Q Do you know Obergruppenfuehrer Mueller, the Chief of Amt IV in the RSHA?
AI knew him.
QDo you know that he and his immediate staff originated in the political police before 1933?
AI do not know that; I knew only that he came from Bavaria.
QDid you know that the secret police did not take part in the excesses on the 9th of November 1938?
AI have always been of the conviction that they did not take part in that, but I saw here a document which at least instructed them not to interfere.
QIf I understand you correctly, you said exactly that on the 9th of November, after your return to Berlin, you called up the chief of the Gestapo. Did this communication take place only because you wanted more precise information or did it happen because you thought the Gestapo had had some active participation in these excesses and in carrying them out?
AIf I had been of the conviction that the Gestapo had taken an active part in these activities I certainly should not have inquired of them. I commissioned my collaborators to find out through the Gestapo, because it had the necessary connections, or through the criminal police. That was indifferent to me. I could only turn to the chief of the police and commission my collaborators to provide me with a report of exactly what had happened.
Q Is it correct that when you surrendered your positon as Chief of the Police to Himmler, that such behavior was unworthy of the German Police and that drastic measures would be adopted towards police members who were guilty of such acts?
AI did, when I surrendered that office, and in my speech there are such passages in it.
QDid you know that there was an order from the RSHA, after your resignation -- that an order existed, according to which every officer was forbidden to commit any such violent act?
AWhat orders were issued after my resignation, I do not know.
QDo you know anything about the fact that there was never an order to treat prisoners violently?
AI could only say with absolute certainty that I didn't know of such order or permitted such order, but otherwise I was outside of Purria. I had no connection with what orders might have been issued then or were not issued; that lies outside my knowledge.
QDo you know anything that, contrary to this order, actually, generally in the Gestapo, such events did take place or could you say that if they did happen, could it have been only excessive on the part of individuals?
AAt that time I was immediately concerned in the Gestapo and at that time, as I often stated, such excesses did take place and punishments did take place. The officials know, in other words, that if they did such things they ran the danger of being punished. A large number of them were punished and what happened later, I cannot supply information on.
DR. MERKEL:No more questions.
DR. BABEL:Dr. Babel for the SS and SD. BY DR. BABEL:
QWitness, did it have to be the same conditions for honorary membership in the SS as in the SA?
AYes.
QDo you know what these conditions were?
ANo.
Q Was there the possibility of refusing that appointment?
AI believe so.
QDid you know that the greatest development of the Waffen SS took place after 1939?
THE PRESIDENT:The light has shewn three times since you have been addressing your questions to the defendant. BY DR. BANEL:
QI repeat. Do you know what the reasons for the growth of the Waffen SS, after the year 1939, were?
AThe first revision of the Waffen SS was to include the best human material in the SS and who fought very bravely. The Fuehrer then gave future support to Himmler's suggestion that the Waffen SS be further enlarged. The army and also the air force just about protested against this because this skimming off the best of the fighters from the army and the air force left a number of those who were also eligible for the Fuehrer Corps. The Fuehrer originally did not want any other carrier of arms but the Wehrmacht, to any extent, but agreed more and more to Himmler's requests in this direction. When it became more and more difficult to find reserves during the course of the war, Himmler more or less deceived the Fuehrer with the statement that he was in a position to provide a large number of SS divisions, and so on. This, of course, was a welcome piece of news to the Fuehrer since he needed troops badly but as a matter of fact, Himmler was using altogether different methods than those of voluntary enlistments. First of all, Himmler created on paper a number of new SS divisions and transports and he said he did not have the people for these divisions, and we heard that he had taken his deputy leaders from other SS divisions and put them in these new divisions and for this and that reason, and the necessary reserves were not here at the time, and the army and air force were those who bore the brunt of this; he had to recruit from the ground forces and from the anti-aircraft batteries. This aroused much dissatisfaction from my personnel in the air force because none of them wanted to join this organization of Himmler's voluntarily. The Fuehrer then commanded that even from reserve units of the army and of the navy, men should be surrendered to the SS. I can only think of that part that was taken from the air force by coercion and I should judge, without documentation, that there were 50,000 such men so recruited.
Then, because this aroused such excitement, I arranged that all those who were used for ground fighting in the future should not belong to the SS but should be incorporated into new parachute divisions. The Fuehrer agreed because in the last phase of the war, the parachute units proved to be the most useful and the strongest and was superior to the SS in fighting ability and resistance. From that time on no further contingents of the air forcer were incorporated into the SS and, so far as I know, no more SS divisions were created.
DR. BABEL:No further questions.
DR. LATERNSER:Dr. Laternser, for the General Staff and the OKW. BY DR. LATERNSER:
QWitness, what was the attitude of the General Staff of the Army towards the waging of an aggressive war?
ATheir opinion was purely professional, that is to say, the General Staff examined all the possibilities of the waging of a war and this was its job. Its attitude towards its own activity was one -- and I must emphasize -- which was very retiring and modest. At this time I must mention the fact that most of the officers' staff had come from a high sphere that had been developed, through fifteen years, and in regard to the waging of war were not predominant. They were of such a sort that these men could not well imagine in general their waging a war. Thus , the General Staff of the army was much more modest in this regard, almost pacitifistic when one compares it with general staffs in general.
QDo you know generals or admirals who wanted war?
ANo.
DR. LATERNSER:No further questions.
THE PRESIDENT:Do the Chief Prosecutors wish to cross-examine?
Correction of transcript - 18 Mar - M
ATheir opinion was purely professional, that is to say, the General Staff examined all the possibilities of the waging of a war and this was its job.
Its attitude towards its own activity was one -- and I must emphasize -- which was very retiring and modest.
At this time I must mention the fact that most of the officers' staff had come from the Reichswehr and that through the 15 years of its development its orientation had not been toward the waging of war.
These men were of such a sort that they could not well imagine in general their waging a war.
Thus, the General Staff of the army was much more modest in this regard, almost pacifistic when one compares it with general staffs in general.
CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:
QYou are perhaps aware that you are the only living man who can expound to us the true principles of the Nazi Party and the inner workings of its leadership?
AI am perfectly clear on that subject.
QYou, from the very beginning, together with those who were associates with you, intended to overthrow, and later did overthrow, the Weimar Republic?
AThat was my firm intention.
QAnd upon coming into power, you immediately abolished parliamentary government in Germany?
AIt was no longer necessary. But I should like to emphasize the fact that we were also the strongest party parliamentarily speaking, yet you are correct that, to this extent, the parliamentary government was disbanded.
QYou established the leadership principle which you have described, a system under which authority existed only at the top and is passed downward and is imposed on the people below, is that correct?
AIn order to avoid any misunderstanding, I should like to explain it once more as I understand it. In previous German parliaments, the responsibility resided in the highest offices and it represented the anonymous power of the whole. In the Fuehrer's principle we arranged for the opposite of that, and the authority went from above to below and the permission was given from the lowest to the above.
QIn other words, you did not believe in and did not permit Government as we do, in which the people, through their representatives, are the possessors of power and authority?
AThat is not entirely correct. We repeatedly called on the population from time to time to express their opinion of our system, only by a different way that was previously used, and in a different way that is used in other countries. We also were of the point of view that, of course, the Government could maintain itself through the Fuehrer principle that had some sort of confidence in its population.
If it no longer had such confidence, then it had to rule with bayonets, and the Fuehrer was always of the opinion that that was impossible in the long run.
QYou did not permit the election of those who should act with authority by the people, but they were designated from the top downward continuously, were they not?
AThe conduct of the Government was entirely up to the Fuehrer. The individual representatives were not chosen by the people, but their leaders were.
QNow, was this leadership principle supported and adopted by you in Germany because you believed that no people or individual is capable of self-government, or because you believed that the German people are not -no matter whether some of us are capable of using our own system, it should not be allowed in Germany?
AI didn't quite understand the question, but I could perhaps answer it as follows:
The Fuehrer's principle proved to be necessary because the conditions previous to his leadership had brought Germany to the verge of ruin. I might in this case remind you that your own President Roosevelt, so far as I can recall -- I don't want to quote it verbatim -- said that democracy, not because they did not wish democracy as such, but democracy had produced men who were too weak to give their people work, and bread, and to correct this it would be best for the people to abolish democracy. There is much truth in that statement. Democracy ruined Germany, and accordingly, only a strong leadership could bring back order.
Let it be understood that the Fuehrer was not brought into power against the will of the people, but only by many elections during the course of time which was more and more strongly expressed.
QThe principles of the Government which you set up required, as I understand you, that they be such that there should be no opposition by political parties which might differentiate or oppose the policy of the Nazi Party?
A Let us understand this correctly. We lived long enough through that period of opposition.
It was tow time not to be a party of opposition, but to build up.
QAfter you came to power, you -- if necessary in order to maintain power -- suppressed all opposition parties?
AWe found it necessary that we permit no opposition to us.
QAnd you also held the theory that you should suppress all individuals opposed to your party lest it should develop into a party of opposition?
ASo far as opposition is concerned in any form, the opposition of each individual person was not tolerated unless it was a matter of unimportance.
Q Now, in order to make sure that you suppressed the parties, and individuals also, you found it necessary to have a secret political police to detect opposition?
AI have already stated that I knew that to be necessary just as previously the political police existed. Only, we did this on a stronger and larger degree.
QAnd upon coming into power, you also considered it immediately necessary to establish concentration camps to take care of all incorrigible opponents?
AI have already stated that the idea of the concentration camps did not arise in such a way. One might say that there were a number of people in opposition to us who should be taken into custody. The idea arose as an immediate measure against the Communist Parties who were attacking us in thousands, and we could not accommodate them in prisons, so it was necessary to erect camps.
QBut you are explaining, as a higher authority of this system, to men who can't understand tie system at all, and I want you to tell us what was necessary to run the kind of system yen set up in general and you, as one of the powers, should be able to tell us what made it necessary, as you saw it?
AI am afraid that was disorderly translated, but I can still answer you. You asked me is it was necessary to establish camps in order to eliminate opposition, is that correct?
QYour answer is yes, I take it?
AYes.
QYou may state also, in explaining this system, what persons were entitled to public trials -- you issued an order that your political police would not be subject to court review or to court orders, did you not?
AYou must discriminate two categories; these who had committed any act of treason against the new state and they, of course, were turned ever to the courts. The cases, however, of whom one could expect such acts, were taken into proper custody and those were the ones who went up in concentration camps.
I am now speaking of the beginning. If for any reason someone was taken into custody for political reasons, this could not be reviewed by any court.
Later, when people were taken into custody for no political reasons, but because they . . . .
QLet's omit that. I have not asked for that. I just want you to answer my question. Your counsel will have a chance to bring out any explanation that is necessary.
You did prohibit all court review, and considered it necessary to prevent court review of the reasons for taking people into what is called "protective custody"?
AThat I answered very clearly, but I would like to make an explanation in connection with my answer.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:Your counsel will see to that. Now, the concentration comps . . .
THE PRESIDENT:Mr. Justice Jackson, the Tribunal feels that the witness should be allowed to make whatever explanation which he cares to make in answer to this question.
MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:The tribunal feels that you may be permitted to explain your answers.
THE PRESIDENT:I did not mean that to apply generally to his answers. I meant it to apply to this particular answer.
THE WITNESS:In connection with your question that those persons could not be reviewed by the court, I want to say that was an order by the Fuehrer that those who were turned ever to concentration camps were to be informed of the reasons that they were there after twenty-four hours had elapsed, and after forty-eight hours, or after a short period of time, they should have the right of attorney.
But this by no means rescinded the order that a review by courts of political arrests was permissible.
I simply wanted to give these people the right to express their own opinions on what had happened to them.
QAnd protective custody meant you were taking people into custody who had not committed any crime but who you thought might possibly commit a crime.
AYes. People were arrested and taken into protective custody who had committed no crime, but of whom one could expect that if they remained in freedom they would do all sorts of things to damage the German state.
QNow, it is also a necessity in the kind of state that you had that you have some kind of organization to carry propaganda down to the people and to get their reactions and inform the leadership of it, is it not?
AI didn't quite understand the conclusion of that question.
QWell, you had to have organizations to carry out orders and to carry your propaganda in that kind of state didn't you?
AOf course we carried on propaganda, and for that reason organized a propaganda department.
QYou carried that on through the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, did you not?
AThe Leadership Corps was there to inform the people of the propaganda and our attitude.
QThrough your system of gauleiters and kreisleiters, down to blockleiters, commands and information went down from the authority, and information as to the people's reactions came back to the leadership, didn't it?
AThat is correct. The orders that were given for propaganda or other purposes were passed down the line as far as necessary. On the other hand, it was a matter of course that the reactions on the part of the people were again transmitted up through the various offices, in order to keep us informed of the mood of the people.
QAnd you also had to have certain organizations to carry out orders -- executive organizations, organizations to fight for you, if necessary, did you not?
AAdministrative organizations were, of course, necessary. I don't understand exactly what organizations you mean. For what fights?
QWell, if you wanted certain people killed you have to have some organization that would kill them, didn't you? Roehm and the rest of them were not killed by Hitler's own hands nor by yours, were they?
ARoehm -- I explained that there that was a matter of state necessity?
QBut whether it was state necessity to kill somebody, you had to have somebody to do it, didn't you?
AI also know other states where it is called secret service or something else.
QAnd the SA, the SS and the SD, organizations of that kind, were the organizations that carried out the orders and dealt with people on a physical level,were they not?
AThe SA never received such an order to kill people. The SA in my time did not. Later on I had no influence. The only orders that were carried out without court order that were given were against a few people in the Roehm Putsch, and this was carried out by the police or by a state organ.
QWhat police?
ASo far as I recall, through the Gestapo. At any rate, it received the order to fight against enemies of the state.
QAnd the SS was for the same purpose, was it not?
AAt this time, in north Germany, not; what the case was in south Germany I don't know.
QWell, the SS carried out arrests and carried out the transportation of people to concentration camps, didn't it? You were arrested by the SS, weren't you?
AYes, but I said later.
QAt what time did the SS perform this function of acting as an executor of the Nazi Party?
A After the seizure of power the police came to be more and more in the hands of Himmler,and it can no longer be understandable to somebody outside this picture where the SS was active and where the Gestapo was active.
They worked very closely, hand in hand. It is known that the SS guarded concentration camps later.
QAnd carried out other functions in the camps?
AWhat functions do you refer to?
QAll of the functions of the camps, didn't they?
AIf an SS unit was guarding a camp and an SS leader was in charge of it, then it could only be that unit that carried out all the functions necessary in the camp.
QNow, this system was not a secret system. This entire system was openly avowed, its merits were publicly advocated by yourself and others, and every person entering into the Nazi Party was enabled to know the kind of system of government you were going to set up, wasn't he?
AEvery member of the Party knew that we embraced the Fuehrer principle, knew the specific measures we wanted to carry out, so far as they were stated in the program, but every member of the Party did not know what was going to happen up to the most minute details.
QBut this system was set up openly and was well known, was it not, not as to everyone of its details. As to organization, everybody knew who the Gestapo was, did they not?
AYes, everyone knew who the Gestapo was.
QAnd what its program was, in general, not in detail?
AI explained that program in detail. At the beginning I described that publicly, and I also spoke publicly of the tasks of the Gestapo, and also those in foreign countries.
QAnd there was nothing secret about the establishment of a Gestapo as a political police, about the fact that people were taken into protective custody, about the fact that there were concentration camps? Nothing secret about those things, was there?
AThere was nothing secret about that at all.
Q As a matter of fact, part of the effectiveness of a secret police and a part of the effectiveness of concentration camp penalties is that the people do know that there are such agencies, isn't it?
AIt is true that if everyone knows that if he acts against the state he will end up in a concentration camp or will be accused before a court of high treason, that is to our advantage. But the original reason why concentration camps were created was to handle enemies of the state.
QNow, that is the type of government, the government which we have just been describing is the only type of government which you think is necessary to govern Germany?
AI should not like to say that the basic characteristic of this government and what was most necessary about it was the immediate organization of the Gestapo and the concentration camps in order to receive our opponents. Over and above that, we had much more important things to take care of. These were not the basic foundations of our government.
QBut all of these things were necessary things, as I understood you, to protect?
AYes. These things were all necessary because of the opposition that was present.
QAnd I assume that that is the only kind of government that you think can function in Germany under present conditions?
AUnder conditions then that was, in my opinion, the only possible form, and we also demonstrated that Germany could be raised in a short time from its miserable poverty to relative prosperity.
QNow, all of this authority of the state was concentrated? Perhaps I am taking up another subject.
Is it the intent to recess at this time?
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal will adjourn.
(A recess was taken until 1400 hours)
DR. STAHMER: The witness Dahlerus has been in Nurnberg for several days and is waiting to testify.
I have been advised that he must be at Stockholm by Thursday, and for that reason he requests, and I am asking the High Tribunal's permission to call him as a witness tomorrow morning. Even if the crossexamination has not been completed, the representatives of the Prosecution have agreed to my proposal.
THE PRESIDENT:Did you say the Prosecution had agreed to your proposal?
DR. STAHMER:Yes, My Lord. I contacted the four gentlemen involved and they have to a man agreed to this.
THE PRESIDENT:How long do you anticipate that the examination in chief of the witness will take? You can't answer for the cross-examination.
DR. STAHMER:I believe that I will need half a day, that is, up until tomorrow noon. Of course I cannot speak definitely, but I assume that will take care of matters.
THE PRESIDENT:His evidence is only relevant to the few days before the 1st of September 1939?
DR. STAHMER:There are two additional questions, but these questions may be answered very briefly. He seems to have made further efforts after that date, but those are very brief questions.
THE PRESIDENT:It appears to the Tribunal that half a day is a totally unnecessary time for the examination in chief of a witness who is going to speak about events during a few days before the war began.
DR. STAHMER:I cannot say exactly, Mr. President. We are not concerned with just a few days. These negotiations already started in June or July. I would like to add further that I will try to be as brief as possible and wil l try to limit myself to relevant material, of course.
THE PRESIDENT:The Tribunal agrees if the Prosecution is willing for this evidence to be interposed. The Tribunal trusts that you will find it possible to make your examination in chief much shorter than you have indicated.
HERMANNGOERING, resumed.
CROSS-EXAMINATION continued BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON:
QYou have related to us the manner in which you and others cooperated in concentrating all authority in the German state in the hands of the Fuehrer, is that right?
A I was speaking about myself and how far I was connected in this direction.
QIs there any defendant in the box you know of who did not cooperate toward that end as far as was possible?
AAs far as the defendants are concerned, that none of them was in opposition or obstructed the Fuehrer in any way is of course definite, but I would like to call your attention to the fact that we must differentiate between periods of time, for the questions that are being put to me are quite general and we are concerned with a period of time, of, say, twenty-four to twenty-five years if you consider the whole picture.
QNow, I want to call your attention to the fruits of this system. You, as I understand it, were informed in 1940 of an impending attack by the German Army on Soviet Russia?
AI have already mentioned just how far I was informed of these matters.
QYou believed the attack not only to be unnecessary but also to be unwise from the point of view of Germany itself?
AIn the period of time. At that time I was of the opinion that this attack should be postponed in order to take care of more important tasks.
QYou didn't see any military necessity for an attack at that time even from the point of view of Germany?
AI saw the effort of Russia in the direction of a mobilization, but hoped to put through measures which would be useful, and thought that time would prevent a danger toward Germany. Later on I was of the opinion that perhaps at any time this period of danger for Germany would arrive and might arrive at any later moment.
QI will only repeat my question, which I think you have not answered.
Did you at that time see any military necessity for an attack by Germany on Soviet Russia?
A I personally believed that at that period of time, the danger had not reached its zenith; therefore, at that time, the attack might not be necessary, but I emphasize that that was my personal view.
QAnd you were the Number Two man at that time in all Germany?
AIt has nothing to do with my position of second importance. Two points of view were contradictory. The Fuehrer saw one danger, and the Fuehrer was the Number One man, and if you wish to put it that way, had I wished to put another strategic measure through and if my plans had gone through, then I would have become the Number One man, but since the Number One man was of a different opinion and I was only the second man, his opinion naturally prevailed.
QI have understood from your testimony -- and I think you can answer this Yes or No, and I would greatly appreciate it if you would -I have understood from your testimony that you were opposed and told the Fuehrer that you were opposed to an attack upon Russia at that time. Am I right or wrong?
AThat is correct.
QNow, you were opposed to it because you thought that it was a dangerous move for Germany to make; is that correct?
AYes, I was of the opinion that the moment -- and I emphasize again that at that time the decisive moment had not come and that more expedient measures should have been taken for Germany.
QAnd, again, because of the Fuehrer system, as I understand you, you could give no warning to the German people; you could bring no pressure of any kind to bear to prevent that step, and you could not even resign to protect your own place in history.
AThere are quite a few questions coming together at one time, and I would like to answer the first one.
The first question was to the effect, I believe, whether I took no occasion to tell the German people about this danger. I had no responsibility in that connection. We were in the war and at war, and any difference of opinion as far as strategic problems were concerned could not be brought before the public during the course of a war. I believe that never in the course of history has anything like that happened.
As far as my resignation is concerned, I do not wish to debate about that, for during a war I was an officer, a soldier, and I was not concerned with whether I shared an opinion or not. I had to serve my country as a soldier.
Point Three: It was not my task to tell a man whom I had given my oath of loyalty to and to separate myself from him if he was not of my opinion. If that had been the case, I would not have had to bind myself to him, and it never occurred to me to leave the Fuehrer.
QAs far as you know, the German people were led into the war, attacking Soviet Russia, under the belief that you favored it?
AThe German people knew about the declaration of war on Russia after the war on Russia had started. The German people cannot be brought in in this connection. The German people were not asked. It was notified of the fact and of the reasons for that fact.
QAt what time did you know that the war, so far as achieving the objectives that you had in mind, was a lost war?
AIt is extraordinarily difficult to say that. According to my conviction, relatively late, and by that I mean at a late period of time the conviction grew within me that the war had been lost. Previous to that time, I thought we would have a chance, and I was hoping for a chance.
QWell, in November 1911 the offensive in Russia broke down, did it not?
AThat is not right at all. We had reverses because of adverse weather, and the aims that we had set out for were not won. The pushthrough of 1913 proved that a military collapse is not even to be thought of. Some corps which had advanced were thrown back, or were taken back, and the frost that set in before we expected it was the cause of all of this.
QYou see, "relatively late", the expression you used, does not tell me anything because I do not know what you regard as relatively late. Will you fix in terms either of events or time when it was that the conviction came to you that the war was lost?
AWhen the push-through of the Russian offensive of 12 January 1943 advanced as far as the Oder, and simultaneously the Ardennes offensive was not successful, at that period of time, I thought -- and I could not think otherwise -- that slowly, in all possibility, a defeat would result.
Before that period of time, I had always hoped that perhaps either at Weichsel -- the position would change toward the East or perhaps towards the West Wall and could be held until new weapons would be put in production and used in such strength so that the American air war could be weakened.
QNow, will you fix that by date; you told us when it was by events.
AI just said January 1915, middle or end of January 1915. At that point I saw no hope any longer.
QDo you want it understood that as a military man you did not realize until January of 1915 that Germany could not be successful in the war?
AI have already said that we must differentiate two methods, to end the war successfully and to end it otherwise. At the period of time when we could do that there are two separate points. The fact that a defeat would take place -- and I am concerned with the collapse of the date that I just mentioned.
QFor some period before that, you knew that a successful termination of the war could only be accomplished if you could come to some kind of terms with the enemy; was that not true?
AYes, of course. A successful termination of a war is only to be considered successful if I either conquer the enemy or through negotiations come to the conclusion that I am successful. That I would call a successful conclusion.
The remaining conclusion is if I come to terms with the enemy through negotiations and I do not achieve the result which victory would have brought but which precludes a defeat on my part. That is an ending without victorious or conquered people.
QBut you knew that it was Hitler's policy never to negotiate and you know that as long as he was head of the government, the enemy would not negotiate with Germany, did you not?
AHostile propaganda emphasized that they would never negotiate with Hitler; that fact I knew. That Hitler did not wish to negotiate under any circumstances, that also was known to me, but not in the same connection. Hitler wanted to negotiate if negotiations would have given him an opportunity, but negotiating which would be completely without success, he did not wish. Through the declaration of the Western Powers after the landing in Africa that under no circumstances would they negotiate with Germany but were interested in forcing an unconditional victory, the resistance of Germany was stiffened to the utmost and had to be organized as such. If I have no chance to conclude a war tjrough negotiations, then negotiations are senseless, and I must try by using weapons to bring about a change in these conditions.
QBy the time of January 1945 you also knew that you were unable to defend the German cities against the air attacks of the Allies, did you not?
AThe defense of German cities against Allied bomb attacks -- I will try to give you a picture of the possibility.
QCan you not answer my question? Time may not mean quite as much to you as it does to the rest of us. Can you not Yes or No? Did you then know at the sane time that you knew that the war was lost that the German cities could not successfully be defended against air attack by the enemy? Can you not tell us Yes or No?
AI can say that I knew that at that period of time it was not possible.
QAnd after that time, the air attacks which were continued against England were well known to you that they could not turn the tide of war and were designed solely to effect a prolongation of what you then knew was a hopeless conflict?
AI believe you are mistaken. After January there were no attacks, except perhaps a plane at a time, because at that time I needed all of my fighters for defense. If I had had any bombers and oil, the, o f course, I would have used them up until the last minute to attack as reprisals for attacks which wer being carried out on German cities.