THE PRESIDENT: One and two?
DR. SAUTER: One and two.
Q Dr. Funk, I have just said that perhaps you could--but quite briefly-give us some more examples of cases in which you used your official position to intervene for artists who, because of their attitudes, had difficulties. Will you mention some names?
A Richard Strauss is a special case. That remarkable composer raninto great difficulties on account of a book, the text of which was written by a Jew, Stefan Zweig, and I succeeded, in having Richard Strauss again received by the Fuehrer, and the whole affair was just passed over.
Similar difficulties were made for Dr. Wilhelm Fuertwangler because he spoke favorably of the compaser Hindemith in an article, and then, of course, the composers with Jewish wives, like Lehar, and others, had difficulties continuously. There were prohibitions against the performance of their works, and I succeeded in getting from Hitler permission for these composers to have performances of their work.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can say that he helped hundreds of jews, but that does not destroy the fact that he may have acted hostilely by signing decrees against the Jewish race -- his helping few Jewish friends. Anyhow, I do not think that it need be gone into in any detail.
DR. SAUTER: We are of the opinion, Mr. President, that to judge the character and the personality of the defendant, it may be of a certain importance whether decrees with an anti-Semitic tendency were signed by him because as an official be considered himself duty-bound to execute laws on the basis of his oath, or whether he signed these laws because he himself was an anti-Semite and because he wished to persecute Jewish citizens and to deprive them of their rights, and for this reason only.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, the Tribunal thinks that you have made the point quite clearly that he helped Jewish friends, but it isn't a question which need be gone into in detail.
DR. SAUTER: I come now, Mr. President, to another point. BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. I want to ask the defendant how, in the course of years, his activiti developed in the Propaganda Ministry.
A. Just exactly in the same, direction as I have described here. I was in charge of a large cultural, economic concern, film companies, broadcasting companies, theaters, orchestras. I was chairman of the board of trustees of the Philharmonic Orchestra, and in the Propaganda Council of German Economy where activity of publicity in an economic field was concerned, and the participation of the economy itself in that activity. Those were the main parts of my work.
Q. Witness, concerning your activity in the Propaganda Ministry, the Prosecution has submitted an affidavit by the former Reich Chief of the Press, I believe, Max Amann, under No. 3501-PS, to which I want to refer now.
In that affidavit, we find the sentence that you, Dr. Funk, and I quote literally, "were practically the Minister in the Propaganda Ministry". And it says further on, and I quote again: "Funk exerted complete control over all means of expression in Germany, over the press, the theater, radio, and music." quite briefly because I have already submitted on affidavit to the contrary by Max Amann to which I will refer later. Reply with one sentence, please.
A. Amann knew the Ministry from the outside only, and therefore he was not informed about the internal business of the Ministry. My work was such as I have described here. It is definitely absurd to assert that under a minister such as Dr. Goebbels, the Ministry could have been led by someone else who was not really the Minister.
Dr. Goebbels assumed such an exclusive and conclusive position in the field of propaganda that beside him no one else could have any importance.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, in that connection, in the appendix to my document book, under No. 14 -- that will be Exhibit No. 3 -- I have an affidavit by that same former Reichsleiter Max Amann which I have submitted. It is the appendix to the document book, and I ask you to take judicial notice of this affidavit. I don't think I have to read it. of a member of the Prosecution. that Reichsleiter Max Amann also confirms that Funk did not have anything to do with propaganda as such. That is to say, he did not make any speeches over the radio, nor propaganda speeches of any kind, but he was mainly concerned with the organization and administration of the Ministry only.
Now, Mr. President, I come to the attitude and position of the defendant as Minister of Economics. BY DR. SAUTER:
Q. Dr. Funk, until 1937 you were State Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry, and then, at the end of November 1937 you become Reich Minister of Economy after your predecessor Dr. Schacht had left that post. took place and why you were called to that post?
A. That came about quite as a surprise to me, too. During a performance at the opera, the Fuehrer, who was present, took me to the side during an intermission and explained to me that the differences of opinion between Schacht and Goering could no longer be bridged, and that therefore he had to dismiss Schacht as Minister of Economy and was asking me to accept the post since he knew about my previous knowledge and my experience in the field of economics.
He also asked me to get in touch with Reichsmarshal Goering who would explain everything else to me. respect.
Q. And then you spoke to Goering himself? Will you describe that.
A. The Reichsmarshal told me that in fact he had intended to put only a state secretary in charge of the Reich Ministry of Economics, but that later he came to the conclusion that the large machinery of the Four-Year Plan should be merged with the extensive machinery of the Ministry of Economics, but that the minister had to follow his directives in his work, and in particular the General plenipotentiaries for the various decisive branches of economy should be maintained and they would take their directives immediately from the General Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan. tion, the Reichsmarshal himself assumed leadership of that Ministry, and in February 1938 he took me into the Ministry.
Q. So it was Goering who for a quarter of a year himself was practically the chief of the Reich Ministry for Economics?
A. Under his leadership that reorganization took place. The leadership of economic policy, of course, was in his hands at that time as well as later. The main posts of leadership in the Four-Year Plan remained the same, and there was a post which gave directives to the Reichsbank; there was the post concerned with food, which gave directives to the Food Ministry, the post for manpower the post which gave directives to the Labor Ministry, and there remained the general plenipotentiaries for the various branches of the economy, that is, for coal, for iron, for chemistry, and so on, which were directly subordinate to the Plenipotentiary for the Four-Year Plan. That is to say, the Ministry of Economics in that way received several offices transferred to it from the Four-Year Plan office which continued to work independently, such as the Reich Office for Economic Research, which was in the hands of Professor Strauch, the Reich Office for Soil Research, which State Secretary Kempner, who was mentioned in connection with Slovakia and Asutria, was in charge of.
I tried to get these offices out of the Ministry again. I don't know today exactly what happened, but they felt that they were still under the Four-Year Plan anyway.
Q. Dr. Funk, the most essential fact among the ones you have mentioned seems to me to be that you had the title of minister, but that in fact you were not really the minister, but maybe had the position and the function of a state secretary, and your so-called Ministry of Economics was subordinate definitely to the directives of the Four-Year Plan, that is to say, your codefendant Goering, and was bound to follow these directives.
Did I understand it correctly?
A. Yes, the latter is correct. The Reichsmarshal has explained and confirmed that here himself. But the first statement is not correct because at any rate, at least formally, I had the position of minister and had a tremendous administrative field to take care of, with which the Reichsmarshal, of course, was not concerned, and that was just the purpose of the reorganization. The Reichsmarshal was in charge of economic policies in decisive phases, and gave me the directives, but the execution, of course, was in the hands of the Ministry and its organizations. it. There was still the ministry above this ministry, so to speak. But that always happened to me during all my life. I always, so to speak, came up to the door, but 1 was not permitted to enter.
Q. In this trial, it happens differently.
Dr. Funk, the Prosecution asserts that although you were not really minister with the usual responsibilities and independence of a minister, in spite of that, under your supervision as Reich Minister, those parts existed in German economy which strategically fell in the group of armament and war industry, that is, particularly raw materials and work materials, mining, the iron industry, power stations, crafts, finance and credits, foreign trade, and foreign currency.
I remind you, Dr. Funk, of the statements on page 22 of the German translation of the trial brief, which I discussed with you several days ago.
the things stood in fact. I had nothing to do with the armament industry. The armament industry at first was under the High Command of the Armed Forces, under the Chief of the Armament Office, General Thomas, who belonged to the conspiracy of Schacht, of which you have heard here. The armament minister Todt, who was put in office in 1940, soon took over the entire power economy from me, and later I turned over all civilian production to the Armament Minister Speer.
Q What do you mean by civilian production?
A By that I mean coal, chemical industry, consumer goods in general. The main branches of production of that field which have been mentioned here already, and I said it before, were under the general Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan. So it came that the Ministry of Economies became a pure Ministry of Commerce. This was only concerned with the distribution of consumer's goods.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, maybe we can still lot him talk for a few seconds because then, after a second, I would come to the chapter of Reichsbank President. BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Will you please continue briefly? I believe you wanted to speak about gold in foreign currency. Who was competent for that? was competent for that, according to whose directives the Reichsbank had to have.
Q And a foreign trade?
A The foreign trade was with the Foreign Office. The Minister of foreign affairs was tenaciously taking care of that. Reichsbank, that is the clearing agreements, accounting, and so on.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, now I come to a chapter in which I should like to deal with his position as Reichsbank President. I believe that would be the best moment to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: The Court will adjourn.
(The Tribunal adjourned until 6 May, 1946, at 1000 hours.)
Tribunal in the matter of: The United States of
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, I will continue with my questioning of the witness Dr. Funk. Saturday morning we were discussing the question of the appointment of Dr. Funk as Minister of Economics in the Reich and now I should like to turn to his appointment as President of the Reichsbank. BY DR. SAUTER:
Q Mr. Witness, in January 1939, I believe it was, you become President of the Reichsbank as successor to Dr. Schacht. How did that appointment come about? January of 1939. I was called to the Fuehrer's office and found the Fuehrer in a state of great excitement. He told me that the Reich Minister of Finance had told him that Schacht had refused the necessary credit, and that consequently the Reich was in financial straits. his policies, that he would not tolerate such treatment on Schacht's part in the future, that if the Reichsbank should try to disturb and oppose his policies -- and the gentlemen in the Reichsbank Directorate were utter fools -he would not tolerate it any longer, and no power and no chief of state in the entire world could possibly make its policy dependent on cooperation or noncooperation of its bank. credits to be issued by the Reichsbank to the Reich would be done by himself according to the demand and suggestion of the Reich Minister of Finance. He further stated that he had given Lammers permission to work together with the Reich Minister of Finance, and to issue a decree by which the position of the Reichsbank, in line with the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, would now be changed, and the granting of credits to the Reich would be handled by him alone in the future.
of the Reichsbank, upon which request I replied that I would be glad to follow his wish, but that first of all I had to have confirmation from him that the conditions for stabilization of currency would be maintained. granting of credits at that time inflation would be brought about, is wrong, and that position is untenable. Twelve billions of credit can have an effect of inflation, and 20 billions of credit do not in any way tend to work toward inflation if the state has the necessary authority to stabilize prices and wages, and further has the authority to regulate prices and economy, and if the people maintain the proper discipline in this respect, and if, finally, the financial means which result as the expansion of credit goes on and represent a further purchasing power, are diverted through taxes or taken up through loans, then as far as the currency and stabilization are concerned, there is absolutely no danger. kept on a stable basis and an even keel. As far as the most essential things of life are concerned, the purchasing power of money in Germany was stable. of course, the purchasing power of money was limited in so far as consumers goods were produced only on a very limited scale, for almost all the production was turned over to armaments.
Q Dr. Funk, have you concluded?
A Just one moment, please. I believe this is a very decisive question. these credits did not in any way cause an inflation. The store of debt applied in the United States as well as in England, and relatively speaking, and even applying an absolute standard, this ratio of debt was much higher than that in Germany and in many other countries. The monetary policy overthrew the old thesis that a war would, of necessity, bring about a disturbance in the monetary system and the monetary value. tained a most admirable discipline. The money can serve as a function of state, and currency will function as long as the state has the authority to maintain the currency on a stable basis, to keep the economic sphere under control, and as long as the people themselves maintain the necessary discipline.
It wasn't at all that I took overthis office with the knowledge that Germany was now entering into an inflationary period, but on the contrary, I knew full well'that through the maintaining of the necessary governmental policy, the currency couldbe protected, and the currency was protected.
However, the basic difference between Schacht's position and my position consisted of this fact, that on the part of Schacht the Reichsbank could determine issuing of credits from the Reichsbank, whereas in my case, this authority was taken from me and the responsibility for domestic financing, therefore, was in the hands of the Finance Minister, and that, of course, meant the Fuehrer himself.
Q Dr. Funk, I have another question. Perhaps, despite your poor state of health today, you might be able to speak a little more loudly so that the court reporters might understand you a little more easily. I wonder if you could try just a little bit. We will try to make this as brief as possible. up to now, in addition to these you had a further office as a successor of Dr. Schacht. This office was the General Plenipotentiary for Economy. Can you give us your attitude and your position in this respect in order to clarify your person, your activity, and your achievements? Reichsmarshal has correctly stated, and as Dr. Lammers confirmed as well. It was a position that I merely held on paper, and there was an essential difference in the position which Schacht had and in the position which I had. I, on the other hand, was the Plenipotentiary for Economy. According to the Reichs Defense Law of 1938, the General Plenipotentiary for Economy was to handle the civilian economy departments and coordinate these departments in preparing the work for a possible war. But, in the meantime, these economic departments had been subordinated to the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan, and I, as General Plenipotentiary for Economy, was also subordinate to the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan. was concerned, as these were laid- down formally, there was a disparity, unclearness, confusion, which resulted in a directive of the Fuehrer just a few months after the beginning of the war, that de jure, that is, legally, the instructions for the General Plenipotentiary of Economy, as far as the economic departments were concerned, that the authority would be given to the Plenipotentiary of the Four Year Plan.
Q When was that?
A In December of 1939. Then there was just a formal authority to issue directives. That is, as far as directives were concerned, I could sign for the five civilian economic departments, which, according to the Reichs Defense Law, were subordinate to this Plenipotentiary. I retained those authorities which pertained to the Reichsbank and to the Ministry of Economy, which I had anyway. the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan; is that correct?
A Yes. Just like all civilian departments, as far as the Ministry of Economy was concerned, there was a closer relationship.
Q Mr. Witness, in August of 1939, that is, shortly before the Polish campaign, in your capacity as General Plenipotentiary for Economy, you gathered the civilian economic offices for a meeting, and Document 3324-PS refers to this meeting. It seems important to me that you define your attitude on this point also, and especially from this angle, that apparently on the basis of this discussion you wrote a letter to Hitler, dated the 25th of August, and that this letter was a result of this meeting.
In your trial brief on page 24 this matter is mentioned. Will you define your position on this point?
A Under Schacht's domain there was an office for the General Plenipotentiary for Economy, and there was a working commettee, which consisted of the representatives of the various economic departments, as well as representatives of the ministry of the Interior, the Plenipotentiary for Administration, the OKW, and above all, of the Four Year Plan. the Plenipotentiary for Economy was transferred to Dr. Vosse, who was his former State Secretary, whereas under Schacht, Staatstrat Wohltat had headed this office and this committee. These people of course had consultations constantly, in which consultations they discussed measures which would be necessary for a carrying on of the war in a civilian and economic sphere, and this was maintained. This matter was dealt with in my speech in Vienna. This was something which existed alongside the Four Year plan, and in the main was charged with transferring the civilian economy into a war economy in case of war without too many disturbances, and also to prepare for a war economy administration. the chiefs of the civilian economy departments, and called in the representative of the Four Year Plan as well. Then in joint consultations we dealt with those measures, and worked them out, which were necessary in case of a war to convert the civilian economy into a war economy, and do this with as little disturbance of economy as possible. dated the 25th of August 1939, and this was a period of time when the German and the Polish Army were already in a state of complete mobilization and faced each other as such.
in the civilian economy in case of a war, and it was further my duty as President of the Reichsbank, as far as gold and other financial assets of the Reichsbank were concerned, to strengthen them. tension which existed at the time, it would have been necessary also even if the war did not materialized, but if it was just a matter of economic sanctions even, sanctions which might have been expected and which one had to expect from the general political tension which existed at the time. As Minister of Economy, it was my duty to do everything to strengthen production.
cerned, I did not concern myself with this problem; and as far as armament problems were concerned, I had nothing to do with them at all, since, as I have already said, the leadership of the civilian as well as the war economy had been turned over to the Plenipotentiary for the 4-Year Plan.
May I tell you a little about the work of this committee? I maintained a reserve, and I can explain this reserve as follows: who at th at time discussed this problem with me must confirm me on this point. In those months shortly before the beginning of the war, I concentrated my entire activity on international negotiations to bring about a better international economic order, and to improve commercial relations between Germany and her foreign partners. ministers Hudson and Stanley. They were to visit me in Berlin. I myself was to go to Paris for negotiations; and in the year 1937 I had me some members of the cabinet when I was present and headed a great cultural affair in Paris at that time. new basis, and I had worked out new proposals to bring about this new order, proposals which were hailed with enthusiasm, especially in England. And in June of 1939, I had an international financial discussion whereby the leading representatives of the banking world, from the United States, from England, from Holland, France, Belgium, Switzerland, and Sweden-representatives of all these countries were there with me. us, and at the same time was instrumental in the exchange of assets of the Reichsbank abroad. This exchange of those assets was hailed in foreign banking circles. It was considered fair and satisfactory. agreements, and I also participated in financial meetings and discussions at Basel; and at the beginning of July of 1939, despite the strong political tension which existed at the time, I was of the opinion and the conviction that it would be possible to prevent a war.
In all of my discussions, at home and abroad, I voiced this conviction of mine. And this is why I was not interested in the discussions, consultations, and (conversion) meetings about the beginning of the war and the change of the national economy for war.
possible, to use its assets abroad to get gold instead of increasing our foreign assets. But in these few months of my official activity before the war, the success of this endeavor of mine was very slight. Our gold assets and foreign assets as they were turned over to me from Schacht were, up until the war, unchanged on the whole. quested clarification on these transactions, since the directorate of the Reichsbank and the managing director at the time I had to have information on this matter and the answers to this question, I am sorry to say, had not arrived as yet.
Q Mr. Witness, these expositions were made by you obviously to show that despite the political tension in the situation at the time you did not even think of a war? a series of discussions which were carried on by Hitler with generals and other personalities. And these discussions were of a military and political content. These were all discussions of which we must say today that they were in the closest connection with preparations for war. learn at these discussions, and from them? was never called in, and I did not participate in a single one of these discussions which were mentioned in this connection as far as aggressive war was concerned. I am referring to discussions with the Fuehrer in this connection. I was never informed even as to the contents of these discussions.
But as far as I can remember, I was hardly ever present at the discussions at the Reichsmarshal's when they dealt with this topic. of 1938.
Q The 14th of October, 1938? I can tell you the document number. It is 1301 P. S. That was the 14th of October 1938, document 1301 P. S. Please continue. Were you present at that meeting?
A No. Yes, that was the meeting in which, according to the accusation held against me, Goering pointed out that he had been instructed by the Fuehrer to strengthen armament abnormally. The Luftwaffe was to be increased five times, as speedily as possible. erted that in this discussion between Goering and me, Goering addressed me in the words of a man who was already at war. In those days, I was not even in Germany. I was in Bulgaria at the time, and consequently could not participate at those sessions.
DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, for the proving of this fact that the defendant Funk at the time of this discussion with Goering on the 14th of October, 1938, was not in Germany, in the document book "Funk" I have submitted several documents, extracts from "Der Voelkische Beobachter, the numbers 5, 6, 7, and 8. These documents are submitted chiefly because they show that at the time beginning with the 13th of October, 1938, until the 15th of October, 1938, Funk, as a matter of fact, was at Sophia, at Bulgaris, and therefore could not have been present at the Goering meeting of the 14th of October, 1938. economic conditions it is hardly necessary for me to read. But I would like to refer especially to his speech of the 15th of October, 1938, found in the Document Book, "Funk", Number 7, in which the defendant Funk, especially in the first paragraph, showed in a schematic manner that the thought of an economic community between the German economy and the Southeast European economy was in his mind, and in which Funk with great deliberateness treats the unilateral dependency of the Southeastern States with respect to Germany, and rejected this unilateral situation.
der to save time I will not go into them in detail.
Q Witness, under No. PS-3562 the Prosecution has submitter a document deal ing with a discussion of the 1st of June 1939.
At this discussion and at this meeting you yourself were nor present but according to the list of these present several representatives of your Ministry were there, as well as a representative of the Reichsbank. At this meeting the financial situation in case of a war was dealt with, as well as the productivity and capacity of German economy and the protectorate also in case of a war. There is a marginal note in this record which says that the record was to be submitted to you, and I am asking you to define your position briefly and to tell us whether this actually did take place. "W.F." to it, and this matter deals with circumstances and continous discussions which I have already dealt with, about the financing of the war, and applies to measures in the civilian economy, field in case of a war. The decisive measures as far as financing were concerned were dealt with and prepared by the Reich Minister of Finance, and these financial measures were discussed at length in this meeting and the question of meeting the expenses through taxes. That was one of the chief problem discussed. In any event, these discussions did take place at that time among the representatives of the various department offices. leadership staff of the Plenipotentiary for Economy concerned himself with this, I just now found the name of this head, this man whose name I could not remember.
There were the instructions, and this committee which even in the days of Schacht's functioning and which later continued.
Q Dr. Funk, on the 30th of March 1939, you made a speech for the Central Committee on the Reichsbank. The excerpts of this speech, which are necessary for the carrying on of this proceeding, I have included these extracts in the Funk document book, under No. 9, and I am referring and coming back to it for the reason that shortly after your assuming office as President of the Reichsbank this speech was delivered and in some connections of importance in this proceeding are considered to be his program as President of the Reichsbank.
Dr. Funk, perhaps with just a few brief words you night give us the high spots of your speech as far as it is relevant for the Prosecution.
A I do not believe that I need to do that. Just a minute ago I briefly mentioned the fact that in those months I carried on international negotiations about a now order for German trade and economic relations, and I mentioned the readiness on Germany's part to participate dicisively, and I do not believe that I need to read anything more from this speech. This speech is to show only that at that time I did not work for preparations for war but with the objective of bringing about an international economic understanding, and that this, my work, was recognized in foreign countries, especially in England, and it was recognized publicly. abroad, especially as far as financial and economic matters were concerned, was, I am sure, decisive for a measure which you already referred to a little while ago, and I mean that the compensations were these who were interested in the Reich sbank. I believe there were some people like that in England and Holland and in Switzerland. This letter would be interesting to us in this respects: In that I would like to know just why you wrote this letter and why in this letter you mentioned "my proposals" even though in the main it was not concerned with things which did not actually trace back to you. Perhaps you can give us a brief explanation. feeling which existed in Germany at that time, and beyond that it is a purely personal letter to the Fuehrer. In this letter I thanked him for his congratulations on my birthday. And that is the reason why the letter is a little on the emphatic side, and if I mentioned "my proposals" this may be traced back to the fact that I personally at some time before had told the Fuehrer which measures would be necessary if a war were to arise. And in the main, those were the measures which later formed the basis of a discussion with the other offices and to which I referred in this letter. It was not quite correct for me to say "My prop sals". I should really have said, "The proposals worked out by me, together with the chiefs of the Economic Office."
Q Dr. Funk, have you concluded?
A No. I would like to explain this whole letter with just a few words, of since it seems to be one of the pillars of the Prosicution's case against me. other. It was the time when the entire German people were in a state of great exe tement because of the constant provocations in Poland, and the mistreatment of the German population in Poland. I personally did not believe that we would actually have war, for I was of the opinion that diplomatic negotiations would be successful in this case in preventing the threat of war as well as war itself, an the Fuehrer had successes in this direction which bordered on the unbelievable, and as a result of this the heart of every German was to beat faster in the knowledge and in the expectation that now there would be a fulfillment of German wishe in the East, that home province of East Prussia which had been separated would be again reunited with the Reich, that the old German city of Danzig would be reunited with the Reich, and that the Corridor problem would be solved.
that this question would call forth a war. We were on the other hand of the conviction that England would be successful to exert pressure on Poland so that Poland would acquiesce in the German demands as far as the corridor is concerned and that no war would break loose. According to the testimony of the witness Gisevius, of course, everyone in the entire world saw clearly that England at that time did nothing to work on Poland in a soothing and conciliatory manner; and if people thought that Germany was trying to bring about a conspiracy in which the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the OKH and the Chief of the German Armament and other leading military personalities were involved, that in the event of a war there would be an overthrow which had been prepared, then the British Government would have been foolish indeed if it had done anything to sooth and quiet Poland; and the British Government would of necessity have to be of the conviction at this point that Hitler would go to war, at which an overthrow would come, and that there would be no war and that the hated Hitler regime would be put aside, and more could not be expected.
Q Dr. Funk, we are not interested in the making of political speeches, but let us stick to this letter of the 25th of August, 1938. I would like to say again, 699PS. Let us return to this matter in which I am interested at present, and if I understood you correctly, I can summarise your testimony so far that this rather enthusiastic letter to Hitler was written for the reason that you were hopeful that Hitler would succeed to reunite your East Prussian home province with the Reich, and would now finally settle the corridor problem without a war. Did I understand you correctly? him that as far as I was concerned, everything had been done. In the event of a war the peace economy would be converted into a war economy without disturbance. And this was the only time atwhich I was active plenipotentiary for Economics, and I referred to my position in this letter. And it may be explained on a human basis, for I was proud of the fact that I had for once done something in this official position, for a man likes to be successful.