q What about concentration camp labor?
A The distribution of labor was done by thelabor offices. Central Planning had nothing to do with that. 36,000 concentration camp prisoners were now being used and wanting an increase to 90,000?
aircraft guns? did you know that the number of concentration camps increased very greatly in Germany?
A That I do not know. What happened after they were turned over to Himmler is beyond my knowledge. It may be that a large number of concentration camps was established then.
Q How do you come to know about Goering's relations with Himmler? What he told you?
A Because I could observe that continuously. Goering once has spoken about it, and I could observe that relations were in no way good ones. Austrian State Police after the Anschluss?
Q Do you know who obtained that appointment for Kaltenbrunner? of the anti-Jewish riots in Germany?
Q Was Goebbels there also?
Q Go ahead; do you want to say something else? there then.
Q Why could he not be there? uprisings?
A Yes, that I found out later--that Goebbels was in Munich. All National Socialist leaders were in Munich because 9 November was a day when everybody met.
Q And Goebbels spoke in Munich, did he not? On the Jewish question that night?
A That I do not know. I do not know that speech.
leaders, was he not? Party met in Munich. That was a general meeting every year.
Q And Goering attended regularly?
Q And you did?
Q Now, Hess attended? participate, always participated on this day. Nobody ever was missing except if he was ill or had any special duties to perform.
Q What of the defendants in the dock attended those meetings? Ribbentrop, of course?
Q Keitel?
A I assume so. I do not know. I have never seen Kaltenbrunner because Kaltenbrunner get into the public service only during the last years, and during the last years, these meetings did not take place quite in the same fashion as before.
Q Rosenberg, of course, was there?
Q And Frick?
A Surely, certainly Frank and Frick. Not during the last years, I don't think so. Before that he certainly participated.
Q Which was that, during the last years? but I do not know for sure. were, was he not?
Q He was very active, was he not?
Q He was very active in the anti-Jewish matters, was he not?
Q And did you see Funk at those meetings? night of the Jewish uprising? always a fixed program on that day, and I do not know anything about that, and I do not think the Reichsmarshal knew anything about that. that something had happened during the night?
A I can not say that anymore because the adjutant changed. I only knew that an adjutant came and made the report.
Q What did he say that happened?
had taken place and that these excesses were continuing; that windows were broken; merchandise thrown into the streets; and so on, and Goering was infuriated.
Q What was he infuriated about?
Q You mean that he was taking the part of the Jews?
Q You mean that he was taking the part of the Jews?
Q You just tell us what it was; you go as far as you want; tell us what his attitude was.
Q Such as fining them a billion Reichsmarks right after the fire; right after these outrages? You know that he did that, don't you?
A Yes. That had been demanded by the Fuehrer.
Q You know that the Fuehrer is dead, don't you? Do you know that for a fact? that the Fuehrer is dead? Reichsmark fine? Who ordered the confiscation of the insurance. few days after this assault?
A That I don't know. I don't know the details any more.
Q Don't you remember that that was Goering's order?
A I do not recall it. I do not recall it now.
Q Why did Goering go to Hitler to get this stopped? Why did he not go to the head of the police, which is supposed to prevent crime?
A Of course he went to the highest chief so that an authorative order could be given that the excesses should stop immediately.
Q Did he have any idea who had started them? these excesses.
Q Did he know that the Gestapo and SS also participated?
A I don't know. As much as I know the SS did not participate.
Q Did the Gestapo?
A No; I don't know anything about that. riots,; is that the fact? incited by members of the government against the Jews? on the 4th of October of last year by Dr. Kempner of our staff, were you not? would not give any testimony against your former superior, Reichsmarshal Goering, and that you regarded Goering as the last big man of the rennaissance; the last great example of a man from the rennaissance period; that he had given you the biggest job of your life and it would be unfaithful and unloyal to give any testimony against him; is that what you said?
A Yes, yes; that is just about what I said.
Q And that is still your answer?
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any other members of the prosecution wish to examine this witness? BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
Q Perhaps you can remember, Mr. Witness, about the conference of political leaders in the occupied countries and territories which took place on the 6th of August, 1942, under the presidency of defendant Goering.
6th of August, that you directed to all the ministers the minutes of this meeting, in which in the appendix to the minutes it was mentioned how much food stuffs and other raw materials should be furnished to Germany? serves asproof of evidence of this meeting.
Q You remember that you sent out this document, don't you? were settled as to how much should be sent to Germany from France, 1,200,000 tons of food stuffs; from Belgium; from the Netherlands; from Norway; from Russia, 3,000 000 tons of grain had to be sent to Germany; and so forth. Don't you consider that such shipments are really pillaging of the occupied countries? help with feed, and in all the occupied territories quotas were established which they could fill, that is to say, if they were not in a position to fill these quotas they could demand changes.
Q You were saying something about pillaging, I think?
A No, I have not said pillaging. It was understood that the territories had to help also with respect to food.
Q That the occupied countries had to participate? them?
Q That is quite evident. Here, I want to ask you another ques-
tion in connection with this. You don't recognize that this was pillaging, but don't you recall that Goering himself -you recall new, said in his address that he is going to pillage aggressively the occupied territories; you don't remember his expression about pillaging aggressively?
Q No, you don't remember. Perhaps you can recall that at the same meeting, addressing those leaders of the occupied countries, that he told them that, "You are sent there not to work for thewelfare of the people you are in charge of, but you are sent there in order to pump out from thatcountry everything that is possible." Do you remember that statement by the Defendant Goering?
Q You cannot remember?
Q And you don't recall any lengthy correspondence between Goering and Rosenberg in which Rosenberg insisted on the fact that all functions relative to the economic exploitation of the occupied territories of the Soviet Union should be taken away from the economic military organs and should be handed over to the ministry headed by Rosenberg?
Q You don't know. And in connection with this you don't remember that this correspondence finally didn't settle the question; still didn't settle the question?
A I don't know about that correspondence; at least I have not seen it.
Q You don't know anything, do you? In 1944 don't you recall that -
DR. STAHMER: I would like to point out one thing: The interrogation is incomplete and hard to understand; we do not understand the questions in part ourselves.
GENERAL RUDENKO: Evidently I think that it is not up to me; it is not my fault if the witness does not get all my questions.
BY GENERAL RUDENKO:
Don't you recall that in 1944, after the Red Army had driven the German troops from the Ukraine, Goering wrote to Rosenberg in settling the question relative to the economic exploitation of the Ukraine, stating it should be postponed until a more opportune time, and Goering mentioned the second seizure of the Ukraine and other Soviet territories. Is that what he had in mind?
A That is supposed to nave happened in 1934?
GENERAL RUDENKO: Evidently, Mr. President, you consider it necessary to adjourn now. I have a few more questions, but I consider it would be convenient to resume after the adjournment.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours).
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn at 4:30 today. BY GENERAL RUDENKO: from the secretary in charge of the foreign affairs dealing with occupied countries, which is Document USSR 74. I want you to recollect whether you have ever seen this document and whether you have ever received the letter contained in that document.
As you see, this document begins with the words:
"Honorable State Secretary, Dear Party Comrade." measures.
A I am taking notice of this document. I am taking it for granted that I have received this document.
Q Yes, you have received this; it is quite obvious. It is quite clear that the letter dealt with the question of having a special meeting under your chairmanship. Thus, is my conclusion correct that you were a very close assistant of defendant Goering on the question of the application of the Nazi economic measures and economic leadership? Year Plan was at the head of both the civilian and the military organs which dealt with the economic exploitation of those occupied territories which Germany had and that in these economic measures you were his closest assistant. Do you affirm or deny this? The problem of collaboration which arose of the economic activity of the occupied countries was met, and we never had this conference.
on you but because of the oncoming offenses of the Red Army, was it not so? it.
Q You say that the question has not been solved. I am telling you: isn't it a fact that the problem had not been solved because of the Red Army and not because of any decision or volition on your part. of this kind felt. The question which had been touched of the comprehensive organization of economic matters in occupied territories did not actually materialize because other influences and circumstances were against it.
Q I do not plan to discuss this with you right now, these questions, but you still have not answered my last question.
I am asking again, do you assert that Goering as the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan was at the head of both the civilian and the military German organs which dealt with the economic exploitation of all the occupied territories? And do you affirm or deny that you were his nearest and closest assistant? deal with it in this manner. The Four Year Plan had the possibility to be connected with the occupied countries, but it was only done if it was absolutely necessary. In general it was concerned with internal problems, and those offices which in the occupied countries took care of economic matters were military or civil agencies. In the East, Rosenberg was concerned with this only if there was a matter between the military and the economic, or between departments at home if there was a dispute or a disagreement the Four Year Plan could be drawn in. The Reichsmarshal in those cases could make special decisions, but that was in very, very few cases. having to help supply foodstuffs for Europe, we had the right, since in the occupied territories, not only the East but also in the West, we put in many new developments in the line of agriculture. In the West I can point out -
Q (Interposing) What law are you discussing? produce, because we put in many new developments in these countries. I would like to point out in the East, the regions which had been completely devastated, which had no seed, no machines, and with greatest difficulty -
Q (Interposing) Who gave that right to the Germans? take part in the surplus, for all of Europe knew what countries we had occupied, and we knew the cares and problems that we had in the occupied countries.
Q I ask you once more, where did the Germans get the right?
A I am not a jurist. Therefore, I cannot answer the question, that we could share in the profits of this developing work.
Q What did you do when you annihilated and plundered the territory?
agricultural country. In fact, we instituted great developments. In the West I remember that part of France was completely devestated -
THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) Witness, you are going too fast. Can't you see the light? organization, the Reichsland, we rebuilt these areas and repatriated French people to this territory and gave them the possibility to again function as peasants and to share in the agricultural production of the country. In the East we found territories which, through the efforts of the war, had been damaged greatly. There were no more machines existing. Everything had been taken away by the Russians, and all agricultural implements had been taken away or had been destroyed. There we had to start with the most elementary and primitive ways to start agriculture again. reinstate agriculture. German initiative and German machinery is to be thanked for this task. BY GENERAL RUDENKO: centration camps established in the occupied countries. Did that not also cover the extent of the German initiative? things I do not know about.
Q You are not sufficiently informed on concentration camps? It appears that you are quite well informed, or appear to be, on other economic measures as well as other social measures within the occupied territories.
rehabilitation of agricultural areas.
Q You still say you know nothing about concentration camps?
A That's right. I was not concerned with these matters. the German occupation authorities -- about that you know nothing?
A No; I know nothing about that.
Q You know nothing about that?
Q Only now?
GENERAL RUDENKO: That's all. BY DR. BOEHM (Counsel for the SA)
Q Mr. Witness, do you know that Heines was Chief of Police at Breslau?
THE PRESIDENT: I asked defendants' counsel at the end of the examination by Dr. Stahmer whether they wished to ask any questions, and they said they didn't offer to ask any questions.
Therefore, it is not your turn now to ask any questions.
DR. BOEHM: I must say through the speech of Mr. Jackson that there was a point raised which I did not know of before, and that is the person of the Chief of Police, Mr. Heines. I request that I may be permitted to put two or three questions to the witness so that this question which we are concerned with may be clarified.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. We hope you won't take too long.
DR. BOEHM: I will try to be brief, Mr. President. Thank you. BY DR. BOEHM:
Q Witness, do you know that Heines was Chief of Police at Breslau? under his jurisdiction? Lager was erected, the Police prisons were overcrowded?
A That I don't know. I just mention the case of Heines as one of the camps which was established without the knowledge of the Defense Ministry.
his capacity as Chief of Police?
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, have you any questions to ask?
DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions to put to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.
DR. STAHMER: With the permission of the high Tribunal, I wish to call as my next witness, General Field Marshall Kesselring.
(ALBERT KESSELRING, a witness, took the stand and testified as follows): BY THE PRESIDENT:
Q Will you tell me your name?
Q Will you repeat this oath after me: speak the pure truth, and will withhold and add nothing?
(The witness repeated the oath). BY DR. STAHMER:
Q Witness, since when do you belong to the Luftwaffe?
Q What rank did you have when you came into the Luftwaffe? the artillery in Dresden. Then I was retired and as a commander of the Luftwaffe I went on from there.
Q You worked on the development of the Luftwaffe? and with the General Staff, andthen was useful in allied fields.
Q Did the development of the Luftwaffe proceed for defense or attack?
A The German Luftwaffe was purely a weapon of defense. I must add that each plane, as well as the total Luftwaffe, in their nature is of course an offensive weapon. Even in ground fighting if offensive without defensive is without success, then in the case of the Luftwaffe it is the same in a more intensified manner. or from attack, and this realization was with the Reichsmarshal and his generals. only the lighter craft are developed or used as the first constructions. Therefore,up until the year 1936 we had 37 light airplanes, Stukas, fighters, and a few others, some old models, but they were models which werenot fit for combat. craft can be successfully done, but I would like to cite the contrary example and point to the end of the World War where the German defensive air force was beaten up by the opposite air force.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal thinks the witness is dealing in far too great detail.
A I will continue. The offensive airforce was absent. We had no fighter planes until 1937 or 1938, and these fighters which were brought later had neither the range nor the fuel to serve as a weapon of conquest or an offensive weapon. We had no 4-motor jobs.
Q You were active in the attack on Warsaw? justified and how was this attack carried through?
A There were several attacks made on Warsaw. Warsaw was, according to German attitudes and conceptions, a fortress and also was being defended by air. Our hypotheses of the Hague Convention were not present in that case. basis of the Luftflotte, was to combat a hostile airforce and the prepared airfields which were in the vicinity, and according to my opinion these attacks were justified. changes, of the Poles. I would like to add that Warsaw was the central point of that part of Poland and we received news that ground troops and railroad stations were heavily supplied. Air attack against these movements was decreed and put through. It was directed at railway depots and bridges of the Vistula. attack by Stukas and fighter planes was justified -- and I was in agreement with this -- because the precision attack of these weapons was presupposed and because we were mainly intent on war targets.
The third phase was concerned with the shooting of Warsaw. This attack was made by the army, and the air arm was used as a supplementary part. I myself was over Warsaw, and after each bombing attack I spoke with the men who took part, and can give personal reports as to this, that everything humanly possible was done to hit military targets only and not to hit civil targets. because of military necessity completely?
Q Were you also present at the attack on Rotterdam?
AAs chief of airfleet No. 2 and the right wing, I made this attack against Holland, France, and had the air infantry corps under my command. General Student had pursued this attack and he is the only personality who saw the position of the ground troops, and the support by air was given to the Fourth Air Corps. The smallest troop units were made into groups which were to be deployed. The deployment and the execution and disposition took place completely and solely according to tactical requirements, according to technical possibilities. The demands on General Student were made very soon and came soon to my command.
Preparations were made according to plan and with ease. The troops knew about the situation and the possibility of change at Rotterdam and that the Reichsmarshal might intervene. We knew about this. We also knew that Panzer divisions were approaching. The target was singular and we knew all the details. The target was not to cause any difficulty, seeing we were all experienced. There was a connecting line between the general of my staff and the other staffs. We all knewjust what was going on, and this communication and connection was disturbed perhaps shortly, since all commands came from me or the Reichsmarshal. Owing to this line of communicatio and the then existing state of technology, there was a possibility of keeping the tactical connection between the ground troops and the air arm. Then the customary connection as far as signals were concerned was regulated and there was to be no difficulty from that score. through, only perhaps whether it would have to be repeated under certain circumstances.
To clarify the question: if we know the personality of this general and the technique of his leadership, his clear demands, we can count on the execution of this air plan. This attack was carried through according to plan and in time, and our knowledge that everything was under control was complete.
We had the report that further attacks were not necessary. The men in charge of the Luftflotte during these three days of combat in Holland were kept posted on all matters, and the Reichsmarshal, especially on the third day, that is, the date on which I am talking of now -- he intervened in the leadership of it and did everything that could be done from a position of such high leadership. I cannot recall a report that the bombing attack was not in accordance with the course of events of the tactical situation.
Q Have there been bombings while capitulation talks were in progress? above Rotterdam had no such information. It might have been that there was confusion in Rotterdam itself, confusion about which I know nothing, and I don't know of the agreements that were made between General Student and the Holland people. At a conference which I attended later I could not carry through, because the General had a brain injury. have been, then I am very sorry. As a soldier of twenty-two years, as an artillery man, as a flyer, and as a man of long leadership I would like to state here emphatically that if this took place, this case is to be counted among those which is really an accident of war, and if the outside world does not know it, it happens to every country and much more frequently than one would expect.
Q How can we say that many fires originated in the city? experience, that in this war devastations did not take part so much through bombing as through fire. I am very sorry to say a bomb hit a power magazine for oil and the fire was spread that way. After the attack, after a state of capitulation had been declared,the fire fighting should have stopped the fire.
Q What military consequences did this attack have?
A The immediate consequence was the capitulation of troops. General Wenninger, who had been air chief, was with me, and he told me the immediate consequences of that was the capitulation of the Dutch Army.
Q In November, 1940, did you lead the attack on Coventry? in that attack. At the moment, I cannot say whether Air Force 3 was not there too, but I did it.
Q What was the purpose of the attack?
A Conventry was, according to our files, target files; with the archieves of the commander in chief of the air force, it was a typical industrial center and we called it "Klein-Essen," (little essen). These files, archives, have been compiled by experts, engineers, officers very carefully and methodically and they contained cards, maps, and key points, descriptions, etc. These details were known to me and the troops very thoroughly, -- besides General Wenninger, who I mentioned before, who was responsible very often to the troops about the particular targets and the effectiveness of their operations. I have myself assisted and supervised, and the Reich Marshal himself has examined these preparations. In the case of Coventry the conditions were very simple, since the nights presented good weather conditions and without radio navigation we could find Coventry. When the target distribution of Coventry was simple one could see what one could hit, so that the missing of the targets way impossible, practically impossible, but the bombing itself depends on the same rules and all the basic statistics of all shooting by weapons. During the war this experience was extraordinary and the particular characteristics of the air bombardment has to be added, that in particular cases a whole area has to be considered as a target and thereby a natural broadening of the target as a consequence. All bombings under the orders of the OB. D. L. were examined the next dayby photography, the taking of pictures, where the bombs landed subsequently. As I said, and as I said about Rotterdam, it is not so that the bombs destroyed the target but the destruction of the of the target was caused by fire, fire started by bombs.